In the High Court at Calcutta Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction Appellate Side The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya WPLRT No. 54 of 2026 Aktar Ali Khan alias Ukil Ali Khan and others Vs. The State of West Bengal and others For the appellants : Mr. Rabindra Nath Mahato, Mr. Aritra Shankar Ray, Advs. For the State : Mr. Nilanjan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Standing Counsel, Ms. Jayita Dhar Chakraborty, Jr. Govt. Adv., Mr. Suman Banerjee, Mr. Swapnamoy Sarkar, Advs. Heard on : 07.07.2026 & 09.07.2026 Reserved on : 09.07.2026 Judgment on : 14.07.2026 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. The writ petitioners are the heirs of one Sattar Ali Khan. The present challenge has been preferred against an order of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, refusing to grant interim relief as prayed for by the writ petitioners in connection with OA 2870/2025 (LRTT) filed by them challenging the order of the Appellate Authority dated September 12, 2025, affirming the order dated December 7, 2023, whereby the subject- 2 plots were directed to be recorded in the name of the Collector on the premise that the said lands have vested in the State. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a registered Mourasi Mokarari Settlement Deed was executed in favour of their predecessor Sattar on March 18, 1953, followed by a registered sale deed by the original owner Midnapore Zamidary Company Limited dated March 25, 1953, also executed in favour of the said Sattar, thereby conferring right, title, interest and possession as well as right to collect tolls from the haat (open-air village market), initially through one Sakhayout Ali Khan and, after the end of the prior settlement to that effect in favour of Sakhayout, directly. 3. The West Bengal Estates Acquisitions Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1953 Act”), came into force on February 12, 1954. Thereafter, Objection Case No.621/7 was filed by Sattar, which was allowed, holding him to be a raiyat, as opposed to an intermediary, in respect of the subject- plots, vide order dated September 17, 1960 passed by the appropriate authority. Simultaneously, Objection Case No.64/1, filed by the Collector, Midnapore, alleging Sattar to be an intermediary, was dismissed and Objection Case No.695/8 of Sakhayout was allowed, holding him to be only a toll collector. 4. Consequentially, the plots were recorded in the name of Sattar in the Records of Rights. The order dated September 17, 1960 remains unchallenged, thus attaining finality. 5. Subsequently, a proceeding was initiated under Sections 56 and 57 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (for short, “the 1955 Act”), which 3 culminated in the order dated December 7, 2023 passed by the prescribed authority under Section 51A(4) of the 1955 Act, holding that the plots were vested in the State and directing those to be recorded in the name of the Collector on behalf of the Government of West Bengal in LR Khatian No.1 (belonging to the State), by deleting the same from LR Khatian No.236. The said order was affirmed by the Appellate Authority on September 12, 2025, giving rise to OA 2870/2025 (LRTT), which was admitted by the impugned order, but without granting any interim relief as prayed for by the petitioners. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the power of the Revenue Officer under Section 51A(4) of the 1955 Act is restricted to revise entries and not to reopen settled decisions which have already attained finality, in the present case in the year 1960. It is argued that the registered deed of 1953 could not have been executed to avoid the rigours of the 1953 Act, since public knowledge of the said statute was only disseminated by notification of the said Act on February 12, 1954. 7. Learned counsel argues that by a subsequent judgment dated February 27, 2026 passed in a Public Interest Litigation bearing WPA (P) No.318 of 2025, in review of an earlier order passed in connection with the said proceeding, all notifications, memos, draft order sheets, etc., issued by the respondent- authorities and all consequential steps taken by the revenue authorities as well as the registration authorities, including initiation of proceedings and orders passed therein, were set aside and quashed, thereby restoring the status quo that prevailed immediately prior to the passing of the judgment 4 under review. Thus, it is submitted that the proceeding initiated under Sections 56 and 57 of the 1955 Act in respect of the subject-plots also stood quashed by operation of the said judgment. 8. In reply, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the State, argues that the authorities are empowered under Section 51A(4) of the 1955 Act to revisit erroneous recordings in the Records of Rights and modify the same in accordance with law. Such power, it is contended, is not fettered by the principle of res judicata. 9. On merits, the State argues that Sattar, the predecessor-in-interest of the writ petitioners, was not a raiyat but a “proprietor”, who is included within the definition of “intermediary” under Section 2(i) of the 1953 Act. Although the said Act does not define the term “proprietor”, Clause (p) of Section 2 thereof provides that expressions used in the said Act and not otherwise defined have the same meaning as in the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (for short, “the BT Act”). Section 3(11) of the BT Act defines “proprietor” to mean a person owning, whether in trust or for his own benefit, an estate or part of an estate. Since Sattar was a proprietor and he acquired the properties subject to the right of Sakhayout to collect tolls, Sattar comes within the purview of “proprietor” and, as such, within the definition of “intermediary”, whose plots vested in the State by operation of the 1953 Act. 10. It is reiterated that the right of the vendee (Sattar) acquired by dint of the Mourasi Mokarari Settlement Deed dated March 25, 1953, was subject to the Mokarari rights of Sakhayout, who could not be termed to be a mere toll collector, as sought to be portrayed by the petitioners. 5 11. The limited question involved in the present matter is whether a prima facie case for hearing of the original application was made out by the writ petitioners before the Tribunal, sufficient to justify the grant of interim reliefs. 12. This court proceeds to decide the matter as follows: Lack of reasons 13. At the outset, it is found that the impugned order of the learned Tribunal is devoid of any reason. The learned Tribunal did not advert to the respective cases of the parties at all but, all the same, did not grant any interim order as prayed for by the writ petitioners, amounting to a deemed refusal of the interim reliefs sought in connection with the original application. Res judicata 14. The admitted position in the present case is that a registered Mourasi Mokarari Settlement Deed was executed in favour of Sattar on March 18, 1953, followed by a registered sale deed dated March 25, 1953, by the original owner Midnapore Zamindary Company Limited. From a conjoint reading of the said two documents, it is evident that the entire right, title, interest and possession in respect of the subject-plots was conferred by the said deeds in favour of Sattar. It is also seen that such transfer was subject to the limited right of Sakhayout Ali Khan to collect tolls from the haat situated on the subject-plots. However, it is conspicuous that Sakhayout had a previous settlement, limited to collection of such tolls till the Bengali month of Chaitra, 1362 BS. As per the sale deed, the transferee/Sattar’s 6 title in the property would be subject to the right of Sakhayout to collect such tolls till the end of the latter’s settlement tenure. Thereafter, from the first day of Baishakh, 1363 BS, the absolute right to collect the tolls would also vest in Sattar. 15. By the order dated September 17, 1960 passed by the competent authority, it was categorically held that Sattar was a raiyat, thereby allowing Objection Case No.621/7 filed by him. More importantly, the Collector’s petition, bearing Objection Case No.64/1, claiming Sattar to be an intermediary, was dismissed and Objection Case No.695/8 of Sakhayout was allowed, holding him only to be merely a toll collector. Thus, it was conclusively decided by the competent authority by dint of the said order that Sattar was not an intermediary but a raiyat and that Sakhayout’s rights were limited only to collect toll for a limited period. The disputed lands were also recorded in Sattar’s name in the Records of Rights consequent to such adjudication. Having not been challenged, the order dated September 17, 1960 attained finality. 16. The question which arises, thus, is the scope of reopening settled issues, if any, by the Revenue Officer under Section 51A(4) of the 1955 Act. As per the said provision, an officer specially empowered by the State Government may, on application within one year or on his own motion within 35 years from the date of publication of the Records of Rights under sub-section (2) thereof, revise an entry in the records finally published in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) after the persons interested are given an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefor. 7 17. In the present case, the objections in respect of the status of Sattar had already been decided on September 17, 1960 and the Records of Rights were corrected accordingly, whereas the present applications under Sections 56 and 57 were filed much thereafter. 18. Both Sections 56 and 57 of the 1955 Act are circumscribed by the other provisions of the 1955 Act. As per Section 56, a Revenue Officer may enter upon any land and make a survey or take measurement or do other acts which he considers to be necessary for carrying out any of his duties under this Act. Section 57 begins with the expression subject to the provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder and proceeds to lay down the powers of the officer akin to that of a Civil Court. 19. Sub-section (4) of Section 51A refers back to sub-section (2) thereof. Which uses the expression “such objections”, thus further referring back to sub- section (1) of Section 51A, which stipulates that when a Records of Rights has been revised or prepared, the Revenue Officer shall publish a draft and shall receive and consider objections which may be made to any entry therein or to any omission therefrom within the prescribed period. 20. Section 51 of the 1955 Act provides for the revision or preparation of the Records of Rights and empowers the State Government to make orders directing revision or preparation of Records of Rights in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, thus referring to Chapter VIIA, which deals with preparation or revision of Record of Rights. Section 50A, under Chapter VIIA, provides that Section 50 of the 1955 Act does not apply to certain Districts before the final publication of any Records of Rights under Section 8 51A. The proviso thereto stipulates that notwithstanding any order made under sub-section (1) of Section 51 in respect of a District or part of a District, the State Government may make an order directing the prescribed authority to incorporate such changes as may be specified in the said order, in the Records of Rights in respect of such District or part of District under Section 50, if the State Government is satisfied that incorporation of such changes is necessary to mitigate the hardships of a raiyat. 21. Section 50B speaks about the State Government’s powers to make an order by notification published in the Official Gazette, directing that the Records of Rights in respect of a District or part of a District be modified by eliminating from such records the entries, if any, which have been deleted and scored out under that Section from time to time. 22. Thus, Section 50B is only consequential to Section 50A which, again, operates in the limited context of necessity to mitigate the hardship of a raiyat, which is not the present case. 23. As discussed above, the entire conspectus of Chapter VII-A refers back to and operates within the other provisions of the 1955 Act and not beyond the same. 24. Chapter VII deals with maintenance of the Records of Rights. Section 50 comes under the said Chapter and merely provides that the prescribed authority shall maintain up-to-date, in the prescribed manner, the village Records of Rights, by incorporating therein the changes on account of – (a) Mutation of names as a result of transfer or inheritance; 9 (b) Partition, exchange, or consolidation of lands comprised in plot of land, or establishment of Co-operative Farming Societies; (c) New settlement of lands or plot of land; (d) Variation of revenue; (e) Alteration in the mode of cultivation, for example by a bargadar; and (f) Such other causes as necessitate a change in the record-of-right. 25. Hence, the powers under Section 51A(4), which operate only in the context of the parent provisions regarding maintenance of Records of Rights, is circumscribed by situations as contemplated in Section 50(1), Clauses (a) to (f). 26. A comprehensive reading of the said provisions indicates clearly that the scope of revision of Records of Rights under Section 51A(4) is limited to subsequent developments, such as mutation, partition, new settlement, variation of revenue, alteration in the mode of cultivation or other similar causes necessitating such revision. Sub-clause (f) of Section 50(1) has to be read, by applying the principle of ejusdem generis, in the context of the previous provisions, all of which deal with subsequent changes affecting the entries in the Records of Rights. Thus, nowhere within the four corners of Chapters VII and VII-A is contemplated any power vested in the Revenue Officer to revisit earlier conclusive adjudications in respect of the subject- plots. Hence, the power under Section 51A(4) is restricted to the context of subsequent developments or at best, to mitigate hardships of a raiyat under the proviso to Section 50A and does not tantamount to the jurisdiction of redetermination, as opposed to other provisions in the self-same statute. 10 27. By way of example, Section 14T of the 1955 Act itself, under sub-sections (5) and (6) thereof, provide for the Revenue Officer, on his own motion or upon any information, to enquire and decide questions as contemplated therein, including any question of title incidental thereto or any interest in the properties or any matter of transaction, including the power to redetermine issues such as actual user, mode of cultivation as well as title, etc. Thus, where the Legislature, in the self-same statute, intends to vest the authorities with the power to redetermine settled issues, it has been specifically conferred in provisions such as Section 14T, sub-sections (5) and (6). 28. In stark contradiction thereto, no such power has been conferred under Section 51A(4), which operates entirely within the paradigm of Sections 50, 50A, 50B and 51. Accordingly, insofar as the power under Section 51A(4) is concerned, the principle of res judicata squarely applies, in view of the provision not clothing the Revenue Officer specifically with the power of re- determining issues of title and allied questions. 29. Viewing the matter from another perspective, Mourasi Mokarari Patta was given to Sattar, coupled with a transfer of the entire right, title, interest and possession in the property in the subject-plots. Under Chapter VI of the 1955 Act, certain restrictions are imposed in respect of settlements of land at the disposal of the State Government, to unsettle which there has to be a categorical cancellation of the Patta granted to a raiyat, which is not argued by either side in the present case. 11 30. Thus, the prescribed authority under Section 51A(4) of the 1955 Act was squarely barred by the principle of res judicata from reopening the issues conclusively settled by the order dated September 17, 1960, which specifically declared Sattar to be a raiyat, as opposed to an intermediary, and Sakhayout merely to be a toll collector, by way of a conclusive determination on merits upon hearing all interested parties, including the State. 31. The third facet of the matter is that from the transfer deed executed in favour of Sattar, it is clear that his rights were not intermediary rights, subject to inferior rights of a permanent nature of Sakhayout to collect tolls. 32. In the circumstances of the case, as narrated above, Sakhayout had a prior settlement restricted to collection of tolls, during the subsistence of which the transfer was made in favour of Sattar. Sattar’s title was made subject to such limited rights of Sakhayout only for the limited period till expiry of the tenure of Sakhayout’s settlement. Thereafter, however, the right to collect tolls was also vested exclusively in Sattar, the paramount title holder in respect of the subject-plots. Thus, there was no under-right of permanent nature contemplated in the transfer deeds of Sakhayout to operate vis-à-vis the subject-plots below Sattar. The continuance of Sakhayout’s rights to collect tolls was only a recognition of his pre-existing temporary right to do so, limited in time to the expiry of such prior right, after which the toll- collection rights were also to vest exclusively in Sattar. Thus Sattar, who was declared to be a raiyat and was also qualified for such description, was 12 a raiyat for all practical purposes, which was conclusively decided as long back as in the year 1960. 33. Hence, not only were the respondent-authorities debarred by the principle of res judicata, but also by the statutory limitation periods envisaged in the provisions of the Act, from reopening such issue. 34. This issue, thus, is decided in favour of the writ petitioners. 35. The State’s insinuation that the Mourasi Mokarari Settlement and transfer deed in favour of Sattar were intended to defeat the rigours of the 1953 Act, cannot also be accepted, since the said Act was notified only on February 12, 1954, about a year subsequent to the Mourasi Mokarari Settlement Deed dated March 18, 1953 and the registered sale deed dated March 25, 1953. Thus, such intention, attributed by the State to Sattar, can easily be ruled out. Whether Sattar was an intermediary 36. Although, in view of the adjudication of the above issue of res judicata, this question no longer remains germane, for the sake of completion, this Court also deals with the same. 37. The definition of “intermediary” under Section 2(i) of the 1953 Act is set out hereinbelow: “2. Definitions.—In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,— *** (i) “intermediary” means a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure- holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a lessee and a sub-lessee;” 13 38. Thus, although the term “proprietor” has been included within the definition of “intermediary”, the same is circumscribed by the expression “or any other intermediary above a raiyat”. The expression “above a raiyat” clearly requires a proprietor, to come within the definition of ‘intermediary’, to be above a raiyat vis-à-vis the subject-plot of land. 39. Clause (p) of Section 2 provides that expressions used in the 1953 Act and not otherwise defined, will have the same meaning as used in the BT Act. However, the definition of “intermediary” in Section 2(i) cannot be read in isolation to restrict the same only to the types of persons mentioned therein, but has to be taken as a whole. The terms “proprietor”, “tenure-holder”, “under-tenure-holder” or “any other intermediary” are used in Section 2 (i) of the 1955 Act with the rider that irrespective of such character, they have to be on a stratum higher than the raiyat in respect of the land-in-question. In view of such specific definition being provided in the 1953 Act itself, we cannot look in isolation to the term “proprietor” as provided in the BT Act, culling the same out of the context of the 1953 Act and the complete definition of “intermediary” clearly provided therein. Seen in such context, in the present case, even if Sattar came within the purview of “proprietor” as contemplated in the BT Act, he did not qualify as an intermediary under the 1953 Act, being not a proprietor “above the raiyat”. Hence, such argument of the State is specious but not tenable in the eye of law. 40. Accordingly, even on merits, since Sattar was never placed ‘above’ Sakhayout and Sakhayout was categorically held, by the order dated 14 September 17, 1960, to be a mere toll collector and not a raiyat, the argument of the State in that regard cannot be accepted. 41. Thus, this issue is also decided in favour of the petitioners, holding that Sattar, the writ petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was a raiyat in respect of the property and was held conclusively to be so in the year 1960. CONCLUSION 42. In view of the above discussions, this Court comes to the clear conclusion that the writ petitioners made out a strong prima facie case for adjudication of their original application on merits as to the legality of the orders impugned in the original application, holding that the lands vested in the State and directing those to be recorded in LR Khatian No.1, belonging to the State. 43. Accordingly, WPLRT No.54 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby modifying the impugned order dated November 21, 2025 passed by the Fourth Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in OA 2870/2025 (LRTT) to the extent that the respondent-authorities shall remain restrained by an order of injunction from giving effect to the order dated September 12, 2025 passed by the respondent no.2, the District Land & Land Reforms Officer, Jhargram in LRP 1/Jhar/2024 as well as the order dated December 7, 2023 passed by respondent no.3, the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, Binpur- I in Case No.VN/2024/2207/1 and/or from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioners in respect of the subject-plots till disposal of OA 2870/2025 (LRTT). 15 44. It is made clear that the above observations are tentative in nature and shall not unnecessarily influence the final adjudication of the original application. It will be open to all parties to argue all questions involved in the original application, including the effect of the orders passed in connection with WPA (P) No.318 of 2025 and RVW No.129 of 2024 and the connected matters, on merits. 45. There will be no order as to costs. 46. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)