1 CGHC010207292019 2026:CGHC:30867 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4651 of 2019 Rameshwar Kureel, S/o. Late Shri Mishri Lal Kureel, Aged About 63 Years, R/o. 417, Vasundhara Nagar, Changorabhata, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd., Through Its Manager Director, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Veena Nair, Advocate (Single Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order On Board 21.07.2026 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 16.08.2017 by which the petitioner has been reinstated in service but the consequential benefits have been denied. ASHOK SAHU Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2026.07.21 14:49:04 +0530 2 2. Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order is illegal and bad in law and the petitioner is entitled for full back wages and all consequential benefits. 3. Ms. Veena Nair, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the petitioner’s conviction was set aside on 18.01.2017 and he was reinstated in service on 16.08.2017, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for back wages. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 5. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar 1 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the 1 (1996) 11 SCC 603 3 employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 6. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh2, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 7. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal3, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that 2 (2004) 1 SCC 121 3 AIR 1994 SC 552 4 an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 8. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim4, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India5, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have 4 (2013) 11 SCC 67 5 (2005) 8 SCC 747 5 remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 9. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others6, their Lordships have relied upon the decision rendered in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and have held that the appellant therein shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal till the date of his reinstatement. 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that petitioner was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal court by order dated 23.10.1997 pursuant to which he was terminated from service on 05.11.1997, however, on his acquittal from the criminal charges by this Court on 18.01.2017, he was reinstated in service on 16.08.2017, but his claim for back wages from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement has been denied as the said period has been treated by the respondent department as ‘no work no pay’ and in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra), Baldev Singh (supra), 6 (2019) 5 SCC 809 6 Mohammed Abdul Rahim (supra) and Raj Narain (supra), subsequent acquittal of the petitioner though obliterates his conviction, but it does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction, however, the petitioner will be entitled for back wages only from the date of his acquittal i.e. 18.01.2017 till the date of his reinstatement i.e. 16.08.2017 in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Narain (supra). 11. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No cost(s). Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Ashok