13th July, 2026 (AK) 14 S.A.T 110 of 2025 IA No: CAN 1 of 2025 Sri Rajesh Verma Vs. Sri Bajrangi Lal Jaiswal Mr. Rachit Lakhmani Mr. Subham Gupta Mr. Anup Kumar Singh Mr. Rajsekhar Bal Bakshi ...for the appellant. Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya Mr. Anirban Saha Roy ...for the respondent. 1. The present challenge arises out of a judgment of affirmance, whereby the first appellate court confirmed the eviction decree passed by the trial court on the ground of reasonable requirement under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant argues that both the courts below substantially erred in law in decreeing the suit for eviction in view of the plaintiff/respondent having not proved the lack of suitable alternative accommodation in the building where the plaintiff allegedly resides as a co-owner. 2 3. It is argued that the courts below erroneously turned the burden of proof on its head by observing that since the defendant/appellant did not take out any application for local inspection to prove the plaintiff’s dearth of suitable alternative accommodation, the suit ought to be decreed on such ground. 4. That apart, it is argued that the root premises, being where the plaintiff admittedly resides, was never inspected at the behest of the plaintiff. 5. Thus, in the absence of any proof as to whether the said premises contains any suitable accommodation, the suit ought to have been dismissed by turning down the ground of reasonable requirement. 6. It is further argued that no title deed of the said alternative residential accommodation was produced by the plaintiff at any point of time to establish that it is a joint property. 7. Furthermore, learned counsel argues that the desire of the plaintiff, allegedly to demolish the suit premises in order to expand the entrance thereto, is at best a fanciful desire and cannot qualify as a ‘reasonable’ requirement. 8. Learned counsel further argues that the plaintiff did not bring any evidence on record to show that 3 the purpose of shifting his business to the suit building would not be satisfied by the upper floors of the self-same building, which were never inspected. 9. Learned counsel reiterates that in the absence of any proof as to suitable alternative accommodation not being there being brought by the plaintiff on record, the courts below erred in law in accepting the ground of reasonable requirement. 10. Lastly, learned counsel points out that despite an application for production of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil procedure having been filed by the defendant/appellant before the first appellate court, the same was never taken into consideration. 11. By way of such additional evidence, the defendant/appellant sought to bring on record notices by the plaintiff/respondent to enhance the rent, which would go on to establish that the interest of the plaintiff/respondent lay in enhancing the rent and, as such, the ground of reasonable requirement was a mere ruse. 12. Taking into consideration the arguments of the appellant as well as the judgments of both the courts below, however, we are unable to accept the contentions of the appellant. 4 13. Both the courts below scrutinized the evidence-on- record and on the premise of the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s witnesses, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has established that he is a co-owner and in joint possession of the residential accommodation available to the plaintiff. 14. By no stretch of imagination can an undivided joint property be said to furnish suitable accommodation or exclusive right to occupy a particular portion of such premises to one of the co-owners. 15. Thus, we cannot fault the reasoning of the courts below on such count. 16. Moreover, it has come out from the evidence of the parties that the two shop rooms where the plaintiff/respondent is currently running his business are both tenanted accommodations, which cannot compete with the own property of the plaintiff insofar as suitability of such accommodation is concerned. 17. The requirement of the plaintiff to demolish/reconstruct the suit property to widen the entrance cannot also be disbelieved altogether in the teeth of the specific finding of the courts below, on the basis of an inspection held at the behest of the plaintiff, that the existing gate is only about four feet in width. 5 18. The plaintiff/respondent, in effect, seeks to shift the business being run by the plaintiff currently in two separate tenanted accommodations in a composite manner to the suit property, for which purpose the plaintiff has made out a requirement to enlarge the existing gate of the same. 19. That apart, irrespective of whether alternative accommodation is available on the upper floors of the suit building, the purposes of running a business and widening the gate would only be sub- served by the ground floor and not the upper floors. 20. Thus, the non-adduction of any further evidence on the part of the plaintiff/respondent, insofar as suitability of the accommodation available on the upper floors of the suit building is concerned, is not germane for the present purpose. 21. The courts below considered all such aspects of the matter and also came to the conclusion that in order to shift the electric meter box, which is now situated within a room in the suit premises, to a proper place of the suit building, the plaintiff requires to reorient and, if necessary, demolish the suit premises. 22. Since the above questions involve appreciation of factual evidence-on-record and both the courts below have arrived at concurrent findings in that 6 regard, it is not for the second appellate court to interfere with the same. 23. Insofar as the application under Order XLI Rule 27 is concerned, even if allowed by the first appellate court, the same would not be germane in the present context, since mere notice on the part of the plaintiff/respondent to enhance the rent cannot tantamount to conclusive proof that the plaintiff does not require the suit premises for his personal requirement. 24. In such view of the matter, we do not find any substantial question of law involved, sufficient to justify admission of the second appeal. 25. Accordingly, SAT 110 of 2025 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 26. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2025 is also dismissed. 27. There will be no order as to costs. 28. Urgent certified copies of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)