IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ******** PRESENT: HON’BLE JUSTICE SUGATO MAJUMDAR AND HON’BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI WPCT 15 of 2026 THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ... PETITIONERS Versus Dr. ALEX MATHEW AND ANOTHER ... RESPONDENTS For the Petitioners : Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Adv For the respondents : Mrs. Anjili Nag, Sr. Adv. Miss. K. Bhawani, Adv Hearing concluded on : 10.07.2026 Judgment on : 13.07.2026 OM NARAYAN RAI, J. 1. This writ petition assails an order dated September 15, 2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench Circuit at Port Blair 1 in O.A. 351/443/2019 whereby the petitioners have been directed to pay to the respondent no. 1 the difference in the emoluments of Homoeo Pharmacist and Medical Officer (Homoeopathy) for the period the respondent no. 1 has discharged duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy). By the said 1 Hereafter “the Tribunal” order, the Tribunal has also directed the petitioners to continue paying the emoluments of a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) to the respondent no. 1 if he is made to work as Medical Officer (Homeopathy) in future. Factual Matrix 2. The case run on the OA may be noted briefly: a. The respondent no. 1 is a qualified Homoeopathic Doctor. He completed the course of Bachelor of Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery in June, 1996 and the relevant certificate therefor was issued to him on November 26, 1997. b. The respondent no. 1 was appointed to the post of Homoeo Pharmacist by an order dated September 18, 2003 issued by the Assistant Director (Admn.), Director of Health Services, Andaman and Nicobar Administration. c. Thus at the time when the respondent no. 1 joined the post of Homoeo Pharmacist, he was a qualified Homeopathy Doctor. d. While the respondent no. 1 rendered his services in the said post of Homeo Pharmacist, he was also required to discharge the duties and functions of Medical Officer, (Homeopathy) on more than one occasion. e. Since, the respondent no. 1 was (is) duly qualified to discharge the duties and functions of a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) and work of a Medical Officer (Homeo) was indeed being taken by the petitioners, the respondent no. 1 made a representation dated March 14, 2017 requesting the administration to either consider his case for appointment on contract basis till the post of the Medical Officer (Homoeo) was filled up or grant extra honorarium till the further appointment of Medical Officer (Homoeo). f. This was followed by another representation dated May 08, 2017 requesting the administration to grant him age relaxation for five years to enable him to participate in the recruitment process for appointment to the regular post of Medical Officer (Homoeo). g. Since the respondent no.1’s case was left unconsidered, he approached the Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 1379/AN/2018 praying inter alia for an order directing the petitioners to appoint the respondent no. 1 to the post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) by adapting the mode of regularization by framing scheme or by taking steps to advertise the post and allowed the respondent no. 1 to participate in the selection process after granting age relaxation to him. h. The said original application was disposed of by the Tribunal by an order dated December 18, 2018 thereby directing the competent authority to decide on the respondent no.1’s representations dated March 14, 2017 and May 8, 2017 in accordance with law. i. Upon such order being passed by the Tribunal the petitioner’s representation was considered by the Director of Health Services, Andaman and Nicobar Administration and an order dated March 11, 2019 declining the respondent no. 1’s request for appointing him as Medical Officer (Homeo) on contract/regular basis was passed. By the said order, the respondent no. 1’s requests for age relaxation and for grant of salary of Medical Officer were also rejected. j. Feeling aggrieved by such order, the respondent no. 1 approached the Tribunal once again by filing OA 351/443/A&N/20192 praying inter alia for an order directing the petitioners to grant to the respondent no. 1 the salary of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) from the date of his appointment till the date he discharged the duties of the Medical Officer. k. The said OA was contested by the petitioners and ultimately, the Tribunal disposed of the same by passing the impugned order dated September 15, 2025. l. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present writ application. 3. It may be recorded that after the matter was reserved for judgment on July 01, 2026 while going through the case records we realised that Fundamental Rule 49 3 might apply to the present case, however since no argument had been advanced by any of the parties on such point, we brought the matter back on board as “To be mentioned” and informed the learned Counsel appearing for the 2 Hereafter “the OA” 3 Hereafter “FR 49” parties about the same. The matter was heard elaborately thereafter. Petitioner’s submissions 4. Mr. Kumar, Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has made the following submissions: i. The Tribunal has committed a serious error in passing the order impugned inasmuch as the respondent no. 1 had been appointed to a substantive post of Pharmacist (Homeo) and that he was discharging additional functions of a Medical Officer (Homeo) without any official authorisation. ii. The post of a Medical Officer (Homeo) is a group ‘A’ post which can only be filled up by following the proper procedure and upon the recommendation of the Respondent No.2 i.e. the Union Public Service Commission. iii. The respondent no. 1 discharged the duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) voluntarily, without any official authority or sanction. iv. The post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) is a contractual post and the respondent no. 1 has been discharging duties at a permanent post and as such he could not have claimed benefits attached to a contractual post. v. The Court was taken through the letters dated April 27, 2009 and May 28, 2009 as well as Certificates dated July 20, 2010 and August 05, 2015 issued by the Director of Health Services and it was submitted that the same would reveal that there was no office order authorizing the respondent no. 1 to discharge the functions and duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy). vi. The respondent no. 1 actually wanted to be regularized as a Medical Officer upon his age being relaxed. vii. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Selvaraj – versus – Lt. Governor of Island, Port Blair4 has been wrongly relied on by the Tribunal inasmuch as in the said case the petitioner therein had discharged the duties of a promotional post while being at a feeder post on the basis of an office order authorizing the petitioner therein to discharge such duties, which is not the case here. viii. Relying on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramakant Shripad Sinai – versus –Union of India and others5 it was submitted that the respondent no. 1 could not have been granted the benefit of pay to which a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) is entitled by the Tribunal. ix. Relying on the Office Memorandum dated September 30, 20226, it was submitted that FR 49 is wholly applicable to the respondent no.1 and in that view of the matter, since there is no office order formally appointing the respondent no.1 to hold full charge of the duties of the post of Medical Officer (Homoeo), 4 AIR 1999 SC 838 5 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 6 Hereafter “the OM” which is a higher post, the Tribunal could not have proceeded to pass the order impugned. Respondent’s submissions 5. Ms. Anjili Nag, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 1 supported the order impugned and made the following submissions: i. It was incorrectly submitted by the petitioners that the post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) is a contractual and not a regular post. ii. Attention of this Court was invited to an order dated November 23, 2004 issued by the Assistant Secretary (Health), Andaman and Nicobar Administration to demonstrate that Medical Officer (Homeopathy) is a regular Group-‘A’ post. iii. The Andaman and Nicobar Administration Medical Officer (Homeopathy) (Group ‘A’ Gazetted) Recruitment Rules 2009 were also referred to demonstrate that the post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) is a regular sanctioned post. iv. The Tribunal has rightly relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme in the case of Selvaraj (Supra) and justly passed the order impugned. v. The authorities have accepted work from the petitioner as a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) without filling up the posts of such Medical Officer (Homeopathy) and as such, the impugned order of the Tribunal calls for no interference. vi. Referring to the Guidelines on additional charge of the current duties of another post mentioned in the OM, it was submitted that in terms of the guidelines mentioned in paragraph 2(i) of Section B of the OM the relevant authorities should have granted approval to the respondent no.1 discharging the additional duties pertaining to the post of Medical Officer (Homoeo) when several recommendations were made to the administration by the Director of Health Services in such regard. Analysis and Decision 6. Heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and considered the materials on record. 7. It is not in dispute that despite the respondent no. 1 having been appointed to the post of Pharmacist (Homeopathy) the respondent no.1 has from time to time discharged duties and functions of Medical Officer (Homeopathy). 8. The letter dated April 27, 2009 issued by the Director of Health Services to the Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair appears to be the first in the series of documents indicating that the respondent no. 1 has discharged the duties and functions of Physician (Homeopathy). By the said letter, the Director of Health Services had recommended payment of the differential amount in the salary of the Homoeopathic Doctors appointed on contractual basis and the Pharmacists (Homeo) to the respondent no.1 till such time the respondent no. 1 continued to discharge the duties and functions of Medical Officer (Homeopathy). 9. The letters dated April 27, 2009 and May 28, 2009 and the certificates dated July 20, 2020 and August 05, 2015 clearly evince that the respondent no. 1 had performed duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) in addition to his own duties. 10. Mr. Kumar’s reliance on the certificate dated August 05, 2015 to contend that the respondent no. 1 had been performing duties in the post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) without any extra remuneration out of his own volition though at the first blush seems attractive but withers away on a holistic consideration of the material on record. The certificate dated August 05, 2015 only indicates that the respondent no. 1 has been performing duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) without any extra remuneration but the same does not and cannot be read to mean that the respondent no. 1 relinquished his right to claim extra remuneration for the additional duty or additional work rendered by him. 11. In fact the representation dated March 14, 2017 made by the respondent no. 1 that had been directed to be considered by the competent authority by the Tribunal’s order dated December 18, 2018 clearly indicates that the respondent no. 1 had made a prayer for either being considered for appointment on contract basis till the filling up of the post of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) or for payment of the extra honorarium till the further appointment of Homeopathic Physician. In such regard, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said representation may be noticed. “5 – In this connection it is pertinent to mention that the request of Director of Health Services vide its letter no. P/1-15(226)/DHS/2000/772 and O.No. 774, dated : 30/03/2009 to consider my case for appointment on contract basis till filling up the post of Medical Officer (Homeo) is yet to be considered by the administration or the extra honorarium amount may be paid till the further appointment of Homeopathic Physician. 6. Sir, the respected Director of Health Services has suggested that the difference of salary of contract doctors of Administration, NRHM doctors may be paid as honorarium of Rs. 22813/- to Dr. Alex Mathew, MD Homeo vide the DHS letter no. P/1-15/212/03/987 dated : 27.04.2009. copies be enclosed for your kind perusal.” 12. If such was the representation that was made by the respondent no. 1 it cannot be said that the respondent no. 1 never claimed additional remuneration for the additional duties that the respondent no. 1 discharged. 13. Although the documents on record evince that the respondent No. 1 has discharged duties and functions of Medical Officer (Homoeo) but still that would not suffice for us to hold that he would be entitled to the remuneration of the higher post. In the case at hand the problem lies elsewhere. In terms of FR 49 which is clearly applicable to the respondent no.1, no officer would be entitled to claim or to be paid any additional amount for duties of a higher post unless such officer has been “formally appointed to hold full charge of the duties” of such higher post. Page 11 of 20 14. A similar question had fallen for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in almost identical fact situation in the case of Mohd. Swaleh v. Union of India7. 15. In the said case the appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court who was holding the substantive post of Deputy Registrar (Admn.) in the High Court of Rajasthan was appointed as Deputy Registrar on deputation in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur. While he was holding such post, the Vice Chairman, of the said Tribunal who was also the Head of the Department permitted the said appellant to discharge all powers and functions of the Registrar as envisaged by Rule 28(3) of the Central Administrative (Procedure) Rules, 1987. In such fact situation, the appellant represented for payment of additional remuneration which was ultimately negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court observing that the appellant had not been appointed to the post of Registrar by the authority competent to do so. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 23. Once it is held that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal are not the appointing authorities for the post of Registrar of a Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, by virtue of any delegation, it must follow that the condition laid down by the Central Government while delegating powers under Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules to the Head of the Department (vide column 5 of Appendix 3, Item 20) has not been satisfied. The said condition would have been satisfied if the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal had been delegated the power to make appointments to the post of Registrar of a Bench 7 (1997) 6 SCC 200 of the Tribunal. If there had been such a delegation of power to the Chairman or Vice-Chairman then the latter could confer additional duties and powers attributable to the post of Registrar, to the Deputy Registrar, for purposes of Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules as well and in that event, the pay of the post of Registrar could be paid to the Deputy Registrars entrusted with higher powers and duties of a Registrar. We are, therefore, of the view that though under Rule 28(3) of the Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman are authorised to delegate the powers and functions of the Registrar to the Deputy Registrar still in the absence of the power of delegation by the Central Government for the purposes of Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules, the appellant who as Deputy Registrar exercised the powers and functions of the Registrar, could not be granted the pay attributable to the post of the Registrar. 24. In fact, this position has been clarified by the letters of the Central Government. The letter dated 5-12-1985 addressed by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of India to the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal would clearly show that the Group ‘A’ post in the Tribunal shall be filled by the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal only after a reference to the department i.e. Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, for obtaining appropriate orders. By the letter dated 21-5-1987 of the Government of India in No. A-12018/5/85-CAT, the Central Government has delegated to the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal the power to make appointment to the post of Deputy Registrar in the Central Administrative Tribunal on deputation basis subject to the Government's Rules and Instructions on the subject. The above two letters, therefore, would make it very clear that the appointments to Group ‘A’ posts (other than Deputy Registrar) could be made by the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal only after a reference thereof to the Central Government. So far as the post of Deputy Registrar among Group ‘A’ posts are concerned, that power of appointment to the post of Deputy Registrar has been delegated to the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal. 25. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the condition mentioned in Appendix 3 to the Fundamental Rules wherein the Central Government has delegated powers under Rule 49 to the Heads of the Department namely that the Head of the Department must have been authorised to make appointment to the higher post, is not satisfied in the facts of this case inasmuch as the power to appoint a Registrar has not separately been delegated to the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Hence the additional remuneration cannot be granted as claimed. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant made a submission that the principle of quantum meruit would apply to the facts of the case and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal & Sons [AIR 1962 SC 779 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 876] . In that case it was held that though the contract for certain works was not executed as per the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, still compensation could be paid under Section 70 of the Contract Act. In our view, the said decision which is based on Section 70 of the Contract Act is not applicable to the present situation where the field is governed by specific statutory rules, namely Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules. *********************** ************************ 28. The result is rather unfortunate but in view of the rule position set out above, we have no choice but to dismiss this appeal. The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. 16. The said judgment also takes note of the doctrine of quantum meruit and holds the same to be not applicable in view of the binding nature of FR 49. 17. In such view of the matter the impugned order of the Tribunal deserves interference to the extent it directs the petitioners to pay to the respondent no. 1 the difference in the emoluments of Homoeo Pharmacist and Medical Officer (Homoeopathy) for the period the respondent no. 1 has discharged duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy) and also to continue paying the emoluments of a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) to the respondent no. 1 if he is made to work as Medical Officer (Homeopathy) in future. 18. However, the matter does not end here. At this juncture, the Guidelines on additional charge of the current duties of another post mentioned in the OM deserve mention. The same are reproduced hereinbelow: “As per FR 49 (iv), no additional pay is admissible to a Government Servant who is appointed to hold current charge of the routine duties of another post irrespective of the duration of the additional charge. However, in a number of cases, officers are appointed to hold additional charge of current duties of another post but the duties are not defined in the order. As a result the officer performs all the functions of the other post including even some statutory functions. But no additional remuneration is paid in view of the specific language of the order of his appointment. In certain other cases, the officer is asked to hold additional charge of another post which implies full charge of the other post, but he is not formally appointed to that post. Therefore, no additional remuneration is paid to him under FR 49. 2. Entrusting the additional charge of another post to an officer shall be govern by the following guidelines: (i) When an officer is required to discharge all the duties of the other post including the statutory functions, steps should be taken to process the case for getting the approval of the Competent Authority and formal orders appointing the officer to the additional post should be issued. On appointment, the officer should be allowed additional remuneration as indicated in FR 49. (ii) Where an officer is only required to attend to the usual routine day- to- day work of non-statutory nature attached to the post, an office order may be issued clearly stating that the officer would not be entitled to any additional remuneration. The office order should also specifies what duties he would be discharging or what duties he would not be discharging.” 19. In the case at hand the Director of Health Services has recommended the case of the respondent no.1 for payment of the difference in the emoluments paid to a Medical Officer (Homoeo) and to a Physicist (Homoeo). Such recommendation does not appear to have been considered. Paragraph 2(i) instructs the administration that in cases where an officer is required to discharge all the duties of the other post including the statutory functions, steps should be taken to process the case for getting the approval of the Competent Authority. The recommendation of the respondent no.1’s case by the Director of Health Services prima facie satisfies such condition of the OM as regards processing the case of an officer required to discharge additional duties of a higher post for approval by the competent authority. 20. The introductory preface to the relevant guidelines under paragraph 2(i) quoted above indicates that the same were framed in order to prevent iniquitous extraction of additional service pertaining to a higher post from officers working at lower posts without paying them for the work rendered in view of the stringent application of FR 49. The expression “approval” used therein should, therefore, be liberally construed so that the benefit of the guidelines reaches the officer who has genuinely rendered additional services at the higher post without being paid anything extra for it. 21. Since the expression used is “approval” and not “prior approval” the same should include within its fold ex post facto approval as well. In such context, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Ashok Kumar Das v. University of Burdwan8 serves 8 (2010) 3 SCC 616 as a useful guidance. The relevant paragraphs thereof are quoted hereinbelow: 11. In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word “approval” has been explained thus: “Approval.—The act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another.” Hence, approval to an act or decision can also be subsequent to the act or decision. 12. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad [1995 Supp (3) SCC 456] this Court made the distinction between permission, prior approval and approval. Para 6 of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow : (SCC pp. 458-59) “6. This Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 264] , considering the distinction between ‘special permission’ and ‘general permission’, ‘previous approval’ or ‘prior approval’ in para 63 held that : (SCC p. 313) ‘63. … we are conscious that the word “prior” or “previous” may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such implication into Section 29(1) [of the Act].’ Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission is that in the first case the action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous act. As to the word ‘approval’ in Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 860] , that the management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. The requirement that the management must obtain approval was distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain permission, of which mention is made in Section 33(1).” 13. Following the decision in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad [1995 Supp (3) SCC 456], this Court again held in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh [(2003) 4 SCC 239 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 424] in para 40 : (SCC p. 255) “40. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it is disapproved it loses its force. Only when permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. [1995 Supp (3) SCC 456])” 14. Section 21(xiii) of the Burdwan University Act, 1981 is quoted hereinbelow: “21. Powers and functions of the Executive council.—Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Executive Council shall exercise the following powers and perform the following functions: (i)- (xii)*** (xiii) to determine, with the approval of the State Government, the terms and conditions of service of Librarians and non-teaching staff;” 15. The words used in Section 21(xiii) are not “with the permission of the State Government” nor “with the prior approval of the State Government”, but “with the approval of the State Government”. If the words used were “with the permission of the State Government”, then without the permission of the State Government the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff. Similarly, if the words used were “with the prior approval of the State Government”, the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff without first obtaining the approval of the State Government. But since the words used are “with the approval of the State Government”, the Executive Council of the University could determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff and obtain the approval of the State Government subsequently and in case the State Government did not grant approval subsequently, any action taken on the basis of the decision of the Executive Council of the University would be invalid and not otherwise. 22. Thus prima facie there appears to be no impediment to the competent authority considering the respondent no.1’s case for granting ex-post facto approval for the period during which he has discharged the duties of Medical Officer (Homoeo).We therefore request the Secretary (Health) Andaman and Nicobar Administration to consider the respondent no.1’s case in terms of the guidelines of the OM and reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether ex-post facto approval can be granted to the petitioner or not and if the answer to the said question is in the affirmative then to proceed to pay to the petitioner the legally permissible sum. 23. We also note that by the order dated December 18, 2018 passed on the earlier Original Application filed by the respondent no.1, the Tribunal had without entering into the merits of the case directed the competent authority to decide on the respondent no.1’s representations dated March 14, 2017 and May 8, 2017 in accordance with law. The petitioner’s representation has been disposed of by the Director of Health Services by declining the reliefs prayed for while the same official had earlier recommended the respondent no.1’s case for payment of the difference in emoluments payable to the Medical Officer (Homoeo) and Pharmacist (Homoeo). 24. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Selvaraj (Supra) would not help the respondent no.1 in the present case inasmuch in the said case the employee had joined the higher post on the strength of an order passed by the Director of Education specifying that his pay will be drawn against the post of Secretary (Scouts) under GFR 77. It was not a case where the appointment was done by an incompetent authority. It was in such situation that the Hon’ble Supreme Court applied the doctrine of quantum meruit and directed payment as per emoluments available in the higher scale of pay. 25. The case of Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar (supra) cited by the petitioners also indicate that merely by reason of discharge of functions of a higher post an employee may not be entitled to the salary attached to such post. Paragraphs 5 of the said judgment may be noticed in such context: 5. The arrangements contemplated by this order plainly do not amount to a promotion of the appellant to the post of Treasurer. The distinction between a situation where a government servant is promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as a promotion. In such a case he does not get the salary of the higher post; but gets only what in service parlance is called a “charge allowance”. Such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority do not enter into it. The person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of the higher post essentially as a stop-gap arrangement. 26. For all the reasons aforesaid we set aside that part of the impugned order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has directed the petitioners to pay to the respondent no. 1 the difference in the emoluments of Homoeo Pharmacist and Medical Officer (Homoeopathy) for the period the respondent no. 1 has discharged duties of Medical Officer (Homeopathy). Insofar as the direction to continue paying the emoluments of a Medical Officer (Homeopathy) to the respondent no. 1 if he is made to work as Medical Officer (Homeopathy) in future is concerned it is required to be mentioned that petitioners should ensure that if they intend to utilise the services of the respondent no.1 as a Medical Officer (Homoeo) then they should do the same following the guidelines mentioned in the OM and not otherwise, so as to eschew exploitation. 27. As already indicated hereinabove, the Secretary (Health) Andaman and Nicobar Administration is requested to consider the respondent no.1’s case in terms of the guidelines of the OM and reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether ex-post facto approval can be granted to the petitioner or not within a period of four weeks from date and if the answer to the said question is in the affirmative then to proceed to extend to the petitioner the legally permissible monetary benefits forthwith. The expectation expressed by the Tribunal as regards taking “appropriate steps to make regular appointments to the post of M.O. (Homoeopathy) after following due process of selection” and to consider the respondent no.1’s case for age relaxation to the extent of the duration of his service in the department “as per rules in this regard” do not call for any interference. 28. WP.CT 15 of 2026 stands disposed of with the above observations. There shall be no order as to costs. I agree. a. (Sugato Majumdar, J.) (Om Narayan Rai, J.)