JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. The applicant in O.A.(EKM) No.581 of 2025 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short), filed this Original Petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India , challenging Ext.P2 order dated 11.04.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application. 2. The petitioner filed O.A.(EKM) No.581 of 2025, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, seeking the following reliefs; “i. Issue an order or direction to the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Respondents to initiate steps to regularize the period of service rendered with the defunct Calicut Development Authority i.e, from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 (three years four months and 19 days) as notionally qualifying service for revision and re-fixation of pensionary benefits ii. Issue an Order or Direction to the 5 th Respondent to re- fix the pay in appropriate pay scale by reckoning the initial service deeming that it is qualifying service ought to have brought forward with the subsequent service enabling the Applicant to get the revised retiaral benefits. iii. Issue an Order or direction to the 5 th Respondent to disburse the arrear monetary claims if any accrued as respect to the period under revision and re-fixation reckoned as prayed for in the O.A iv. Issue an Order or Direction to the 7 th Respondent to make available the initial service file of the Applicant for its verification as and when required by the appropriate authority v. Issue an Order or Direction to the appropriate authority to render the needful co-ordination in this context within a fixed time frame. vi. Issue an order or Direction to the 8thRespondent to re- verify the total service period deeming that the service from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 as qualifying service as per the legal prescriptions and work out the final retiaral benefits accordingly”. 3. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioner has a physical disability of above 55%. The case of the petitioner is that, in commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of Indian Independence, the petitioner and other similarly placed persons had been re-deployed into the service of various Departments/institutions. The petitioner got re-deployment at the erstwhile Calicut Development Authority (‘CDA’ for short) as Assistant Grade-II. The case of the petitioner is that, in commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of Indian Independence, the petitioner and other similarly placed persons had been re-deployed into the service of various Departments/institutions. The petitioner got re-deployment at the erstwhile Calicut Development Authority (‘CDA’ for short) as Assistant Grade-II. There exist several Government orders and Judicial orders for regularising the service periods of the physically disabled persons, and this has benefited a large number of similarly placed candidates. Meanwhile, the CDA had been on the verge of winding up, and the personnel and administration matters had been vested with the Government, and thereby the re- deployed service period of the petitioner from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 had been skipped out of the contextual consideration by the appropriate authorities. While continuing with the CDA, the petitioner had been advised by the Kerala Public Service Commission for the post of LDC in the Women and Child Development Department. Presently, the petitioner is a retiree from the Women & Child Development Department, whose initial provisional service rendered with the CDA has not been reckoned for pension and other related retirement benefits. There are ample grounds for reckoning the said period as qualifying service. Hence, the said period has to be taken notionally deemed to be rectified; and as such, regularisation by the Government, enabling revision and disbursement of the revised and enhanced pensionary benefits and other legal entitlements to the petitioner. 4. The tribunal, after considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader, by the impugned Ext.P2 order dated 11.04.2025, dismissed the original application. Paragraphs 3, 4 and the last paragraph of that order read thus; “3. The learned Government Pleader pointed out that Annexure A8 representation of the applicant was declined by the 5 th respondent citing the reasons in detail. This communication has not been challenged. 4. The applicant contents that he had worked in CDA for the period from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002. Thereafter he joined the Women and Child Development Department and retired from service on 31.10.2024. The representation to reckon his prior service in CDA for pensionary benefits at Annexure A8 is dated 09.12.2024 and Annexure A9 representations are dated 17.02.2025. Annexure A8 representation was declined through Annexure A10 communication citing specific reasons for such refusal. The same has not been challenged by the applicant. The representation to reckon his prior service in CDA for pensionary benefits at Annexure A8 is dated 09.12.2024 and Annexure A9 representations are dated 17.02.2025. Annexure A8 representation was declined through Annexure A10 communication citing specific reasons for such refusal. The same has not been challenged by the applicant. The applicant's claim that he would have been eligible for the benefits granted to other physically disabled persons, through Annexure A6 if he had not left CDA and therefore he should be granted such benefit does not merit any consideration as such a contention is not legally sustainable. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed”. 5. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the original application, the petitioner-applicant is now before this Court with this original petition. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there are Government orders for regularising the service of physically disabled persons engaged/redeployed during the commemoration of the golden jubilee of Indian independence. But that benefit had not been extended to the petitioner for the reason that he subsequently joined the service of the 5 th respondent. He is entitled to regularisation of the deployed initial service period stretching back from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Maya P.C v. State of Kerala [2025 (3) KLT 558] 8. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that by Annexure A10 order dated 19.02.2025, the 5 th respondent has rejected the claim of the petitioner. However, he did not challenge the same. The Tribunal has correctly analysed the same. The learned Senior Government Pleader would further submit that the judgment in Maya P.C [ 2025 (3) KLT 558 ] does not apply to the case of the petitioner, since in that case the Government order which restricted declaration of probation, inclusion in the combined seniority list or consideration for promotion, after the reappointment of the temporary employees was under challenge, and whereas in the case of the petitioner, there is no such issue. 9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. 9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 10. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd[ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ], the Apex Court held thus; "The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to." 11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 12. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ] , while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India , the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 13. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [ (2015) 12 SCC 39 ] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India , the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 14. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India , this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 15. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India , cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 16. While going through the judgment in Maya P.C . [2025 (3) KLT 558] , we notice that the challenge in that particular case was on the subsequent Government order which restricted the non-declaration of probation, inclusion in the combined seniority list or consideration for promotion of the temporary employees who were reappointed by creating supernumerary posts in their respective departments. But in the instant case, the issue is entirely different. In such circumstances, the judgment in Maya P.C [ 2025 (3) KLT 558 ] is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 17. From the materials placed on record, we notice that the petitioner is seeking the service benefits for the period from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 during the period he was redeployed in Calicut Development Authority. His Annexure A8 representation dated 09.12.2024 to reckon his service for the aforesaid period was rejected by Annexure A10 order dated 19.02.2025 by the 5 th respondent. From the materials placed on record, we notice that the petitioner is seeking the service benefits for the period from 10.02.1999 to 29.06.2002 during the period he was redeployed in Calicut Development Authority. His Annexure A8 representation dated 09.12.2024 to reckon his service for the aforesaid period was rejected by Annexure A10 order dated 19.02.2025 by the 5 th respondent. However, the same was not challenged by the petitioner. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold the impugned order of the Tribunal as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising supervisory jurisdiction. In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.