01 10.07.2026 CRC 31 of 2025 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 In F.M.A.T 208 of 2025 Sudeep Chitlangia Vs. Kanchan Jyoti Rao and others Mr. Krishnaraj Thaker, Snr. Adv., Ms. Susrea Mitra, Mr. Chunky Agarwal, Mr. Akshay Kumar Jain Sukhani Ms. Simran Sureka ...for the petitioner. Mr. Anirban Ray, Sr. Adv., Mr. Aditya Chakraborty, Mr. Arjun Roy, Ms. Saolini Bose ....for the contemnor nos. 1, 5. Mr. Ashok Banerjee, Sr. Adv., Ms. Saolini Bose ...for the contemnor no. 6. Mr. Aniruddha Mitra, Sr. Adv., Mr. Aishik Chakraborty Mr. Anirban Ghosh ...for the contemnor nos. 2, 3 & 4. 1. The present Contempt Rule was issued on December 8, 2025, upon giving a preliminary hearing to the alleged contemnors. Although initially, on the said date, all the alleged contemnors were represented by the same set of counsel, subsequently such representation branched out and the contemnor nos.1 and 5, contemnor nos.2, 3 and 4 and contemnor no.6 have thereafter been represented by separate set of counsel, each of the contemnors having filed individual affidavits of show cause to the Rule. 2 2. The brief backdrop of the case is that in a declaratory suit filed by the contemnor no.1, an ad interim order of status quo was passed. Subsequently, the learned Trial Judge dismissed an application for vacating such ad interim order filed by the petitioner in the present contempt application (defendant in the suit) under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and simultaneously allowed the temporary injunction application of the plaintiff/contemnor no.1, thereby making the ad interim order of status quo with regard to nature, character and possession of the suit property absolute. 3. Being aggrieved, the defendant/petitioner preferred an appeal bearing FMAT No.208 of 2025. Vide judgment and order dated June 18, 2025, the said appeal was disposed of by modifying the order impugned therein. The crux of the ordering portion of such judgment/order is found in Paragraph No.29 of the same, which is quoted below: “29. Accordingly, FMAT No. 208 of 2025 is disposed of by modifying the impugned order to the limited extent that the parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the nature and character and/or possession of the suit property, with the rider that the defendant/appellant and his men and agents might have limited and temporary ingress and egress to the suit property for specific purposes, if any. It is made clear that such ingress and egress shall not be of such nature as to disturb the exclusive possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and/or shall not create any equity or special right in favour of the defendant/appellant.” 3 4. Subsequently the appellant therein, being the present petitioner, filed the present contempt application alleging that, in wilful and deliberate violation of the Order dated June 18, 2025, the plaintiff/respondent no.1 in the appeal (present contemnor no.1), in collusion with the respondent no.5/contemnor no.2, authorised third parties to affix a noticeboard and nameplates in the suit property and permitted such third parties to operate from the suit premises. It is alleged that the nature, character and possession of the suit property was altered by such creation of third- party interest. Moreover, it is alleged that despite the Court having granted access for specific purposes to the petitioner, such access is being restricted. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that from the photographs annexed to the contempt application, it will be evident that signages and nameplates/flex have been put up at the suit premises which show that one Government Muslim Marriage and Kazi Welfare Association (for short, “GMM”) has set up a branch office at the suit premises, situated at 113, Park Street, Poddar Point Building, Kolkata – 700 016, which is the suit property. It is contended that from the said signboards, it would be evident that contemnor no.5, Md. Razaul Khan, is the Director and contemnor no.6, 4 Kazi Md. Faisullah Ansari, is the General Secretary of the said GMM. 6. It is further alleged that in deliberate and wilful violation of the order of this Court dated June 18, 2025, the said organization/association has been permitted to indiscriminately hold religious ceremonies, including animal slaughter, at the suit building. Furthermore, the men and agents of the petitioner, including telecom operators who attempted to have access to the network apparatus situated at the roof of the said premises, have been prevented by the contemnors from entering into the suit premises. 7. The petitioner also submits that the contemnor no.2, through its Directors, contemnor nos. 3 and 4, have actively colluded in such violation of the order of this Court. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner next argues that the contemnors, apart from flouting the Court’s order, are guilty of aggravated contempt due to their attempts to cover up their contumacious acts by making false and contradictory pleas in their show cause affidavits. 9. It is argued that the Order dated June 18, 2025 does not only protect the possession of the plaintiff but also the status of such possession of all entities as on the date of the order. The Poddar Point Owners’ and Occupiers’ Association has been in continuous 5 possession of a small room above the stairwell in the suit building. However, ingress and egress of the said Association, of which the petitioner is the President, is being obstructed by the contemnors, thereby halting the day-to-day administration of the Poddar Point building. 10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner relies on the photographs annexed to the contempt application which, according to him, substantiate the allegations of creation of third-party interests as well as the existence of network apparatus on the roof of the building. However, the contemnors, it is submitted, have blatantly denied the existence of any such network apparatus, which is patently contradictory to the photographic evidence. 11. Although contemnor no. 1 disowns knowledge or involvement in putting up the boards-in-question, it is alleged by her that contemnor nos. 5 and 6, both of whom are her agents, have been instrumental in conduct of religious ceremonies by GMM, with which contemnor no.6 is admittedly associated. Such facts are borne out from the show cause affidavits of the different contemnors. 12. Insofar as the stand of the contemnors that the Rule of contempt was defective and, hence, ought to be discharged, it is argued by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the Rule was issued duly in 6 accordance with the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975 (in brief, “the 1975 Rules”) and that material particulars of the acts of contempt have been categorically disclosed in Paragraph Nos. 11 to 17 of the contempt application, all of which have been affirmed as true to knowledge or derived from the records. Hence, the argument of the contemnors that the allegations are vague and affirmed as submissions is incorrect. It is submitted that Paragraph No. 19 of the contempt application, which has been affirmed as submission, merely contains the crux of the allegations in a nutshell, preceded by specific statements on oath in the earlier paragraphs. 13. Learned senior counsel submits that the “Slap-say sorry-and forget” school of thought has been deprecated in contempt jurisprudence by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, reported at (2006) 5 SCC 1. 14. It is submitted that although false apology has been tendered by the contemnors, it has been tendered only in the teeth of punishment for contempt and not as an outcome of remorse or contrition. Learned senior counsel cites Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, reported at (1995) 1 SCC 421, in support of the proposition that an apology which is not the outcome 7 of real remorse but is tendered as a weapon of defence is not acceptable. 15. Learned senior counsel also relies on U.P. Resident Employees Coop. House Building Society v. NOIDA, reported at (2007) 15 SCC 515, for the proposition that tendering apology after it was found that a false statement has been made on oath is worthless. 16. Learned senior counsel reiterates that not stopping at violating the order of the Court wilfully, the contemnors have tried to mislead the Court in their contradictory statements made in the show-cause affidavits, which tantamounts to an aggravated act of contempt. 17. Learned senior counsel also places reliance on the definition of “status” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Eleventh Edition. 18. In reply, learned senior counsel for the contemnor nos.1 and 5 raises a preliminary objection to the effect that Rule 9 of the 1975 Rules clearly provides that the petitioners ought to affirm statements made in contempt applications based on knowledge, information and belief or on records. There is no scope of accepting statements affirmed as submissions. In the present case, it is alleged that the specific particulars of materials as required under Rule 6 of the Rules have been affirmed as submissions in Paragraph No.19 of the contempt application. 8 19. With regard to the alleged violation of the parent order dated June 18, 2025, it is contended that the Court directed maintenance of status quo with regard to the nature and character and/or possession of the suit property and granted limited and temporary ingress and egress rights to the appellant/present petitioner and his men and agents, which ingress and egress might be for specific purpose, if any, without disturbing the exclusive possession of the plaintiff/contemnor no.1 in respect of the suit property. It is submitted that on a reading of the show cause affidavits of contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6, it is evident that possession of the suit property is still with contemnor no.1 and no one is claiming possession or any rights to the suit property. It is argued that parting with possession must be accompanied by actual transfer, where the contemnor no.1 has consciously excluded herself from her possession. However, in the present case, contemnor no.1 has never given possession to any third party and has only used her leased-out property for allowing a specific ceremony to her authorised persons. The suit property has not been converted to a marriage house/hall, as submitted by the petitioner. 20. In the absence of any proof of transfer of exclusive control and possession of the property by the contemnor no.1 in favour of third parties, it is argued 9 that there cannot be any violation of the status quo order. 21. It is argued that contemnor no.1 was never aware of the offending signboard and, immediately upon coming to know of the same, ensured that it was removed from the suit property. Moreover, the board was fixed outside the suit property, beyond the entrance gate of the same, without any knowledge of contemnor no.1. 22. It is submitted that the contemnor no.1 permitted contemnor no.6, who has been acquainted with her and her husband for quite some time and is also associated with religious organizations, to conduct a religious marriage ceremony for two days and did not derive any commercial benefit therefrom. 23. It is submitted that contemnor no.5 is acquainted with contemnor no.1 and has been working for her for the purpose of upkeep and maintenance of the suit property. He, it is submitted, had nothing to do with the putting up of the signboard and is not the Director of GMM or, for that matter, any other organization or association. 24. It is contended that a register is being maintained and the name of contemnor no.5 was displayed along with his mobile number to ensure that persons seeking access to the roof get the same. It is submitted that the restriction in respect of access to the roof was in 10 consonance with and in terms of the order of this Court dated June 18, 2025 and not in violation thereof. 25. Installation of a calling bell and the system of signing a register for persons entering the roof which was put in place were in terms of the exclusive possession of contemnor no.1, recognised by this Court. The men and agents of the petitioner and the association of which he is the President have been signing the said register without any demur. Thus, there was no contumacious act at any point of time. 26. It is pointed out that the ingress and egress allowed to the petitioner was only for specific purposes, which has not been hampered by the system of maintaining a register and putting up the phone number of contemnor no.5 as the contact person for persons seeking access to the roof. 27. Learned senior counsel for contemnor nos. 1 and 5 next argues that contempt jurisdiction is a quasi- criminal jurisdiction; hence, rules have been framed in such a manner that strict interpretation is to be given thereto in order to ensure that an alleged contemnor is not wrongly vexed. However, in the present contempt application, the acts of contempt alleged is vague and require a purposive interpretation of the order, which creates doubts as to whether the alleged contemnors 11 were aware that they were causing a deliberate and wilful violation of the order. 28. Rule 19 of the Rules, it is submitted, requires that a rule nisi be drawn up, and Form-1 of Appendix-1 thereof clearly require that the rule must set out the nature of the contumacious conduct. The present rule, however, stopped short of enumerating the contumacious conduct for which this Court issued the rule. 29. Lastly, it is argued that contemnor no.1 has taken all necessary steps to uphold the order of this Court and has ensured that the offending board is removed immediately upon coming to learn of the same. Possession, admittedly, remains with contemnor no.1 and contemnor no.5 is an agent who acts at the instance of contemnor no.1. The allegations were immediately put to rest by taking care to purge all acts of contempt which have been alleged. Moreover, unconditional apology has been offered by the contemnors, which ought to be deemed to purge the act of contempt, if any. 30. Learned senior counsel cites Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, reported at (2012) 4 SCC 307, for the proposition that unless a clear-cut case of obstruction is made out, the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely on surmises and conjecture. 12 31. Learned senior counsel appearing for the contemnor nos. 1 and 5 next cites Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, reported at (2003) 11 SCC 1, in support of the contention that there is no evil intent or motive of transferring possession in any manner on the part of the contemnors and the manner in which allegations have been made is incapable of execution by contemnor no.1, treating the order on its face value. 32. Learned senior counsel further cites Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, reported at (2002) 5 SCC 352, in support of the argument that in the event a judgment/order does not contain any specific direction, the Court ought not to exercise the contempt jurisdiction. 33. Next citing a judgment of this Court in Suvendu Adhikari v. Manoj Malaviya, reported at (2022) 1 HCC (Cal) 330, it is submitted that in case the attending material or circumstances do not clinch beyond reasonable doubt that the action of the contemnors is wilful or deliberate or an attempt to lower the dignity of the Court, the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 34. Learned senior counsel relies on U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., reported at (2022) 1 SCC 101, to contend that the Court is not expected to conduct a 13 roving enquiry and disputed questions of fact should be left to be decided in the original proceeding. 35. Citing Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported at 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 855, it is argued that if the rule is not drawn up properly, the same has to be discharged, holding the rule to be defective ab initio. 36. By relying on Narayan Chandra Das v. Anjan Ghosh, reported at 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 8317, it is further submitted that unless full particulars of materials of contempt are provided, a contempt rule should be discharged. 37. Learned senior counsel cites Namita Sinha Roy v. State of West Bengal, reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 2753, for the proposition that the contemnor should know the specific charge levelled against him and if the rule does not specify the same, but the order for drawing up the rule only observes prima facie grounds, no foundational fact is established and the rule should be discharged. 38. Citing Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors., reported at 2025 INSC 1337, it is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court disregarded statements made and affirmed on submissions in the said case. In the present case, Paragraph No.19 of the contempt application, which contains the charges of contempt, are affirmed true to submission. 14 39. Lastly, learned senior counsel cites Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, reported at (1989) 3 SCC 56, to argue that the parting with possession depends upon the quality of occupation given and that mere occupation is not sufficient to infer parting with possession. The test is whether the landlord retains control over the property and exclusive right to enjoy the property. In the present case, it is argued that contemnor no.1 has not parted with possession and is all along in control of the suit property. 40. Learned senior counsel for the contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4 adopts the arguments of contemnor nos. 1 and 5. The written notes of arguments filed by contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4 is almost a verbatim reproduction of the written notes of contemnor nos. 1 and 5. In addition to the judgments cited by contemnor nos.1 and 5, contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4 cite Mahendra Nath Bagchi v. Tarak Chandra Sinha, reported at AIR 1932 Cal 504, to contend that constructive possession, as distinguished from actual possession, generally means possession through a tenant or agent. 41. Contemnor no. 6 adopts the arguments of the other contemnors as well and reiterates that the said contemnor has tendered unconditional apology, which itself should suffice to purge the perceived contempt, if any. However, it is denied that any deliberate or wilful 15 violation of the order of this Court has been committed by the said contemnor. 42. Upon hearing the contentions of the respective parties, the following issues fall for consideration: (i) Whether the Contempt Rule was in form and supported by clear allegations made in the contempt application on oath, and is thus maintainable; (ii) Whether any willful and deliberate disobedience of the Order of this Court dated June 18, 2025 has been made out; (iii) Whether the apologies tendered by the contemnors purge the acts of contempt, if any. 43. The above issues are answered in the following manner: (i) Whether the Contempt Rule was in form and supported by clear allegations made in the contempt application on oath, and is thus maintainable 44. In order to decide this issue, certain facts have to be taken into consideration. The Contempt Rule was issued on December 8, 2025, “calling upon the contemnors as pleaded in the contempt application to show cause as to why they should not be committed to prison or otherwise penalised or dealt with for having 16 wilfully violated the order dated June 18, 2025 passed by this Court in FMAT No.208 of 2025.” 45. The expression “as pleaded in the contempt application” clearly links the rule to the contempt application and the averments made therein. 46. It is to be noted that prior to the issuance of the rule, copies of the contempt application had been served on all the contemnors, upon which they were represented by a single set of counsel on December 8, 2025. Upon both parties being heard, the Court observed, upon taking note of the averments and annexures to the contempt application, that the Court was satisfied prima facie of there being a deliberate and wilful disobedience of the order of the Court dated June 18, 2025, by way of altering the status quo as regards the possession by inducting third parties to the property- in-question, and directed a rule to be issued. 47. Hence, there could not have been an iota of doubt in the mind of the contemnors as to exactly what allegations were levelled against them and what was the scope of the contempt. 48. It is to be kept in mind that the power of contempt is inherent in a Court of records, which every High Court is, within the contemplation of Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the Rules framed under the Contempt of Courts Act are merely procedural aids to the same. Unless there is a gross violation of any 17 Rule, it cannot be said that the contempt rule is bad in law or should be discharged on such ground alone. 49. Insofar as the present contempt application is concerned, Paragraph Nos. 11 to 17 thereof, in particular Paragraph Nos. 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17, categorically spell out the exact nature of the contumacious acts alleged against the contemnors. The said paragraphs, in the jurat portion of the supporting affidavit, are stated to be either true to the knowledge of the petitioner or true to knowledge derived from the records. Hence, the arguments of the contemnors that the specific particulars of contempt were not disclosed and/or that the rule was defective, cannot be accepted from any perspective. 50. Paragraph No.19 of the contempt application, which was affirmed as true to submission, was a mere summarisation of the acts of contempt. In fact, the statement made in the said paragraph, that the contemnors are guilty of wilful violation of the order of this Court, was to be decided finally by the Court and it was for the petitioner only to submit the same before the Court. The petitioner can only point out the contumacious acts but not state, true to his knowledge, as to whether the contemnors are actually guilty of contempt. Hence, Paragraph No.19 was rightly affirmed as true to submission, whereas the necessary ingredients of the contumacious acts were 18 elaborately stated in the preceding paragraphs, which were duly affirmed as true to knowledge or records in the affidavit. 51. In Biman Bose’s case1, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court was dealing with a suo motu rule of criminal contempt, as provided in Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The rules issued therein were not in conformity with the Rules framed by this Court. The co-ordinate Bench observed, inter alia, that although in the petition filed by the Bar Association and its Secretary, the petitioners prayed for issue of suo motu Rule, in fact, the Court issued the Rule as if those Rules were founded on a petition moved by the petitioners and also referred to the allegations contained in the petition, without referring to the particular acts complained of in the rule drawn up, nor was there any reference of those contumacious acts in the order issuing the rule. 52. 52. Even in the order passed by the Division Bench issuing the rule, it was found that there was no reference of the contumacious acts which impelled Their Lordships to issue the rule. In such context, it was held that the tule was defective. 53. As opposed thereto, in the present case, the contempt rule was issued in consonance with the governing Rules of this Court and clearly referred to the 1 Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported at 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 855 19 contempt application, copies of which had already been served on the contemnors. In the order directing issuance of such rule as well, the Court had observed clearly the nature of the contempt alleged. Thus, the principle laid down in Biman Bose (supra)2 is not applicable herein. 54. Again, in Namita Sinha Roy (supra)3, the Court observed that there was no specific charge mentioned in the cause title or the prayer portion of the contempt application. However, a bare perusal of the contempt application which gave rise to the instant rule, bearing CPAN 1525 of 2025, shows that the exact acts of violation of the Court’s order and nature of the contumacious acts were categorically classified and mentioned both in the cause title and the prayer portion of the application. Thus, the said judgment does not come to the aid of the contemnors as well. 55. In Rikhab Chand Jain (supra)4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court disregarded statements affirmed on submission. However, the context of the said lis was a writ petition, which is in the nature of an original action where the averments on oath partake the character of not only pleadings but evidence, as opposed to a suit. In a contempt application, however, the function of the petitioner is merely to bring to the notice of the Court 2 Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported at 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 855 3 Namita Sinha Roy v. State of West Bengal, reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 2753 20 the deliberate and wilful acts of violation, upon which it is for the Court to issue or not to issue a rule. That apart, the ratio laid down in the above report is not germane in view of our above discussion that the exact particulars of the contumacious acts were categorically stated on oath, true to the knowledge of the deponent and records, thus ruling out the reliance of the Court only on statements affirmed on submissions. 56. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the contemnors. (ii) Whether any willful and deliberate disobedience of the Order of this Court dated June 18, 2025 has been made out 57. We cannot but take note of the fact that even prior to issuance of the rule, upon getting notice of the contempt application and being served with copies thereof, all the contemnors were represented by a single set of counsel on the first day of their appearance in the contempt proceeding, that is, on December 8, 2025. However, the contemnors later segregated into different sets and filed separate show cause affidavits, each set being represented by separate counsel as well. However, from the inherent contradictions in the affidavits of the 4 Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors., reported at 2025 INSC 1337 21 contemnors, such segregation is called out. The said contradictions are discussed at length hereinbelow. 58. Learned senior counsel appearing for all the contemnors submitted before the Court on the very first day, as borne out by the order dated December 8, 2025, that contemnor nos. 5 and 6, whose names were depicted in the signboard affixed at the suit premises, were the “authorised persons”/ “authorised agents” of contemnor no. 1. 59. Contemnor no. 1, in her show cause affidavit, states in Paragraph No.8 that the suit premises are being used by her for her official purpose. In Paragraph No.11, it is stated that limited and temporary ingress and egress was given to the petitioner, to ensure adherence to the letter which the lessor of contemnor no.1 wrote on June 22, 2025, proposing the maintenance of a register to record the purpose of visit, time or entry and exit, etc., which the petitioner and his men followed by putting their names and details, without any objection, in the register. In Paragraph No.14 of her show cause affidavit, contemnor no.1 relies on a letter dated August 14, 2025 to the petitioner asserting her exclusive possession and the fact that the property was being used for her official purpose. 22 60. It is further stated that the signboard and flex depicted in photographs annexed to the contempt application are not “at” or “inside” the suit premises but at the entrance of the suit premises. She further states that the same was put up for a “couple of days” solely for a religious marriage ceremony. 61. Again, contemnor no.1 states that she did not know of the said board. However, in Paragraph No.20, while reiterating her exclusive possession, contemnor no.1 states that under her supervision, contemnor no.6, Kazi Md. Faisullah Ansari, who was known to contemnor no.1 and her family and works with her, held a religious ceremony with the permission of contemnor no.1. In the same breath, it is admitted that contemnor no.6 is a part of GMM. 62. In Paragraph No.15 of the said show cause, contemnor no.1 admits that contemnor no.5, Md. Razaul Khan, is the staff of contemnor no.1 and is charged with the upkeep and maintenance of the suit premises, working under the authorization of contemnor no.1. It is further stated that contemnor no.5 put up his name and mobile number at the entrance of the roof in order to avoid inconvenience to persons seeking to enter the roof. 23 63. However, we fail to understand that if the property has been in exclusive possession of the contemnor no.1, how a religious ceremony could be permitted to be performed there for a couple of days, which cannot be the official purpose of contemnor no.1 by any stretch of imagination and would tantamount to altering the status and character of the suit property, for however limited a period. 64. Contemnor no.1 categorically admits, as does contemnor no.5 in his show cause affidavit, that contemnor no.5 is known since long to contemnor no.1 and her family and works under her and under her authorization. It is alleged that contemnor no.5 is not associated with GMM or any other organization or association for that matter. 65. However, such fact is categorically belied by the photograph annexed at Page 899 of the contempt application. From the same, it is seen that a board has been affixed at the suit property, which appears to be in sky blue colour in the photograph, where contemnor no.5 Md. Razaul Khan is mentioned as the Director and Kazi Md. Faizullah Ansari, contemnor no. 6, as the General Secretary of GMM. The phone number of the contemnor no.6, and not contemnor no.5, is given thereunder. 66. The stand taken by contemnor no.1 is that she was unaware of such board being put up. 24 Contemnor no.5 follows suit by saying that he had not put up the same. Surprisingly, contemnor no.6 also disowns having affixed the said board. Thus, between themselves, the contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6 feign ignorance as to who put up the board, despite the same depicting the names of contemnor nos.5 and 6 categorically in specific capacities as officials of GMM, with which contemnor no.6 is admittedly associated and contemnor no. 1 is not. 67. Read in conjunction, the averments of the said three contemnors to the effect that the contemnor nos.5 and 6 work under the contemnor no.1 and contemnor no.4, and that contemnor no.6 is associated with GMM, with which contemnor no.1 admittedly has no nexus, goes on to show beyond reasonable doubt that with active permission of contemnor no.1, who claims to be in exclusive possession of the suit property, the said property was permitted to be used by a third- party/organization, being the GMM, for a purpose unconnected with contemnor no.1. Although contemnor no.6 allegedly works as an agent of contemnor no.1, in view of the admission of contemnor no.1 that she has no connection with GMM, with which contemnor no.6 is independently associated, it is clear as daylight that the property was permitted to be used by a third- 25 party/organization having no nexus with contemnor no.1, for whatever purpose. The averment that such user was not for any commercial benefit but for religious purpose does have any bearing on the issue at hand, since monetary gain is not a component of the order of the status quo passed by this Court, which unequivocally directed all parties to maintain status quo not only as regards possession but as regards the nature and character of the suit property as well. The character of the suit property, which is admittedly used for the official purpose of contemnor no.1, was altered by permitting user of the same for religious/ceremonial purposes, that too by a third party-association over which contemnor no.1 admittedly has no control. 68. Contemnor no. 5 conveniently feigns ignorance about his name being depicted as a Director of GMM in the board put up at the suit premises, which is admittedly in exclusive possession of contemnor no.1. If contemnor no.1 admittedly is in exclusive possession and contemnor no.5, as admitted in his show-cause affidavit, has been present at the suit premises throughout the relevant period, it defies logic as to how the said board could be put up without their knowledge. 26 69. It is sought to be made out by the contemnors that the other navy-blue signboard seen in the photograph at Page 899 of the contempt application was for the purpose of implementing the order of this Court. In the said board, the order of this Court has even been referred to. However, the directions contained in the said board were not a part of the status quo order of this Court. The board uses the expression “in compliance with the above order” (the date of the Order of this Court is also stated) but proceeds to state certain restrictions which were never a part of the order, such as persons entering the property duly identifying themselves and proving their identity by ID/authorization verification, etc. Thus, the mutilation and perversion of the contents of the order, as depicted in the said board, is itself a deliberate and willful violation of the order of this Court and is palpably contumacious. 70. In the said board, the names of contemnor no. 5 and 6, with their respective mobile numbers, find place in the capacity of “authorized signatory”. Since such capacity was indicated with reference to the Court’s order, the obvious connotation to any layman would be that the Court had authorized contemnor nos. 5 and 6 to put up the board, which is a travesty of justice and a 27 deliberate effort to twist the order of the Court beyond recognition and putting words into the order which were never there in the original order. Even otherwise, contrary to the statements in the show cause affidavits of contemnor nos. 1 and 5, in none of the said boards is it reflected that the depiction of the mobile number of contemnor nos.5 and 6 was for the purpose of assisting people to get access to the roof. 71. Another board is seen in the photograph annexed at Page 901 of the contempt application. An absurd and ridiculous defence has been taken by the contemnors, that the same was not “in the suit premises” but at its entrance gate. If a signboard is put up at the entrance of a building, it would be preposterous to say that the same is not “at the suit building”. On a much more serious note is what is written on the said board. The full name of the GMM, an association, having admittedly no connection with contemnor nos. 1 to 5, is depicted thereon with its branch office being shown as the suit property itself. Thus, the said signboard, affixed at the entrance gate of the suit premises and boldly depicting the branch office of an alien association to be the suit property itself, clearly goes on to show that the third-party association was given possession in respect of the suit 28 property which is not of a temporary but of a permanent nature. 72. The consistent case of the contemnors has been that no possession was handed over to the said association, apart from the purpose of an one-off conduct of a “religious marriage ceremony”. The contemnors even rely on Mahendra Nath Bagchi (supra)5 to distinguish between constructive possession and actual possession. 73. In Gopal Saran (supra)6 cited by contemnor nos.2 to 4 as well as contemnor nos.1 and 5, it was held in the context of an eviction suit that parting with possession depends on the quality of occupation given and if the landlord retains control and the exclusive right to enjoy the property, mere occupation of a third-party would not be sufficient to infer parting with possession. However, as enumerated in the said judgment, the consideration therein was whether the ground of eviction, being assignment, subletting or otherwise parting with possession, was satisfied. The tests thereof are different from a contempt application. In case of an eviction suit, transfer of exclusive possession and control is required to be proved for the purpose of establishing the ground of subletting/assignment/parting with possession. 5 Mahendra Nath Bagchi v. Tarak Chandra Sinha, reported at AIR 1932 Cal 504 29 However, in the instant case, we are to look only at the purport of the order alleged to be violated. The order directed categorically both parties to maintain status quo as regards nature, character and possession of the suit property. Even if an element of permanent hand over of possession is not proved, still, an act of parting with possession even for a limited period would tantamount to violation of the said order. 74. Insofar as the last above-mentioned photograph is concerned, it clearly shows that the suit property has a branch office of GMM, with which contemnor no. 1 admittedly has no connection, at the suit premises. In the teeth of the consistent assertion of contemnor no.1 of being in exclusive possession, the said photograph militates against the stand of the contemnors and clearly shows that the contemnors are trying to cover up the deliberate violation of the order of this Court by parting with possession, even if of a portion of the subject property, in favour of a complete stranger. 75. The attempts at misguiding the Court do not end there. The contemnor nos. 1 and 5, despite admitting exclusive possession and being present in the suit property at all points of time, pretend to have been completely unaware of who set up the board. Not stopping there, they admitted to have 6 Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, reported at (1989) 3 SCC 56 30 removed the board, allegedly after detecting the same. 76. Contemnor nos. 1 as well as 5 and 6 assert repeatedly in their show cause affidavits that the religious ceremony took place only for two days, with the permission of contemnor no. 1 and active assistance of contemnor no. 5, immediately after which the offending signboards were removed. Hence, not only possession was parted with for two days, on a much graver note, the board affixed at the entrance, which was removed after detection, clearly goes on to show that the suit property was permitted to be used as a branch office of a complete stranger association, which was sought to be covered up by removing the board to efface evidence of contempt after being caught out. 77. When we pose the question to ourselves, “Is it possible that contemnor no. 1, who admittedly permitted contemnor no. 6 (admittedly her agent) to organize a religious/marriage ceremony as a functionary of a third-party organization, and contemnor no. 5, also an agent of contemnor no. 1, who actively assisted in conduct of such ceremony on the instruction of contemnor no. 1, were completely unaware of the board at the relevant juncture?”, the resounding answer we get is “No”. 31 78. The complicity of all the contemnors in the deliberate violation of the order of this Court is, thus, evident, since contemnor nos.5 and 6, who were not parties to the original appeal, have their names printed boldly in the offending boards referred to above, in which the order of this Court was categorically mentioned. Thus, the contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6 all along acted in tandem and deliberately violated the order of this Court without any scruple. 79. The said contumacious acts are aggravated by the attempts of the said contemnors to cover up such misdeed by making contradictory statements in their respective show cause affidavits and pretend ignorance of the boards being set up. 80. In Kanwar Singh Saini (supra)7, cited by the contemnors, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that if disobedience is under compelling circumstances, no criminal contempt lies. Contempt was held to be of a quasi-criminal nature, requiring standard of proof as in criminal cases, not resting on surmises and conjecture. 81. We take note of the fact that the said proceeding arose out of a criminal contempt, as distinguished from the present case, which is a civil contempt in nature, by dint of willful and deliberate violation of 7 Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, reported at (2012) 4 SCC 307 32 a Court’s order. In a criminal contempt, the standard is higher, to the extent that the Court has to come to a conclusion that an obstruction has been come to the administration of justice, although the “beyond reasonable doubt” principle is applicable to both. 82. Even otherwise, there is no scope of conjecture and surmise in the present instance, as a clear-cut case of contumacious acts has been made out. 83. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union (supra)8, it was held that a deliberate action with evil intent or bad motive/purpose tantamounts to civil contempt, as in the present case. An exception was made in cases where the order is not capable of execution but requires extraordinary effort, independent upon the act or omission of a third-party, for compliance. No extraordinary effort, however, was required in the instant case to comply with the status quo order passed by this Court. Rather, positive and deliberate acts in violation of the same were required to flout such order, the ingredients of which have been established from the facts as discussed above. 84. In Jhareswar Prasad Paul (supra)9 it was held that Court shall not enter into questions not dealt with 8 Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, reported at (2003) 11 SCC 1 9 Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, reported at (2002) 5 SCC 352 33 in the parent order or consider directions not issued but which the order “should have” contained. In the present case, we only proceed on the premise of the exact words of the order dated June 18, 2025, which are neither ambiguous nor vague, requiring clarification. 85. In Suvendu Adhikari (supra)10 it was only held that the benefit of the doubt regarding deliberate disobedience, if available, goes to the contemnor. We agree with the proposition that censure for contempt is an extreme measure to protect the dignity of the Court. However, it is the dignity of the Court which is at stake in the present case due to the willful violation of the Court’s order by the contemnors. 86. In U.N. Bora (supra)11, it was observed that no roving enquiry is to be undertaken by the Court going beyond the violated order and that such principle would apply with more vigour when disputed question of facts are involved. 87. However, in the present case, we go only by the admitted facts. The boards and flexes depicted in the photograph-in-question were admitted to have existed and to have been removed by the contemnors themselves. We further proceed on the 10 Suvendu Adhikari v. Manoj Malaviya, reported at (2022) 1 HCC (Cal) 330 11 U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., reported at (2022) 1 SCC 101 34 basis of the averments made in the show cause affidavits of the contemnors themselves. 88. Thus, none of the judgments cited by the contemnors come to their aid. 89. The next facet of the matter is that the contemnors consistently deny the existence of any network apparatus or device on the roof of the suit premises. 90. However, the photograph at Page 907 of the contempt application, which is not denied by the contemnors, clearly depicts a microwave dish antenna which is generally used as a wireless internet receiver for internet service providers. Devices in the nature of the said rooftop infrastructure which is visible in the said photograph are generally utilized by wireless internet service providers to enhance network connectivity in buildings or complexes. We also find on record several e-mails sent by the different service providers to the Association of Owners, complaining that they have been denied access to the roof. Seen in the context of the admitted position that a register was put in place and the roof was locked by the contemnors, which was not provided for in the parent order, it is quite credible that due to the locking of the roof entrance by the 35 contemnors, the network providers could not get access thereto. 91. We are rather surprised that the exact words of the order were altered and new words alien to the order were introduced in the board seen in the photographs at Pages 899 and 900 of the contempt application. Words were put into the mouth of the Court which were not there, by giving out that such statements were “in compliance with the” order of this Court. 92. In the order dated June 18, 2025, it was merely mentioned that the right of ingress and egress of the appellant/petitioner and his men and agents would be limited and temporary, for specific purposes if any, and would not be of such nature as to disturb the exclusive possession of the plaintiff/contemnor no.1. However, there was no provision in the said order permitting the respondent/plaintiff or any of the contemnors to block the ingress and egress and subject the entry and exit to the suit property, insofar as the petitioner and his agents are concerned, to the will and whims of the contemnors. There is not a single word in the order dated June 18, 2025 to the effect that the ingress and egress of the petitioner and his men and agents, although limited and for specific purposes, would be subject to the 36 permission of the contemnors. In the absence of the same, putting a lock on the door and subjecting the petitioner and his men and agents to permission being taken from the contemnors on each and every occasion was not at all in consonance with the order; rather, in gross derogation of the same. 93. Thus, this Court comes to the conclusion that there was deliberate and willful violation of the order of this Court, both in letter and spirit, by the contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6. 94. However, insofar as other contemnors are concerned, we do not find any specific proof of any deliberate and willful violation on their behalf or their direct involvement in the acts of contempt narrated hereinabove. Moreover, contemnor no.2 and its Directors, contemnor nos.3 and 4, are apparently in constructive possession of the property through the contemnor no.1, the latter claiming exclusive possession in any event. 95. This issue is decided accordingly. (iii) Whether the apologies tendered by the contemnors purge the acts of contempt, if any 96. The apology supposedly tendered by the contemnors in their show cause affidavits, although described as 37 “unconditional”, are qualified by the rider: “in the event the contemnors are found to be guilty of contempt”. Thus, the contemnors have not come clean before the Court, apologising for their violation of the order of Court, but have only paid lip-service to the concept of apology. 97. In U.P. Resident Employees’s case12, it was categorically observed that the apology tendered in the case was worthless, after it being found that false statements were made on oath. In the present case, the attempts of the contemnors have been to mislead the Court by making false and incorrect statements on oath, thus rendering the apology worthless. 98. In Chandra Shashi (supra)13, the Hon’ble Supreme Court succinctly observed that had the contemnors shown real contriteness and regret for the act done, the Court would have perhaps accepted his apology; but such apology cannot be used as a weapon of defence to get purged of the guilt which precisely the contemnor had sought to do as he desired to avoid worldly suffering which would follow if sentenced. In such context, such lip-service of an apology was discarded. 12 U.P. Resident Employees Coop. House Building Society v. NOIDA, reported at (2007) 15 SCC 515 13 Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, reported at (1995) 1 SCC 421 38 99. Again, in T.N. Godavarman (supra)14, the Supreme Court reiterated that the explanations of the contemnors were clearly unacceptable and mens rea was writ large. Apology was held to be an act of contrition and unless it was offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, it was shorn of penitence and hence liable to be rejected. The same principle applies in the present case as well, since after having made misleading and deliberately incorrect statements in their show-cause affidavits, the contemnors tender the charade of an apology. 100. Hence, such mechanical and empty apology is a farce and is thus unacceptable, having been used merely as an alternative line of defence to escape the consequences of contempt. Thus, reject such so-called apology as a mere ploy and a defence to ward off punishment for contempt. 101. This issue is, thus, also decided against the contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6. CONCLUSION 102. In view of our above observations, the Court comes the conclusion that the contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6 are guilty of deliberate and wilful disobedience of the Order dated June 18, 2025, passed in FMAT No.208 of 2025 (with CAN 1 of 2025). 14 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, reported at (2006) 5 SCC 1 39 103. Accordingly, we hold the contemnor no. 1 (Kanchan Jyoti Rao), contemnor no. 5 (Md. Razaul Khan) and contemnor no. 6 (Kazi Md. Faizullah Ansari) guilty of contempt of court and sentence them to simple (civil) imprisonment for 2 days (48 hours) starting from today, as well as fine of Rs. 2000/- each, payable by the each of the contemnors within 24 hours. In default of payment of such fine, the period of imprisonment shall stand extended for a further period of 2 days (48 hours). 104. The Deputy Sheriff shall take immediate custody of the contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6 and do the needful in terms of the above order. 105. Subsistence allowance, costs, and other requisites shall be put in by the petitioner immediately. 106. CRC 31 of 2025 is made absolute in terms of the above order. 107. The connected contempt application, being CPAN 1525 of 2025, stands allowed accordingly. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Uday Kumar, J.) 40 Later After the above order is passed, a prayer of stay is made on behalf of the contemnors. However, we do not find any mitigating circumstances to grant such prayer. Accordingly, such prayer is refused. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Uday Kumar, J.)