JUDGMENT : A.C. BEHERA, J. 1. This 2 nd appeal has been preferred against the confirming judgment. 2. The predecessor of the appellants in this 2 nd appeal, i.e., Naresh Prasad Saha, was the sole plaintiff before the learned trial court in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 and after the death of Naresh Prasad Saha his legal heirs preferred the 1 st appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018 being the appellants. The parents of the respondents in this 2nd appeal were the defendants before the learned trial court in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 and the respondents before the learned 1 st appellate court in the 1 st appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018. When, during the pendency of the 1 st appeal, the parents of the respondents expired, then, the respondents in this 2 nd appeal were substituted in their places. 3. The properties described in Schedule-A of the plaint, i.e., Plot Not.257(gharabari, dokan ghara) A.0.16 decimals under Khata No.137 in Mouza-Baripada Town, Unit-6, Purunahatsahi in the district of Mayurbhanj are the suit properties. 4. The predecessor of the appellants in this 2 nd appeal, i.e., Naresh Prasad Saha filed a suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 being the plaintiff against the parents of the respondents in this 2 nd appeal in the court of the learned Civil Judge(Sr. Division), Baripada praying for a declaration that, “he is the absolute owner of the suit premises described in Schedule-A of the plaint, to restrain the defendants from entering into the suit properties/premises through municipality, to injuct the defendants permanently from coming into the suit premises/properties described in Schedule-A and to pass a decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties, if he(plaintiff) is found to be dispossessed from the suit properties during the pendency of the suit.” As per the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff, Munilal Saha was their common ancestor. The said Munilal Saha died leaving behind his three sons, i.e., Ramdayal Saha, Raghunandan Saha and Jogeswar Saha. Ramdayal Saha died leaving behind his six sons, i.e., Sibasankar Saha, Mangal Saha, Mohesh Saha, Sahadev Saha, Ranjeet Saha and Susil Saha. The said six sons of Ramdayal Saha were not made parties in the suit. The 2 nd son of Munilal Saha, i.e., Raghunandan Saha died leaving behind his only son Hariprasad Saha.
Ramdayal Saha died leaving behind his six sons, i.e., Sibasankar Saha, Mangal Saha, Mohesh Saha, Sahadev Saha, Ranjeet Saha and Susil Saha. The said six sons of Ramdayal Saha were not made parties in the suit. The 2 nd son of Munilal Saha, i.e., Raghunandan Saha died leaving behind his only son Hariprasad Saha. Hariprasad Saha and his wife Shantilata Saha died on dated 05.12.2009 and 29.11.2009 respectively leaving behind the defendant nos.1(a) and 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b) as their successors. The 3 rd son of Munilal Saha, i.e., Jogeswar Saha died leaving behind his two sons, i.e., Ganesh Prasad Saha and Naresh Prasad Saha. Naresh Prasad Saha is the plaintiff in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005. According to the case of the plaintiff Naresh Prasad Saha, there was long standing dispute between three sons of Munilal Saha, i.e., Ramdayal Saha, Raghunandan Saha and Jogeswar Saha and their litigation vide Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 reached before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in that Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 appointed a sole Arbitrator and the said sole Arbitrator allotted lands and buildings including the business of the parties, i.e., both the movable and immovable properties with assets and liabilities thereof between the three sons of Munilal Saha separately. In that allotment, the market building inside Baripada town fell in the share of Hariprasad Saha(defendant no.1) and motor parts business, which was running in that market building fell in the share of the plaintiff. On the basis of that settlement/allotment as per the order/direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999, the plaintiff managed the motor parts business situated on suit Plot No.257 described in Schedule-A of the plaint and paid rent of the same to the Government and also collected rents from the tenants of the said market building. The defendant no.1, i.e., Hariprasad Saha filed a suit vide C.S. No.393 of 2002 against one tenant of that market building, i.e., against Narayan Prasad Bhatter praying for declaration and recovery of possession, but that suit was dismissed on dated 31.10.2007 for the default of the defendant no.1(Hariprasad Saha). 5. According to the above allotment, the plaintiff had/has been enjoying the Schedule-A market building for more than 40 years being the owner of the same, in which, the defendants have no interest and possession. 6.
5. According to the above allotment, the plaintiff had/has been enjoying the Schedule-A market building for more than 40 years being the owner of the same, in which, the defendants have no interest and possession. 6. As per the order of the Tahasildar Baripada, in Mutation Case No.205 of 2000, the Tahasildar, Baripada recorded suit land in favour of the defendant no.1(Hariprasad Saha) erroneously on the basis of the allotment/settlement made by the sole Arbitrator, to which, he(plaintiff) challenged by filing Mutation Appeal No.32 of 2000 before the Sub- collector, Baripada alleging that, the Tahasildar, Baripada has passed such order relying upon fake and false documents. When on dated 31.05.2005, Baripada Municipality issued notice to all the tenants of the suit premises including the plaintiff for vacation of the houses from the same for the purpose of renovation and when, the plaintiff came to know that, the defendants have managed to issue such notice to him(plaintiff) and his tenants through Municipality in order to evict them from the suit premises illegally and when the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit premises, then, he (plaintiff) approached the civil court by filing a suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 against the defendants, i.e., against Hariprasad Saha and his wife Shantilata Saha praying for declaration of his title over the suit premises/properties described in Schedule-A and to injunct the defendants from entering into the same through Baripapada Municipality and to recover the possession of the suit premises from the defendants, if he(plaintiff) is found to be dispossessed from the suit premises illegally by the defendants during the pendency of the suit. 7.
7. In the said suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005, the defendants filed a petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. praying for rejection of the plaint of the plaintiff on the ground that, when there was previous partition/distribution of their all joint properties including the Schedule-A suit properties/premises between them(defendants and plaintiff) along with their other co-sharers as per the order/direction issued/passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 and when on the basis of such allotment/settlement, the suit properties described in Schedule-A had fallen in the share of the defendant no.1(Hariparasad Saha) and when, as per such allotment made by the sole Arbitrator, the plaintiff was allotted only with the motor parts business, which was running by then in the market building, but, not the land and building thereof and the land and building thereof was allotted in favour of the defendant no.1(Hariparasad Saha) and when the award passed in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 between the parties has already been reached in its finality, the said matter cannot be reopened again through the present suit filed by the plaintiff long years thereafter and when, the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India passed in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 has already been acted upon by the parties, then, the plaintiff is estopped under law to file the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005. For which, the plaint of the plaintiff in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 is liable to be rejected being barred under law. As such, the plaint of the plaintiff in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 is vexatious. The same is to be rejected. 8. The plaintiff objected to the aforesaid petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. of the defendants stating in his objection that, the sole Arbitrator appointed in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 by the order/direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had allotted motor parts business (which was running in the building of the suit premises) in his favour, for which, he(plaintiff) is the owner in both, i.e., suit premises as well as motor parts business, As the deceased father of the defendants, i.e., Hariparasad Saha managed to mutate the suit premises illegally in his favour, for which, he(plaintiff) challenged the same preferring a mutation appeal.
When, it is the settled propositions of law that, order of mutation as well as RoR do not create or extinguish title, then, the petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. of the defendants is liable to be rejected. 9. After hearing from both the sides, the learned trial court allowed to the petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. of the defendants as per order dated 28.02.2018 passed in C.S. No.290 of 2005 and rejected to the plaint of the plaintiff in C.S. No.290 of 2005 assigning the reasons that, “the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff in C.S. No.290 of 2005 are purely illusory. There is no real cause of action in the plaint for filing the same. Because, the suit properties/premises were allotted by the sole Arbitrator as per the order/direction made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 in favour of the defendant no.1, i.e., Hari Prasad Saha. For which, the suit of the plaintiff vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 is barred under law. The plaint thereof is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, as per order dated 28.02.2018, the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Baripada rejected to the plaint of the plaintiff in C.S. No.290 of 2005.” 10. On being dissatisfied with the said order of rejection to the plaint of the plaintiff vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 passed on dated 28.02.2018 by the learned trial court, the plaintiff challenged the same preferring an appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018 being the appellant against the defendants arraying them (defendants) as respondents. 11. When, during the pendency of the appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018, the appellant/plaintiff as well as defendants expired, then, their legal heirs were substituted in their places. 12.
11. When, during the pendency of the appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018, the appellant/plaintiff as well as defendants expired, then, their legal heirs were substituted in their places. 12. After hearing from both the sides, the learned 1 st appellate court dismissed to that 1 st appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018 on dated 30.07.2022 of the plaintiff and confirmed to the order of rejection to the plaint of the plaintiff vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 passed by the learned trial court on dated 28.02.2018 assigning the reasons that, “When, the plaintiff has not taken any step within prescribed time limit to challenge the award/allotment/settlement passed in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 by the sole Arbitrator and when the allotment made by the sole Arbitrator in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 has already been reached in its finality and when basing upon such award, RoR of the suit properties has already been prepared in favour of the defendants as per order passed in Mutation Case No.205 of 2000 and when the prayer no.(i) in the plaint of the plaintiff is purely on the basis of the award passed by the sole Arbitrator in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999, then, the real controversies between the parties, i.e., whether the suit properties/premises, on which, the market building exists had fallen in the share of the defendants or plaintiff and when, the appeal of the plaintiff vide Mutation Appeal No.32 of 2000 has already been dismissed by the Sub-Collector, Baripada on dated 17.10.2001 taking the award of the Arbitrator into account and when as per the award/allotment of the Arbitrator, the land and buildings on Schedule-A suit properties were allotted in favour of the defendant no.1, i.e., Hari Prasad Saha and when, such allotment has already been set at rest and when the prayer no.(ii) to (iv) in the plaint of the plaintiff are dependant upon the prayer no.(i) and when prayer no.(i) has already been decided by the sole Arbitrator and the said decision of the sole Arbitrator is binding upon the parties and when the decision of the Arbitrator has remained unchallenged by the parties thereof including the plaintiff, then, at this stage, if the suit of the plaintiff vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 will be allowed to proceed, then, it will be a re-visit to the arbitral award by the civil court.
For which, civil court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and the same will not bring an end to the litigation and the aim and object of the law shall be frustrated. Therefore, it is held by the trial court that, the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff are illusory and the same does not provide cause of action for filing the suit. Therefore, the impugned order passed on dated 28.02.2018 by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Baripada in C.S. No.290 of 2005 for the rejection of the plaint is not required to be interfered with.” 13. On being aggrieved with the aforesaid dismissal of the appeal vide RFA No.16 of 2018 of the plaintiff/appellant, the successors of the plaintiff challenged the same preferring this 2 nd appeal being the appellants against the defendants arraying the successors of the defendants as respondents. 14. This 2 nd appeal was admitted on formulation of the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the learned trial court is justified in rejecting the plaint on the plea of the existing award particularly when the suit is in respect of protection of the property fell into the share of the plaintiff pursuant to the said award and subsequent attempt to frustrate the award constituting the cause of action to file the suit? (ii) Whether the plaint could have been rejected on the plea of limitation, cause of action and res judicata which involves determination on mixed question of fact and law and accordingly, warranting adjudication of the suit on merit inter alia with other issues? (iii) Whether the learned courts below justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation counting the same on and from the date of award while the suit prayer involved subsequent event to deprive the plaintiff to protect his property fell into the share of the plaintiff by virtue of the said award? 15. I have already heard from the learned counsel for the appellants(plaintiffs) and the learned counsel for the respondents (defendants). 16. In support of the impugned order and judgment for rejection of the plaint, the learned counsel for the respondents(defendants) relied upon the following decision :- (i) In a case between T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal and another, (1977) 4 SCC 467 17.
16. In support of the impugned order and judgment for rejection of the plaint, the learned counsel for the respondents(defendants) relied upon the following decision :- (i) In a case between T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal and another, (1977) 4 SCC 467 17. When, the aforesaid three formulated substantial questions of law are inter-linked relating to the matter, i.e., rejection of plaint of the appellant/plaintiff in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C., then all the above three formulated substantial questions of law are taken up together analogously for their discussions hereunder:- 18. As, this 2 nd appeal has been preferred challenging the rejection of the plaint of the plaintiff/appellant in C.S. No.290 of 2005, for which, this 2 nd appeal is not enjoined to be decided on merits of controversies between the parties. For which, in this 2 nd appeal, the formulated substantial questions of law shall be answered confining its examinations only to the validity of the impugned order of the learned trial court as well as the judgment of the learned appellate court in respect of the petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. of the defendants. So, the scope of this 2 nd appeal shall be confined to the above purpose, but, not beyond that. 19. On this aspect, the propositions of law has already been clarified by the Apex court in the ratio of the following decision:- (i) In a case between Sri Srikanth N.S. and others vs. K. Munivenkatappa and another , 2025 (3) CCC (SC) 01 that, Any appeal against the rejection of plaint, the appellate court is not enjoined to decide merits of the controversies. The appellate court shall only examine the validity of order of the trial court in rejecting the plaint. For the said purpose, the appellate court will see only to the averments in the plaint and nothing beyond. So, this 2 nd appellate court shall answer to the aforesaid formulated substantial questions of law only referring to the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff, but, nothing beyond that. 20. Naresh Prasad Saha(father of the appellants) was the sole plaintiff before the learned trial court in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005.
So, this 2 nd appellate court shall answer to the aforesaid formulated substantial questions of law only referring to the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff, but, nothing beyond that. 20. Naresh Prasad Saha(father of the appellants) was the sole plaintiff before the learned trial court in the suit vide C.S. No.290 of 2005. After the death of the sole plaintiff, his legal heirs have been substituted in his place and they have adopted to the plaint of the plaintiff Naresh Prasad Saha. 21. In para nos.2, 3, 4, 4(a), 5 and 6 of the plaint of the plaintiff, it has been specifically stated that, “there was long standing dispute between his co-sharers, for which, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 appointed sole Arbitrator and the said sole Arbitrator by way of award settled/allotted lands, buildings and business in respect of both movable and immovable properties with assets and liabilities between the co-sharers. As per such allotment/settlement made by the sole Arbitrator, the market building fell in the share of Hari Prasad Saha, predecessor of the defendants and motor parts business, which was running in that market building on suit Plot No.257 fell in the share of the father of the plaintiff. On the basis of the said allotment, the plaintiff managed and controlled the motor parts business on suit Plot No.257. The suit Plot No.257 has been mutated in favour of the defendants on the basis of the award passed in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 by the Tahasildar, Baripada in Mutation Case No.205 of 2000, to which, they(plaintiffs) have challenged by filing mutation Appeal No.32 of 2000 before the Sub-collector, Baripada. The principal prayer of the plaintiff in the suit is to declare him(plaintiff) as the absolute owner of the suit premises vide Plot No.257 of Schedule-A properties.” 22. On the basis of the aforesaid averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff, it is his own case of the plaintiff that, in the award passed by the sole Arbitrator on being appointed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999, the market building situated on Schedule-A land, i.e., on Plot No.257 had fallen in the share of Hariprasad Saha(defendant no.1) and the motor parts business(which was running in the said Plot No.257) had fallen in the share of the father of the plaintiff, i.e., Jogeswar Saha.
The suit Plot No.257 has already been mutated in favour of the defendants on the basis of the award passed by the sole Arbitrator. 23. Now, the questions arise, when the land and buildings situated on the suit Plot No.257 described in Schedule-A was allotted in favour of the defendant no.1 in the award passed by the sole Arbitrator on being appointed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 and when the motor parts business(which was running in the suit plot) was allotted in favour of the plaintiff, then at this juncture, it will be seen, as per law, who is the owner of the land and building situated on suit Plot No.257 described in Schedule-A. The land and building was allotted in favour of the defendant no.1 and the motor parts business running in the same was allotted in favour of the plaintiff. The suit of the plaintiff is for declaration of title over the suit properties described in Schedule-A on the basis of the allotment of motor parts business in favour of the plaintiff. 24. It is very fundamental in law that, a business or trade, which is a growing concern, is movable property, even though, the business may be conducted at a fixed place. So, business is a movable property, but, a building or land is immovable property under the property law. Any business and ownership thereof can be transferred through sale of good will, shares, or partnership interest often without transferring any immovable property. As per Section 3 of the T.P Act, 1882, a business does not fall under the definition of immovable property. It is neither land nor a benefit arising directly out of the land. Therefore, as per Section 3 of the T.P. Act, 1882, a business is a movable property. As per Section 3(36) of the general clause Act, 1897, the business is excluded from the definition of immovable property, which naturally falls within the scope of movable property. 25.
It is neither land nor a benefit arising directly out of the land. Therefore, as per Section 3 of the T.P. Act, 1882, a business is a movable property. As per Section 3(36) of the general clause Act, 1897, the business is excluded from the definition of immovable property, which naturally falls within the scope of movable property. 25. When, it is the own case of the plaintiff in his plaint that, as per the allotment made by the sole Arbitrator on being appointed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999, the land and building on Plot No.257 described in Schedule-A was allotted in favour of the defendant no.1 and the motor parts business(which was running in plot situated in Plot No.257) was allotted in favour of the plaintiff and when, in view of the above definition of the business according to Section 3 of the T.P. Act, 1882 and Section 3(36) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a business is not an immovable property, but, land and building are immovable property under property law and a business is movable property, even though, the same may be conducted at a fixed place, then at this juncture, on the basis of the above allotment made by the sole Arbitrator in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999, the defendants are the owners of the suit properties/premises, even though, the motor parts business(which was running in the suit premises) was allotted in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not the owner of the land and building described in Schedule-A of the plaint. 26. The whole purpose of conferring the powers under Order-7, Rule- 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of a plaint is that, a litigation, which is meaningless and abortive, the same should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court exercising the mind of the defendant or defendants. Because, the sword of damocles need not be kept hanging over the head of the defendant or defendants unnecessarily without point or purpose in any civil litigation. So, the court readily exercise its power to reject a plaint. Therefore, no meaningless litigation should be permitted to proceed, so that, time of judiciary shall not be wasted unnecessarily. For which, the ends of justice shall bestly be served, if there will be an end to the sham litigation.
So, the court readily exercise its power to reject a plaint. Therefore, no meaningless litigation should be permitted to proceed, so that, time of judiciary shall not be wasted unnecessarily. For which, the ends of justice shall bestly be served, if there will be an end to the sham litigation. So, the power of court to reject the plaint is drastic. 27. On this aspect, the propositions of law has already been clarified in the ratio of the following decisions:- (i) In a case between Kumari Geetha and others vs. Nanundaswamy and others , 2024 (2) Civil Law Judgments 691 (SC) that, The principle underlying behind the Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint is that, no meaningless litigation be permitted to proceed. So that, time of judiciary be not washed. It is necessary for the ends of justice that, there should be an end of sham litigation. Power of court rejecting of plaint is drastic. (ii) In a case between Azhar Hussain vs. Rajib Gandhi , 1986 (Supp.) SCC 315 (Para-12) that, The whole purpose of conferment of powers to the court under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of plaint is to ensure that, a litigation, which is meaningless and abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. (iii) In a case between Dahiben vs. Arvindabhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and others , ( 2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2021 (1) Civil Court Cases 210 (S.C.) that, that, If, however, on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that, the suit does not disclose right to sue, cause of action or suit is barred by any law, in that case, the court has no option but to reject the plaint, as the provisions of Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. is mandatory in nature in view of the expression “shall” appearing therein. (iv) In a case between Bhargavi Constructions and another vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others , AIR 2017 SC 4428 : (2017) 3 SCC 474 that, For rejection of plaint, law means, judge made law, but, not only the legislative enactment.
(iv) In a case between Bhargavi Constructions and another vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others , AIR 2017 SC 4428 : (2017) 3 SCC 474 that, For rejection of plaint, law means, judge made law, but, not only the legislative enactment. For which, plaint shall be rejected not only through legislative enactment, but also through judicial decision of the Supreme Court given under Article-141 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Law means, judgment made law by High Court and Supreme Court in respect of Order-7, Rule-11 (d) of the C.P.C. (v) In a case between Sadhu Ram (Since Deceased) through his LRs. and others vs. State of Haryana through Collector, 2025 (4) Civil Law Judgments 370 (P&H) that, When, the matter has already been reached in its finality, the same cannot be re-adjudicated through any suit or proceeding. (vi) In a case between Vinod Kumar Singh and others vs. Devraj Singh and others , 2015 (3) CCC 463 (Delhi) that, When, an issue is decided in a suit between same parties involving same subject matter, the same cannot be raised in subsequent suit. (vii) In a case between Laxmi Housing Udyog Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sharad Subramanyan and others , 2016 (2) CCC 188 (Callcutta) that, When, the same matter has already been decided between the same parties, the plaint in the subsequent suit between the same party will be liable to be rejected. (viii) In a case between T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal and another , AIR 1977 SC 2421 that, where on reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should exercise its power under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C.. If a clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court must nip it in the bud. 28.
If a clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court must nip it in the bud. 28. When, it is the settled propositions of law in view of the decision of the Apex court between Vinod Infra Developer Ltd. vs. Mahavir Lunia and others, 2025 INSC 772 that, at the stage of consideration of the petition under Order-7, Rule-11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff and not to venture into the merits and veracity of claims and when as per the averments made in the plaint of the plaintiff, he (plaintiff) has prayed for declaration of his ownership over the buildings situated on suit Plot No.257 described in Schedule-A of the plaint on the basis of the allotment made by the sole Arbitrator according to the direction/order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.1068 of 1999 and when in that allotment, the allotment of the suit properties/premises in favour of the defendants has already been reached in its finality without being challenged/questioned by the plaintiff, then at this juncture, by applying the principles of law enunciated in the ratio of the aforesaid decisions to the plaint of the plaintiff in C.S. No.290 of 2005, it is held that, the plaint of the plaintiff in C.S. No.290 of 2005 is barred under law. Therefore, the rejection to the plaint of the plaintiff vide C.S. No.290 of 2005 passed on dated 28.02.2018 by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Baripada and confirmation to the same by the learned 1 st appellate court in RFA No.16 of 2018 cannot be held as erroneous. 29. For which, the question of interfering with the same through this 2 nd appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff does not arise. 30. Therefore, there is no merit in this 2 nd appeal filed by the appellants/plaintiff. The same is liable to be dismissed. 31. In result, the 2 nd appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff is dismissed on contest, but, without cost.