IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR] PRESENT : THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SUGATO MAJUMDAR AND THE HON’BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI SAT/4/2026 I.A. No. CAN/1/2026 SHRI DILIP KUMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VS. SHRI RATAN CHANDRA DEY AND OTHER … RESPONDENTS For the appellants : Mr. Ananda Halder For the respondents : Mr. Siddhartha Singha Heard on : July 07, 2026 Judgment delivered on : July 09, 2026 SUGATO MAJUMDAR, J. 1. The instant second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 26/11/2025 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, North & Middle Andaman District at Mayabunder in Title Appeal No.1 of 2025 affirming the judgment dated 22/03/2018 and the final decree dated 04/04/2018 passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Mayabunder in Title Suit No.17 of 2014. 2 2. The original suit was filed by one Durga Rani Dey, Gopal Singh (Respondent No.5 herein) and Nepal Singh (Respondent No.6 herein) against the present Appellants as well as against some of the Respondents herein praying for partition by metes and bounds. Preliminary decree was passed ex- parte. Subsequently the present Appellants appeared in the suit. Partition Commissioner submitted report for passing the final decree. The Trial Court, in the order dated 22/03/2018 noted that the parties were satisfied with the report of the Partition commissioner, Mr. Uttam Kirtania, the Learned Advocate and accepted the report. Accordingly, the final decree of partition was drawn up. 3. The Appellants herein preferred an appeal against the final partition decree before the Learned Additional District Judge, North & Middle Andaman District at Mayabunder being the First Appellate Court. The point for determination before the First Appellate Court was whether the impugned final decree dated 22/03/2018 holding that all five shareholders of the land would get equal share of the land was proper and valid. The Learned First Appellate Court noted the plea of the Respondents therein that the present appellants did not raise any objection against the report of the Partition Commissioner. After discussing various authorities on the point, the First Appellate Court was pleased to dismiss the first appeal. 4. On being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the instant appeal has been filed. 3 5. Mr. Halder, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that although the Learned Trial Court noted that the parties accepted the said report, in fact the Appellants had not granted any consent to accept the report. According to the Learned Lawyer, the First Appellate Court failed to take note of the fact that there was no consent of the Appellants to accept the Report of the Learned Commissioner and the appellants had not given any such instruction to the learned Advocate to accept the Commissioner’s Report. 6. We have heard the submission and perused the material on record. 7. Firstly, the question as to whether or not the Learned Advocate had been authorized to grant consent or to concede to the Commissioner’s Report is a question of fact which ought to have been raised before the Learned Trial Court itself at the first instance. Neither the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court nor the Memorandum of Appeal filed before this Court indicate that the said question was ever raised even before the first Appellate Court which is the final court of facts. In such view of the matter there can be no question of law, much less substantial question of law that can fall for decision before this Court. 8. Secondly, the final decree of the suit was passed upon recording the satisfaction of the parties, in the order dated 22/03/2018. The Appellants have now complained that they had not given consent. 9. The legal effect of such recording by court would be that there was mutual acceptance of the Commissioner Report upon satisfaction of the 4 parties leaving no room for any adjudication, as there was no dispute. The same operates as a consent. 10. Now even if we accept the assertion of the appellant at face value, then also at the most it would mean that the consent was unlawful or that the recording of satisfaction of the appellant was unlawful. That clearly falls within the domain of Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 11. The plea raised by the Learned Counsel thus demands perusal of section 96 (3) as well as Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code. 12. Section 96 provides for appeals from original decrees. Sub-section (3) of Section 96, however, provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. 13. Order 23 Rule 3-A reads as follow: “3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.” 14. The position of law was summarized by the Supreme Court of India in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, [(2006) 5 SCC 566] : “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: 5 (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. 15. More recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi & Anr. vs Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead through Lrs) [2025 SCC OnLine SC 835] has laid emphasis on the following paragraph from Pushpa Devi Bhagat’s case (supra) thus:- “Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent 6 decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.” 16. In view of the settled principles of law, as discussed above, we do not find any question of law much less substantial question of law involved in this appeal and as such we are not inclined to admit the same. SAT 4 of 2026 accordingly stands dismissed. The Appellants will however be at liberty to take appropriate legal steps. 17. Since the appeal itself has been dismissed, the connected application also stands disposed of accordingly. 18. All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. 19. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities. ( Sugato Majumdar, J. ) I agree. ( Om Narayan Rai, J. )