1 CGHC010165702018 2026:CGHC:29759 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 110 of 2018  Shai Transporter Registered Office At Plot 8-B Industial Estate, Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh 490026, Through Partner Namely Hemant Sial S/o Late Shri B.S. Sial, Aged About 47 Years, R/o- 78a/3, Nehru Nagar (West), Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1. Employees State Insurance Corporation Through- Its Regional Director, Regional Office, 102 Ramnagar Road Kota, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Deputy Director Employees State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office, 102 Ramnagar Raod Kota, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : None, in two rounds. For State : Mr. Pranav Saxena, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 14.07 .2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record from the ESI Corporation showing on which basis the the authority has assessed contribution under section 45-A of the Employee State Insurance Act. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 02.02.2018 passed by the appellate authority respondent no. 1 (ANNEXURE P-1) and consequently the letter of recovery dated 12.02.2018. SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2026.07.16 11:44:51 +0530 2 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal of the petitioner on its own merits with affording opportunity of hearing. 10.4 Any other relief as deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court.” 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner is a partnership firm indulged in business of Civil, Mechanical Erection, Fabrication, Refractory and material handling under the respondents. The petitioner had obtained labour licence as well as ESI code to carry out above stated works. It is further pleaded that respondent No. 2 passed an order on 24.10.2017 and issued a demand notice of Rs. 165722/-. 3. The petitioner preferred an appeal according to the provisions of Section 45- AA of Act of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short “Act, 1948”), but it was presented after expiry of prescribed limitation period of 60 days on 20.01.2018, and therefore, it was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 02.02.2018. Against said order this petition has been preferred. 4. It is pleaded in the writ petition that the appellate authority should have condoned the delay caused in filing appeal. 5. Mr. Pranav Saxena, Advocate appearing for respondents would contend that under the Act of 1948, the appellate authority exercises quasi-judicial powers and as there is no application of law of limitation, therefore, the application, if any, moved by the petitioner for condonation of delay could not be considered. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in WP No. 9129 of 2024 parties being Gyan Singh Parmar vs. Employee State Insurance Corporation and Others, wherein, 3 it is held that the Court cannot fix a period of limitation, if not fixed by the Legislature. He would contend that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr. Saxena and perused the documents placed on record. 7. Admittedly, appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the appellate authority on 20.01.2018, whereas, original order was passed on 24.10.2017 and it was duly communicated to the petitioner on 30.10.2017. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 45AA of the Act of 1948 is 60 days. 8. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Gyan Singh Parmar (supra) while dealing with the similar issue referred various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and in para 12, 13 & 14 held as under :- “12. In absence of any provision for condonation of delay, this Court cannot compel the Appellate Authority to decide the application for condonation of delay. This Court, by passing a Judicial Order cannot give the power to the Appellate Authority to condone the delay. It is well established principle of law that Constitutional Court cannot legislate and if the Court directs the Appellate Authority to consider the application for condondation of delay even in absence of any provision of law, then it would amount to legislation, which cannot be done. The Supreme Court in the case of Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484 has held as under : 9. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co.) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of V.K. Naswa v. Union of India, reported in (2012) 2 4 SCC 542has held as under: 6. It is a settled legal proposition that the court can neither legislate nor issue a direction to the legislature to enact in a particular manner. 7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P. and V.K. Sood v. Deptt. of Civil Aviation, this Court has held that the writ court, in exercise of its power under Article 226, has no power even indirectly to require the executive to exercise its law-making power. The Court observed that it is neither legal nor proper for the High Court to issue directions or advisory sermons to the executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively within the domain of the executive under the Constitution. The power under Article 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is the legislative power. This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be. The courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its law- making power in any manner. The courts cannot assume to themselves a supervisory role over the rule-making power of the executive under Article 309 of the Constitution. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly Narinder Chand Hem Raj v. UT, H.P., where it has been held that legislative power can be exercised only by the legislature or its delegate and none else. 8. In State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of Medical College, this Court deprecated the practice adopted by the courts to issue directions to the legislature to enact a legislation to meet a particular situation observing : (SCC p. 174, para 4) "4. ... The direction given by the Division 5 Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of ragging, for otherwise it is difficult to see why, after the clear and categorical statement by the Chief Secretary on behalf of the State Government that the Government will introduce legislation if found necessary and so advised, the Division Bench should have proceeded to again give the same direction. Thus the Division Bench was clearly not entitled to do. It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation." 9. In Asif Hameed v. State of J&K this Court while dealing with a case like this at hand observed : (SCC p. 374, para 19) "19. ... While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonise qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive." (emphasis added) 10. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, this Court similarly observed : (SCC p. 332, para 14) "14. ... It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation.... The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts." 11. Similarly in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind 6 Coop. Marketing- cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., this Court held that the court cannot fix a period of limitation, if not fixed by the legislature, as "the courts can admittedly interpret the law and do not make laws". The court cannot interpret the statutory provision in such a manner "which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature". 12. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms observing that the court cannot issue direction to the legislature for amending the Act or Rules. It is for Parliament to amend the Act or Rules. In District Mining Officer v. TISCO, this Court held that function of the court is only to expound the law and not to legislate. 13. Similarly, in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, this Court held that the court cannot direct the legislature to enact a particular law for the reason that under the constitutional scheme Parliament exercises sovereign power to enact law and no outside power or authority can issue a particular piece of legislation. (See also State of J&K v. A.R. Zakki.) 14. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, this Court held that if the court issues a direction which amounts to legislation and is not complied with by the State, it cannot be held that the State has committed the contempt of court for the reason that the order passed by the court was without jurisdiction and it has no competence to issue a direction amounting to legislation. 9. Having considered the facts discussed-above and law laid down by the High Court of M.P., this Court is of the opinion that as appeal was not preferred within a period of limitation and there is no application of Section 5 or 29 of 7 Limitation Act, therefore, the appellate authority rightly dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE $iddhant