- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT PETITION NO.18304 OF 2023 (SC/ST) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. NARAYANAMMA D/O LATE MADDURAMMA AND LATE MANTALAPPA, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, AGRICULTURIST, RESIDING AT SAGEHALLI COLONY, BIDARAHALLI HOBLI, BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK-571 116. 2. SMT. SHANTHAMMA D/O LATE MADDURAMMA AND, LATE MANTALAPPA, W/O MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, AGRICULTURIST, MALUR TOWN, KOLA DISTRICT-563 130. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. SRIHARI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, KUNDALA BENGALURU-562 110. Digitally signed by V MANJUSHA BAI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION, DODDABALLAPUR-561 203. 3. THE TAHSILDAR HOSKOTE TALUK, HOSKOTE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-560 067. 4. M. JAYARAM S/O MUNISWAMY @ MUTHUSWAMY, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, 5. UTHIRAMBAL W/O M. JAYARAM, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, RESPONDENT NOS.4 AND 5 ARE R/AT THIRUVARANGA VILLAGE, HANUMANGONDANA HOBLI, HOSKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL-560 067. 6. RAMASWAMY REDDY S/O LATE MUNI REDDY, AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS, 7. NARAYANA REDDY S/O THIMMA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 105 YEARS, RESPONDENT NOS.6 AND 7 ARE R/AT MUTHASANDRA VILLAGE, HANUMANAGONDANA HOBLI, HOSUR TALUK, BENGALURU-560 084. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. ANITHA N., AGA., FOR R.1 TO R.3; SRI. B.N. PRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R.4 AND R.5; VIDE ORDER DATED 19.07.2024 NOTICE TO R.6 AND R.7 IS DISPENSED WITH.) - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 12.12.2022 PASSED IN NO.LND/SCST/45/2020- 21 BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 VIDE ANNEXURE-A AS ILLEGAL AND CONSEQUENTLY CONFIRM THE ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 DATED 08.11.2020 PASSED IN CASE NO.PTCL.SR(HO).10/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-D, ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING/VIDEO CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN ORAL ORDER 1. The petitioners are the legal heirs of the original grantee of the land which is the subject matter of the writ petition. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 are the present owners and they have purchased the same from respondent Nos. 6 and 7, who in turn had purchased the same from the original grantee. 2. The grant was made in favour of the original grantee in the year 1970. In the said grant, there was a clause stating that the property should not be alienated for a period of 15 years. However, in contravention of the said clause, the land was sold in the year 1981. Presently, - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 respondent Nos.4 and 5 are the owners of the land. When this was the situation, the petitioners made an application under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'the PTCL Act') before respondent No.2 in the year 2018. Respondent No.2 allowed the application and ordered for resumption and restoration of the land in favour of the petitioners. Aggrieved by the same, respondent Nos.4 and 5 preferred an appeal before respondent No.1, who in turn has allowed the appeal and has dismissed the application filed by the petitioners before respondent No.2. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The case of the petitioners is that, irrespective of the delay in filing the application, in the light of the amendment to Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2023, the petitioners are entitled for restoration of the land in their favour. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Satyan v. Deputy - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 Commissioner and Others reported in (2020) 14 SCC 210. 4. It is contented that, unreasonableness of time cannot be gone into by any Authority concerned while deciding the case on hand. 5. On the said ground, it is prayed that the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 be set aside and the order passed by respondent No.2 be upheld. 6. The learned AGA appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 supports the contention of the petitioners. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 submits that, in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232 as well as the decision of this Court in R.Suresh Mohan v. State of Karnataka and Others in W.P.No.3597/2018, disposed of on 06.07.2026, the - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that there is an unreasonable delay in challenging the sale transaction, which is fatal to the case of the petitioners. 8. The question that arises for consideration is, under the given peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, whether the sale made in the year 1981 for valuable consideration can be set aside on the application made by the petitioners belatedly in the year 2018 based on Section 4 of the PTCL Act. 9. No doubt, Section 4 of the PTCL Act is enacted to protect the exploitation of the Scheduled Castes /Scheduled Tribes from the Society forcing them to alienate the land granted in their favour. The said prohibition has been upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manchegowda and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301 and the same is reiterated in Satyan's case. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 10. However, any challenge made to the sale has to be done within a reasonable period as per the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232. Paragraph 8 of the said judgment reads as under: "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (2018)12 SCC 527 and also in Ningappa v. Commr. (2020)14 SCC 236 reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Commr. 1998 SCC OnLine KAR 671, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka (2006)4 Kant. LJ 303 and G. Maregouda vs. Commr. (2000)2 Kant.L.J.SN 4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly." 11. Further, the amendment to Section 5 of the PTCL Act does not come to the rescue of the petitioners because the same has been interpreted by this Court in Writ Appeal No.100101/2024. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment reads as under: "3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The subject land does not answer the definition of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003. (b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is un understandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered. (c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under: “(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated. (d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity. (e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view: “8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void u nder Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. …..” (Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least. (f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate. (g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25 make out this point: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches. 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond. (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify." 12. In the instant case, admittedly, the sale took place in the year 1981 and has been challenged after a lapse of 37 years, which cannot be considered reasonable. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:34194 WP No. 18304 of 2023 13. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not see any error in the order passed by respondent No.1 and the writ petition stands dismissed. SD/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE VMB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 46