Judgment : Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. This CRLMC under Section528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the order dated 20.08.2024 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge-cum- C.J.M., Balasore in S.T. Case No.116 of 2022 and the order dated 18.01.2025 passed by the leaned Additional Sessions Judge, Balasore in Crl. Rev. No.44 of 2024 rejecting his application filed under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for to discharging him from the offences under Section 307 of the I.P.C. read with Sections 25/ 27 of the Arms Act. I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The facts of the case are as follows: (i) The litigation arises from Town P.S., Balasore P.S. Case No. 52 of 2021 registered on the written report of Alisa Singh, alleging that on 13.03.2021 at about 6:00 PM the present petitioner (Laxman Behera) fired a shot at the informant’s husband Ananda Singh, leading to registration of offences under Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959. (ii) After investigation by the IIC, Town P.S., charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner under Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 Arms Act; the S.D.J.M., Balasore took cognizance in C.T. Case No. 195 of 2021 (order dated 07.07.2021) and the matter was committed to the Sessions Court for trial. (iii) Post-committal, the case was made over to the court of the C.J.M.-cum-Asst. Sessions Judge, Balasore and was registered as S.T. Case No. 116 of 2022. (iv) Before framing of charge, the petitioner filed an application under Section 239 CrPC seeking discharge from offences under Section 307 IPC read with Sections 25/27 Arms Act; the trial court rejected the discharge petition by order dated 29.08.2024. (v) The petitioner challenged the rejection order by filing Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2024; the Addl. Sessions Judge, Balasore by order dated 08.01.2025 dismissed the revision and confirmed the trial court’s order refusing discharge. (vi) In the revision proceeding, the petitioner appeared in person (without counsel), and the State was represented through the Associate Lawyer; the revision court noted materials such as injury report indicating entry and exit wound in the left upper abdomen and also noted existence of eye-witnesses as per record. (vii) The revision court recorded that the District Magistrate, Balasore granted sanction for prosecution under Sections 25/27 Arms Act by order No. 1966 dated 02.07.2021. II. (vii) The revision court recorded that the District Magistrate, Balasore granted sanction for prosecution under Sections 25/27 Arms Act by order No. 1966 dated 02.07.2021. II. PETITIONER’S SUBMI SSIONS: 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions. (i) The petitioner challenges the revision order dated 08.01.2025 as illegal/perverse and alleges that both the revisional court and the trial court rejected discharge mechanically without properly appreciating record material. (ii) The petitioner asserts he is a retired professor, septuagenarian, handicapped, with no criminal antecedents; he claims absence of prior enmity or motive with the victim, and argues that lack of motive undermines the allegation of “attempt to murder” under Section 307 IPC. (iii) On merits, he pleads the incident arose from a parking-related altercation; he claims the victim manhandled/attacked him and, in the course of a tussle, a single bullet went off “unknowingly/accidentally,” i.e., without intention to fire at the victim. (iv) He emphasizes that only one bullet was fired though the revolver allegedly contained five other live rounds; he argues that if there was intention to kill, multiple shots would have been fired, hence the mental element for Section 307 IPC is not made out. (v) He attacks the investigation as biased/perfunctory, particularly alleging that CCTV coverage existed at the spot and the police failed to seize/produce CCTV/DVR footage, which according to him would have revealed the “truth” supporting his defence version. (vi) On Arms Act, he argues that as a valid arms licence holder, Sections 25/27 Arms Act cannot be invoked against him; he suggests Arms Act offences apply when arms are acquired/possessed/carried/used without licence, whereas his possession was licensed. (vii) He also attempts to frame the case as one of private defence, contending that if his act is seen as self-defence, the matter should be evaluated within the IPC private defence framework (Sections 96–106 IPC) rather than being treated as a culpable/attempted murder act. (viii) He alleges procedural and investigative impropriety broadly (including claims about arrest-communication requirements and charge formulation), and contends these infirmities make continued trial unjustified; he seeks quashing of the revisional order and consequent discharge. III. OPPOSITE PARTYS ’ SUBMISSIONS: 4. (viii) He alleges procedural and investigative impropriety broadly (including claims about arrest-communication requirements and charge formulation), and contends these infirmities make continued trial unjustified; he seeks quashing of the revisional order and consequent discharge. III. OPPOSITE PARTYS ’ SUBMISSIONS: 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions: (i) The opposite parties contend that the act was done with intention to kill and not in exercise of private defence; they argue that an educated person like the petitioner would understand the consequences of firing a bullet, supporting inference of intention. (ii) They argue that the discharge plea (and the petitioner’s attempt to push a “mini-trial” on self-defence) is not maintainable at the stage of consideration of charge or prior to it; hence the trial court’s refusal to discharge is justified. (iii) They highlight that the arms licence is not a licence for illegal use of the weapon and that firing at the victim is not immunized merely because the weapon was licensed; therefore, Arms Act provisions can still be attracted depending on use and sanction. (iv) They rely on the prosecution version that the petitioner fired at the victim in anger due to a parking dispute; they underscore that medical material indicates entry and exit wound in the left upper abdomen and the record mentions several eye-witnesses. (v) On the whole, they submit that there is sufficient material for proceeding to charge/trial; therefore the discharge prayer and the challenge to the impugned orders deserve dismissal. IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT OF A.S.J, BALASORE: 5. The Revisional Court, upon examining the challenge to the order refusing discharge, held as follows: (i) The revisional court first addressed maintainability and treated the revision as entertainable, relying on the Supreme Court position that an order framing charge or refusing discharge is neither purely interlocutory nor final, and therefore not barred by Section 397(2) CrPC. (ii) The court noted the petitioner’s reliance on Ex-Ct. Mahadev v. Director General, BSF and others, but held that the factual context of that decision was different and therefore not applicable to decide discharge in the present case. (iii) On the Arms Act objection, the revisional court relied on the existence of a District Magistrate’s sanction order dated 02.07.2021 for prosecution under Sections 25/27 Arms Act and treated this as supporting continuation of proceedings for Arms Act offences. (iii) On the Arms Act objection, the revisional court relied on the existence of a District Magistrate’s sanction order dated 02.07.2021 for prosecution under Sections 25/27 Arms Act and treated this as supporting continuation of proceedings for Arms Act offences. (iv) The court treated the arms licence as not extending to “illegal use” of the weapon, and reasoned that possession of a valid licence does not by itself negate prosecution when the allegation is that the weapon was used unlawfully in the incident. (v) On the Section 307 IPC aspect, the court leaned on the prosecution’s narrative that the shooting occurred due to anger over parking, noted the injury location (left upper abdomen with entry and exit wounds), and recorded that there were several eye-witnesses, collectively indicating prima facie material. (vi) The revisional court’s approach was to see whether the trial court’s refusal to discharge was legally sustainable on a prima facie view, and it concluded that the trial court had “rightly” rejected discharge given the record materials referred to in the order. (vii) Consequently, the revision was dismissed on contest (without costs) and the record was directed to be returned to the trial court, thereby keeping the case at the stage where charges could be considered/framed and the trial could proceed. V. EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL MATRIX: 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. 7. At the outset, it is well-settled that the threshold for discharging an accused (under Section 227/239 CrPC) is very low. The court only needs to see whether there is sufficient ground to proceed, not whether the case will result in conviction. The materials on record must be taken at face value without meticulous evaluation, and the court cannot consider the accused’s defence or assess the pros and cons of evidence at this stage. 8. Multiple judicial precedents have repeatedly highlighted that the if the broad probabilities of the case and the totality of material indicate a prima facie offense, the matter must proceed to trial. In the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh 1977 AIR 2018 the Court held as follow: “At that stage the Court is not to 'see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. In the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh 1977 AIR 2018 the Court held as follow: “At that stage the Court is not to 'see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the, initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. if the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the, trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal.” 9. An order of discharge is an exception, not the rule, where the allegations, taken as true, clearly do not make out any offense, the court may discharge; otherwise, it should refrain from “throttling” a legitimate prosecution at the threshold. In short, unless the record is so devoid of evidence that no reasonable person could think an offense is made out, the case must go to trial. 10. In short, unless the record is so devoid of evidence that no reasonable person could think an offense is made out, the case must go to trial. 10. Viewed against the above standard, the Court finds that the lower courts correctly concluded a prima facie case under Section 307 IPC. The FIR and charge-sheet allege that the petitioner fired a revolver shot at the victim’s abdomen causing an entry-and-exit gunshot wound. Medical evidence notes an injury in the left upper abdomen, which by its nature could have been fatal. The presence of multiple eyewitnesses to the incident is recorded, and their statements incriminate the petitioner as the shooter. Firing a gun at a person at close range, aimed at a vital part of the body, ordinarily permits a strong inference of an intention or knowledge that death may ensue, fulfilling the mens rea for “attempt to murder”. 11. The petitioner’s chief argument, that he fired only a single shot and did not continue firing despite having more rounds, does not exonerate him at this stage. Even a single gunshot can evince intent to kill if aimed at a vital organ; the law does not require multiple wounds or repeated shots to establish an attempt to murder. As the Supreme Court observed, absence of a proven motive or the fact that the assailant fired only once is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution when clear direct evidence of the act exists. 12. Here, the direct evidence of the shooting eyewitness accounts and injury forms a sufficient basis to presume that the petitioner attempted to take the life of the victim, the ultimate question of intent can be examined fully at trial on the evidence, but at this stage the strong suspicion of intent is enough. The petitioner’s reliance on a theory of self-defence, claiming the shot went off during a tussle initiated by the victim, and the contention of no prior enmity or motive are defences that cannot be adjudicated without trial. 13. It is well-settled that an accused’s plea of private defence or other justification must be evaluated on the basis of evidence led during the trial, unless the prosecution’s own materials conclusively demonstrate that the act was in self-defence, the case cannot be thrown out at the threshold on such a plea. 14. 13. It is well-settled that an accused’s plea of private defence or other justification must be evaluated on the basis of evidence led during the trial, unless the prosecution’s own materials conclusively demonstrate that the act was in self-defence, the case cannot be thrown out at the threshold on such a plea. 14. In the present case, the prosecution version accuses the petitioner of being the aggressor, and nothing in the charge-sheet indisputably establishes that the petitioner was acting to defend himself. Therefore, the petitioner’s assertion of self-defence raises factual issues that must be tested in trial, not accepted ex parte at the charge stage. 15. A significant aspect of the petitioner’s case is his possession of a valid arms license for the firearm used. The petitioner argues that, as a licensed firearm holder, he cannot be prosecuted under Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959. The revisional court brushed aside this argument, reasoning that a license is “not a license to kill” and that unlawful use of a weapon can still attract the Arms Act. 16. The legal position, however, requires careful scrutiny. Section 25 of the Arms Act penalizes possession of firearms without a license or in violation of license conditions. Section 27, as it stands after the 1988 amendment, penalizes the use of arms only in certain circumstances, namely, using a firearm in contravention of Section 5 or Section 7 of the Act.Section 5 prohibits manufacturing, selling, or possessing firearms without a license or beyond license terms, while Section 7 deals with prohibited arms/ammunition. Thus, to sustain a charge under Section 27, the prosecution must demonstrate that the accused used the firearm in violation of Section 5 or 7. 17. If a person is in authorized and licensed possession of the weapon, and the weapon is not of a prohibited category, then the mere fact that he misused it to commit an offense does not automatically invoke Section 27. 18. The Supreme Court has clarified this important point in Surinder Singh v. State(UT of Chandigarh) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2373 OF 2010 . 18. The Supreme Court has clarified this important point in Surinder Singh v. State(UT of Chandigarh) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2373 OF 2010 . In that case, which also involved a licensed service pistol used in an attempted murder, the Court acquitted the accused of the Arms Act charge, holding the following: “It appears that the Trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations such as illegal use of the weapon, and lost track of the objective of the Statute, which has been enacted to provide a licensing/regulatory regime, to enable law- abiding citizens to carry arms, and also to prohibit the possession, acquisition, manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms, unless authorized by the Central Government. In other words, illegal use of a licensed or sanctioned weapon per se does not constitute an offence under Section 27, without proving the misdemeanour under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms Act. At best, it could be a ‘misconduct’ under the service rules, the determination of which was not the subject of the trial.” 19. Because the accused was in lawful possession of the weapon (duly sanctioned by the authorities), he had not contravened Section 5, and thus fell outside the ambit of Section 27.The Court observed that the Arms Act’s objective is to regulate possession of firearms through licensing and to prohibit certain categories of weapons; it is not aimed at punishing every unlawful use of a firearm. 20. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner’s revolver was a licensed weapon. There is no allegation that he was carrying or using it without authority of a license on the day of the incident. Nor is there any suggestion that the firearm was a prohibited arm under the Act. 21. In light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Surinder Singh, the Court finds substantial force in the petitioner’s submission that the Arms Act offenses may not be made out. Specifically, a charge under Section 25 would fail because the petitioner, having a valid license, did not possess the firearm without license. A charge under Section 27(1) is also prima facie unsustainable, since using a licensed gun to shoot someone, however illegal and punishable under IPC, does not amount to contravention of Section 5. 22. Specifically, a charge under Section 25 would fail because the petitioner, having a valid license, did not possess the firearm without license. A charge under Section 27(1) is also prima facie unsustainable, since using a licensed gun to shoot someone, however illegal and punishable under IPC, does not amount to contravention of Section 5. 22. The sanction for prosecution under Sections 25/27 granted by the District Magistrate does not by itself cure this legal defect, the sanction merely authorizes the prosecution, but the viability of the charges must stand on the provisions of law. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the inclusion of Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act in the charge-sheet is misconceived on the uncontroverted facts. The proper course is to confine the prosecution to the IPC offense, rather than stretch the Arms Act to a scenario it does not fittingly cover. 23. Indeed, to prosecute a licensed owner for “illegal use” of the weapon, the remedy lies in the penal provisions of the IPC and possible cancellation of his arms license or other administrative action, but not under Section 27, absent a violation of Sections 5/7 of the Arms Act. VI. CONCLUSION: 24. In view of the above analysis, the Court reaches the following conclusion. There is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders of the trial court and revisional court so far as they refuse discharge of the petitioner for the offence under Section 307 IPC. The materials on record undeniably make out a prima facie case for attempt to murder, and the petitioner’s grounds for quashing that charge do not pass legal muster. However, with respect to the charges under Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, this Court finds that continuing the prosecution for those offenses would amount to an abuse of the legal process, since on the admitted facts the ingredients of those provisions are not satisfied. 25. Consequently, the CRLMC is allowed in part . It is directed that the petitioner shall be discharged from the offences under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, and the sanction dated 02.07.2021 for prosecuting those offences is rendered otiose. The impugned orders of the courts below are modified to that extent. 26. 25. Consequently, the CRLMC is allowed in part . It is directed that the petitioner shall be discharged from the offences under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, and the sanction dated 02.07.2021 for prosecuting those offences is rendered otiose. The impugned orders of the courts below are modified to that extent. 26. As to the charge under Section 307 of the IPC, the petition stands dismissed, and the trial court is at liberty to frame charge under Section 307 IPC (along with any other IPC offense disclosed by the facts, if required) and proceed with the trial in accordance with law. It is made clear that nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the case; the observations herein are only to determine the sufficiency of material for framing charge. 27. The interim order staying the proceedings, if any, is vacated.