JUDGMENT : KRISHNA S. DIXIT, J. This Intra-Court Appeal is directed against a learned Single Judge's order dated 01.02.204 whereby private Respondents' WP(C) No.18802 of 2023 having been favoured, relief has been granted to them in the following words: "In such view of the matter, this Court directs the Opposite Party Nos.1 to 3 to disburse the death claim amount in favour of the Petitioners, if the said amount has not yet been disbursed in favour of the nominee. Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Dvn.), Dhenkanal is also directed to dispose of the Execution Case No.07 of 2014 as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of presentation of this order.? 2. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant vehemently argues that the impugned order is liable to be voided for the following reasons: (i) The private Respondents have suppressed the fact of they having obtained an ex parte decree against the LIC & the Appellant in Civil Suit No. 356 of 2011, have put the judgment & decree dated 05.04.2014 in enforcement vide Execution Case No. 7 of 2024; however, they have suppressed the same and thus no relief could have been granted to them on account of culpable conduct. (ii) Appellant’s son, who is none other than the husband of private Respondent No.1 and also the father of private Respondent No.2, had nominated both the Appellant & the Respondent No.1 as the nominees separately in two different LIC policies; Appellant has received Rs.9,48,229/-, being the nominee in one policy, whereas Respondent No.1, being the widow, has received Rs.5,34,867/-, being the nominee in the other policy. That being the position, impugned order of the kind could not have been made for payment of all the policy money to her only. (iii) Although the Appellant happens to be the sole nominee in one policy and the 1st Respondent happens to be the sole nominee in the other, are entitled to retain the maturity value on the death of policy holder, in view of 2015 Amendment to Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938; this aspect having not been adverted to by the learned Single Judge, the impugned order is unsustainable. (iv) Appellant’s wife being the mother died subsequent to the death of policy holder; she being one of the Class-I heirs, is entitled to 1/3rd share in the insurance amount, 2/3rds collectively going to private Respondents. (iv) Appellant’s wife being the mother died subsequent to the death of policy holder; she being one of the Class-I heirs, is entitled to 1/3rd share in the insurance amount, 2/3rds collectively going to private Respondents. This contention, he advances, after telling that an application is moved seeking recall of the decree. 3. Learned Senior Advocate appearing Respondent Nos.1 & 2 resists the Appeal making submission in justification of the impugned order and the reasons on which it has been constructed. He tells the Court that there is no conflict between decree of the Civil Court & the impugned order and therefore, the contention of suppression does not hold water; Appellant being the father was only the nominee, has no title to the insurance money, and that he holds it in trust for the Respondents; even otherwise he is not a Class-I heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1955; what learned Single Judge has done by passing the impugned order, has brought about a just result and therefore, interference of this Court is not warranted. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Appeal papers, we decline indulgence in the matter with certain observations and for the following reasons: 4.1. AS TO FOUNDATIONAL FACTS (i) Appellant happens to be the father of Insurer, namely, Chakradhar Sahu; Respondent No.1 happens to be the widow of Insurer; Respondent No.2 happens to be the son of Insurer. We are told at the Bar that the Insurer has a mentally challenged brother residing with Appellant. Chakradhar had bought as many as eight (8) LIC Policies; Appellant was the nominee in respect of six (6) of them, whereas 1st Respondent was the nominee in respect of the remaining two (2). Chakradhar passed away on 27.06.2010 leaving behind the parents, the widow & a son, intestate. It is also admitted that his mother died subsequently leaving the Appellant as the widower and a brother (mentally challenged). (ii) Appellant received in all Rs.9,48,229/- whereas 1st Respondent received Rs.4,24,815/-. These monies were received admittedly in the years 2010 & 2011. It is not in dispute before us that parties being Hindus, mother happens to be a Class-I heir of the deceased Insurer along with widow & son, i.e., private Respondents under the Schedule to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Father is not a Class-I heir. These monies were received admittedly in the years 2010 & 2011. It is not in dispute before us that parties being Hindus, mother happens to be a Class-I heir of the deceased Insurer along with widow & son, i.e., private Respondents under the Schedule to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Father is not a Class-I heir. Therefore, the succession to the estate of the deceased Insurer would open accordingly. After the death of mother, the Appellant, his 2nd son & the private Respondents could succeed to her estate in equal proportion. 4.2. AS TO SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS It is not in dispute that the private Respondents have obtained an ex parte judgment & decree on 05.04.2014 in C.S. No. 356 of 2011 at the hands of Sr. Civil Judge, Dhenkanal. They have also put the said decree in Execution Case No.7 of 2024. This has been withheld from the knowledge of Writ Court, is apparent. However, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge does not conflict with the said decree, is also relevant in treating contention of the kind. At the most, there is duplication of relief and therefore, no extra advantage is derived by the private Respondents. In view of that, the plea of supprecio veri does not come to the aid of Appellant, who happens to be Judgment Debtor. It could have been ideal, had these facts been pleaded in the Writ Petition by the private Respondents. This being said, it is open to prosecute the Recall Application filed by the Appellant before the learned Civil Judge, who has handed the decree, in accordance with law. Much deliberation in this regard is not needed. 4.3. AS TO NOMINEE BEING THE BENEFICIARY UNDER THE INSURANCE ACT, 1938 (i) Pre-2015 Amendment : As already observed, the Appellant received certain sums of money under six (6) of the Policies being the sole nominee and similarly 1st Respondent received a certain money under the remaining two (2) Policies. This was way back in the years 2010 & 2011. It has long been settled by the Apex Court vide Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi , (1984) 1 SCC 424 that a nominee is like a trustee but not a beneficiary in respect of monies received under LIC Policy. This was way back in the years 2010 & 2011. It has long been settled by the Apex Court vide Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi , (1984) 1 SCC 424 that a nominee is like a trustee but not a beneficiary in respect of monies received under LIC Policy. He holds that money in trust for the benefit of title holders, which has to be ascertained in accordance with the personal law applicable to the beneficiaries. Therefore, what all money is received by the Appellant & the 1st Respondent, as nominees, will not automatically become a part of their purse. Such nominees, at times, can also be beneficiaries, cannot be denied. (ii) Post-2015 Amendment : The vehement submission of learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that after 2015 Amendment to Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938, the nominee becomes the beneficiary to the proceeds of Insurance Policy, is difficult to countenance. True it is that pursuant to 190th Report of the Law Commission of India, the Parliament brought about certain changes in relation to the status of nominee in an insurance policy. Section 39 provides for nomination by policy holder. Sub-Sections (8) (9) & (11) of this Section, which are heavily relied upon by the Appellant’s side, read as under: "(8) Subject as aforesaid, where the nominee, or if there are more nominees than one, a nominee or nominees, to whom sub-section (7) applies, die after the person whose life is insured but before the amount secured by the policy is paid, the amount secured by the policy, or so much of the amount secured by the policy as represents the share of the nominee or nominees so dying (as the case may be), shall be payable to the heirs or legal representatives of the nominee or nominees or the holder of a succession certificate, as the case may be, and they shall be beneficially entitled to such amount. (9) Nothing in sub-sections (7) and (8) shall operate to destroy or impede the right of any creditor to be paid out of the proceeds of any policy of life insurance. (11) Where a policyholder dies after the maturity of the policy but the proceeds and benefit of his policy has not been made to him because of his death, in such a case, his nominee shall be entitled to the proceeds and benefit of his policy.? (11) Where a policyholder dies after the maturity of the policy but the proceeds and benefit of his policy has not been made to him because of his death, in such a case, his nominee shall be entitled to the proceeds and benefit of his policy.? (iii) Ordinarily, all substantive amendments are prospective in operation and procedural are retrospective, unless otherwise indicated, vide Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar , (2001) 8 SCC 24 . True it is that this amendment is retrospective in operation. However, the retrospectivity is restricted to 26.12.2014. M.N Srinivas and K. Kannan’s Principles of Insurance Law (Eleventh Edition) at page 925 vide footnote 262 reads; "Subs. by Act 5 of 2015, Section 45, for Section 39 w.r.e.f. 26 December 2014?. Sub-Section (8) of Section 39 speaks of a circumstance wherein the policy holder dies and thereafter the nominee passes away without receiving the amount under the policy. That is not the case here and therefore, this provision has to stay miles away. Amended Sub-Section (10) makes modified Sub-Section (7), and newly added Sub-Section (8) applicable to all policies of Life Insurance that would mature post- amendment. However, in this case, the policies matured not because of efflux of maturity period but on account of death of Insured much before. A life insurance policy matures in the sense of becoming encashable on the happening of the event, i.e., on the arrival of maturity date if the assured is alive and at his death, if it happens earlier. Thus, the risk covered is ‘death’ which may occur in any manner before the stipulated date. Of course, the risk can also be extended or curtailed by the express term of the policy. In the case at hand, the Insured admittedly died on 27.06.2010, i.e., years before the 2015 Amendment was enacted. 4.4. AS TO THE CLAIM OF APPELLANT AS A HEIR OF POLICY HOLDER ’S MOTHER (i) All the above being said, there is force in the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant in an admitted fact situation: The Insured died on 27.06.2010 and thereafter his mother, i.e., the wife of Appellant herein passed away. On the death of policy holder, the insurance amount, which becomes payable under the terms, would constitute his estate. On the death of policy holder, the insurance amount, which becomes payable under the terms, would constitute his estate. Mother happens to be one of the Class- I heirs under Schedule to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, although father is not. However, on the death of policy holder, there shall be four sharers, namely, Appellant, deceased mother who is Appellant’s wife, widow of the policy holder, i.e., Respondent No.1 & son of policy holder, i.e., Respondent No.2. Another brother of policy holder, is not a heir. (ii) All the above aspects have not been dealt with in the impugned order, is apparent. It does not appear to have been dealt with in the civil court decree, either. Now, the said decree is put in execution, when Appellant has moved an application seeking recall of the decree passed ex parte. Till that application is decided, the Execution Proceedings have to be kept at a bay, as a matter of justice. We request the jurisdictional Court to hear & dispose off the said application at the earliest, after giving an opportunity of hearing to all the stakeholders. We are not expressing anything on the merits of that application. 4.5. The vehement submission of learned counsel appearing for the Appellant that the Court has to sit in the arm chair of law maker and provide remedy to an aggrieve, whose case does not strictly fit into the framework of the statute vide casus omissus, is bit difficult to countenance. Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates v. Asher , [1949] 2 KB 481 observed as under: hen a defect appears, a judge can not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the legislature…. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.? In the above circumstances and with the above observations, this Appeal is disposed off, costs having been made easy. Web copy of the judgment to be acted upon by all concerned.