Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 27216 (ORI)

Sandhyarani Mohanty v. Union of India

2026-03-10

Chittaranjan Dash, Krishna Shripad Dixit

body2026
Judgment : Chittaranjan Dash , J. 1. By means of the present writ petitions, the Petitioners call in question the legality and propriety of the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench in the respective Original Applications filed by them, whereby their claims seeking conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme have been declined. Since the questions of fact and law arising in all the writ petitions are substantially similar and the impugned orders proceed on identical reasoning, the matters were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The Petitioners in the present batch of writ petitions were employees under the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and had been governed by the CPF Scheme during the course of their service. After their retirement, or at a belated stage during service, the Petitioners sought conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF- cum-Pension Scheme, claiming entitlement to be brought under the pensionary regime applicable to similarly situated employees. Since the said claim was not acceded to by the authorities, the Petitioners approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench by filing separate Original Applications seeking direction for such conversion and for grant of consequential pensionary benefits. In certain cases, upon dismissal of the Original Applications, the concerned Petitioners also pursued Review Applications seeking reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal, upon consideration of the respective pleadings and materials placed on record, declined to grant the relief sought for by the Petitioners and dismissed the Original Applications. In the cases where Review Applications were filed, the Tribunal also declined to interfere with its earlier orders holding that no error apparent on the face of the record had been made out warranting review. It is these orders passed by the Tribunal which have been assailed in the present writ petitions. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners assailed the impugned orders primarily on the ground that several similarly situated employees under the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan have been granted the benefit of conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme pursuant to orders passed by different Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal and referred to various High Court’s decisions. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners assailed the impugned orders primarily on the ground that several similarly situated employees under the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan have been granted the benefit of conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme pursuant to orders passed by different Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal and referred to various High Court’s decisions. It was contended that such benefits having been extended and the challenges made by the institution before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India having not succeeded, denial of the same benefit to the present Petitioners would amount to discriminatory treatment. In support of such contention, reliance was placed upon the decision in University of Delhi vs. Shashi Kiran and Others , (2022) SCC OnLine SC 594 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with a batch of matters arising out of SLP Diary Nos. 13901 of 2017, 36222 of 2018, 36221 of 2018, 29577 of 2018 and 17008 of 2017. Learned counsel further referred to the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench dated 09.05.2024 passed in Misc. Petition No.2864 of 2023, which was carried in challenge before the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP(C) Diary No.47659 of 2024 and came to be dismissed on 29.11.2024. It was further submitted that the said orders have also been implemented by the institution concerned. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Baijayati Mohanty vs. Union of India and Others in W.P.(C) No.7336 of 2025 as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Jaspal Kaur , (2007) 6 SCC 13 along with certain other decisions of the Tribunal and various High Courts to contend that the Petitioners are entitled to similar relief. 4. Per contra, learned counsels appearing for the Opposite Parties submitted that the institution had, on multiple occasions, afforded opportunities to its employees to exercise option for conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme. According to him, communications inviting such options were issued from 05.10.1987 to 21.01.1988 and further opportunities were extended from time to time between 09.02.1989 and 16.11.1998, culminating in a final notification dated 31.01.1999 prescribing the last cut-off date for exercising such option. According to him, communications inviting such options were issued from 05.10.1987 to 21.01.1988 and further opportunities were extended from time to time between 09.02.1989 and 16.11.1998, culminating in a final notification dated 31.01.1999 prescribing the last cut-off date for exercising such option. It was submitted that a large number of employees had exercised such option pursuant thereto, whereas the Petitioners, despite such opportunities, continued under the CPF Scheme and have raised the present claim only at a belated stage. It was further argued that the factual matrix of the present cases is not identical to the cases relied upon by the Petitioners and, therefore, the benefit granted in those matters cannot be mechanically extended to the Petitioners. Accordingly, it was urged that the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the Original Applications and the Review Applications and that no interference is warranted herein. 5. In view of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials placed on record, the principal question that arises for consideration in the present batch of writ petitions is whether the Petitioners, having continued under the CPF Scheme and having not exercised the option for migration to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the stipulated period, are entitled at this stage to seek conversion to the pension scheme and claim consequential pensionary benefits, and whether the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal declining such relief call for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners has placed heavy reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in University of Delhi vs. Shashi Kiran and Others (supra) to contend that similarly situated employees who were initially governed under the CPF Scheme have been extended the benefit of migration to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme. However, upon careful consideration, this Court finds that the factual matrix of the said decision stands on a different footing. In the said case, the employees had approached the appropriate forum within a reasonable time and the circumstances surrounding the exercise of option and the conduct of the employer were distinguishable in nature. 7. Having considered the rival submissions and upon perusal of the records, this Court has also carefully gone through the respective orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the Original Applications filed by the present Petitioners. 8. 7. Having considered the rival submissions and upon perusal of the records, this Court has also carefully gone through the respective orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the Original Applications filed by the present Petitioners. 8. Insofar as W.P.(C) No.28979 of 2025 filed by Sandhyarani Mohanty is concerned, the challenge is to the order passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No.260/00185 of 2021, whereby the petitioner’s prayer for conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme was rejected. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Tribunal examined the service particulars of the petitioner, who had joined the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan as a Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) in the year 1985 and continued under the CPF Scheme throughout her service. The Tribunal recorded that the petitioner had not exercised the option for migration to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the stipulated period and had accepted CPF deductions during service. Taking note of the belated nature of the claim and the absence of any contemporaneous objection, the Tribunal declined to grant the relief sought. The cases of the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.28901 of 2025 (Ramesh Chandra Samal), W.P.(C) No.28995 of 2025 (Lakshmi Kanta Rana) and W.P.(C) No.29484 of 2025 (Sandhya Rani Patel) stand on a similar footing. The said petitioners had approached the learned Tribunal seeking conversion from the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme by filing O.A. No.260/00216 of 2021, O.A. No.260/00232 of 2021 and O.A. No.260/00214 of 2021 respectively. The Tribunal dismissed the said Original Applications upon holding that the petitioners had continued under the CPF Scheme and had not exercised the option for migration to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the stipulated period. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners invoked the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal by filing Review Applications, including R.A. No.1 of 2024. The Tribunal, however, declined to interfere with the earlier orders, observing that the grounds urged in review merely sought reconsideration of issues already adjudicated and that no error apparent on the face of the record had been demonstrated warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. Insofar as W.P.(C) No.28564 of 2025 (Chaitanya Pradhan) is concerned, the challenge arises from the order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No.260/00217 of 2021. Insofar as W.P.(C) No.28564 of 2025 (Chaitanya Pradhan) is concerned, the challenge arises from the order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No.260/00217 of 2021. The Tribunal, upon examining the materials on record, found that the petitioner had remained under the CPF Scheme and had not exercised the option for migration to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the time prescribed despite opportunities extended by the employer. The Tribunal further noted that the claim had been raised after considerable delay and accordingly declined to grant the relief sought. 9. A perusal of the aforesaid orders clearly indicates that the Tribunal has considered the factual background of each case, the service records of the Petitioners and the policy governing migration from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme before arriving at its conclusion. The findings recorded by the Tribunal are essentially findings of fact based on the materials placed on record and do not disclose any perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 10. The law is well settled that a writ court exercising equitable jurisdiction would be slow to entertain stale claims raised after inordinate delay and acquiescence. In this regard, reference may be made to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others vs. T.T. Murali Babu , as follows: ‚16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‚procrastination is the greatest thief of time? In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‚procrastination is the greatest thief of time? and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.? 11. In the present case, the records reveal that the Petitioners had continued under the CPF Scheme during their entire service tenure and had accepted the benefits flowing therefrom without raising any objection at the relevant point of time. The challenge has been made only after a considerable lapse of time, in some cases even after retirement. 12. Even through merit, the application does not succeed. The challenge has been made only after a considerable lapse of time, in some cases even after retirement. 12. Even through merit, the application does not succeed. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Jaspal Kaur , wherein the Apex Court had occasion to consider a similar claim raised by employees seeking conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme after having continued under the CPF Scheme. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while examining the factual circumstances of that case, held that where an employee had consciously continued under the CPF Scheme and had not exercised the option for migration within the stipulated time, such employee cannot subsequently claim the benefit of the pension scheme at a belated stage. The Court further observed that once an employee had accepted the CPF regime and derived benefits thereunder during the course of service, a belated claim seeking conversion to the pension scheme would not be legally sustainable. 13. This Court further notes that an identical issue has already been considered in detail by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Baijayanti Mohanty vs. Union of India (supra), wherein a similar claim by an employee of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan seeking conversion from the CPF Scheme to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme after retirement was examined. The Co-ordinate Bench, after analysing the factual and legal aspects of the matter, declined to interfere with the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. In doing so, it also took note of the settled principles relating to delay and laches laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu (supra) and Union of India vs. N. Murugesan , (2022) 2 SCC 2 5. Since the issue has already been comprehensively dealt with therein, this Court does not propose to revisit the same in detail. 14. In the instant case, it further appears from the impugned orders that the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the institution had issued communications from time to time inviting employees to exercise their option for conversion from CPF to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme and had ultimately fixed a final cut-off date for exercising such option. 14. In the instant case, it further appears from the impugned orders that the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the institution had issued communications from time to time inviting employees to exercise their option for conversion from CPF to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme and had ultimately fixed a final cut-off date for exercising such option. The Tribunal recorded that several employees had exercised the said option pursuant to such notifications, whereas the Petitioners had not availed the same within the stipulated period. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the Petitioners, having continued under the CPF Scheme and having accepted the benefits flowing therefrom, cannot seek conversion to the pension scheme at a belated stage. The Tribunal has also considered the decisions relied upon by the Petitioners and distinguished the same on the ground that the entitlement to conversion would depend upon the factual circumstances of each case, particularly with regard to the exercise of option within the prescribed time and the conduct of the employee concerned. The Tribunal ultimately concluded that the claim raised by the Petitioners suffers from delay and laches and that no legal right had been made out warranting a direction for conversion to the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme. 15. Before parting with the case, this Court also deems it appropriate to advert to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. vs. M.M. Sarkar, 2010 (2) SCC 59 , hereunder: ‚7. When a scheme extending the benefit of option for switchover, stipulates that the benefit will be available only to those who exercise the option within a specified time, the option should obviously be exercised within such time. The option scheme made it clear that no option could be exercised after the last date. In this case, the respondent chose not to exercise the option and continued to remain under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, and more important, received the entire PF amount on his retirement. The fact that the respondent was the head of his department and all communications relating to the offer of Eighth Option and the several communications extending the validity period for exercising the option for pension scheme, were sent to the heads of the departments for being circulated to all eligible employees/retired employees, is not in dispute. The fact that the respondent was the head of his department and all communications relating to the offer of Eighth Option and the several communications extending the validity period for exercising the option for pension scheme, were sent to the heads of the departments for being circulated to all eligible employees/retired employees, is not in dispute. Therefore, the respondent who himself was the head of his department could not feign ignorance of the Eighth Option or the extensions of the validity period of the Eighth Option. In fact, as noticed above, in his application before the Tribunal the respondent refers to all the options. He is careful to say that he was not `intimated' about the contents of the last order relating to extension of the option, but does not say that he was unaware of the order extending the benefit of option. The respondent consciously chose not to exercise the option as he admittedly thought that receiving a substantial amount in a lump sum under the provident fund scheme (which enabled creation of a corpus for investment) was more advantageous than receiving small amounts as monthly pension under the pension scheme. In those days (between 1957 when the pension scheme was introduced and 1976 when the respondent retired) the benefits under the provident fund scheme and pension scheme were more or less equal; and there was a general impression among employees that having regard to average life expectancy and avenues for investment of the lump sum PF amount, it was prudent to receive a large PF amount on retirement rather than receive a small pension for a few years (particularly as there was a ceiling on the pension and as dearness allowance was not included in the pay for computing the pension). 8. From 1980 onwards, gradually the pension scheme became more and more attractive as compared to the Contributory Provident Scheme, on account of various factors, like dearness allowance being included in the pay for computing pension, ceiling on pension being removed and liberalisation of family pension etc. But the respondent was well aware that not having opted for pension scheme and having received the PF amount on retirement, he was not entitled to seek switch over to pension scheme. But the respondent was well aware that not having opted for pension scheme and having received the PF amount on retirement, he was not entitled to seek switch over to pension scheme. But in 1996, when the respondent learnt that some others who had retired in and around 1973 to 1976 had been permitted to exercise the option in 1993-94 on the ground that they had not been notified about the option, he decided to take a chance and gave a representation seeking an option to switch over to pension scheme. Having enjoyed the benefits and income from the provident fund amount for more than 22 years, the respondent could not seek switch over to pension scheme which would result in respondent getting in addition to the PF amount already received, a large amount as arrears of pension for 22 years (which will be much more than the provident fund amount that will have to be refunded in the event of switch over) and also monthly pension for the rest of his life. If his request for such belated exercise of option is accepted, the effect would be to permit the respondent to secure the double benefit of both provident fund scheme as also pension scheme, which is unjust and impermissible. The validity period of the option to switch over to pension scheme expired on 31.12.1978 and there was no recurring or continuing cause of action. The respondent's representation dated 8.10.1998 seeking an option to shift to pension scheme with effect from 1976 ought to have been straight away rejected as barred by limitation/delay and laches.? 16. In the considered view of this Court, the observations made in the aforesaid decision assume particular relevance to the present batch of cases. The materials on record reveal that the petitioners had continued under the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme during their service tenure without raising any objection at the relevant time and had accepted the benefits flowing therefrom. The present claims appear to have been raised only after subsequent developments and decisions rendered in other cases came to light. Such attempts, often prompted by later perceptions of comparative advantage between schemes, cannot form a valid basis for reopening matters that had long attained finality. An option exercised, or consciously not exercised, under a scheme must be understood as a considered choice made in the context of the prevailing circumstances at that time. Such attempts, often prompted by later perceptions of comparative advantage between schemes, cannot form a valid basis for reopening matters that had long attained finality. An option exercised, or consciously not exercised, under a scheme must be understood as a considered choice made in the context of the prevailing circumstances at that time. 17. This Court would therefore observe that employees must exercise due diligence and make informed decisions when options under service schemes are offered. Courts cannot permit reopening of settled positions merely because, with the passage of time or with the emergence of favourable precedents, one scheme appears more advantageous than the other. Entertaining such belated claims would not only undermine certainty in service administration but also encourage avoidable litigation by those seeking to revisit choices made decades earlier 18. Upon careful consideration of the impugned orders and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the Tribunal has examined the matter in detail and has assigned cogent reasons while declining the relief sought for by the Petitioners. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal does not suffer from any apparent error of law, perversity or jurisdictional infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Web copy of the order to be acted upon by all concerned.