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2026 DAILYLAW 27215 (ORI)

Chandradhwaja Majhi v. State of Odisha

2026-01-30

Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

body2026
Judgment : Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to quash the notice dated 22.10.2025 and the no-confidence meeting held on 11.11.2025 for non-compliance with Section 24 of the Odisha Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, and to protect her continuance as elected Sarpanch in accordance with law. I. F ACTUAL M ATRIX OF THE C ASE 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: (i) The writ petitioner is the elected Sarpanch of Maidalpur Gram Panchayat, Papadahandi Block, District Nabarangpur, having been elected in the PRI Election, 2022. (ii) Maidalpur Gram Panchayat has 22 wards; 21 Ward Members are in position and 1 seat (Ward No. 11) is stated to be vacant. (iii) A requisition seeking a no-confidence motion against the petitioner-Sarpanch was submitted on 12.09.2025 by 13 Ward Members, along with a copy of a proposed resolution dated 13.08.2025, stated to have signatures of ward members in support of the motion. (iv) The Sub-Collector, Nabarangpur received the requisition and initiated steps under Section 24 of the Odisha Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 for convening a special meeting to consider the no-confidence motion. (v) For verification of signatures and willingness of requisitioning members, the Sub-Collector forwarded the matter to the Tahasildar, Papadahandi, who called the Ward Members to appear on 08.10.2025 at the Gram Panchayat Office, Maidalpur for signature verification. (vi) On 08.10.2025, the Tahasildar conducted the verification exercise and recorded that the requisitioning ward members admitted submission of requisition and resolution of their own willingness; the signatures were stated to be found genuine and authentic and this was communicated to the Sub-Collector. (vii) By notice/order dated 22.10.2025, the Sub-Collector fixed the date of the special meeting as 11.11.2025 at 11.00 A.M. at the Gram Panchayat Office, Maidalpur and issued notice to ward members including the Sarpanch, stating that it was accompanied by the requisition and proposed resolution. (viii) The opposite parties state that the notice dated 22.10.2025 was dispatched to members through registered post and also served through personal service, and that the notice and accompanying documents were published on the notice board of the Panchayat Samiti as directed. (ix) The petitioner asserts that she received/was served the notice on 29.10.2025, and claims that the service did not satisfy the statutory requirement of “fifteen clear days” prior notice under Section 24(2)(c) of the Act. (ix) The petitioner asserts that she received/was served the notice on 29.10.2025, and claims that the service did not satisfy the statutory requirement of “fifteen clear days” prior notice under Section 24(2)(c) of the Act. (x) The opposite parties assert that the meeting date (11.11.2025) was fixed with a gap of 19 days from the date of notice (22.10.2025), and they rely on postal tracking and acknowledgement to contend that the petitioner either avoided earlier receipt or was duly served personally with the notice along with the requisition and proposed resolution. (xi) The special meeting for the no-confidence motion was conducted on 11.11.2025 at 11.00 A.M. by the Tahasildar, Papadahandi acting as the authorised Presiding Officer; voting was stated to be by secret ballot and records were forwarded to the Sub-Collector. (xii) The Sub-Collector forwarded the resolution/proceedings to the Collector, Nabarangpur; however, the Collector withheld publication/result in view of an interim order of the High Court in WP(C) No. 31691/2025 and communicated the withholding. (xiii) The counter affidavit on behalf of Opposite Party Nos. 4 and 5 was filed by the Block Development Officer, Papadahandi, stating that he was authorised by the Sub-Collector due to an ongoing law-and-order situation. II. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE P ETITIONER 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions: (i) The petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the notice dated 22.10.2025 issued for convening the no-confidence meeting fixed on 11.11.2025, contending that the mandatory statutory procedure under Section 24 of the Odisha Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 has not been complied with. (ii) The petitioner’s primary ground is that she was served the notice on 29.10.2025, which, according to her, does not satisfy the requirement of “at least fifteen clear days” notice under Section 24(2)(c), thereby vitiating the entire no-confidence process. (iii) The petitioner asserts that she was not served with the copy of the requisition and/or the proposed resolution along with the notice as mandated by Section 24(2)(c), and that the absence of these documents deprived her of the ability to understand the allegations and prepare a defence. (iv) The petitioner pleads that Section 24 prescribes mandatory safeguards before an elected Sarpanch can be unseated, and strict compliance is required because the office is held pursuant to a democratic mandate under the constitutional scheme of Part IX. (iv) The petitioner pleads that Section 24 prescribes mandatory safeguards before an elected Sarpanch can be unseated, and strict compliance is required because the office is held pursuant to a democratic mandate under the constitutional scheme of Part IX. (v) The petitioner relies on precedents of the Orissa High Court, including Nilambar Majhi v. Collector , Keonjhar 2005 (II) OLR 659 and Heeramani Munda v. Collector, Keonjhar 99 (2005) CLT 180 , to contend that defective notice or non-compliance with the mandatory “fifteen clear days” requirement renders the proceedings void. (vi) The petitioner argues that when a statute prescribes a particular method for doing an act, it must be done in that manner alone, and any deviation in notice/service/procedure invalidates the action ab initio. (vii) The petitioner asserts that the impugned action is arbitrary, mala fide, and influenced by political vendetta, and amounts to misuse of state machinery to destabilize a democratically elected representative. (viii) The petitioner claims that denial of adequate notice and non-supply of material documents violates principles of natural justice, fair play, and equality under Article 14, and undermines constitutional decentralisation under Articles 243-B, 243-C and 243-G. (ix) The petitioner seeks judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 on the footing that the statutory authority acted without jurisdiction or in breach of mandatory conditions precedent, and prays for quashing of the notice and all consequential actions, with a direction to allow her to continue as Sarpanch. III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE O PPOSITE P ARTIES 4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions: (i) The opposite parties raise a preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold, contending that no enforceable fundamental or legal right has been violated so as to invoke Article 226 jurisdiction. (ii) They contend that the impugned notice dated 22.10.2025 was issued strictly in accordance with Section 24 of the Odisha Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, and that the petitioner’s challenge is misconceived and based on misrepresentation of facts and law. (iii) They assert that the requisition for no-confidence was validly submitted on 12.09.2025 by 13 ward members along with the proposed resolution dated 13.08.2025, and that the statutory process was commenced on the basis of a lawful requisition. (iii) They assert that the requisition for no-confidence was validly submitted on 12.09.2025 by 13 ward members along with the proposed resolution dated 13.08.2025, and that the statutory process was commenced on the basis of a lawful requisition. (iv) They state that authenticity of signatures and willingness of requisitioning ward members was verified by the Tahasildar, Papadahandi on 08.10.2025, and the signatures were found genuine and the ward members affirmed their voluntary support for the no-confidence motion. (v) They contend that the Sub-Collector fixed the meeting on 11.11.2025 by issuing notice on 22.10.2025, thereby providing a clear gap of 19 days between the notice date and the meeting date, which exceeds the statutory requirement of fifteen clear days. (vi) They deny any non-service or defective service and state that notice along with the copy of requisition and proposed resolution was served to members by registered post and also by personal service, and further published on the notice board of the Panchayat Samiti in compliance with Section 24(2)(d). (vii) They allege that the petitioner deliberately avoided early receipt of the notice as reflected in postal tracking, and that she later received it, and in any event she also received notice personally and acknowledged receipt by signature and seal, making the plea of non-receipt of requisition/resolution false. (viii) They contend that a no-confidence motion is part of the democratic process and the petitioner has no vested right to continue as Sarpanch once a substantial number/majority of ward members express want of confidence, and that courts should not interfere at the notice stage absent patent illegality. (ix) They state that the special meeting was duly held on 11.11.2025 at 11.00 A.M. under authorised presiding officer, secret ballot was conducted, records were forwarded properly, and the result has been withheld only due to the High Court’s interim order, demonstrating respect to judicial process. (x) They deny allegations of mala fides and political interference as bald and unsubstantiated, and contend the writ petition is filed to delay the democratic outcome and to take advantage of the petitioner’s own conduct regarding receipt of notice. IV. C OURT ’ S R EASONING AND A NALYSIS 5. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed before this Court. 6. The removal of an elected Sarpanch via a no-confidence motion is a serious matter that implicates the democratic choice of the electorate. IV. C OURT ’ S R EASONING AND A NALYSIS 5. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed before this Court. 6. The removal of an elected Sarpanch via a no-confidence motion is a serious matter that implicates the democratic choice of the electorate. The Court’s role in review is to ensure that the strict procedural safeguards prescribed by statute have been observed, as these safeguards are intended to protect the mandate of the people while also allowing for accountability of the office-holder. 7. Section 24 of the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 (“the Act”) lays down the procedure for a no-confidence motion. Under Section 24(2)(a) to (c), a special meeting for no-confidence can be convened only on a requisition by at least one-third of the total membership of the Gram Panchayat along with a copy of the proposed resolution, and the Sub- Collector (Sub-Divisional Officer) must then fix a date for the meeting and “give notice of the same to all members… along with a copy of the requisition and proposed resolution, at least fifteen clear days before the date so fixed”. 8. The law further requires this notice to be sent by post (with certificate of posting) and to be published on the Panchayat Samiti notice board at least seven days before the meeting. Notably, Section 24(2)(e) explicitly provides that “the proceedings of the meeting shall not be invalidated merely on the ground that the notice has not been received by any member”. It essentially highlights that a failure of actual service on a member will not, by itself, vitiate the meeting if the prescribed notice procedure was duly followed. 9. In the present case, it is not disputed that the requisition for no-confidence was submitted by 13 ward members, which satisfied the one-third requirement of Section 24(2)(a). The Sub-Collector, as required, initiated the process under Section 24 by verifying the requisitioners’ signatures and willingness through the Tahasildar and then issued the impugned notice dated 22.10.2025 convening the special meeting on 11.11.2025 at 11:00 AM. The petitioner’s challenge, therefore, hinges on whether the statutory conditions of notice, particularly the “fifteen clear days” notice period and the service of the requisition and proposed resolution along with the notice, were complied with. 10. These procedural requirements are mandatory in nature given that they safeguard the rights of the office-holder and members in the no- confidence process. The petitioner’s challenge, therefore, hinges on whether the statutory conditions of notice, particularly the “fifteen clear days” notice period and the service of the requisition and proposed resolution along with the notice, were complied with. 10. These procedural requirements are mandatory in nature given that they safeguard the rights of the office-holder and members in the no- confidence process. If they are not met, the very jurisdiction to hold a valid no-confidence meeting would be lacking. However, the Court must also bear in mind the legislative intent in clause (e) of Section 24(2) and past precedent which indicate that minor deviations in service that do not prejudice the outcome will not invalidate an otherwise properly convened meeting. 11. The phrase “at least fifteen clear days before the date so fixed” in Section 24(2)(c) has been authoritatively interpreted by this Court to mean that the interval between the date of notice and the date of the meeting must be not less than fifteen days, excluding the date on which notice is issued and the date of the meeting. 12. In Nilambar Majhi (Supra) , this Court held that failure to give 15 clear daysnotice as thus computed would render the no-confidence proceeding illegal ab initio. The relevant excerpts are produced below: “It was thus, held that if the margin of clear 15 days between the date of notice and the date of meeting is not there, then the notice and the resolution passed in that meeting would be illegal and invalid even if the petitioner participates in the meeting and he is not estopped from challenging the legality of the meeting on the ground of violation of the mandatory provision of law. So. the content of paragraph-20 of the judgment of the Full Bench relied by learned Addl. Government Advocate is of no help as that observation was meant for the period between date of receipt of notice by the petitioner and the date of the meeting.” 13. In the present case, the notice is dated 22.10.2025, and the meeting was fixed for 11.11.2025. Excluding the date of notice (22.10.2025) and the date of meeting (11.11.2025), the intervening period would be from 23.10.2025 up to 10.11.2025, a span of 19 days. On the face of it, this satisfies the statutory requirement of a minimum fifteen-day clear interval. 14. In the present case, the notice is dated 22.10.2025, and the meeting was fixed for 11.11.2025. Excluding the date of notice (22.10.2025) and the date of meeting (11.11.2025), the intervening period would be from 23.10.2025 up to 10.11.2025, a span of 19 days. On the face of it, this satisfies the statutory requirement of a minimum fifteen-day clear interval. 14. The petitioner’s contention, however, is that she actually received the notice only on 29.10.2025, which left fewer than fifteen clear days from the date of receipt to the meeting, allegedly vitiating the notice. After examining the record, the Court is not convinced that this circumstance invalidates the notice. The statutory scheme does not condition the validity of the notice on each member receiving it 15 days in advance, but rather on the notice being given and dispatched with a meeting date allowing for the requisite interval. 15. Here, the Sub-Collector dispatched the notice by registered post on 22.10.2025 itself (nineteen days before the meeting), and also arranged personal service. The Opposite Party authorities have produced postal tracking information and an acknowledgement to show that any delay in the petitioner’s receipt was due to her unavailability or avoidance, and that ultimately personal service was effected (the petitioner having signed with her seal upon delivery) well before the meeting. 16. In analogous circumstances, courts have warned that if the notice period were counted from date of actual service, an unscrupulous member could evade or delay receipt to frustrate the meeting. In fact, the Kerala High Court in the case of Joshy Pereppadan v. Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies (General) and Ors. W.P. (C) No. 20935 of 2022 in the context of Kerala Co-operative Societies Rule 1969, outlined the intent behind the 15 days of notice for the no-confidence motion. The Court held as follows: “…not less than fifteen clear days of notice of such meeting’, as provided in Rule 43-A(ii), has to be understood as 15 clear days computed from the date of issue of the notice and not from the date of service of notice. If any other interpretation is given, it will make the provision unworkable as it is always possible that a person may evade the service for a longer period to frustrate the holding of the meeting for passing the motion of no confidence.” 17. If any other interpretation is given, it will make the provision unworkable as it is always possible that a person may evade the service for a longer period to frustrate the holding of the meeting for passing the motion of no confidence.” 17. That is precisely why the law treats the notice as valid once duly issued in the prescribed manner with the proper lead time, and why Section 24(2)(e) bars invalidation of proceedings merely due to non-receipt by a member. What is crucial is that the convening authority acted in compliance with the statute by fixing a date with sufficient lead time and sending notice through the approved channels. In this case, the notice was issued and sent 19 days in advance, exceeding the mandated minimum. 18. Therefore, the Court finds no infraction of the “fifteen clear days” rule on the part of the authorities. The petitioner’s late receipt (on 29.10.2025) does not, by itself, invalidate the proceedings in the absence of any evidence that this resulted from a deliberate breach by the authorities or that it prejudiced the petitioner’s ability to participate in the meeting. It is pertinent that the petitioner had nearly twelve days notice even from 29.10.2025 till the meeting date, which, while shorter than ideal, still afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare or reach out to the ward members. Indeed, there is no assertion that the petitioner was prevented from attending the meeting or presenting her case; notably, the record does not reflect that she ever objected to the notice period at the meeting itself. 19. Consistent with the decision in Sarat Chandra Padhi v. State of Orissa , AIR 1988 ORISSA 116 a procedural irregularity in service of notice would warrant quashing a no-confidence proceeding only if it has been demonstrated to cause material prejudice. The court held as follows: “Coming to the instant case as noticed earlier, the sole ground on which the resolution passed in the meeting held on 24-9-85 is challenged by the petitioner is the invalidity of the notice on the ground discussed earlier. It is not in controversy that the petitioner received the notice of the meeting. No case has been made out and no material has been placed to show that the petitioner was prejudiced in any manner due to the shorter period of notice. It is not in controversy that the petitioner received the notice of the meeting. No case has been made out and no material has been placed to show that the petitioner was prejudiced in any manner due to the shorter period of notice. In view of my finding that the provision of Section 24(2)(c) is directory, the challenge of the petitioner to the decision has to be held to be without substance.” 20. In the present case, no such prejudice is substantiated by the petitioner. 21. Equally important is the requirement under Section 24(2)(c) that the notice to members must be accompanied by a copy of the requisition and the proposed no-confidence resolution. This provision makes sure that the Sarpanch and members are fully informed of the allegations or grounds (if any) and the identity of the movers, enabling them to make an informed decision at the meeting. The petitioner has alleged that the notice served on her did not include a copy of the requisition and resolution, thereby depriving her of knowledge of the charges and violating natural justice. On this factual point, the Court finds against the petitioner. 22. The Opposite Parties have categorically stated, on affidavit and in contemporaneous records, that the notice delivered to every member (including the petitioner) did enclose the requisition and the proposed resolution. The notice dated 22.10.2025 itself recites that a copy of the requisition and proposed resolution is enclosed, and this is corroborated by the service report. 23. In the petitioner’s case, the process server’s endorsement (bearing the petitioner’s dated signature and official seal) indicates that the entire packet, inclusive of enclosures, was received. There is also evidence that the requisition and resolution were publicly posted on the Notice Board of the Papadahandi Panchayat Samiti as required by Section 24(2)(d). The petitioner has not produced any material to counter these official records, nor even specified in what manner the notice was allegedly deficient. In these circumstances, the bald allegation of non-receipt of the enclosures is not credible. The Court is satisfied that the requirement of supplying the copy of the requisition and proposed resolution was complied with. Hence, the petitioner’s claim of being kept in the dark about the grounds of no-confidence is untenable on facts. 24. In these circumstances, the bald allegation of non-receipt of the enclosures is not credible. The Court is satisfied that the requirement of supplying the copy of the requisition and proposed resolution was complied with. Hence, the petitioner’s claim of being kept in the dark about the grounds of no-confidence is untenable on facts. 24. It is worthwhile to recollect that a no-confidence motion against a Gram Panchayat head is a statutory mechanism reflecting the concept of institutional accountability in local self-government. The Sarpanch holds office not as a proprietary right but as a public trust subject to the confidence of the elected ward members. 25. The Supreme Court has highlighted that a validly carried no-confidence resolution is essentially an expression of the electorate’s will by proxy and is a direct check flowing from accountability, being akin to a recall of the elected representative in a representative democracy. 26. In Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Raibareilly (1992) 4 SCC 80 , the Court upheld the removal of a municipality Chairman via no-confidence, observing that recall by the elected council is effectively a recall by the people and such provision advances democratic values by ensuring true and just representation. 27. Likewise, in Ram Beti v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari , (1998) 1 SCC 680 the Supreme Court sustained the no-confidence removal of a Gram Pradhan and held that the statutory empowerment of elected members to remove their leader is not unconstitutional nor violative of Article 14, rather, it is consistent with the democratic scheme post the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. The relevant excerpts are produced below: “For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to hold that Section 14 of the Act, in so far as it empowers the members of the Gram Panchayat to remove the Pradhan of a Gram Sabha buy moving a motion of no-confidence, is unconstitutional and void being violative of the concept of democracy or is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to be hit vary Article 14 of the Constitution.” 28. These principles remind us that courts should be cautious not to thwart the will of the majority of the Panchayat members, except where there is a clear-cut violation of law or mala fides. The petitioner cannot claim a vested right to remain in office if the required majority of her own constituency’s representatives has lawfully resolved to remove her. V. C ONCLUSION 29. The petitioner cannot claim a vested right to remain in office if the required majority of her own constituency’s representatives has lawfully resolved to remove her. V. C ONCLUSION 29. For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not made out any ground to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The impugned notice dated 22.10.2025 and the convening of the no-confidence meeting on 11.11.2025 are found to be in substantial compliance with Section 24 of the Act. The procedural safeguards were adhered to and the Petitioner was afforded adequate notice as well as opportunity consistent with the statute. In the absence of any violation of a mandatory provision or demonstrable prejudice, the no-confidence proceedings cannot be held ultra vires. 30. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed 31. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.