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2026 DAILYLAW 27195 (ORI)

Naba Kishore Mishra v. State of Odisha(VIG)

2026-02-13

Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

body2026
JUDGMENT : Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the criminal proceeding initiated against him in T.R. Case No.375 of 2007, arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.40 of 2002 dated 23.09.2002, which is pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Angul, along with the charge-sheet dated 31.03.2005 submitted in connection with the aforesaid vigilance case. I. F ACTUAL M ATRIX OF THE C ASE 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: i. The petitioner is a retired Government servant. On 23.09.2002, Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 40 of 2002 was registered against him alleging commission of offences under Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on the allegation of possession of disproportionate assets. The quantum of alleged disproportionate assets is stated by the petitioner to be Rs. 30,21,063/-. ii. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 31.03.2005 and cognizance of the offences was taken on 29.04.2006. iii. The case was initially pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar. Thereafter, it stood transferred to the Court of the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack and subsequently to the Court of the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Angul, where it is presently pending as T.R. Case No. 375 of 2007. iv. Aggrieved by the continuance of the said proceeding, the petitioner has fieled the present petition seeking quashing of the same. II. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE P ETITIONER 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions in support of his contentions: i. The petitioner submitted that the allegation of disproportionate assets is based on an erroneous computation. It was contended that the Investigating Officer, while calculating the alleged disproportionate assets, aggregated the income and assets of the petitioner’s wife, son and father, who are stated to be independent income-tax assessees, with that of the petitioner. ii. It was further contended that certain bank account balances belonging to another individual bearing a similar name were wrongly included in the petitioner’s assets. iii. Learned counsel submitted that if the income of the independent family members is excluded and the petitioner’s lawful sources of income, including agricultural income and compensation received towards land acquisition, are properly taken into account, the alleged disproportionate assets would either not subsist or would fall within permissible limits. iv. iii. Learned counsel submitted that if the income of the independent family members is excluded and the petitioner’s lawful sources of income, including agricultural income and compensation received towards land acquisition, are properly taken into account, the alleged disproportionate assets would either not subsist or would fall within permissible limits. iv. Learned counsel also submitted that the proceeding has remained pending for more than two decades without commencement of trial, thereby violating the petitioner’s right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that despite submission of charge-sheet in the year 2005 and cognizance being taken in 2006, charge has not yet been framed. v. It was further submitted that the delay is attributable to the prosecution, inter alia, on account of non-supply of certain relevant documents despite directions of the trial court. vi. In support of the contention regarding violation of the right to speedy trial, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. State of Bihar , (1980) 1 SCC 81 , Vakil Prasad v. State of Bihar , (2009) 3 SCC 355 and Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 . vii. Learned counsel further relied upon the decision in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre , (1988) 1 SCC 692 to contend that where the possibility of conviction is remote and continuation of the proceeding would serve no useful purpose, this Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the same. viii. It was also submitted that cognizance of the offences was taken on 29.04.2006 without obtaining prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It was contended that sanction under Section 19 of the Act is mandatory for prosecution of a public servant and that absence of such sanction vitiates the proceeding. Learned counsel submitted that the requirement of sanction continues to apply even if the prosecution is launched after retirement. III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE O PPOSITE P ARTIES 4. Learned counsel submitted that the requirement of sanction continues to apply even if the prosecution is launched after retirement. III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE O PPOSITE P ARTIES 4. Learned counsel for the opposite parties made the following submissions in support of his contentions: i. Learned counsel for the Vigilance Department opposed the petition and submitted that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed at a belated stage seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding along with the charge-sheet arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 40 of 2002 corresponding to T.R. No. 375 of 2007 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Angul. It was submitted that trial has already commenced after framing of charge and prosecution witnesses are being examined. ii. It was further submitted that the petitioner, while working as Traffic Inspector, OMVD, was charge-sheeted for possession of disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 45,00,533/- during the check period from 01.01.1984 to 13.06.2002. iii. Learned counsel submitted that though cognizance was taken on 29.04.2006, the case could not proceed till 17.01.2019 due to non- appearance of the petitioner. It was contended that even thereafter, on several dates fixed for framing of charge, the petitioner did not appear before the trial court. A petition for discharge was filed and rejected, and ultimately charge was framed and trial commenced. It was submitted that the delay in progress of the case is attributable to the petitioner and that he cannot take advantage of such delay. iv. With regard to sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, learned counsel submitted that no sanction is required where the accused had ceased to be a public servant at the time of taking cognizance. It was contended that the petitioner superannuated on 31.03.2004 and the charge-sheet was submitted on 31.03.2005. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India , (1991) 3 SCC 655 , State of Punjab v. Labh Singh , (2014) 16 SCC 807 ,; and CBI v. B.A. Srinivasan, (2020) 2 SCC 153 , to submit that sanction under Section 19 of the Act is not necessary in respect of a person who has retired from service prior to taking cognizance. v. It was further submitted that there is no illegality in the order taking cognizance or in continuation of the trial and that the petition is liable to be dismissed. IV. C OURT ’ S R EASONING AND A NALYSIS 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record, including the compliance report submitted by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Angul. 6. At the outset, it is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, either to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice. 7. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , the Supreme Court in this regard, observed as replicated hereinunder: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 8. At the stage of quashing of a charge-sheet, this Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous examination of evidence or adjudicate disputed questions of fact which fall within the domain of the trial court. 9. The first contention of the petitioner relates to absence of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is not in dispute that the petitioner superannuated from service on 31.03.2004. The charge- sheet was submitted on 31.03.2005 and cognizance of the offences was taken on 29.04.2006. Thus, on the date of taking cognizance, the petitioner had already ceased to be a public servant. 10. It is not in dispute that the petitioner superannuated from service on 31.03.2004. The charge- sheet was submitted on 31.03.2005 and cognizance of the offences was taken on 29.04.2006. Thus, on the date of taking cognizance, the petitioner had already ceased to be a public servant. 10. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, governed the field at the time cognizance was taken. The petitioner seeks to contend that in view of the subsequent amendment, sanction was mandatory even in respect of retired public servants. 11. The amendment to Section 19 came into force on 26.07.2018. In the present case, the FIR was registered in 2002, the charge-sheet was submitted in 2005 and cognizance was taken in 2006, much prior to the coming into force of the amended provisions. 12. The validity of the order taking cognizance must be examined with reference to the statutory provisions prevailing on the date such cognizance was taken. A subsequent amendment cannot be applied retrospectively so as to invalidate cognizance which was otherwise lawful under the unamended statutory regime. 13. In this regard, the Supreme Court in State of Telangana v. Managipet , (2019) 19 SCC 87 has held that the amended provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2018 cannot be made applicable to cases where the FIR was registered prior to the amendment coming into force. The relevant extract is appended herein: “37. Mr Guru Krishna Kumar further refers to a Single Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in M. Soundararajan v. State [M. Soundararajan v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 13515] to contend that amended provisions of the Act as amended by Act 16 of 2018 would be applicable as the amending Act came into force before filing of the charge-sheet. We do not find any merit in the said argument. In the aforesaid case, the learned trial court applied amended provisions in the Act which came into force on 26-7-2018 and acquitted both the accused from charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. The High Court found that the order of the trial court to apply the amended provisions of the Act was not justified and remanded the matter back observing that the offences were committed prior to the amendments being carried out. The High Court found that the order of the trial court to apply the amended provisions of the Act was not justified and remanded the matter back observing that the offences were committed prior to the amendments being carried out. In the present case, the FIR was registered on 9-11-2011 much before the Act was amended in the year 2018. Whether any offence has been committed or not has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the statute as it existed prior to the amendment carried out on 26-7-2018.” 14. In view of the aforesaid position, since cognizance in the present case was taken in the year 2006 under the unamended provisions of the Act, the amendment of 2018 does not govern the matter. The contention regarding absence of sanction, therefore, does not merit acceptance. 15. The next contention relates to alleged erroneous computation of disproportionate assets. It is contended that income and assets of independent family members were wrongly included and that certain bank accounts were incorrectly attributed to the petitioner. Such submissions involve disputed questions of fact regarding assessment of income, valuation of assets and attribution of financial holdings. These issues necessarily require appreciation of documentary and oral evidence. In exercise of inherent jurisdiction, this Court cannot enter into factual adjudication at this stage. 16. The petitioner has also contended that the prolonged pendency of the proceeding violates his right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the matter has remained pending for a considerable length of time. 17. However, upon perusal of the compliance report submitted by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Angul, it appears that after supply of police papers and additional documents, charges were framed on 18.12.2025 and trial has commenced. One witness has already been examined, cross-examined and discharged, and the case is posted for further evidence. 18. The report further reflects that opportunities were granted to the petitioner at the stage of consideration of charge and that additional documents sought by the defence were supplied. In such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the entire delay is attributable to the prosecution. 19. The right to speedy trial is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is undoubtedly available to every accused. In such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the entire delay is attributable to the prosecution. 19. The right to speedy trial is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is undoubtedly available to every accused. However, the mere passage of time, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing criminal proceedings. The Court is required to examine the nature of the offence, the stage of the proceedings, the reasons for delay and whether the delay is attributable to the prosecution or the accused. In the present case, the compliance report reflects that charges have been framed, the trial has commenced and evidence is being recorded. The materials also indicate that the delay cannot be attributed solely to the prosecution. In such circumstances, interference at this stage would not be warranted. 20. Upon an overall consideration of the factual matrix and the legal position governing exercise of inherent jurisdiction, this Court does not find that the present case falls within the parameters laid down for quashing of criminal proceedings. The matter requires adjudication on evidence before the trial court. V. C ONCLUSION 21. Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and the materials placed on record, this Court finds that the allegations in the charge-sheet prima facie disclose the commission of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 22. The issues raised by the petitioner with regard to computation of disproportionate assets involve disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence, which fall within the domain of the trial court. The plea regarding absence of sanction under Section 19 of the Act is untenable in view of the fact that cognizance was taken in 2006 under the unamended statutory regime. The ground of violation of the right to speedy trial also does not warrant interference at this stage, particularly when the trial has commenced and evidence is being recorded. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any ground to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash the proceeding in T.R. Case No. 375 of 2007 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 40 of 2002. Accordingly, the CRLMC stands dismissed. 24. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any ground to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash the proceeding in T.R. Case No. 375 of 2007 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 40 of 2002. Accordingly, the CRLMC stands dismissed. 24. However, considering that the matter pertains to the year 2002, the learned trial court is directed to make all endeavour to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either party. 25. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.