JUDGMENT : B.P. ROUTRAY, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.Pal, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. S.S.Mohanty, learned counsel for Opposite Party. 2. Present writ petition is directed against order dated 7 th January 2026 passed by the learned Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar in Arbitration(P) No.29 of 2025. 3. The facts of the case are that present Petitioner was the Claimant in the arbitration proceeding conducted before the sole- Arbitrator between present Petitioner and Opposite Party pursuant to the direction passed in ARBP No.41 of 2022. The arbitration proceeding continued and vide procedural order dated 30 th March 2025 the settlement arrived between the parties was confirmed by the Arbitrator. In said procedural order dated 30 th March 2025, the Arbitrator has observed that the parties and their respective counsels have agreed that the final agreement shall be on 3 rd May 2025 and it has also been agreed that after signing of the agreement the consent award shall be passed on a subsequent date to be fixed with consent of parties. But on 2 nd May 2025 a petition was filed by the Claimant praying to pass appropriate order by the Arbitrator to set Respondent No.2 Ex-parte since she refused to accept and sign the settlement conditions arrived on 30 th March 2025, thereby modifying procedural order dated 30 th March 2025 of the Arbitrator. 4. It needs to be mentioned that the settlement made in writing by the parties dated 30 th March 2025 has been signed by the Claimant and Respondent No.1 along with their respective counsels and counsels for Respondents No.3 to 5. 5. On 3 rd May 2025, the Tribunal vide its procedural Order No.18 observed that the Claimant filed an affidavit on 2 nd March 2025 and prayed for further time to comply his obligations for payment of Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores) to Respondent No.1 as per the terms of settlement dated 30 th March 2025. 6. 5. On 3 rd May 2025, the Tribunal vide its procedural Order No.18 observed that the Claimant filed an affidavit on 2 nd March 2025 and prayed for further time to comply his obligations for payment of Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores) to Respondent No.1 as per the terms of settlement dated 30 th March 2025. 6. But on 25 th May 2025 the Arbitrator vide procedural Order No.19 has stated that the Claimant has sent a letter dated 23 rd May 2025 informing that he has filed a petition, i.e. ARBP No.29 of 2025 under Section 14 & 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred as the Act) before the Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar with prayer to terminate the proceedings of said arbitral Tribunal on the ground that its mandate has expired on 19 th February 2025. 7. Now coming to the contention of the Petitioner, he has filed the application in ARBP No.29 of 2025 under Section 14 & 15 of the Act praying for termination of arbitration proceeding on the ground that the mandate in terms of Section 29-A of the Act for continuation of the arbitration proceeding has expired, with additional ground that the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction to record a finding in terms of the settlement and by doing so the Arbitrator has exceeded its jurisdiction. The Commercial Court upon adjudication of the prayer of the Petitioner has rejected the same vide impugned order dated 7 th January 2026 under Annexure-7. 8. Mr. Pal, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Commercial Court has failed to appreciate the contention of the Petitioner with regard to expiry of the period for arbitration proceeding and secondly, it has erred in law to observe that there is no deficiency accrued on the Arbitrator in terms of Section 12 (5) of the Act, albeit the same was not the case of the Petitioner before the Court. According to the Petitioner the time limit for continuation of arbitration proceeding expired on 30 th January 2025 and therefore, any subsequent proceeding and order passed after 30 th January 2025 would be null and void and without any authority on the part of the Arbitrator. According to the Petitioner the time limit for continuation of arbitration proceeding expired on 30 th January 2025 and therefore, any subsequent proceeding and order passed after 30 th January 2025 would be null and void and without any authority on the part of the Arbitrator. It is also submitted that the settlement recorded by the Arbitrator in terms of order dated 30 th March 2025 is not warranted on the part of the Arbitrator as the Petitioner was forced to sign on the settlement. 9. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for Opposite Party submits in his reply that all such contentions made on behalf of the Petitioner are without any merit. He submits that the arbitration proceeding commenced as per the communication of appointment of the Arbitrator is made on 31 st January 2023. The due date of filing of settlement of claim and defence was on 31 st July 2023, when statement of claim and defence were filed on 24 th July 2023.. The pleadings were completed on 16 th December 2023 and therefore, the time limit continued up to 16 th June 2025. 10. It is further submitted by Mr. Mohanty that all such allegations with regard to the authority of the Arbitrator to arrive at the settlement raised on the part of the Petitioner are not supported by any material. All such contentions have been made in a well thought manner so that the agreement earlier arrived by the Claimant in terms of the settlement dated 30 th March 2025 can be invalidated, and the Claimant is trying to get rid of the same by taking several such pleas only to nullify the effect of settlement he arrived earlier on 30 th March 2025. 11. The Petitioner relies on the provisions of the Act prescribed under Section 29-A(1) read with Section 23(4). As per the rival submissions made by the parties, the dispute with regard to completion of time period lies on the point in interpreting the phrase “completion of pleadings” as appearing in Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A of the Act. What is submitted by Mr. As per the rival submissions made by the parties, the dispute with regard to completion of time period lies on the point in interpreting the phrase “completion of pleadings” as appearing in Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A of the Act. What is submitted by Mr. Pal that Section 23(4) postulates that the statement of claim and defence shall be completed within a period of six months from the date the Arbitrator received notice in writing of his appointment, so that the date of filing of the defence by the Opposite Party should be treated as the date of completion of pleadings in terms of Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A. 12. I fail to conceive such argument advanced by Mr. Pal. It is for the reasons that Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A grants the Arbitral Tribunal a period of 12 months plus extended period of six months, as per Sub-section 3, from the date of completion of the pleadings under Sub-section 4 of Section 23. Here, if Sub-section 4 of Section 23 is looked into, the same speaks that the statement of claim and defence under this Section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of notice of appointment of the Arbitrator. There is difference between the words used in Sub-section 4 of Section 23 and Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A. According to Sub- section 1 of Section 29-A the phrase used is “date of completion of pleadings” whereas the words used in Sub-section 4 of Section 23 are “the statement of claim and defence”. Thus, what should be the date of completion of pleadings is to be interpreted in terms of Sub-Section 1 of Section 29-A. Pleadings does not complete upon filing of the statement of claim and defence. The opportunity to complete the pleading remains with the parties till the issues have been determined because in reply to the statement of defence filed by the Respondent, the Petitioner has the option to file his reply by way of rejoinder or by way of further affidavit. Taking a situation where a counter claim is raised by the Respondent in the statement of defence or set off is sought for, in that event, it is natural for the Claimant to file his reply or counter affidavit or written statement of defence also. Taking a situation where a counter claim is raised by the Respondent in the statement of defence or set off is sought for, in that event, it is natural for the Claimant to file his reply or counter affidavit or written statement of defence also. Therefore, taking all such probable situations, the phrase “completion of pleadings” as used in Sub-section 1 of Section 29-A would be stretched more than the requirement expressed in Sub-section 4 of Section 23, i.e. beyond the filing of statement of claim and defence. It is therefore can be suitably accepted that the completion of pleadings would be the date of settlement of the issues. This view as expressed by me is found supported in EMCO Limited vs. Delhi Transco Limited , 2024 SCC Online Del 6306 , where the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court has observed that the time period in terms of Section 29-A(1) would be reckoned from the date the rejoinder is actually filed. As it is understood, for effective adjudication of the dispute before the Arbitrator, issues are usually settled for determination in terms of Sub-section 1 of Section 23 of the Act. Even the issues are not settled then also the effective order passed by the Arbitrator in terms of Section 23(1) would be reckoned as the relevant date for the purpose of completion of pleadings. Thus, what is stated by the Petitioner that the pleadings were completed on filing of the statement of defence on 24 th July 2023, and 18 months thereafter falls on 24 th January 2025 or to say it on 30 th January 2025, would be an incorrect fact. 13. As seen from the procedural Order No.5 dated 16 th December 2023 of the Arbitrator the issues have been framed on the same date and it is also observed by the Arbitrator that the pleadings have been completed. Therefore, there would be no hesitation to accept the date on 16 th December 2023 as the date of completion of pleadings. Counting a period of 18 months thereafter, it comes to 15 th June 2025. So it cannot be said that the time limit for continuation of the proceeding has been completed in terms of Section 29-A (1) on 30 th January 2025. But in the facts of the present case, it is on 15 th June 2025. 14. Counting a period of 18 months thereafter, it comes to 15 th June 2025. So it cannot be said that the time limit for continuation of the proceeding has been completed in terms of Section 29-A (1) on 30 th January 2025. But in the facts of the present case, it is on 15 th June 2025. 14. According to the submission made on behalf of the Opposite Party, he has applied on 13 th June 2025 before the Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar in ARBP No.34 of 2025 for extension of the time period for continuation of the arbitration proceeding in terms of Sub-section 4 & 5 of Section 29-A of the Act. It is further stated that said ARBP No.34 of 2025 pending before the Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar has been stayed by this Court as per the interim order passed in the present case. So it can now be safely concluded that the completion of the time period for continuation of the arbitration proceeding was till 15 th June 2025 and therefore, all orders passed prior to 15 th June 2025 by the Arbitrator cannot be questioned as nullity on the ground of expiry of the time period on 30 th January 2025. 15. As regards to the other contention raised by the Petitioner that the learned Commercial Court has not appreciated the contention of the Petitioner but relied to the provisions of Section 12(5) to reject his prayer under Section 14 & 15 of the Act, the same is also not found a fact on record. A perusal of the impugned order dated 7 th January 2026 of the Commercial Court reveals that it has dealt the prayer of the Petitioner along with the objection of the Opposite Party in detail dealing with all such points raised before it. At Paragraph- 6 & 7 it is the specific observation of the learned Commercial Court that the application for extension of time having been filed by the Opposite Party and pending, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall continue till disposal of such application and therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that the mandate of learned Tribunal has already been expired since 19 th February 2025 is not sustainable. To deny the prayer of the Petitioner to declare the Arbitrator de jure ineligible to continue with the arbitration proceeding, the Commercial Court has opined the foundation of such ground advanced by the Petitioner is not factually correct. While answering such contention of the Petitioner for the purpose of his prayer to declare the Arbitrator de jure ineligible, the Tribunal has referred Section 12(5) in order to deny such contention of the Petitioner that his case is not any of the deficiency in terms of Scheduled-7 of the Act and therefore, such prayer to declare the Arbitrator de jure ineligible is unsustainable. The learned Commercial Court upon further discussion has stated that the Petitioner has been failed to show any reason or justifiable ground to question the impartiality or independence of the Arbitrator and the functions of the Arbitrator would always be allowed to give the award or to record the settlement in course of the arbitral proceeding. So, the Commercial Court without finding any effective ground within the purview of Section 14 has refused to allow the prayer of the Petitioner. This Court does not find any illegality or defect in the same to interfere with said order of learned Commercial Court. In addition to this, the conduct of the Petitioner before the Arbitrator also needs to be observed. Here it is emphasize that, when the Petitioner contends that the arbitration proceeding has expired by time period on 30 th January 2025, still he continues to participate in arbitration proceeding before the Arbitrator without raising any objection to that effect till 23 rd May 2025. It is only on the 23 rd May 2025 when the Petitioner sent a letter to the Arbitrator intimating about filing of the case before the Commercial Court under Section 14 of the Act. In the meantime, the Petitioner along with his counsel filed the written settlement/agreement having signed on the same without any objection. Till date also the Petitioner does not dispute his signature on the settlement made on 30 th March 2025. As it reveals from the procedural order dated 30 th March 2025 of the Arbitrator and subsequent order dated 3 rd May 2025 that, the Petitioner has not raised a single objection with regard to the written settlement arrived between the parties and signed by him along with his counsel. As it reveals from the procedural order dated 30 th March 2025 of the Arbitrator and subsequent order dated 3 rd May 2025 that, the Petitioner has not raised a single objection with regard to the written settlement arrived between the parties and signed by him along with his counsel. Rather on 2 nd May 2025, he filed a petition stating that due deliberations had been made between the Claimant and Respondents No.3 to 5 and all have agreed and satisfied with the conditions of settlement signed on 30 th March 2025. Even in the petition filed on 2 nd May 2025 though the Petitioner has prayed to the Arbitrator to consider his prayer to pass directions setting Respondent No.2 as ex-parte, who refused to accept and sign the settlement dated 30 th March 2025, still he did not pray thereby saying anything about his disagreement or dissatisfaction about the settlement dated 30 th March 2025. This implies that the subsequent action of the Petitioner to question the inability of the Arbitrator for recording such written settlement between the parties on 30 th March 2025, to be an afterthought attempt made by him for any other reason. Without making any specific pleading regarding conduct of the arbitration proceeding before the Arbitrator affecting his right, such averments made as additional grounds in ARBP No.29 of 2025 is completely unsustainable and unacceptable at this stage. 16. Mr. Pal, learned counsel though submits regarding bias on the part of the Arbitrator and relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Airports Authority of India, 2026 SCC Online SC 7 . But it is found that in the facts of the present case such question of bias as apprehended by the Petitioner is unfounded and unsupported by materials. As stated earlier, the appointment of the Arbitrator has been made in terms of Section 11 of the Act. It is reiterated here that till 23 rd May 2025 the Petitioner has participated in the arbitration proceeding before the Arbitrator without raising any single objection. When he was not dissatisfied till 23 rd May 2025, either regarding conduct of the arbitration proceeding or in arriving at the settlement, his subsequent apprehension regarding de jure inability of Arbitrator is found devoid of any merit. 17. When he was not dissatisfied till 23 rd May 2025, either regarding conduct of the arbitration proceeding or in arriving at the settlement, his subsequent apprehension regarding de jure inability of Arbitrator is found devoid of any merit. 17. Section 14 of the Act authorizes the party to apply to the Court on the ground of failure of impossibility to act by the Arbitrator in passing the award. Said provision as per Sub-Section 1 of Section 14 includes that the Arbitrator for other reasons fails to act without undue delay. It is to be stated here that, it is not the case of the Petitioner before the Commercial Court in ARBP No.29 of 2025 that the Arbitrator becomes de facto unable to perform his functions for any such reason mentioned in Scheduled-7. The contention of the Petitioner that the Arbitrator is not performing the functions without undue delay is not supported with specific pleadings or materials produce thereof. Thus, no merit is seen by this Court in such contention of the Petitioner to entertain his prayer either to terminate the mandate or to substitute the Arbitrator. 18. In the result, for the reason stated and discussions made above, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit.