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2026 DAILYLAW 27185 (ORI)

Rashmi Roshan @ Nigar v. Union of India

2026-01-20

Chittaranjan Dash, Dixit Krishna Shripad

body2026
JUDGMENT : Chittaranjan Dash , J. 1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court in W.P.(C) No. 19271 of 2016, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 2. The appellant and Respondent No.4 came in contact in the year 2004 at Cuttack, during the appellant’s visit to her aunt’s house, and gradually developed a relationship. On 25.06.2006, their marriage was solemnised according to Islamic rites (Nikah) at Bhadrak, following which the marriage was consummated. Soon thereafter, when the appellant was taken to the parental house of Respondent No.4 at Kendrapara, she was subjected to cruelty, dowry demands, and refusal of acceptance as a daughter-in-law, compelling her to seek shelter outside the matrimonial home. Owing to continued neglect and harassment, the appellant initiated legal proceedings, including a maintenance case in the year 2007 and approached the Women Commission, pursuant to which criminal proceedings were initiated against Respondent No.4 and his family members. On 12.12.2008, Respondent No.4 and his father were arrested, following which Respondent No.4 admitted his wrongdoing and agreed to formalise the marital relationship. On the same day i.e. 12.12.2008, a Nikah was solemnised before a Government Kazi in the presence of family members from both sides, and a Nikahnama was duly issued. An agreement was also executed contemporaneously to safeguard the appellant from threats of arbitrary divorce. Subsequent to resuming his service in the Indian Air Force, Respondent No.4 failed to maintain the appellant and deliberately withheld information of the marriage from his service authorities. On 28.12.2008, the appellant formally submitted representations along with the marriage documents to the Air Force authorities, requesting that her name be recorded as the wife of Respondent No.4 in his service records. Despite being in possession of the relevant documents, the authorities did not act upon the request. Instead, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Respondent No.4 in May, 2009 for failure to obtain permission for marriage and for non-disclosure of marital details, culminating in a punishment of reprimand under Section 82 of the Air Force Act, 1950. During this process, the appellant was examined through questionnaires, and the marital relationship stood acknowledged in official proceedings. Even thereafter, no steps were taken to record the appellant’s name in the service records. During this process, the appellant was examined through questionnaires, and the marital relationship stood acknowledged in official proceedings. Even thereafter, no steps were taken to record the appellant’s name in the service records. In the year 2012, the appellant furnished a judicial order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate confirming the marital status between the parties. Despite this, the authorities continued their inaction. For the first time, in July 2012, Respondent No.4 claimed to have divorced the appellant in September 2009, though no such assertion had been made earlier, nor was any valid proof disclosed at the relevant time. It later transpired that a Talaqnama dated 20.12.2014 was relied upon by the authorities, notwithstanding serious infirmities relating to jurisdiction, legality, and absence of the appellant’s consent or participation. During this period, Respondent No.4 was permitted to contract a second marriage in August 2013, even before the alleged divorce was formally recorded, and the name of the second wife was entered into the service records, thereby excluding the appellant altogether. Aggrieved by the continued refusal of the Air Force authorities to recognise her marital status and to deduct maintenance from the salary of Respondent No.4, the appellant approached this Hon’ble Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 19271 of 2016. By the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2025, the learned Single Judge declined interference on the ground that disputed questions of fact were involved, yet proceeded to make definitive findings on marital status and validity of divorce, and ultimately dismissed the writ petition as being devoid of merit. It is against this decision, whereby the appellant has been left remediless despite long-standing documentary and judicial recognition of her marital status, that the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 3. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 09.04.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 19271 of 2016, declined to exercise writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, holding that the reliefs sought by the petitioner involved disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication on the basis of evidence by a competent civil court. 3. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 09.04.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 19271 of 2016, declined to exercise writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, holding that the reliefs sought by the petitioner involved disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication on the basis of evidence by a competent civil court. The learned Single Judge further held that, in view of the existing marital status recorded in the service records of Respondent No.4 and the rival claims regarding marriage, divorce, and subsequent remarriage, no writ of mandamus could be issued either for recording the petitioner’s name as wife in the service records or for deduction of maintenance from the salary of Respondent No.4. 4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roshina T vs. Abdul Azeez K.T. & Ors., 2019 (I) ILR – CUT 10 (S.C.) has categorically reiterated that questions relating to disputed facts cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as follows: 14. These questions, in our view, were pure questions of fact and could be answered one way or the other only by the Civil Court in a properly constituted civil suit and on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court. 15. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between the private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. (See Mohan Pande vs. Usha Rani, 1992 (4) SCC 61 and Dwarka Prasad Agrawal vs BD Agrawal, (2003) 6 SCC 230 ). 16. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. (See Mohan Pande vs. Usha Rani, 1992 (4) SCC 61 and Dwarka Prasad Agrawal vs BD Agrawal, (2003) 6 SCC 230 ). 16. In our view, the writ petition to claim such relief was not, therefore, legally permissible. It, therefore, deserved dismissal in limine on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit by respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) in the Civil Court. 17. We cannot, therefore, concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court when it unnecessarily went into all the questions of fact arising in the case on the basis of factual pleadings in detail (43 pages) and recorded a factual finding that it was the respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) who was in possession of the flat and, therefore, he be restored with his possession of the flat by the appellant. 18. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while so directing exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a Civil Court. In our view, it was not permissible. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain vs. Rajeshwari Shivam & Ors. , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 , has further held the following: 26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable. 6. It is well settled that questions relating to disputed facts cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ court does not undertake an exercise involving appreciation of evidence, examination of witnesses, or recording of findings on facts. Issues such as determination of marital status, validity of marriage or divorce are essentially questions of fact, which can be resolved only upon a full-fledged adjudication before a competent forum. Such issues, by their very nature, fall outside the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction. 7. Issues such as determination of marital status, validity of marriage or divorce are essentially questions of fact, which can be resolved only upon a full-fledged adjudication before a competent forum. Such issues, by their very nature, fall outside the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction. 7. From the material placed on record, it is evident that while the appellant relied upon a Nikahnama dated 12.12.2008 and subsequent judicial orders granting maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the respondents produced documents indicating pronouncement of talaq in September 2009 and its subsequent registration, which was verified by the Air Force authorities through an internal inquiry. It is also borne out from the record that Respondent No.4’s second marriage was permitted and recognised by the competent service authorities after such verification, and the name of the second wife stood recorded in the official service records. 8. Further, the maintenance awarded in favour of the appellant has already been adjudicated and enforced through criminal court proceedings, which have attained finality up to this Court, and there is no material on record to demonstrate any subsisting default warranting recourse to Section 92(i) of the Air Force Act, 1950. 9. In view of the aforesaid factual position and the nature of disputes involved, we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. The impugned judgment reflects a correct appreciation of the limits of writ jurisdiction in matters involving contested marital status and service record entries. 10. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order dated 09.04.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 19271 of 2016, and the writ appeal stands disposed of accordingly. It is made clear that the observations made herein are confined to the scope of the present writ proceedings and shall not come in the way of the appellant in availing or pursuing any appropriate legal remedy before the competent forum for establishment of facts, in accordance with law.