- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT PETITION NO.3597 OF 2018 (SC/ST) BETWEEN: 1. SRI. R SURESH MOHAN S/O RANGAMURTHY, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/AT NO.13, 3RD CROSS, BHARATIYAR ROAD, CHOLAIMEDU, CHENNAI-600 094 TAMIL NADU. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. V SANJAY KRISHNA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY REVENUE SECRETARY, M.S. BUILDING, B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560 001. 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT, CHAMARAJANAGAR-571 313. 3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER KOLLEGALA SUB-DIVISION, KOLLEGALA, CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571 115. R Digitally signed by V MANJUSHA BAI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 4. (a) MOLLE CHICKKAIAH S/O LATE DODDA CHICKKAIAH, SINDE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS, SMT. SAAKAMMA, AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS, W/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH, (b). KUM. DODDATAYAMMA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH, (c). KUM. D. SHIVAMMA AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH, (d). KUM. BHAGYAMMA AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH, (e). KUM. KAMALAMMA AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, D/O LATE MOLLA CHICKKAIAH, RESPONDENT NOS.4(a) TO 4(e) ARE R/AT MANGALA GRAMA, KOLLEGAALA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT-571 115. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. I. THARANATH POOJARY, AAG., ALONG WITH SMT. ANITHA N., AGA., FOR R.1 TO R.3; VIDE ORDER DATED 02.06.2026 R.4 (b) TO (e) ARE THE LRS. OF DECEASED R.4 (a); R.4(b) TO R.4(e) ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED.] - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 09.10.2017 IN P.T.C.L NO.6/2011- 12 PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHAMARAJANAGAR DISTRICT, THE 2ND RESPONDENT HEREIN, PRODUCED UNDER ANNEXURE-A, ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING/VIDEO CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN ORAL ORDER 1. The land which is the subject matter of the writ petition was granted in favour of respondent No.4-Molle Chickkaiah, who is presently deceased and is succeeded to by his legal representatives namely, respondent nos.4(a) to 4(e). In spite of service of notice, they have remained absent and unrepresented. 2. The grant was made in the year 1967. Thereafter, in the same year, the land was alienated in favour of the late mother of the petitioner. The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'PTCL Act') came into force on - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 01.01.1979. The alienation that took place in the year 1967 was challenged for the first time in the year 2007 by respondent no.4. Respondent No.3-Assistant Commissioner, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the Act, resumed the land and appropriated it to the Government. In the said proceedings, the petitioner herein was unrepresented. It is the case of the petitioner that no notice was served on him. The said finding is not disputed by the respondents. Thereafter, respondent Nos.4(a) to (e) filed an appeal before respondent No.2-Deputy Commissioner, with a prayer to restore the land so resumed in their favour. The notice issued by respondent no.2 was served on the petitioner and the petitioner thereafter filed a cross appeal challenging the order passed by respondent no.3-Assistant Commissioner. Respondent No.2, after hearing both the parties, has passed an order wherein the land was restored in favour of respondent nos.4(a) to (e) and the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Aggrieved by - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 the orders passed by respondent no.3 and respondent no.2, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the granted land was purchased by him way back in the year 1967 and after a lapse of around 40 years, the same was challenged before respondent Nos.2 and 3 and they have passed the impugned orders in violation of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232. On the said ground, it is prayed that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submits that subsequent to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, Section 5 of the PTCL Act has been amended and the following amendment has been introduced: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 "(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section." 5. It is further submitted that the PTCL Act is a beneficial legislation and it has to be interpreted in order to benefit the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. It is also submitted that the PTCL Act has been included in 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India and the validity of the PTCL Act has been upheld. For the aforementioned reasons, it is submitted that the impugned orders passed by respondent nos.2 and 3 are proper and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Admittedly, in the instant case, the alienation has taken place in violation of terms of the grant. It is also not in dispute that the alienation took place in the year 1967 and was challenged for the first time in the year 2007. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 7. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the question that arises for consideration is whether the delay of 40 years in preferring an application before respondent No.3 under Section 5 of the PTCL Act would be fatal to the case of the grantee or his legal heirs. 8. Section 4 of the PTCL Act reads as under: "4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority." - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 9. Section 5 of the PTCL Act reads as under: "5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands.- (1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of section 4, he may,- (a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard; (b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 (c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section." (1-A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly. (2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-A, any order passed under sub-section (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. (3) For the purposes of this section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other than the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4." - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 Thus, any transfer of granted land made either before or after commencement of the PTCL Act in contravention of the terms of the grant shall be null and void. 10. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manchegowda and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301, while upholding the constitutional validity of the aforementioned provisions of the PTCL Act in paragraph 15 has held as under: "15. Any person who acquires such granted land by transfer from the original grantee in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on such transfer must necessarily be presumed to be aware of the prohibition imposed on the transfer of such granted land. Anybody who acquires such granted land in contravention of the prohibition relating to transfer of such granted land cannot be considered to be a bona fide purchaser for value; and every such transferee acquires to his knowledge only a voidable title to the granted land. The title acquired by such transfer is defeasible and is liable to be defeated by an appropriate action taken in this regard. If the Legislature under such circumstances seek to intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the community and choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper method of recovery of these granted lands which - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 were otherwise liable to be resumed through legal process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rights of the transferees are affected. Transferees of granted lands with full knowledge of the legal position that the transfers made in their favour in contravention of the terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation governing such grant are liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not have in law or equity, a genuine or real grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands so transferred is, in fact, being defeated and they are being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in law liable to be dispossessed by process of law. The position will, however, be somewhat different where the transferees have acquired such granted lands not in violation of any term of the grant or any law regulating such grant as also where any transferee who may have acquired a defeasible title in such granted lands by the transfer thereof in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by prescription of time or otherwise. We shall consider such cases later on. But where the transferee acquires only a defeasible title liable to be defeated in accordance with law, avoidance of such defeasible title which still remains liable to be defeated in accordance with law at the date of commencement of the Act and recovery of possession of such granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be termed as unconscionable, unjust and arbitrary. The first - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, overruled." Thus, the Apex Court while upholding the validity of the PTCL Act has created an exception by stating that if the purchaser has perfected his title by virtue of prescription of time or otherwise, such a transfer cannot be set aside. 11. In Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, the Apex Court has held at paragraph 8 as under: "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (2018)12 SCC 527 and also in Ningappa v. Commr. (2020)14 SCC 236 reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Commr. 1998 SCC OnLine KAR 671, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka (2006)4 Kant. LJ 303 and G. Maregouda vs. Commr. (2000)2 Kant.L.J.SN 4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly." Thus, the Apex Court has held that, any challenge made to the alienation in respect of the granted lands under the provisions of the PTCL Act has to be made within a reasonable period. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others v. Hari Kishore Yadav reported in (2018)12 SCC 527 while explaining reasonable time has observed in paragraphs 10 and 13 of the judgment as under: "10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn. "reasonable time" is explained as follows: “That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer.” Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve rights and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses. 11. xxx 12. xxx 13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 Statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights." 13. When the Apex Court rendered the judgment in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, Section 5 of the PTCL Act was not yet amended and thereafter in the year 2023, the amendment mentioned in paragraph 4 supra, has been introduced. 14. It is submitted by the parties concerned that the constitutional validity of the said amendment is challenged and the same is pending consideration before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Be that as it may, this Court in the case of Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma vs. The Deputy Commissioner and Others in W.A.No.100101/2024 disposed of on 29.07.2024, while analysing the effect of the amendment to Section 5 - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 of the PTCL Act, it has been held at paragraph 3 of the judgment as under: "3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The subject land does not answer the definition of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 (b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is un understandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered. (c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under: “(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated. (d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity. (e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view: “8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void u nder Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. …..” (Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least. - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 (f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate. (g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25 make out this point: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches. 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond. (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify." 15. It is submitted that the State preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court against the aforementioned judgment in W.A.No.100101/2024; however, the same has been dismissed at the threshold itself. Thus, by virtue of the aforesaid decision of this Court in W.A.No.100101/2024, in spite of the amendment carried out to Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2023, still a person is required to challenge an alienation under the provisions of Section 4 of the PTCL Act within a reasonable period. The said reasonable period has to be considered by taking into consideration various factors under the given facts and circumstances of each case. 16. In the present case, admittedly, there is a delay of around 40 years in challenging the alienation. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 17. In the present case, the original grantee himself alienated the land in the year 1967. Admittedly, he received a valuable consideration equivalent to the market value as on the date of the sale. After a lapse of around 40 years, when the value of the land has increased multifold, he challenges the same. 18. A beneficial legislation is enacted to help the downtrodden, uneducated and the deprived classes to be insulated from the exploitation that they may be subjected to by others. However, such beneficial legislation is not intended to enable a person belonging to the deprived class to use it as a tool to exploit others. Under the given facts and circumstances of the case, the challenge to the sale which has taken place in the year 1967 cannot be considered to have been done within a reasonable period. The impugned orders under challenge have put the purchaser to a great loss that he should not suffer and causes serious injustice to him. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 19. Further, Section 6 of the PTCL Act reads as under: "6. Prohibition of registration of transfer of granted lands.-Notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 on or after the commencement of this Act, no registering officer shall accept for registration any document relating to the transfer of, or to the creation of any interest in, any granted land included in a list of granted lands furnished to the registrating officer except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act or the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant." 20. In spite of the aforementioned provision, learned Additional Advocate General candidly admits that the revenue documents in respect of the lands concerned do not highlight the fact, whether the land is a granted land in favour of persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or not and whether the same can be alienated or not. He also admits that due to lack of proper information to the concerned Sub-Registrar, the deeds of conveyance in respect of the granted lands are being registered. It is an unfortunate situation wherein due to - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33877 WP No. 3597 of 2018 callousness of the State, a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration is put to peril. 21. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) The writ petition is hereby allowed; (ii) The impugned orders dated 09.10.2017 passed by respondent No.2-Deputy Commissioner (vide Annexure-A to the writ petition) and 18.10.2011 passed by respondent No.3-Assistant Commissioner (vide Annexure-B to the writ petition) respectively are hereby set aside; (iii) A direction is hereby issued to the State to mention in the revenue records, wherever the land is a granted land for the purposes of the PTCL Act, which shall put the purchaser on guard. SD/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE hkh.List No.: 1 Sl No.: 42