APHC010672412022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3565] THURSDAY,THE FIFTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023 Between: 1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR(L.A.O), G.N.S.S., NANDYAL. ...APPELLANT AND 1. MACHALAPURI MABU SAHEB, S/o Dasthagiri, Age 45 years, Perusomula Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District and others. ...RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellant: 1. GP FOR APPEALS (AP) Counsel for the Respondents: 1. K RATHANGA PANI REDDY The Court made the following: 2 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023 COMMON JUDGMENT (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand): 1. These Land Acquisition Appeal Suits arise out of the Common Order, dated 30.11.2021, passed in LAOP.No.2 of 2016 and batch on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Allagadda (hereinafter referred to as "Reference Court") whereby the compensation for the land acquired was enhanced from Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and Rs.65,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land. 2. This batch of Appeals arise from the same land acquisition Notification dated 26.06.2006 for the land of village Perusomula Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District and involved common facts and questions; therefore, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties, all these Appeals have been heard together treating the LAAS No.20 of 2023 as the leading Appeal. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as per their ranking in the Reference Court. 4. The Government has issued a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') dated 3 26.06.2006. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value of the lands at the rate of Rs.45,000/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and for Rs.65,000/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land vide Award 10/2006-07 dated 19.08.2006. 5. Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded in Award No.10/2006-07 dated 19.08.2006, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘LAO’), several land owners submitted references under Section 18 of the Act. These references were adjudicated by the Common Order, dated 30.11.2021 in leading LAOP.No.2 of 2016 and batch before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Allagadda. The Reference Court enhanced the market value of the acquired land from Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and from Rs.65,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land. 6. Briefly stated facts of the present Appeals for referring to matters by the Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) GNSS, Unit-I, Nandyal, to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act are as follows: (a) The Special Deputy Collector (LAO), GNSS Unit-I, Nandyal and the Executive Engineer, GNSS Division No.4, Koilakunta, submitted requisitions dated 09.06.2006 and 12.06.2006 for the acquisition of 135.60 acres of land in Perusomula Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District, for the excavation of the GNSS Flood Flow Canal. Under Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act, urgency was invoked, and the enquiry under Section 5(A) was dispensed with. The lands were classified as Rainfed Dry Land and Irrigable 4 Dry Land and the D.N. proposal for 135.60 acres was approved on 12.06.2006. The Section 4(1) notification was published in the Kurnool District Gazette on 15.06.2006, and the draft declaration was published in relevant local offices on 21.06.2006 and 22.06.2006. (b) To determine the market value, the LAO considered sale transactions from three years before the Notification under Section 18 of the Act. However, all transactions from the Sub-Registrar, Owk, were discarded. The market value was fixed at Rs.45,000/- per Acre for Rainfed Dry Land and Rs.65,000/- per Acre for Irrigable Dry Land. The Claimants, however, were not satisfied with the assessed market value. 7. In their respective OPs, the Claimants argued that the compensation granted by the LAO was insufficient, lacking justification and failing to follow the principles outlined under Section 23 of the Act. They contended that the LAO did not account for the potential of the acquired lands, comparable sales, or exercise individual discretion. The Claimants, who depend on the acquired land for agricultural purposes, also highlighted that they earn Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/- from Bengal gram cultivation on dry land with black cotton soil, which the LAO did not consider. Additionally, they pointed out that the Court has enhanced the compensation of Rs.2,51,600/- for dry land in OP No.1034/2003, dated 29.12.2008 (Award No.74/2001-02, dated 01.03.2000) and noted that Prism Cement Limited purchased lands nearby at Rs.3,00,000/- per Acre in 2007-2008. The Claimants thus sought an enhancement of Rs.10,00,000/- per Acre with all statutory benefits. 5 8. Based on the above pleadings, the Reference Court framed the following points: (1) Whether the market value fixed by the LAO is proper? (2) Whether the acquired lands have got any mining potentiality? (3) Whether the claimants are entitled for enhancement of the market value fixed by the LAO? (4) To what relief? 9. During the common enquiry to substantiate the Claimants’ claim, some of the Claimants were examined as P.Ws.1 to 6 and got marked Exs.P1 to P20. On behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer/Referring Officer, no evidence was adduced but Ex.B1 was marked. 10. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the Reference Court enhanced the compensation amount from Rs.45,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for Rainfed dry land and Rs.65,000/- to Rs.2,87,620/- per Acre for I.D. land. Consequently, awarded 30% solatium on the enhanced market value fixed as provided under Section 23(2) of the Act; additional market value @ 12% per annum on such market value from the date of Sec.4(1) Notification of the Act till the date of Award; also awarded interest at 12% per annum for one year from the date of taking possession thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of payment on enhanced market value and also entitled to interest on additional market value and solatium. 11. Aggrieved by this common order, the Appellant/Referring Officer filed the present batch of First Appeals. 6 12. Learned Government Pleader for Appeals appearing for the Appellants, argues that the enhancement of the compensation by the Reference Court was without basis or evidence; it failed to consider the oral and documentary evidence presented in the case; it discarded Ex.P.2, dated 04.06.2008 which is subsequent to the award notification of Ex.B.1 award copy been that the sales pertaining to 2008 cannot be taken into consideration and whereas the 4(1) notification is 2004 only; it erroneously considered the award No.10/2006-07 while enhancing the compensation amount towards the land and also the previous Award No.74/2001-2002 which was decided in O.P.No.1034/2003, dated 29.12.2008 and that the enhancement made by the learned Judge was excessive and exorbitant. 13. The Respondents/Claimants would contend that the Reference Court passed awards in neighbouring villages in land acquisition proceedings. By relying on those awards, the respondents assert that the compensation granted by the Reference Court is reasonable. 14. Having regard to the pleadings in the Original Petitions, the findings recorded by the Reference Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1) Is the market value of the acquired land determined by the Reference Court lawful and adequate? 2) Does the Orders of the Reference Court need any interference? 7 POINTNOs.1 and 2: 15. It is apparent from the record that the then Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) acquired the lands to form the Galeru Nagari Sujala Sravanthi Flood Flow Canal. The LAO issued the 4(1) Notification on 26.06.2006 and the 6(2) Notification on 31.03.2006 for the acquisition of the lands, as part of Award No.10/2006-07, dated 19.08.2006, following an enquiry conducted with the assistance of the Revenue Department and its officials, including the Tahsildar of Sanjamala and his staff. The Special Deputy Collector and the Executive Engineer of the GNSS Division No.4, Deputy Inspector of Survey, Special Surveyor, and Special Deputy Tahsildar visited the acquired land and determined its market value. Subsequently, the LAO disbursed compensation to the Claimants. After receiving the compensation, some of the awardees filed Protest Petitions before the LAO, Galeru Nagari Sujala Sravanthi, Unit-I, Nandyal, which were subsequently referred to the Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 16. As reflected in Ex.B.1, the Award, dated 19.08.2006, the Land Acquisition Officer classified the acquired lands into two categories: Rainfed dry land and irrigated dry land with bore wells. As per Ex.B.1, the Award, the Special Collector noted that the primary crop cultivated on the acquired land was paddy. The paddy yield was assessed at 20 quintals per Acre, with a market price of Rs.6,000/- per quintal, resulting in a gross income of Rs.13,200/- per Acre. After deducting the expenditure, the net value was estimated to be between Rs.6,000/- and Rs.6,500/- per Acre. By applying the 8 multiplier '10', the land's value was determined to be between Rs.60,000/- and Rs.65,000/- for irrigated dry (I.D.) land. Consequently, the Special Deputy Collector fixed the market value at Rs.42,000/- to Rs.45,000/- for dry land. 17. The Reference Court correctly observed that the LAO failed to provide a clear basis for assessing the yield from irrigated dry (I.D.) lands and the associated expenditure. The LAO did not gather relevant information from the Agricultural Officer or the Market Committee. In the absence of such critical data, the Reference Court concluded that the market value fixed by the LAO was improper and inadequate. 18. Before the Reference Court, the Claimants strongly asserted that the acquired lands contained deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone, but the LAO improperly classified these lands as dry lands. The Reference Court, after considering the arguments, rejected this contention, providing detailed reasons for its decision. 19. In the Ex.B.1 Award proceedings, the LAO did not mention that the acquired lands contained Kadapa slabs and limestone. Had such deposits been present on the Claimants' lands, the LAO would undoubtedly have acknowledged them in the Award. The Reference Court also referenced the testimony of PW.1, who stated that the lands were agricultural and some were equipped with bore wells. However, no evidence was presented to demonstrate that agricultural cultivation could still be carried out on lands containing deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone. 9 20. The 1st Claimant in OPNo.2 of 2016, as PW.1, testified that the acquired lands are black cotton soil suitable for cultivating various commercial crops. He further claimed that the lands contain minerals such as Kadapa slabs and limestone. However, the claim statement explicitly stated that all the acquired lands were classified as dry lands with black cotton soil and that the Claimants depended solely on these agricultural lands for their livelihood. The Claimants also mentioned growing Bengal gram on the acquired lands, but the claim statement did not mention Kadapa slabs or limestone deposits. The claimants also testified that although the lands acquired by the LAO under this Award were being cultivated as agricultural lands, they also contained minerals. 21. The learned counsel for the Claimants argues that the mere omission to mention the presence of mineral deposits in the acquired lands should not be a reason to reject the Claimants' contention. He contends that this omission cannot be treated as a fatal flaw akin to a defect in a plant. 22. In this regard, learned counsel for the Respondents relied on the decision in Rajamani V. Collector, Raipur1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 4 ...................... It is settled law that the statement under Section 19 in terms of the objection under Section 18 of the Act is not treated as a plaint. Upon Service of the notice on the claimant or interested person, he is treated to be a plaintiff and Land Acquisition Collector to be a defendant for the purpose of conducting the proceedings as envisaged under Section 22 of the Act. They are entitled to be represented by counsel. On receipt of the application, it is the duty of the claimant. The burden is always upon him, who seeks higher 1 (1996) 5 SCC 701 10 compensation to adduce evidence and prove in the Court that the compensation awarded by the Collector was inadequate and that the acquired lands were possessed of higher value for the Award of the compensation to be just and adequate compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer is to rebut the evidence the claimant/interested person adduced. The burden is always on the claimant. Ultimately, it is the duty and power of the Court to determine just and adequate compensation on relevant facts and law sitting in the armchair of a prudent purchaser in an open market. ………………. 23. In civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient ground for decision if the facts and circumstances are such that no reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree of probability in the case is such that as to include any hypothesis besides the one to be proved then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot be said to have discharged the onus of proof of establishing that theory. But, if the evidence strongly preponders in favour of any of the two theories set up, the Court is entitled to act on it. Trite, the proposition of law is that witnesses might lie, but the circumstances would not do so. 24. In R. Puthunainar Alhithan V. P.H. Pandian2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an inference from the proved facts must be so probable that if the Court believes, from the proved facts, that the facts do exist, it must be held that the fact has been proved. The inference of proof of that fact could be drawn from the given objective, direct or circumstantial. 25. The learned counsel for the Claimants argued that, despite their testimony in chief regarding the presence of minerals on their lands, the 2 (1996) 3 SCC 624 11 learned Assistant Government Pleader chosen to cross-examine the witnesses on that aspect. Consequently, he contends that the unchallenged testimony should be considered as establishing the Claimants’ case. 26. In Special Deputy Collector, (L.A.O), Anakapalli V. Padala Venkata Ramana 3 , the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 7. It is relevant to mention that in all the claim statements filed before the reference Court, it was stated that compensation at the rate of Rs.2 lakhs per Acre was claimed before the LAO. The market value, determined under the impugned Award, is thus much more than what the respondents allegedly claimed before the LAO, even on their own admission. We are not saying for a moment that there is a legal bar against awarding more compensation. However, the admission only indicates that the claimants were content with receiving compensation of Rs.2 lakhs per Acre (Rs.2,000/- per cent). But, they laid a speculative claim before the reference Court, which found its ready acceptance by the Court. 22. The learned Subordinate Judge should have taken elementary care to scrutinise the oral evidence and evaluate its intrinsic worth instead of commenting that the Government advocate did not cross-examine PW2 or that rebuttal evidence was not let in. The claimants themselves did not deem it fit to claim as much as the Court estimated. The learned Judge should have thought over twice before unreservedly accepting the interested version of PW2 and arriving at the yield and income at such a high figure. Even if there was no cross-examination by the Government Pleader, the Court is not helpless in eliciting the truth. The Court need not glibly swallow whatever is stated by the claimant in his own interest without subjecting the evidence to critical scrutiny and testing the same from the standpoint of common knowledge and probabilities. 27. In light of the observations, this Court views that though the claim statement cannot be treated as a plaint, it cannot be concluded that the 3 MANU/AP/0163/1999 12 version put forth by the Claimants in the earlier statement cannot be considered and must be ignored. 28. The LAO could have mentioned in the Ex.B.1 Award if there were deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone, as seen in other awards. However, nothing in the Award attributes this omission to the LAO concerning the deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone. There appears to be no valid reason for such an omission by the LAO. Furthermore, the Claimants could have included this crucial fact in their claim statements. The version regarding mineral deposits was introduced after noticing compensation awards in other cases. Consequently, the Reference Court rightly chose not to consider the Claimants' contentions in this regard. We find no justification to disregard the observations made by the LAO regarding the nature of the land. 29. In M. Narsinga Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh 4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. The word "proof" needs to be understood in the sense it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is the production of such materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher 4 (2001) 1 SCC 691 13 Moulton. L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Company, Ltd., observed this: "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion." 16. The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching a conclusion, the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law. The law gives absolute discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact that it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the Court may have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular case. The discretion is envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 30. For the reasons stated above and based on the observations made, we are of the opinion that the Reference Court, after a thorough and proper appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly concluded that the Claimants' lands could not be classified as dry lands containing deposits of Kadapa slabs and limestone. The Claimants have failed to produce any revenue records or other official documents that would substantiate the nature of the lands as being rich in such mineral deposits. In the absence of such crucial evidence, the Reference Court's decision stands well-founded. Without appropriate records or credible proof of the alleged deposits, the Claimants' assertion regarding the mineral content of their lands cannot be accepted as valid. 14 31. In Bhupal Singh V. State of Haryana5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically considered a similar question of determination of market value under Section 23 of the Act and held that the fair market value of the acquired land is required to be determined on the basis of the market rate of the adjacent lands similarly situated to the acquired lands prevailing on the date of acquisition or/and prior to acquisition but not subsequent to the date of acquisition. 32. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chamanlal Hargovind Das V. S.L.A.O6, Manoj Kumar and others V. State of Haryana and others7, Union of India V. Dyagala Devamma and others8, and Bhupal Singh (supra), we have no difficulty to hold that the market value of the acquired land is required to be determined on the basis of the market rate of the adjacent land similarly situated to the acquired lands prevailing on the date of acquisition or/and prior to the acquisition but not subsequent to the date of acquisition. 33. In this regard, it is profitable to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhag Singh and ORs. V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.9, wherein it held that: 15. The question now is whether the determination of market value subsequent to the notification would be relevant to determining the market value of the land acquired more than two years earlier. We find that though appreciation in price can be presumed, the market value cannot be assessed 5 MANU/SC/0383/2015 6 MANU/SC/0071/1988 7 MANU/SC/1349/2017 8 MANU/SC/0772/2018 9 MANU/SC/0589/2022 15 by applying a suitable deduction in the market value of the land acquired by a subsequent notification. When the later notification is issued, the development activities have already taken place in view of the earlier two notifications. Therefore, it is not the percentage of increase in the market value but the increase due to the development which has taken place on account of earlier notifications. Therefore, the market value of the land cannot be based upon the land acquired vide notification dated 11.11.1993, i.e., more than two years after the notification in question and when other notifications were intervening on 26.10.1990 and 25.7.1991. 34. Evidently, in the present case, development activities also occurred due to the earlier notification. In light of this, we find that the Reference Court rightly disregarded the Ex.A.2 sale transaction. The sale, being post- notification, was influenced by the subsequent development activities, making it an unreliable indicator of the land's market value at the time of acquisition. Therefore, the Reference Court's decision to ignore this transaction is justified. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record to prove that the nature of the said land was similar to that of the acquired land. In the absence of evidence to prove the similarity regarding locality, potentiality, or the nature of the said land vis-à-vis the subject land, post-sale transactions cannot be relied upon to determine the market rate of the acquired land. 35. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the Reference Court failed to appreciate the previous Award relied upon by the Claimants in the correct perspective and that the Reference Court should not have enhanced the compensation at a rate of 10% per annum. 16 36. In Land Acquisition Officer-cum-M.R.O. V. Gouramma 10 , the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 11………..…The potentiality of the land and the increase in price also depend on the lie of the land, the situation of the land and the demand for land in that particular area. Generally, as inflation is on the high side, particularly when the rupee is losing its value, the courts, in the absence of any guidelines for increase, take into account a 5 to 10 percent increase every year. Even that 5 to 10 per cent, as we take into consideration, is the discretion left to the Court taking into account the potentiality of the land, increasing value of that particular land, strategic position of the land and the increase in prices of the land covered by other sale deeds or other statistics that have been brought to the notice of the Courts concerned. So, in this case, if we take the maximum rate that the Government can pay for this acquisition for providing house sites and the increase even if we calculate at the rate of 10 percent increase every year for 10 year period as the notification is dated August 28, 1989, at best, we feel reasonable that the increase should be 10 x 10, i.e., 100 per cent, and accordingly, we are granting that 100% than the value that has been fixed by the Court under Ex.A-2 Even in the case on hand, we want to make it clear that the Award has become final on account of the judgment of the Court, but still, either the Land Acquisition Officer or the claimant can prove the rate of increase or decrease based on the sale deeds that are available and where no other document is available, these final judgments can be taken into consideration When the other sale deeds are available those sale deeds also can be taken into consideration, but the value fixed in these cases can be settled as the variance will be either on the increase or on the decrease. If some comparable sale deeds are available, based on the values only, the market value has to be determined, and it is completely left open to the discretion of the Officer to decide the reasonable compensation based on the documents and the awards that have been passed by this Court. 10 MANU/AP/0226/1993 17 37. In Acquainted Realtors LLP and ORs. V. State of Haryana and Ors11., the Hon’ble Supreme Court referenced the decision in ONGC Ltd.12, wherein it is observed that: 15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisitions) where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on sale transactions/ acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond that, it may be unsafe, even if it is related to neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is only a few years old may become an unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of land acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pit falls. This is because, over the course of years, the "rate" of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard of increase. 38. The Reference Court relied on Exs.A.7 and A.9 awards to determine the market value of the property, and we refer to some of its observations to address the Government Pleader’s contention as follows: (i) Ex.A6, a copy of Award No.58/1998-99 dated 01.03.1999, pertains to the acquisition of lands in Reddipalli village. The LAO set the market value at Rs.28,000/- per Acre for Category No.1 and Rs.30,000/- per Acre for Category II, as of the draft notification on 7.7.1993. After referencing this Court, the market value was enhanced to Rs.50,000/- per Acre in OP 11 MANU/SC/0248/2021 12 (2008) 14 SCC 745 18 250/2000, consolidating both categories into one for dry lands, as per Ex.A9. The Government appealed against this order in LAAS 1677/2003, but the Hon'ble High Court upheld the enhancement on 18.11.2006, as shown in Ex.A8. For example, Ex.B1, the Award classifying the Claimants' lands as BC soil dry lands and I.D lands with bore wells, indicates that the lands in both awards are comparable. (ii) In Valluri Veerabhadra Rao and Others V. Land Acquisition Officer13, this Court ruled that a 10% annual increase should be applied to calculate the market value of lands acquired under a subsequent notification, provided the lands are similar in fertility, value, and purpose. Applying this to the time lag between Ex.A7's notification on 7.7.1993 and Ex.B1's Award on 3.4.2006 (12 years, 8 months, and 26 days), the market value increase of Rs.50,000/- results in Rs.63,694/-. Adding this to the original Rs.50,000/-, the total market value is Rs.1,13,694/- (rounded to Rs.1,13,000/- for dry land and Rs.1,33,000/- for irrigated land with bore wells as of the 3-4-2006 notification). 39. In The Special Deputy Collector V. M. Pedda Subbarayudu (LAAS No.80 of 2014), the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 8. It is almost a settled and recognised principle of law to allow 10% appreciation per year for the value of immovable properties. The lands of the respondents were acquired 8 years after the land in the same village was acquired for the purpose of the main canal. Though they were entitled to 80% appreciation over the market value extracted in Ex.B.2, the reference Court took the appreciation at 70%. We do not find any basis to interfere with the order passed by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Nandyal. 40. After carefully reviewing the precedents cited, we firmly believe that the Reference Court has appropriately determined the market value in 13 1993 ALD D.B. page 129 19 accordance with the judgments rendered by both the Supreme Court and this Court. The argument put forth by the Government Pleader questioning increasing the compensation amount by 10% per annum, as per the Awards under Exs.A.7 and A.9, is not sustainable. 41. We are of the considered views that the reasoning and basis adopted by the Reference Court in awarding compensation are sound and appropriate. We find that the Reference Court approached the matter correctly, and after thorough consideration, we agree with the Reference Court’s assessment of the evidence. The findings of the Reference Court are sound, and no valid grounds have been presented by the Land Acquisition Officer to alter the compensation amount awarded. Based on the preceding discussion, we see no reason to depart from the Reference Court’s perspective. Accordingly, the Points are answered. 42. As a result, these Appeals fail and are dismissed without costs. The Decree and Order passed by the Reference Court are affirmed. 43. There is no order as to costs. Miscellaneous pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND ____________________________ JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA Date: 05.03.2026 PGR 20 (206) THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL NOS.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 & 71 OF 2023 DATE: 05.03.2026 PGR