JUDGMENT : SANJEEB K. PANIGRAHI, J. 1. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Hon’ble Court to quash the impugned orders dated 25.04.2025 and allied eviction notices, and to restrain the authorities from dispossessing or demolishing her dwelling, except in accordance with law, after due adjudication and rehabilitation. I. F ACTUAL M ATRIX OF THE C ASE 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: (i) The petitioner is residing with her three minor children on a portion of land measuring Ac.0.02 decimals out of Ac.0.13 decimals in Mouza Palasahi, Khata No.509, Plot No.871, District Khurda, and claims to have been in possession of the said portion for several years. (ii) Proceedings under the Odisha Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1972 were initiated in respect of the said land by the Tahasildar, Balipatna, and an encroachment case bearing No.23/2021–22 was registered. (iii) An eviction notice was issued to the petitioner directing her to vacate the land within a stipulated time, failing which eviction and demolition were proposed. (iv) The petitioner challenged the eviction proceedings before this Hon’ble Court in W.P.(C) No.28670/2024, which was disposed of on 21.11.2024 with liberty to approach the appellate authority under Section 12 of the OPLE Act. (v) Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Sub-Collector, Bhubaneswar, which was heard and disposed of on the same day with a direction relating to eviction of the petitioner’s structure. (vi) The petitioner thereafter approached this Hon’ble Court in subsequent writ petitions, where directions were issued to avail the statutory remedy of revision before the competent authority. (vii) The petitioner filed OPLE Revision Case No.02/2025 before the Collector, Khurda, which was dismissed on 25.04.2025 at the stage of admission. (viii) According to the petitioner, the land in question corresponds to Sabik Khata No.456, Sabik Plot No.589, earlier recorded in the name of Late Madhabananda Nayak, and was subsequently recorded in Government Khata during settlement due to non-appearance. (ix) According to the counter affidavit of Opposite Party No.4, the land in question is recorded as Government land under Hal Khata No.509 and Hal Plot No.871, and the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation thereof. (x) Opposite Party No.4 states that the encroachment proceedings were initiated on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Revenue Inspector and statutory notices under the OPLE Act were issued to the petitioner. (x) Opposite Party No.4 states that the encroachment proceedings were initiated on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Revenue Inspector and statutory notices under the OPLE Act were issued to the petitioner. (xi) It is stated by Opposite Party No.4 that the Collector, Khurda, while disposing of Revision Case No.02/2025 on 25.04.2025, directed the Tahasildar to evict the encroacher in accordance with law and protect the Government land from further encroachment. (xii) As per the counter affidavit, certain homestead lands are recorded in the name of the petitioner’s father and grandfather at village Palasahi, and it is further stated that land is recorded in the name of the petitioner’s husband’s family at village Patapara under Balanta Tahasil. (xiii) Opposite Party No.4 has also relied upon reports of the Revenue Inspector regarding the petitioner’s family income and landholdings from the paternal and marital sides. (xiv) Allegations have been made in the counter affidavit that the petitioner objected to or obstructed certain developmental and communal activities on nearby Government land and that she has allegedly encroached upon another Government plot. (xv) The petitioner disputes the assertions made in the counter affidavit and contends that the eviction proceedings are illegal and procedurally improper, while Opposite Party No.4 maintains that all actions were taken strictly in accordance with the OPLE Act and after following due process. II. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE P ETITIONER 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions: (i) The impugned orders passed by the Sub-Collector and the Collector suffer from complete non-application of mind, having been passed without calling for records, examining material documents, or granting a meaningful opportunity of hearing. (ii) Recording of land in Government Khata during settlement does not confer title upon the State, as Record of Rights neither creates nor extinguishes title, and questions of ownership lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil court. (iii) Initiation of encroachment proceedings against the petitioner is without authority of law since the land is claimed to be private Sabik land and the Tahasildar lacks jurisdiction to decide title or evict on that basis. (iv) The finding that the petitioner is not landless is arbitrary, as even according to official records the petitioner has no independent landholding and any notional family share is negligible and insufficient for shelter. (iv) The finding that the petitioner is not landless is arbitrary, as even according to official records the petitioner has no independent landholding and any notional family share is negligible and insufficient for shelter. (v) The action of the authorities violates the petitioner’s right to life and shelter under Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly in view of her status as a deserted woman with minor children. (vi) The Government policy to provide Ac.0.04 decimals of homestead land to landless persons entitles the petitioner to protection and consideration rather than demolition of her dwelling. (vii) The eviction proceedings are vitiated by malafides, reliance on false and motivated reports, and undue influence of private individuals having no legal interest in the land. (viii) Forcible eviction without alternative rehabilitation would render the petitioner and her minor children homeless and defeats constitutional obligations of the State. (ix) The impugned orders dated 25.04.2025 and the eviction notices deserve to be quashed as arbitrary, illegal, and violative of principles of natural justice. III. S UBMISSIONS O N B EHALF O F T HE O PPOSITE P ARTIES 4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions: (i) The petitioner is an encroacher over Government land, and the occupation being unauthorized, she is not entitled to any relief; any structure raised on such Government land is liable to be demolished and the land vacated. (ii) The Tahasildar is a statutory authority governed by the OPLE Act, 1972 and Rules, with power of wide amplitude to initiate proceedings and issue statutory notices (Forms Ka/K/Kha as referred) to keep Government land free from encroachment; there is no fetter on such power. (iii) The encroachment proceedings were initiated strictly as per statute on the basis of RI report and statutory forms, and the petitioner was provided due opportunity; hence there is no violation of natural justice. (iv) The eviction notice dated 05.05.2025 was issued pursuant to the Collector’s order dated 25.04.2025 in Revision Case No.02/2025 directing immediate eviction as per law; therefore the notice is justified and procedurally valid. (v) The petitioner is not a landless/homestead-less person, since she has homestead land from her paternal side and her husband’s side, and also has family income above the threshold shown in the RI enquiry; hence she cannot claim benefits meant for landless persons. (v) The petitioner is not a landless/homestead-less person, since she has homestead land from her paternal side and her husband’s side, and also has family income above the threshold shown in the RI enquiry; hence she cannot claim benefits meant for landless persons. (vi) The petitioner has no right, title or interest over the case land and is attempting different pleas “aimlessly”, which are stated to be untenable in law. (vii) The petitioner’s conduct is alleged to hinder public interest, including obstruction of community use and Government development projects (including demarcation for a proposed health sub-centre), and she is alleged to have encroached additional Government land, strengthening the case for eviction. (viii) Since land is scarce and must be used judiciously, encroachments that hinder public/communal and developmental use must be removed, and the statutory machinery under OPLE should be permitted to operate. (ix) The interim protection granted by the High Court should be vacated and the writ petition dismissed, as the authorities have acted within jurisdiction and followed due process. IV. J UDGMENT AND ANALYSIS 5. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed before this Court. 6. The petitioner admits that the land in dispute is recorded as Government property (Hal Khata No.509, Plot No.871) and that she is in occupation of a small portion thereof. Under the Odisha Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1972, any person found occupying Government land without authorization is liable to summary eviction after notice and opportunity of hearing. In the present case, the Tahasildar issued the requisite notices (Forms Ka/Kha) and ultimately passed eviction orders, which the petitioner has challenged through successive appeals and revisions as well as writ petitions. Having exhausted the statutory remedies (appeal to the Sub-Collector and revision to the Collector), the petitioner seeks relief by writ. 7. The fundamental question is whether there are any grounds to interfere with the statutory eviction proceedings. It is well established that recording of land in Government Khata under the revenue records does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. 8. In the case of Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur and Ors. /b> . In this regard, the Supreme Court held that mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. 8. In the case of Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur and Ors. /b> . AIR 1996 SC 2823 the Supreme Court held that mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title. The court held as under: “Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question.” 9. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the land might once have been private (Sabik) land, the fact that it is entered in Government Khata means only that title is disputed and remains to be adjudicated by a civil court. The OPLE Act itself does not permit the authorities to determine title; it merely treats the land as Government land for the purpose of eviction. As a result, any claim of ownership must be pursued in the civil forum, and in the meantime the petitioner’s occupation is to be treated as unauthorized if the revenue record shows State ownership. In this light, the petitioner’s contention that the Tahasildar had no jurisdiction to evict is misplaced: on the face of the record, the land was within the administrative control of the Revenue Department, and the Tahasildar had authority under Section 7 of the Act to issue notices and order eviction. 10. Nor is there any convincing evidence of procedural unfairness. Counsel for the State asserts that the statutory process was duly followed, the petitioner received show-cause notices and was heard by the Tahasildar, and she later availed herself of the appeal and revision remedies. The petitioner alleges non-application of mind and lack of hearing, but the mere fact that the final orders came quickly does not prove arbitrary conduct. In any event, the High Court’s earlier orders expressly directed the petitioner to pursue appeal or revision rather than obtain relief by writ, and she did so. In the absence of any specific finding of mala fide behavior or violation of natural justice by the authorities, there is no basis to invalidate the impugned orders. 11. In any event, the High Court’s earlier orders expressly directed the petitioner to pursue appeal or revision rather than obtain relief by writ, and she did so. In the absence of any specific finding of mala fide behavior or violation of natural justice by the authorities, there is no basis to invalidate the impugned orders. 11. Courts are generally reluctant to quash administrative acts where an alternate statutory remedy is available and has been pursued. The Supreme Court in the case of Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes , AIR 1964 SC 1419 has emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is to be exercised sparingly where the statute provides an efficacious alternative remedy such as an appeal or revision. The relevant excerpts are produced below: “Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.” 12. Here, the petitioner has already utilized those remedies and cannot now re-litigate the same issues by way of writ petition. 13. The petitioner also relies on Article 21, urging that eviction would violate her fundamental right to life and shelter, especially given her status as a woman with minor children. It is true that the right to life has been interpreted to include a right to livelihood and shelter. 13. The petitioner also relies on Article 21, urging that eviction would violate her fundamental right to life and shelter, especially given her status as a woman with minor children. It is true that the right to life has been interpreted to include a right to livelihood and shelter. In the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation , 1985 (3) SCC 545 the Supreme Court recognized that depriving a person of shelter may affect the right to life. However, the Court also held that this right does not confer a license to occupy public land unlawfully. Evictions carried out by the State in good faith and according to law are not per se unconstitutional simply because the occupant is destitute. The petitioner’s reliance on Article 21 does not override the statutory scheme; if the State follows due process, the fact of eviction per se is not arbitrary. Nevertheless, to mitigate hardship, courts have directed that evictions be carried out humanely and that alternate rehabilitation be considered. In the present case, there is no statutory guarantee of alternative housing in lieu of eviction under the OPLE Act itself. 14. On the other hand, there is a welfare policy that every truly landless/homesteadless family in Odisha is entitled to a small plot of Government land for a house site. It appears that since 1974 the State has provided up to four decimals (0.04 acre) of land free of premium to each homesteadless family this was later increased to 0.10 acre by 2008. If the petitioner is indeed without any other homestead or land (which the authorities dispute), she may apply for consideration under this Vasundhara scheme. Such allocation is not automatic, but if she qualifies the Collector should earnestly process her application. This Court cannot compel grant of land, but it can direct the State to give her a fair hearing under the policy. In short, while the petitioner’s actual possession of Government land cannot be legalized through this writ, her entitlement under the homestead allotment scheme can and should be addressed by the revenue authorities. 15. In view of the above, the writ petition does not disclose any legal infirmity in the eviction orders that would justify interference. The Tahasildar and subsequent authorities acted under the OPLE Act, and no jurisdictional error or manifest violation of law is shown. 15. In view of the above, the writ petition does not disclose any legal infirmity in the eviction orders that would justify interference. The Tahasildar and subsequent authorities acted under the OPLE Act, and no jurisdictional error or manifest violation of law is shown. The petitioner’s challenge is essentially one of title and of hardship, neither of which entitles her to writ relief in this forum. 16. To reiterate, entries in the revenue record are not conclusive on title. Where there is doubt, the proper remedy is a civil suit or alternate statutory remedy, not a writ petition. The allegations of malafide and obstruction of development are unsupported; indeed the public interest in preserving scarce Government land for communal and developmental uses is strong. While this Court is sympathetic to the petitioner’s plight, it cannot override the statutory process without clear ground. 17. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed . No interference is warranted in the impugned eviction orders under the OPLE Act. 18. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.