CGHC010208832022 2026:CGHC:30409 AFR Reserved On : 18.06.2026 Pronounced On : 17.07.2026 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 163 of 2022 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Mahasamund, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Vijay Singh Rajput S/o Late Madan Singh Rajput Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Sirko, Police Station Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh Present Residence Near Santoshi Temple, Nayapara, Ward No. 7, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Suresh Tandon, Panel Lawyer For Respondent : Mr. Lawrence Antony and Mr. Rahul Jaiswal, Advocates Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas C.A.V. JUDGMENT 1. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mahasamund District – Mahasamund (C.G.) dated 23.11.2021, in Criminal Case No. 2093 of 2018, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 of the IPC in connection with Crime No. 598/2018. 2. Brief facts as reflected from the record are that, the complainant, Nihal Singh, lodged a First Information Report on 30.10.2018 (Ex.P/2) at Police Station Mahasamund alleging that on 06.09.2018, while he was proceeding to his office on motorcycle bearing registration No. CG 04 DG 5273 along with his mother Rajinder Kaur, the driver of Alto car bearing registration No. CG 04 H 0974 driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner dashed their motorcycle and caused injuries to the pillion rider. Upon registration of the First Information Report at Police Station Mahasamund, investigation was commenced. During the course of investigation, a spot map of the place of occurrence (Ex.P/3) was prepared. The motor-cycle bearing registration No. Cg/04/5273 was seized vide Ex.P/4 and the Alto car bearing registration No. CG 04 H 0974 along with its documents was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/5). The accused, Vijay Singh Rajput, was arrested. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon completion of the investigation, sufficient evidence having been found against the accused, a charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mahasamund for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused denied charges and faced trial. Page 3 of 11 3. After appreciating the evidence on record, the learned trial Court did not believe the evidence proving guilt of the accused and acquitted the accused from the offences charged. Learned trial Court while acquitting the accused has recorded its finding that there is no cogent, reliable, and convincing evidence available on record against the accused to establish that the accused, was driving the vehicle in question on a public road in a rash and negligent manner, or that by driving the said vehicle rashly and negligently he caused simple as well as grievous injuries to the injured. Even if it is assumed that the accused was driving the vehicle in question, there is still no direct evidence on record to prove that he was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. Therefore, in absence of sufficient evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant State would submit that the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence available on record and wrongly acquitted the accused. He would further submit that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the statement of the eye-witnesses le. Kirtan Kumar (P.W/1) and Indrajeet Singh Hora (P.W/4) who have indubitably admitted in their statements that the accused was driving the said offending vehicle which had hit the complainant in a rash and negligent manner. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has failed to consider the statement of other witnesses Nihal Singh (P.W/2), Rajinder Kaur (P.W/3) and Amin Quraishi (P.W/5) who supported the case of the prosecution and established the case. Therefore, he would pray for setting aside of the judgment and allowing the appeal. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is based on proper appreciation of the entire evidence available on record and does not warrant any interference by this Court. He would further submit that mere proof of an accident having occurred is not sufficient to attract the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code unless rashness or negligence on the part of the accused is affirmatively proved. He would further submit that none of the witnesses has specifically stated the manner in which the vehicle was being driven so as to establish rashness or negligence like an excessive speed or a manner endangering human life. Therefore, he would pray for dismissal of the appeal preferred by the State, being devoid of merit. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. From the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the point emerged for determination of this Court is “whether, the learned trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and whether the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the respondent was not driving the vehicle in rashn and negligent manner, is justified? ” 8. To appreciate this point, this Court has to consider the provisions of Section 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC which reads as under :- 279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.— Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.— Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. 338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.— Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with impris-onment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 9. From perusal of Section 279 of the IPC, this Court has to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving the vehicle in rash and negligent manner as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. For appreciating the point to be determined by this Court, this Court has to analyse the evidence brought on record. 10. Nihal Singh (PW/2) in his examination-in-chief has stated that the car which has caused accident was going behind their motorcycle in the same direction and was driven in high speed, dashed the leg of his mother therefore, his mother fell down, causing injury on her leg and head. The witness was cross- examined by the defence wherein he has admitted that at the time of incident, the vehicle was driven with the speed of 50-60 Km/h speed and his motorcycle was driven by him at the speed of 30 km/h and also admitted that the car has dashed his mother due to which his mother fell down and sustained injuries. 11. The prosecution has examined Rajinder Kaur (PW/3) who has also stated that the vehicle was driven negligently with high speed. In her cross-examination she has stated that after getting dashed with high speed by the car, she fell down from the motorcycle however, she is unaware the vehicle sustained any damage or not. 12. Indrajeet Singh Hora (PW/4) who is eye-witness to the incident, in his cross-examination has admitted that he was standing 20-25 feet away from the place of occurrence and denied that he has seen the incident. He has also admitted that he reached to the place of incident after 5-7 minutes as he was talking to his uncle. He has also admitted that the victim was taken to hospital by the accused and her son. 13. Ravi Singh (PW/8) in his examination in chief has stated that he does not identify Vijay Singh Rajput and also stated that he does know about the incident. In his cross-examination he has denied that any accident has taken place. Dr. Amit Jain (PW/9) who examined the victim admitted in his cross-examination that the injury could be caused to the victim on account of falling down on solid surface. 14. The accused has not examined any witness but he was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C wherein he has denied the allegation and has taken plea of false implication. 15. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record, has recorded its finding that prosecution is unable to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving the vehicle in rash and negligent manner and caused injury to the victim, though it has recorded that the vehicle was driven by the respondent but essential ingredients which are necessary for proving the offence under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC have not been placed on record by the prosecution and accordingly, it has acquitted the accused. 16. Learned trial Court on the basis of the appreciation of the evidence and material on record has recorded this finding which is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence as the prosecution witness has nowhere stated that the vehicle was driven in rash and negligent manner to attract the offence under Section 279 of the IPC. The essential ingredients of involving any accused for commission of offence under Section 279 of the IPC is that the accused has driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner which means an overhasty act and opposed to a deliberate act which would have done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Moh. Auynuddin vs. State of A.P. {(2000) 7 SCC 72} has examined what are the essential ingredients of rash act with regard to use of motor vehicle and held in paragraph 9 as under :- 9. A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution. 17. Similarly, it is also well settled position of law that merely vehicle was driven in high speed does not res ipsa loquitur to establish negligence or rashness by itself. What should be negligence, rashness in driving of a vehicle has come up for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka vs. Satish {(1998) 8 SCC 493} wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 4 and 5 as under :- 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. 18. In light of the above law and considering the evidence brought on record and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in paragraph 20, it is quite vivid that the prosecution is unable to prove that the vehicle, though had dashed the victim, was being driven in rash and negligent manner by the accused to attract the offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, as such the finding of the learned trial Court is neither perverse nor suffers from any illegality warranting interference by this Court. 19. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that if one view has been taken by the prosecution which is in favour of the accused, normally the appellate Court should not interfere in the case of acquittal, unless the finding are so perverse that only one view of conviction is possible for the appellate Court. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and Anr vs. State of Uttarakhand {2025 INSC 114} dealt with the issue when an appellate Court can interfere in the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court and held in paragraph 12 as under:- 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 20. In the present case, as observed by the learned trial Court, the prosecution has failed to place on record any evidence to show that the respondent has driven the vehicle in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality or perversity in acquitting the respondent from the charges punishable under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC which warrants interference by this Court. 21. In the result, following order is passed:- (i) The acquittal appeal is dismissed. (ii) The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court dated 23.11.2021 in Criminal Case No. 2093/2018 is affirmed. (iii) Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Deshmukh KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Digitally signed by KISHORE KUMAR DESHMUKH Date: 2026.07.17 17:24:17 +0530