JUDGMENT : Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 17.9.2025 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Khurda, in Exn. (P)No.1000 of 2022. By the impugned order, the Commercial Court directed the Registrar, Civil Courts, Khurda at Bhubaneswar to release the deposited award amount of Rs.8,71,12,761/- (kept in fixed deposit vide TDR No.41910141012) along with accrued interest in favour of present Opposite Party No.2. I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The petitioner is Paradip Port Authority, a statutory body, which had invited tenders for installation of large-scale solar panels. Pursuant to the tender process, the bid submitted by the opposite party No. 2, M/s. Surana Solar Ltd., was accepted and a letter of intent was issued on 28.11.2016. Disputes thereafter arose between the parties in relation to the execution of the contract, which were referred to arbitration. 3. The Ld. Arbitral Tribunal passed its award on 8.4.2021, directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 8,69,34,723/- to the opposite party No. 2 within a period of three months from the date of the award, failing which interest at the rate of 9% per annum was to accrue from the date of the award until realisation. The petitioner did not comply with the award within the stipulated time. 4. Challenging the arbitral award, the petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar on 30.5.2022. The said proceeding was registered as ARBP No. 19 of 2022. 5. Separately, the opposite party No. 2 initiated Execution Petition No. 1000 of 2022 for enforcement of the award. The present Petitioners did not enter appearance in the said matter and the Executing Court u/s 36 of the Act, upon considering the conduct of the Petitioners, set them ex parte on11.1.2023 and passed order attaching the bank account of the Petitioners to the extent ofthe awarded amount, which was duly attached on 12.1.2023. 6. It appears that the Opposite Party No. 2 had suspected further litigation and had therefore filed a caveat before this Court with respect to the order of attachment. 6. It appears that the Opposite Party No. 2 had suspected further litigation and had therefore filed a caveat before this Court with respect to the order of attachment. However, the Petitioner did not file a Civil Miscellaneous Petition and preferred W.P.(C) No. 2133 of 2023, which required no caveat notice to be served on the Opposite Party No. 2. 7. Thereafter, without being properly informed, on 25.1.2023, in W.P.(C) No. 2133 of 2023 this Court directed the Petitioner to deposit the entire decretal amount before the Registry for stay of further proceeding of Execution Case No. 1000 of 2022. 8. Aggrieved, the present Opposite Party No. 2 mentioned the matter and the order dated 25.1.2023 was subsequently modified by this Court vide it’s order dated 28.2.2023 in W.P.(C) No. 2133 of 2023 wherein this Court was pleased to direct that the interim order of stay would continue for three weeks only. The Petitioner was given liberty to seek continuance of the same thereafter directly before the Ld. Commercial Court with notice to the Opposite Party No. 2. In compliance with the said direction, the petitioner deposited the awarded sum, which was kept in fixed deposit along with accrued interest. 9. There appears to be some inordinate delay because the present Petitioner did not seek any extension of the interim order immediately upon its expiry. Instead, on 5.4.2023, the Petitioner filed an application for stay of the award which was granted on 20.5.2023 till the disposal of ARBP No. 19 of 2022. 10. The application under Section 34 came to be dismissed by the learned Commercial Court by judgment dated 9.7.2025. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioners have preferred a statutory appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Court of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar. The appeal was registered as ARBA No. 22 of 2025 on 9.9.2025 and remains pending. 11. After dismissal of the Section 34 application, Execution Petition No. 1000 of 2022 was listed for hearing on 17.9.2025. On that date, the petitioner appears to have filed a petition seeking time, stating that the appeal under Section 37 had already been filed and was expected to be taken up shortly, and prayed for deferment of the execution proceedings. However, the counsel appears to have been absent despite repeated calls and as such, the petition was rejected. 12. On that date, the petitioner appears to have filed a petition seeking time, stating that the appeal under Section 37 had already been filed and was expected to be taken up shortly, and prayed for deferment of the execution proceedings. However, the counsel appears to have been absent despite repeated calls and as such, the petition was rejected. 12. On the same date, the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar proceeded to pass the impugned order directing release of the deposited amount of Rs. 8,71,12,761/- along with accrued interest, which was lying in fixed deposit, in favour of the opposite party No. 2. 13. As the order did not require the opposite party No.2 to furnish any security while permitting withdrawal of the amount, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal under Section 37, the present Petitioner is before this Court seeking judicial review of the said order. 14. It is also important to note that the present writ petition was filed on19.9.2025 and upon being mentioned was taken up on the self same date by this Court, which by order dated 19.9.2025, stayed the operation of the impugned order and directed that the deposited amount shall not be released until further orders. 15. However, it is brought to this Court’s notice during the course of hearing that the decretal amount had already been withdrawn by Opposite Party No. 2 on 18.9.2025, i.e. prior to the interim order of this Court. 16. Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been urged to seeking the exercise of this Court’s plenary powers of review. II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS: 17. The petitioners submit that the impugned order dated 17.9.2025, passed in Execution Petition No. 1000 of 2022, suffers from serious procedural and legal infirmities and has resulted in manifest prejudice. It is contended that the learned Commercial Court proceeded to direct release of the entire deposited amount, along with accrued interest, despite being expressly informed that a statutory appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, had already been filed and was pending consideration before the competent appellate court. 18. It is contended that the learned Commercial Court proceeded to direct release of the entire deposited amount, along with accrued interest, despite being expressly informed that a statutory appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, had already been filed and was pending consideration before the competent appellate court. 18. It is urged that on 17.9.2025, when the execution case was listed for the first time after dismissal of the Section 34 application, the petitioner had filed a petition seeking time, clearly disclosing the pendency of the appeal and requesting deferment of execution. According to the petitioner, although the said petition was taken on record, the matter was later taken up in its absence on the same day, culminating in an order permitting withdrawal of the deposited amount without any requirement of security. The petitioner asserts that such a course of action was adopted in undue haste and without affording a meaningful opportunity of hearing. 19. The petitioners further submits that while it does not dispute the general principle that an award-holder is entitled to the fruits of the award, such entitlement is not absolute and must be balanced against the statutory right of the award-debtor to pursue an appeal. It is contended that where an appeal under Section 37 is pending, release of the deposited amount ought to be conditioned upon furnishing adequate security, so as to safeguard restitution in the event the appeal succeeds. The absence of any such protective direction, according to the petitioner, renders the impugned order arbitrary and inequitable. 20. On the question of maintainability, the petitioner submits that no efficacious alternate remedy was available against the order dated 17.9.2025. It is contended that the said order, being one passed in execution, does not fall within the categories of appealable orders enumerated under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, nor within the scope of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 21. It is also contended that the pendency of the Section 37 appeal before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar, does not operate as a bar to the present proceedings, since the subject matter of challenge is confined to the execution order dated 17.9.2025 and not to the dismissal of the Section 34 application. 21. It is also contended that the pendency of the Section 37 appeal before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar, does not operate as a bar to the present proceedings, since the subject matter of challenge is confined to the execution order dated 17.9.2025 and not to the dismissal of the Section 34 application. The petitioner submits that the execution proceedings are distinct from the arbitral challenge proceedings, and the appellate court hearing the Section 37 appeal had not entertained any interim prayer relating to execution. III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF OPPOSITE PARTIES: 22. Per contra, the opposite parties, opposing the writ petition, submits that the challenge to the order dated 17.9.2025 is misconceived and untenable. It is contended that the impugned order was passed in lawful exercise of the execution jurisdiction of the learned Commercial Court, following dismissal of the petitioner’s challenge to the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on 9.7.2025. According to the opposite parties, once the award survived judicial scrutiny under Section 34, there was no legal impediment to its enforcement especially considering that there was no stay on the award. 23. The opposite parties submits that the arbitral award dated 8.4.2021 has remained unsatisfied for a considerable period and that the opposite party, as decree-holder, has been deprived of the fruits of the award despite having succeeded before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Commercial Court. It is urged that the execution proceedings were initiated in accordance with law and that the petitioner had already deposited the awarded amount pursuant to earlier judicial directions. The release of the deposited amount, therefore, was a natural and legitimate consequence of the dismissal of the Section 34 application. 24. It is further contended that mere filing of an appeal under Section 37 does not, by itself, operate as a stay on execution of the award. The opposite parties submit that no stay order had been granted by the appellate court in ARBA No. 22 of 2025 as on 17.9.2025. In the absence of any subsisting stay, the executing court was justified in proceeding with execution and permitting withdrawal of the deposited amount. 25. On the issue of security, the opposite parties submits that there is no statutory mandate requiring an award-holder to furnish security as a condition for withdrawal of the deposited amount after dismissal of the Section 34 application. 25. On the issue of security, the opposite parties submits that there is no statutory mandate requiring an award-holder to furnish security as a condition for withdrawal of the deposited amount after dismissal of the Section 34 application. It is urged that insistence on security in every case would defeat the object of speedy enforcement of arbitral awards and would effectively reintroduce delays that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeks to eliminate. 26. The opposite parties also raise a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the writ petition. It is contended that the petitioner had an alternate remedy under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and that the present writ petition amounts to an impermissible attempt to bypass the statutory framework. The opposite parties submits that the writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked to interfere with routine execution orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 27. Having heard the Parties, this court has identified the following issue that has to be determined which has emerged contentiously during the course of the hearing: a. Whether the Learned Executing Court was justified in passing the Impugned Order? A. WHETHERTHE LEARNED EXECUTING COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN PASSING THE IMPUGNED ORDER? 28. At the outset, this Court is required to examine whether the present writ petition is maintainable in its present form. The challenge before this Court is directed substantially against the release of the decretal amount in favour of the decree-holder, who is a private commercial entity. The dispute arises out of contractual obligations, adjudicated through arbitration, and culminates in execution proceedings between two private parties. 29. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is primarily intended to ensure judicial review of State action, public law functions, or statutory duties. While the High Court may, in exceptional circumstances, exercise supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts, such power is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. 30. The impugned order is an execution order passed by a Commercial Court in proceedings arising from a private arbitral dispute. The grievance projected by the petitioner essentially concerns the manner in which the execution court exercised its discretion in allowing withdrawal of the deposited amount. Such grievances ordinarily lie within the realm of civil adjudication and statutory remedies, and do not, by themselves, warrant invocation of writ jurisdiction. 31. The grievance projected by the petitioner essentially concerns the manner in which the execution court exercised its discretion in allowing withdrawal of the deposited amount. Such grievances ordinarily lie within the realm of civil adjudication and statutory remedies, and do not, by themselves, warrant invocation of writ jurisdiction. 31. In these circumstances, this Court harbours serious doubts as to the correctness of entertaining a writ petition which, in substance, seeks to interdict enforcement of a private arbitral award between private parties. 32. A further aspect which weighs with this Court is the petitioner’s own admission that it had approached the learned Commercial Court in the pending arbitration appeal proceedings seeking reliefs of a similar nature. It is not in dispute that such an application was considered and did not yield the relief sought by the petitioner. Significantly, the order passed therein has not been independently challenged, at least to the best of this Court’s knowledge as appearing from the records. 33. The present writ petition, therefore, appears to be an indirect attempt to secure relief which the petitioner failed to obtain from the competent statutory forum. Judicial discipline does not permit a litigant to re-agitate the same grievance through parallel proceedings before different forums, particularly when the earlier order has attained finality inter parties. 34. This Court cannot be converted into an alternative forum of first instance merely because the petitioner is dissatisfied with the outcome before the Commercial Court. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not meant to circumvent or supplant the statutory adjudicatory process consciously invoked by a litigant. 35. Allowing the writ petition to proceed in such circumstances would amount to permitting forum shopping and would erode the sanctity of orders passed by courts of competent jurisdiction. When the petitioner itself accepts the subsistence of an adverse order and chooses not to challenge it directly, the continuation of the present writ proceedings becomes legally untenable. 36. The approach adopted by the learned Executing Court is also fortified by the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Chakardhari Sureka v. Prem Lata Sureka through SPA & Ors. ,decided on 15.9.2025 in Civil Appeal No.11840 of 2025 . In the said decision, the Supreme Court has authoritatively clarified the legal position governing execution of arbitral awards during pendency of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. ,decided on 15.9.2025 in Civil Appeal No.11840 of 2025 . In the said decision, the Supreme Court has authoritatively clarified the legal position governing execution of arbitral awards during pendency of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the order, the Apex Court has held as follows: “6. In our view, the question of executability of the award can be gone into by the Execution Court in accordance with law while addressing objections as and when raised. However, it would not be proper for the Execution Court to defer consideration of the execution application and the objections thereto only because an appeal is pending under Section 37 when there is no interim order operating against the award against which objection under Section 34 of the Act stands rejected. 7.In view of the above, we deem it appropriate to dispose of this appeal by observing that subject to any interim order passed in the appeal pending under Section 37 of the Act, the Execution Court shall be free to proceed with the execution of the award in accordance with law. Needless to observe that if any objection is raised as regards executability of the award, the same shall be addressed in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.” These observations leave no manner of doubt that pendency of an appeal under Section 37, especially in the absence of a stay, does not inhibit the Executing Court from proceeding with enforcement of the award. 37. Most significantly, it is not disputed before this Court that the decretal amount had already been released in favour of the decree-holder prior to the interim order passed by this Court. The interim protection granted on 19.9.2025 operated prospectively and did not undo actions already completed in execution of the impugned order. 38. Once the amount stood disbursed, the factual substratum of the writ petition ceased to exist. The relief sought to prevent release of the deposited amount had already become incapable of enforcement. Courts do not decide academic or hypothetical questions divorced from live controversies. 39. In such a situation, no effective or meaningful relief can now be granted in these proceedings. Any adjudication on merits would be purely academic and would not alter the rights of the parties as they presently stand. Courts do not decide academic or hypothetical questions divorced from live controversies. 39. In such a situation, no effective or meaningful relief can now be granted in these proceedings. Any adjudication on merits would be purely academic and would not alter the rights of the parties as they presently stand. The proper remedy, if any, lies elsewhere, in accordance with law. 40. A court of law adjudicates real and subsisting controversies. When the factual foundation upon which a proceeding is instituted ceases to exist, the proceeding itself loses vitality. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the decretal amount was released to the decree-holder prior to the interim order passed by this Court. The interim protection granted thereafter did not and could not operate retrospectively to undo an act already completed. 41. It is a settled principle that when the cause of action no longer survives, the proceedings must be brought to a close. The present writ petition, having lost its relevance due to subsequent events, is rendered infructuous and does not merit further consideration. 42. The principal relief sought in the writ petition was to prevent release of the deposited amount without insistence on security. Once the amount stood disbursed, that relief became incapable of enforcement. 43. The doctrine of infructuousness is not a technicality; it reflects judicial pragmatism. When events overtake proceedings to such an extent that no practical outcome can follow, continuation of the litigation serves no purpose other than generating advisory opinions. Such an exercise lies outside the constitutional role of courts. 44. It is also relevant that the petitioner has not sought restoration of status quo ante through any independent proceeding capable of legally reversing the disbursement. The present writ petition was framed narrowly, challenging the execution order and seeking to prevent withdrawal. It was not structured as a substantive restitutionary claim. The Court cannot recast the nature of relief after the cause of action itself has evaporated. 45. Even assuming arguendo that the petitioner’s grievances raise arguable legal questions, those questions are now divorced from any live relief. Adjudicating them would amount to answering abstract propositions of law, untethered from enforceable consequences. Constitutional courts have consistently declined to engage in such exercises. 46. The proper course in situations of this nature is to leave parties to such remedies as the law may permit in appropriate proceedings. Adjudicating them would amount to answering abstract propositions of law, untethered from enforceable consequences. Constitutional courts have consistently declined to engage in such exercises. 46. The proper course in situations of this nature is to leave parties to such remedies as the law may permit in appropriate proceedings. Any claim for restitution, adjustment, or recovery must be pursued before the forum competent to grant such relief, subject to statutory limitations and procedural safeguards. 47. The continuation of a writ petition despite extinction of the cause of action risks creating uncertainty and false expectations. It also burdens the judicial system with disputes that have already resolved themselves through the passage of events, irrespective of their legal correctness. 48. In view of the admitted factual position regarding disbursement of the decretal amount, this Court is satisfied that no effective relief survives for consideration. The writ petition has, therefore, become infructuous and is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone, independent of all other objections. V. CONCLUSION: 49. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition suffers from serious infirmities most important of which is the absence of any surviving cause of action. The writ petition has been overtaken by events and continuation thereof would serve no legal purpose. 50. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. 51. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the dispute between the parties. 52. The parties are left at liberty to pursue such remedies as may be available to them in law. 53. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated. No order as to costs.