1 CGHC010026762022 2026:CGHC:29554 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 548 of 2022 Deepak Das, S/o Shri Vidyut Kumar Das, Aged About 37 Years (Constable No. 315 Terminated), R/o House No. 607, Street No. 08, Ward No. 21, Sindhiya Nagar, Titurdih, Durg, District- Durg (C.G.), Pin No. 491001. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.). 2 - Deputy Inspector General of Police Kanker Range, Kanker, District- Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.). 3 - Superintendent of Police Narayanpurpur, District- Narayanpurpur (C.G.). 4 - Incharge of Police Station Narayanpurpur, District- Narayanpurpur (C.G.). 5 - Incharge of Police Station Farasgaon, District- Kanker (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Brajesh Chandra Mishra, Advocate and Mr. Shailesh Puriya, Advocate For State/Respondents Date of Hearing Date of Order : : : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Deputy Advocate General 23.06.2026 14.07.2026 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey C A V Order 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 “10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court kindly call for the entire record in relates to the case of the petitioner. 10.2. That, this Hon’ble Court, may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/order to quash the order dated 30.12.2021 (Annexure P/1), passed by the respondent No.2, and also quashed the order dated 20.09.2021, passed by the respondent No.2, and further be pleased to reinstate the service of the petitioner with all consequential benefits with seniority, in the ends of the justice. 10.3. That, any other relief, this Hon’ble Court, deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. Brief facts of the present case are as under:- A. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable under the respondents on 15.09.2008 at Police Station Narayanpur. During his service tenure, his services were transferred at various places. Vide order dated 25.08.2020, his services were transferred from Police Station Narayanpur to Police Station Farasgaon, District Narayanpurpur, but he failed to join duties at the transferred place and, at the same time, made a representation against the said transfer order. B. When the petitioner did not report at the transferred place, notices were issued to the petitioner to resume his duties and thereafter an article of charge was issued on 12.03.2021. C. Allegations against the petitioner were made as under:- “Charge No. 1 – The petitioner was relieved to report at Police Station Farasgaon on 31.08.2020, but failed to report at the transferred place and remained unauthorizedly absent for a period of 100 days and joined services on 08.12.2020. His conduct is in contravention of Rule 3 (3)(c) 3 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and Clause 64(4) of the Police Regulations. Charge No. 2 – The petitioner was served with notices four times, but he did not report at the transferred place and flouted the orders passed by the superior authorities. Charge No. 3 – The petitioner was served with notices to appear before the Inquiry officer, but despite service of notices, he did not turn up and such act of the petitioner amounts to indiscipline and arbitrariness. Charge No. 4 – The petitioner remained absent from service and was afforded opportunities to improve his conduct, but he repeated such acts again.” D. The petitioner filed a reply to the article of charge and denied the allegations made against him. He participated in the departmental inquiry, but but failed to cross-examine witnesses and the Inquiry officer, after completion of the inquiry, submitted his report before the disciplinary authority, wherein he found all allegations proved. E. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings recorded by the Inquiry officer and a subsequent show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, and thereafter the disciplinary authority, inflicted the penalty of dismissal from service vide order dated 20.09.2021. F. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before the appellate authority, which was dismissed vide order dated 30.12.2021. 4 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity to defend his case. He would further submit that the petitioner was never served with notices to participate in the departmental inquiry. He would also submit that relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner. He would contend that the services of the petitioner were transferred vide order dated 25.08.2020 and against the said transfer order representations were made, but the respondent authorities, instead of taking decision on those representations, issued notices and initiated a departmental inquiry. He would submit that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; thus, he would pray to quash the order(s) impugned passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose the submissions put forth by the counsel appearing for the petitioner. He would submit that the services of the petitioner were transferred from Police Station Narayanpurpur to Police Station Farasgaon vide order dated 25.08.2020. He was relieved from services on 31.08.2020 at 11:35 hours but failed to join duties at the transferred place till 04.09.2020; therefore, Rojnamcha Sanha No. 30 was registered on 05.09.2020 at 10:05 hours. The petitioner approached Police Station Farasgaon on 08.12.2020 at 09:30 hours. He would submit that in this regard a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Town Inspector, Farasgaon Police Station. 5. He would contend that prior to initiation of the preliminary inquiry, various notices were served upon the petitioner directing him to resume his duties. During the course of the preliminary inquiry, the petitioner did not appear; therefore, his statement could not be recorded. He would further contend that the petitioner was a habitual absentee and had remained absent from duty on 11 occasions. He 5 would submit that an article of charge was issued to the petitioner on the 12.03.2021, which was duly replied to by the petitioner. He would also contend that the disciplinary authority appointed an Inquiry officer and a Presenting officer. The petitioner appeared before the Inquiry officer on 14.04.2021 and denied the allegations. He admitted receipt of all relevant documents, including the article of charge. He did not appoint a defence assistant. 6. Mr. Mishra would argue that on 06.05.2021 a notice was issued to the petitioner for examination of witnesses, but he requested another date, which was accepted by the Inquiry officer. It is also contended that notices were served upon the petitioner on 19.04.2021, 06.05.2021 and 13.05.2021, but he did not turn up. It is informed that notice dated 28.05.2021 was not served due to Lockdown situation and therefore, radio message was sent to the Police Inspector, Police Station- Narayanpurpur to convey the message to the petitioner; thus, the conduct of the petitioner was the main reason for passing the impugned orders, therefore, the petition preferred by the petitioner is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 8. In the present case, notice dated 28.05.2021 was not served upon the petitioner due to the lockdown situation and, therefore, radio messages were sent to the Inspector of Police Station Narayanpur to convey the message to the petitioner. The petitioner refused to accept the notice and thereafter a registered notice was sent at his registered address. Notice dated 11.06.2021 was issued to the petitioner and he refused to accept it on 14.06.2021 and 15.06.2021. On 19.06.2021, the petitioner was informed through mobile phone and notice was also sent through registered post. 6 9. The Inquiry officer proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and recorded statements of Assistant Sub-Inspector Sati Netam (AW-1); Assistant Sub-Inspector Manoj Dubey (AW-2); Head Constable No. 52 Biriya Ram Bhagat (AW-3); Police Inspector Deepak Kumar Sao (AW-4); Constable No. 395 Jitendra Kumar Patel (AW-5); Constable No.763- Virendra Kashyap (AW-6); Head Constable No. 409 Ishwari Prasad Diwakar (AW-7); Constable No. 58 Mannulal Sori (AW-8); Constable No. 531 Jagdev Netam (AW-9); Constable No. 284 Dharamdas Vaishnav (AW-10); and Police Inspector Pradeep Joshi (AW-11). The petitioner failed to cross-examine these witnesses. The prosecution exhibited documents Ex. P/1 to P/20. 10.The Inquiry officer, after conclusion of the inquiry, found the allegations proved and submitted his report before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority issued a second show cause notice to the petitioner and granted seven days’ time to submit a reply. 11.The second show cause notice was served upon the petitioner, but no reply was filed, therefore, the disciplinary authority again issued notices to the petitioner on 06.08.2021 and 03.09.2021. 12.The petitioner vide application dated 07.09.2021 sought some time to file a reply but failed to do so, therefore, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 20.09.2021 inflicted penalty of dismissal from service and declared the period of absence as “no work no pay”. The petitioner preferred an appeal but the appellate authority dismissed it and affirmed the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. 13.Though the petitioner has taken a ground that opportunity of hearing was not afforded but perusal of the departmental inquiry record would reveal that he initially participated in the inquiry, but later failed participate. 7 14.Notices were served upon the petitioner physically as well as through registered post and this fact has not been disputed by the petitioner either in the petition or by filing a rejoinder to the return. 15. It is a case where the previous absence of the petitioner on 11 occasions has been taken into consideration while inflicting the penalty. Though a specific finding has been recorded in this regard but said findings has not been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. This Court feels it appropriate to consider the aspect as to whether the previous misconduct of a delinquent employee can be taken into consideration while imposing punishment. 16. It is well settled principle of law that while exercising powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded in a departmental enquiry. The scope of judicial review is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the decision itself. Judicial review is limited to considering whether the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whether the principles of natural justice were complied with, whether the findings are based on some legal evidence, and whether the decision suffers from illegality, perversity or procedural irregularity. The High Court cannot re-appreciate or re-evaluate the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence adduced before the disciplinary authority. Further, the Court cannot interfere with the punishment imposed unless it is so shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Court. In the case of members of a disciplined force such as the police, discipline is of paramount importance and acts of misconduct are required to be viewed with greater seriousness. 8 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab and Others v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh1 while dealing with the similar issue involving a member of armed forces, who remained absent from services for considerable period was inflicted with the punishment of removal from services held as under :- “19. This Court, in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra), has held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to disclose that his past record will also be taken into consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the past conduct of the respondent while passing the dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice to the respondent and had observed that despite the receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not submit his reply, which shows that the respondent accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his absence for 224 days and for which he was punished accordingly. 20. To properly understand the controversy in the light of question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra), dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an employee in a similar situation, as follows: - "7. It is true that the last sentence suggests that the past record of Bose has also been taken into consideration. But it does not follow from this that that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion that Bose's services must be terminated in the interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give additional weight to the 1.2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848 9 decision already arrived at. Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was not competent to go behind the finding of the Managing Director and consider for itself the evidence adduced before him. The order of the Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and directing his re-instatement is, therefore, set aside as being contrary to law." 21. In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sal Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: - "6. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required department/establishment in which the delinquent person the concerned works. 22. Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was dismissed from service on account of misconduct having been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working hours and had also been earlier imposed with minor punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as under: - "32.... In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary." 23. Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. us. Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was employed as police constable was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court had held that: - 10 "5. ....In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often (necessary) only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority." 24. This Cout in Bishamber Das Dogra's case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra) held as under: - "24.In State of Mysore u. K. Manche Gowda, this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject matter of the charge at the first instance xx xx xx xx 30.In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require. [Emphasis Supplied] 31. lt is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline (vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226, para 6).] 32. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. 33.Admittedly, the respondent employee has not 11 completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the show-cause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the line for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned. 34. The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt had ever been made at any stage by the respondent employee to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him by non-furnishing of the enquiry report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the respondent employee had never denied at any stage that he had not been punished three times before initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause notice in the instant case. No explanation could be furnished by the respondent employee as under what circumstances he has not even considered it proper to submit the application for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the statutory appellate authority giving cogent reasons. 35. The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…" 30. This Court, in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Ram Singh Ex- Constable while interpreting Rule 16.2(1) of the 12 Rule of 1934 has held as under: - "7.Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part is referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is distinction between gravest misconduct and grave misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it shall be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only when there are gravest acts of misconduct, since it impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent after putting long length of service. As stated the first part relates to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General Clauses Act singular includes plural, "act" includes acts. The contention that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to award dismissal is fastidious. The word "acts" would include singular "act" as well. It is not the repetition of the acts complained of but its quality, insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from the offending 'act'. The colour of the gravest act must be gathered from the surrounding or attending circumstances. Take for instance the delinquent who put in 29 years of continuous length of service and had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he commits defalcation of public money or fabricates false records to conceal misappropriation. He only committed once. Does it mean that he should not be inflicted with the punishment of dismissal but be allowed to continue in service for that year to enable him to get his full pension. The answer is obviously no. Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient to award an order of dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct. 8. The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service and that the length of service of the offender and his claim for pension should be taken into account in an appropriate case. The contention that both parts must be read together appears to us to be illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct minor in character which does not by itself warrant an order of dismissal but due to continued acts of misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect on service morale and may be a ground to take lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform. Despite giving such opportunities if the delinquent officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely unfit to remain in 13 service then to maintain discipline in the service, instead of dismissing the delinquent officer, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement or demotion to a lower grade or rank or removal from service without affecting his future chances of re-employment, if any, may meet the ends of justice. Take for instance the delinquent officer who is habitually absent from duty when required. Despite giving an opportunity to reform himself he continues to remain absent from duty off and on. He proved himself to be incorrigible and thereby unfit to continue in service. Therefore, taking into account his long length of service and his claim for pension he may be compulsorily retired from service so as to enable him to earn proportionate pension. The second part of the rule operates in that area. It may also be made clear that the very order of dismissal from service for gravest misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore, the word 'or' cannot be read as "and". It must be disjunctive and independent. The common link that connects both clauses is "the gravest act/acts of misconduct." 32.We have perused the show cause notice and the order of dismissal passed against the respondent. After going through the same, it is clear that penalty of dismissal is a consequence of proved misconduct. Therefore, the order impugned is within the first part of Rule 16.2 (1) of the Rules. While passing the order dismissing the appeal, the disciplinary authority recorded the finding that the act of absence of the respondent from duty is a grievous act of misconduct. The respondent was appointed as a constable in the Punjab Armed Forces and then transferred to the Commando Force, which is a disciplined force. The authority while passing the order has referred to his previous act of absence from duty besides proving an gravest act of misconduct leading to the order of dismissal.” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus P. Gunasekaran2 while dealing with the scope of interference in service matters held as under :- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the 2 . (2015) 2 SCC 610 14 evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings. the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings: (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case: (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. 15 (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be: (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 16 19. Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad3 held that penalty inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct. 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others v. Bishamber Das Dogra, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 102, held that though it is desirable for the disciplinary authority to inform the delinquent employee that their past conduct would taken into consideration while imposing the punishment, but in cases involving grave misconduct or serious indiscipline, the authority may, even in the absence of a statutory rule or prior notice, take the employee's undisputed past conduct or service record into account to justify or enhance the punishment where the facts of the case warrant it. The relevant Paragraph 30 is reproduced hereinbelow:- “30. In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require.” 21.In the matter of Central Industrial Security Force v. Abrar Ali, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 507 , while considering the law laid down in the matter of Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran reported in 3(2005) 13 SCC 709 17 (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-15 held as under:- “15. P. Gunasekaran (supra), this Court held as follows: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person 13.could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 18 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 22. From bare reading of the above quoted judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority over disciplinary proceedings by re-appreciating or reassessing the evidence recorded in the departmental inquiry. Judicial review is confined to examining the legality and fairness of the decision-making process, such as whether the inquiry was conducted by a competent authority, followed the prescribed procedure, complied with the principles of natural justice, was free from arbitrariness, bias, or extraneous considerations, and whether the findings are supported by some legal evidence. The High Court cannot re-evaluate the sufficiency, adequacy, or reliability of the evidence, correct errors of fact, or interfere with the punishment unless it is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court. Further, the armed forces have to live in discipline and any misconduct committed by the force personnel has to be viewed seriously. 23.The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary 19 authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S.Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315], wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- "10.The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- 20 "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." 21 24.From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 25.In the present case, the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing. The disciplinary authority, on the basis of the legally admissible evidence and taking into consideration the past misconduct of the petitioner inflicted the penalty. Further, the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority have been affirmed by the appellate authority; thus, there are concurrent finding of fact, which cannot be disturbed while exercising powers under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. 26.Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no good ground is involved in the present case to interfere with the impugned orders, accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim