1 CGHC010255562026 2026:CGHC:29546-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1814 of 2026 1. Anjana Jangde W/o Balkrishna Jangde Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Temri, P.S. Nandghat, District Bemetra Chhattisgarh Presently R/o H.I.G.-1/13, Pirda Housing Board, P.S. Vidhansabha, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2. Balkrishna Jangde S/o Late Brijlal Jangde Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Temri, P.S. Nandghat, District Bemetra Chhattisgarh Presently R/o H.I.G.-1/13, Pirda Housing Board, P.S. Vidhansabha, District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Tilda Nevra, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2. Pramod Kumar Verma S/o Gokul Prasad Verma Aged About 31 Years R/o Ward No. 8 Kurmipara, Jota, P.S. Tilda-Nevra, District Raipur Chhattisgarh ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.07.15 10:37:39 +0530 2 For Petitioners : Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar and Mr. Gyan Prakash Dandekar, Advocates. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 14.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar and Mr. Gyan Prakash Dandekar, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent No. 1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayers: “1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the charge-sheet/final report No. 291 of 2025 dated 16.10.2025 (Annexure P/1) and supplementary charge-sheet No. 291(A) of 2026 dated 14.04.2026 filed against the petitioners before the trial Court, FIR No. 358 of 2025 registered at Police Station Tilda – Nevra District Raipur (C.G.) for offences under Sections 232(1) and 190 of BNS against the petitioners in the interest of justice. 2. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the cognizance order passed by the trial Court (Annexure P/2) and all consequential criminal proceedings arising from the aforesaid FIR, in the 3 interest of justice. 3. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper may also be granted to the petitioners in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are arrayed as accused in Crime No. 358/2025 registered at Police Station Tilda Nevra for the offences punishable under Sections 232(1) and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the FIR dated 18.08.2025 was lodged by one Pramod Kumar Verma, who was a prosecution witness in Sessions Trial No. 235/2021, alleging that certain persons had threatened and induced him to depose in favour of the accused persons. The FIR specifically named seven accused persons, namely, Luckky Maharaj, Suraj Verma, Babul Verma, Rajat Verma, Ajay Rahuja, Ajay Nishad and Gappu Verma @ Deepak Verma. The petitioners were admittedly not named in the FIR. He further submits that the implication of petitioner No. 1, Anjana Jangde is solely on the basis of the memorandum statement of co-accused Dinesh Dongre recorded on 16.10.2025, wherein it was alleged that she had instructed him to commit the alleged acts. Except for the said memorandum statement, there is no independent, direct or corroborative material connecting either of the petitioners with the alleged offence. It is further submitted that despite their regular appearance before the trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 235/2021, the petitioners were incorrectly shown as absconding in the charge-sheet 4 dated 16.10.2025. He also submits that all the originally named accused persons, including Deepak Verma, Ravikant Verma, Suraj Verma, Rajat Verma, Jaymohan @ Lucky Sharma and Ajay Rahuja, had already been granted bail. It is also submitted that the complainant Pramod Kumar Verma himself filed a no-objection before the Trial Court in the bail proceedings of certain co-accused, stating that he had named them by mistake, thereby creating serious doubt regarding the prosecution story. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that petitioner No. 1 was granted anticipatory bail by this Court vide order dated 05.12.2025 passed in MCRCA No. 1923 of 2025. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 was granted anticipatory bail vide order dated 11.12.2025 passed in MCRCA No. 1953 of 2025 after consideration of the case diary and the material collected during investigation. He further submitted that the complainant preferred CRMP No. 2866 of 2025 and CRMP No. 2877 of 2025 seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners. However, by a detailed order dated 15.12.2025, this Court dismissed both petitions after specifically recording that all the material prosecution witnesses, including the complainant, had already been examined, that except for the memorandum statement of Dinesh Dongre there was no connecting material against the petitioners, that only official witnesses remained to be examined, and that no exceptional circumstance warranting cancellation of bail was made out. While doing so, reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Jangid & Anr. Vs. Mukesh Kumar Agarwal & Anr. [Criminal 5 Appeal No. 2381 of 2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1632 of 2025], wherein it has been held that cancellation of bail stands on a different footing from grant of bail and can be ordered only upon the existence of cogent and overwhelming circumstances demonstrating misuse of the liberty granted. 6. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by order dated 26.02.2026 passed in Sessions Trial No. 399/2025, the learned trial Court summoned Prosecution Witness Nos. 1 to 3 for their examination and fixed the matter for 27.04.2026. He submitted that the petitioners have been made accused only on the basis of the memorandum statement of co-accused Dinesh Dongre recorded on 16.10.2025 and were shown as absconding on 10.10.2025 despite the fact that they were regularly appearing before the learned trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 235/2021. He further stated that the petitioners are law-abiding citizens. Petitioner No. 1 is a Government servant possessing a B.Sc. (Agriculture) degree. There is no likelihood of the petitioners absconding, tampering with evidence or influencing any witness. 7. It is further submitted that the petitioners had earlier preferred Cr.M.P. No. 1625/2026 seeking quashing of FIR No. 358/2025, the chargesheet, cognizance order and consequential proceedings. The said petition was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 25.06.2026 with liberty to file a duly constituted fresh petition by impleading the complainant as a respondent. Learned counsel further submits that the 6 petitioners are not named in the FIR and have been implicated solely on the basis of the memorandum statement of a co-accused, which by itself is not substantive evidence and cannot constitute the sole basis for prosecution. 8. It is further submitted that even if the allegations contained in the FIR and the chargesheet are accepted in their entirety, they do not disclose the commission of offences under Sections 232(1) and 190 of the BNS against the petitioners. Neither the complainant nor any independent witness has attributed any overt act of threat or inducement to the petitioners. He further submits that the prosecution case itself is rendered doubtful in view of the complainant's own statement before the Trial Court that certain accused persons had been named by mistake. It is also submitted that while granting anticipatory bail and while rejecting the applications for cancellation of bail, this Hon'ble Court has already recorded that there is no direct allegation or independent material against the petitioners except the memorandum statement of Dinesh Dongre. 9. It is submitted that the investigation has been conducted in a wholly arbitrary manner. The petitioners were wrongly shown as absconding despite their regular appearance before the Trial Court, and no effort was made by the investigating agency to collect any independent evidence linking the petitioners with the alleged offence. Learned counsel submits that the ingredients of Section 232(1) of the BNS require clear and direct evidence of threatening or inducing a 7 witness to give false evidence. No such material has been collected against the petitioners. Even the persons allegedly identified through mobile numbers have not stated that the petitioners had instructed or influenced them to threaten the complainant. 10. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the present case squarely falls within the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 CrLJ 527, as the allegations, even if accepted on their face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence against the petitioners, the material collected during investigation does not connect them with the alleged crime, the prosecution story is inherently improbable, and the proceedings appear to be manifestly attended with mala fides. The continuation of the criminal proceedings, therefore, deserves to be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. 11. Per contra, learned State counsel vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that the investigation has culminated into filing of the charge-sheet after collection of material against the petitioners. It is contended that the petitioners have been charge-sheeted on the basis of the material collected during investigation and, therefore, it cannot be said that no prima facie case is made out against them. It is further submitted that the pleas raised by the petitioners relate to appreciation of evidence, including the evidentiary value of the memorandum statement, which cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. Learned State counsel submits that at this stage the 8 Court is only required to see whether the allegations and the material collected during investigation disclose commission of a cognizable offence and not whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed in proving the charges. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS). 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not 9 constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 15. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS). The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self- 10 restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 16. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Court reaffirmed the test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor and observed that criminal proceedings can be quashed at the threshold only when the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely demolishes the prosecution case, remains incapable of being refuted by the prosecution, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the record, this Court finds that the FIR was initially registered on the complaint of Pramod Kumar Verma alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 232(1) and 190 of the BNS. After completion of investigation, the investigating agency has filed the charge-sheet 11 against the petitioners. Whether the material collected during investigation is sufficient for conviction or whether the same is ultimately admissible in evidence are matters which fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trial Court. 18. The principal contention of the petitioners is that they were not named in the FIR and that their implication is based only on the memorandum statement of co-accused Dinesh Dongre. The petitioners have also relied upon the orders granting anticipatory bail, dismissal of the petitions seeking cancellation of bail and the alleged no-objection given by the complainant in the bail proceedings of certain co-accused. However, all these submissions require appreciation of the material collected during investigation and determination of disputed questions of fact, which is impermissible while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. 19. Merely because the petitioners were not named in the FIR would not, by itself, furnish a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings if during the course of investigation material has been collected connecting them with the alleged offence. Likewise, the correctness or otherwise of the investigation, the evidentiary value of the memorandum statement of the co-accused, the plea that the petitioners were wrongly shown as absconding and the effect of the complainant's statement in other proceedings are all matters of evidence which can appropriately be examined during trial after the parties lead evidence. 20. The orders dated 05.12.2025 passed in MCRCA No.1923 of 2025 12 and dated 11.12.2025 passed in MCRCA No.1953 of 2025 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners, as also the order dated 15.12.2025 passed in CRMP No.2866 of 2025 and CRMP No.2877 of 2025 rejecting the applications for cancellation of bail, were rendered while considering the question of grant or cancellation of bail. Such orders neither amount to an adjudication on the merits of the prosecution case nor can they be construed as findings warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings. The observations recorded therein are confined to the issue of personal liberty of the accused and cannot be read as a determination of the legality or otherwise of the prosecution. 21. This Court is also of the considered view that the contention of the petitioners that the memorandum statement of the co-accused is inadmissible or insufficient to establish their guilt cannot be examined at this stage. The admissibility, evidentiary value and probative force of the material collected during investigation are matters to be considered by the trial Court at the appropriate stage in accordance with law. At this stage, this Court cannot undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence or conduct a mini trial while exercising inherent jurisdiction. 22. On an overall consideration of the allegations made in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the settled legal principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, this Court is unable to hold that the present case falls within any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), Neeharika (supra) and Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) so as to warrant quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet 13 or the consequential criminal proceedings. The allegations cannot be said to be so absurd or inherently improbable that no prudent person could ever reach a conclusion that an offence is made out. The material collected during investigation discloses a prima facie case requiring adjudication before the competent trial Court. 23. Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. It is, however, made clear that any observation made herein is only for the purpose of deciding the present petition under Section 528 of the BNSS and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case pending before the trial Court, which shall decide the matter independently in accordance with law. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan