1 CGHC010252052026 2026:CGHC:29243-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3605 of 2026 1 - Aman Agrawal S/o- Nand Kishor Agrawal, Aged About 33 Years W/No. 10 Akaltara Road, Janjgir, District- Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh-495668 ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Public Works Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Engineer In Chief Public Works Department, Atal Nagar Nawa, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Champa Division, Champa, District-Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Shailesh Tiwari, Advocate For State : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13-07-2026 1. Heard Mr. Shailesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Addl. Advocate General, appearing for the State. Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.07.15 19:48:19 +0530 2 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seek for the following relief(s): “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the complete records from the respondent authorities, particularly all payment records, bills, correspondence, and documents relating to the withheld amount and Performance Guarantee. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction directing the respondent authorities to forthwith release and pay the petitioner the withheld sum of 4,55,242/- together with ₹ interest at the rate stipulated under the agreement, or at such rate as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, from the date of withholding until payment. 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to decide the representation dated 01.06.2026 (Annexure P/3) within a stipulated period of time. 10.4 That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief(s) as may be deemed fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The brief facts as mentioned in the petition are that, the petitioner is a duly registered Class-D contractor with the Public Works Department holding GST Registration No. 22BHKPA3957Q1ZZ. By 3 Memo dated 13.07.2018, the respondent authorities awarded the petitioner the work of construction of E-type quarter for the Law & Legislative Department at Champa under Agreement No. 15/DL/2018- 19 for a contract value of Rs.61,15,000/-. In terms of the agreement, the petitioner furnished a Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) of Rs.1,00,456/-. The petitioner executed the work in accordance with the contractual specifications and site instructions, including certain additional works carried out on the instructions of the respondent's officials. The work was duly completed and a Completion Certificate dated 29.12.2020 was issued by the Executive Engineer, PWD, Champa Division certifying satisfactory completion. The Defect Liability Period of three years expired on 29.12.2023. Although the respondent acknowledged the additional work executed by the petitioner, an amount of Rs.1,27,351/- towards such extra work remained unpaid without any justification. It is further case of the petitioner that despite completion of the work and expiry of the Defect Liability Period, the respondent authorities failed to release the Performance Bank Guarantee of Rs.1,00,456/- and the outstanding amount of Rs.1,27,351/- towards extra work. The petitioner submitted several representations requesting release of the aforesaid amounts and, finally, by representation dated 01.06.2026 called upon the respondents to release the total amount of Rs.2,27,807/- within fifteen days, failing which legal proceedings, including a claim for interest and invocation of the contractual dispute resolution mechanism, would be initiated. The petitioner further states that although the request for extension of time 4 was approved by the Executive Engineer without levy of penalty and forwarded to the Superintending Engineer for final approval, no penalty order has ever been passed. Nevertheless, the respondents deducted Rs.2,17,435/- from the petitioner's bills towards extension of time charges. Apprehending that adverse orders, if any, may have been passed without notice, the petitioner also sought information under the Right to Information Act. However, the respondents have neither responded to the petitioner's representations nor released the withheld amounts, resulting in arbitrary and unjustified retention of the petitioner's legitimate dues. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had duly completed the contractual work to the satisfaction of the respondent authorities, as evidenced by the Completion Certificate dated 29.12.2020, and that the Defect Liability Period expired on 29.12.2023. Despite there being no subsisting contractual or legal impediment, the respondents have unlawfully withheld the amount of Rs.1,27,351/- towards extra work and have also failed to refund the Performance Guarantee of Rs.1,00,456/-, which became refundable immediately upon expiry of the Defect Liability Period. It was contended that the respondents, being instrumentalities of the State, are bound to act fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the terms of the contract and the principles of natural justice. However, the continued retention of the petitioner's legitimate dues without assigning any reason or passing any order is arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and has caused severe financial prejudice to the petitioner. It has been further 5 submitted that the petitioner's detailed representation dated 01.06.2026 seeking release of the outstanding amounts has been ignored without any response or explanation, demonstrating complete arbitrariness on the part of the respondent authorities. Learned counsel further argued that the respondents have illegally deducted a sum of Rs.2,17,435/- from the petitioner's bills towards alleged extension of time (EOT) penalty, despite the fact that the Executive Engineer had approved the petitioner's request for extension of time under Clause 5 of the agreement specifically without levy of any penalty and had forwarded the matter to the Superintending Engineer for final approval. It has been also submitted that no order imposing penalty or liquidated damages has ever been passed by the competent authority, and in the absence of any such order, the unilateral deduction is wholly unauthorized, arbitrary, and contrary to the terms of the agreement. Learned counsel therefore prayed that the respondents be directed to release and pay the petitioner the withheld sum of Rs.4,55,242/- along with applicable interest, and grant such other reliefs as may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that, the dispute herein arises purely out of contractual obligations under a tender agreement, involving disputed questions of fact regarding completion, quality, measurement and verification of work, which cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled principle that writ courts should not ordinarily 6 interfere in contractual matters where efficacious alternative remedies such as arbitration or civil suit are available, further, the payment of the the amount is subject to due verification, certification, and compliance of all contractual conditions, including defect liability and other technical parameters, and mere completion as alleged by the petitioner does not ipso facto entitle him to full payment; moreover, writ jurisdiction is discretionary and to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances involving clear arbitrariness, which is absent in the present case, as there is no arbitrary or mala fide action on part of the respondents but only a procedural and contractual compliance requirement. It was also contended that the extension of time granted by the Executive Engineer was only recommendatory in nature and was subject to final approval by the competent authority, namely, the Superintending Engineer. Therefore, the deductions made from the petitioner's bills cannot be said to be illegal at this stage. Hence, the present writ petition seeking monetary relief is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the material annexed with the petition. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Motors Limited v The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (Best) and Others passed in Civil Appeal No. 3897 of 2023 vide judgment dated 19.05.2023 held as follows : “48. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a 7 lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. (See: Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489). 52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the 8 public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 679. 53. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. 54. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Others, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in 9 assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.” 8. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction is not intended to supplant ordinary civil remedies, particularly in matters involving contractual disputes requiring adjudication of complex and disputed questions of fact. In "State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd.", 2002 (1) SCC 216, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the claim arises out of breach of contract and involves disputed facts, the appropriate remedy lies in a civil suit and not in a writ petition. In paragraph 7, it has been observed that:- “7. In the present case many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.” 9. Though in "ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd.", 2004 (3) SCC 553, the Hon'ble Apex Court recognized that a writ petition may be maintainable in contractual matters in limited circumstances, it was clearly observed that such jurisdiction is to be exercised where the facts are undisputed or where 10 the State action is patently arbitrary, unreasonable, or in violation of Article 14. The present case does not fall within such an exception, as the very substratum of the petitioner's claim is contested. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India", 2015 (7) SCC 728, where adjudication involves serious factual controversies necessitating evidence, the writ court should decline to exercise jurisdiction and relegate the parties to appropriate forums. In paragraphs 69 and 70, the legal position has been summarised that:- “69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various Judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the 11 State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of 12 principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the and the contract between private party State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non- arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes.” 11. From the pleadings of the parties and the material placed on 13 record, it is evident that the claim raised by the petitioner arises out of contractual obligations relating to execution of works allotted by the respondent department. Though the petitioner has asserted that the amount claimed is admitted and undisputed, the respondents have specifically contended that release of payment is subject to verification of records, budgetary allocation, sanction, and compliance with departmental and financial formalities. Thus, the dispute raised in the present petition involves examination of factual aspects pertaining to verification of the work executed, determination of liability, and fulfillment of procedural requirements for release of public funds, which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. The law with regard to maintainability of writ petitions in contractual matters is well settled by catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In matters arising out of contracts, particularly where disputed questions of fact are involved or where adjudication requires appreciation of evidence, the parties are ordinarily required to avail the remedy under ordinary civil law. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in nature and is not intended to adjudicate pure contractual disputes or monetary claims arising therefrom, unless a clear case of arbitrariness, mala fide exercise of power, or violation of constitutional or statutory obligations is made out. 13. In the present case, this Court does not find any material demonstrating arbitrariness or mala fides on the part of the respondents 14 warranting interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The dispute essentially pertains to release of payment under contractual transactions between the parties and adjudication thereof would necessarily require detailed examination of records and factual determination, which cannot conveniently be undertaken in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In view of the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Motors Limited (supra), State of Bihar (supra), ABL International Ltd. (supra), and Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is not maintainable for adjudication of the claim involved herein and the petitioner is at liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to him under law before the appropriate forum. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. 16. I.A. No.01 of 2026, application for withdrawal of writ petition seeking liberty to file duly constituted petition, filed by the petitioner in the present petition is disposed of since we have already declined to interfere in the matter. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil