2026:HHC:43833 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision Nos. 645 and 646 of 2026 Reserved on: 24.09.2026 Date of Decision: 07.10.2026 1. Cr. Revision No. 645 of 2026 Ram Paul ...Petitioner Versus Prem Chand & another ...Respondent 2. Cr. Revision No.646 of 2026 Ram Paul ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner(s) Mr Vinay Thakur, Advocate, for the petitioner(s) in both the petitions. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:43833 For the Respondent(s) / State Mr Y.P.Sood, Advocate, for Respondent No.1 in Criminal Revision No. 645 of 2026. Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent/State, in both the petition(s). Rakesh Kainthla, Judge Since both revision petitions arise from a common judgment, they are taken up together for disposal by a common judgment. 2. The present revisions are directed against the judgment dated 28.10.2014, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide which the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned trial Court) was set aside and the revisionists were convicted and sentenced as under: - Sections Sentence 323 and 324 of IPC Released on probation of good conduct for a period of one year and to pay compensation of ₹5,000/- 3 2026:HHC:43833 (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience) 3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revisions are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 325 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Prem Chand (PW-1), is the owner in possession of Khasra No. 574/2, which he had purchased from Ved Prakash. Accused Ram Paul, the informant’s brother, claimed ownership of the land. He had also filed a civil suit against the informant. The informant was standing on his land on 27.10.2008, when the accused Ram Paul came to the spot and started digging the edge of the field. The informant objected, and Ram Paul inflicted a blow by means of the spade on the informant's nose. The accused also abused the informant. The matter was reported to the police. An entry (Ext.PW8/A) was recorded in the police station. An application (Ext.PW-9/A) was filed for the informant’s medical examination. Dr. K.D. Jassal (PW- 4) medically examined the informant and found that he had sustained an injury that could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW-4/A). An entry (Ext.PW-8/B) 4 2026:HHC:43833 was recorded in the Police Station and FIR (Ext.PW-7/A) was registered. ASI Parmod Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-9/B). X-rays (Ext. PW-5/A to Ext.PW5/C) were taken. Dr O.P. Ramdeo (PW-6) went through the X-rays and found a fracture of the nasal bone. He issued the report (Ext.PW-4/C). The informant produced a blood- stained under vest ( Ext.P3) and parna (Ext.P2), which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/C). The accused produced a spade (Ext.P1), which was seized vide memo (Exhibit PW1/D). The informant's clothes were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed. The seal impressions (Ext.PW-9/C-1 and Ext.PW-9/C-2) were taken on separate pieces of cloth. The photographs (Ext. D1 to Exhibit D4) were taken. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial court. 4. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 325 and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5 2026:HHC:43833 5. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Prem Chand (PW-1), Kuldeep Rai (PW-2), and Sucha Singh (PW-3) narrated the incident. Dr. K.D. Jassal (PW-4) medically examined the informant. Rakesh Kumar (PW-5), a radiographer, took the informant's X-ray. Dr O. P. Ramdeo (PW-6) went through the X-ray and issued a report that there was a fracture of the nasal bone. ASI Ramesh Chand (PW-7) signed the FIR. Constable Devinder Singh (PW-8) proved the entries in the daily diary. SI Pramod Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. 6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that a false case was made against him. He examined Sunita Kumari (DW-1), Ruby Sharma (DW-2) and Amit Goel (DW-3) to prove his defence. 7. Learned trial Court held that the time of the incident was mentioned as 05:30 a.m. in the daily diary (Ext. PW-8/A); however, it was changed to 08:30 a.m. by interpolation, and no reason was assigned for it. The relationship between the parties was strained, and the prosecution case was required to be seen with due care and caution. The defence version that the accused was not present on the spot, but was discharging his duties was probable. 6 2026:HHC:43833 The contradictions in the statements of the witnesses made the prosecution case suspect. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the informant/victim filed an appeal, which was decided by learned Session Judge-Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The medical evidence also corroborated the prosecution version. The discrepancies pointed out by the learned trial Court were not material. The matter was immediately reported to the police, and the promptly lodged FIR corroborated the informant's version. The enmity can be a motive for the commission of the crime. The plea of alibi was not believable, because the accused had not claimed that he was not present on the spot in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. The learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court was set aside, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 and 324 of IPC and was released on probation of good conduct for 1 year. 7 2026:HHC:43833 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court, the accused has preferred two revisions asserting that the learned appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. There was an interpolation in figure 8, and the learned trial Court had rightly held that 5 was changed to 8. No explanation was provided for this interpolation. The presence of PW-2 and PW-3 on the spot was highly doubtful. The plea taken by the accused that he was discharging his duties at Dasuya, about 140 km away from the place of the incident, was highly probable. The medical evidence did not corroborate the prosecution version, and the learned appellate Court erred in holding that the prosecution version was corroborated by the medical evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revisions be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr Vinay Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner(s)/accused in both the petitions. Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for respondent no. 1/victim in Criminal Revision No. 645 of 2026, and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State in both the petitions. 8 2026:HHC:43833 11. Mr Vinay Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner(s)/accused in both the petitions, submitted that the learned appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. The appellate Court can reverse the judgment if it is perverse or based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record. A judgment cannot be reversed simply because another view emerges after reading the evidence. The learned trial Court had rightly held that there was interpolation in the time of the incident for which no explanation was provided, and the presence of eyewitnesses on the spot was suspect because their names were not mentioned in the FIR. The defence taken by the accused that he was discharging his duties at Dasuya was highly probable. The learned trial Court had taken a view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before it, and it was not permissible to set aside the view of the learned trial Court, simply because the learned appellate Court would have taken a different view, had it been trying the matter as an original Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present revisions be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: 9 2026:HHC:43833 ➢ P.Somaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh: 2025, Supreme (SC) 1864; ➢ State of H.P. vs. Onkar Chand : 2026: HHC: 8221 12. Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for respondent no.1/Victim submitted that the learned appellate Court had demonstrated the fallacy in the reasoning of the learned trial Court, which showed that the view taken by the learned trial Court was not reasonable. The learned appellate Court had taken a lenient view and released the accused under the Probation of Offenders Act. This Court should not interfere with the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court by re-appreciating the evidence; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 13. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.2/State submitted that the learned trial Court had gravely erred in acquitting the accused based on irrelevant considerations and the learned appellate Court had rightly corrected the mistake committed by the learned trial Court. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present revisions be dismissed. 10 2026:HHC:43833 14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: - “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions 11 2026:HHC:43833 Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re- examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and 12 2026:HHC:43833 thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein 13 2026:HHC:43833 time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with 14 2026:HHC:43833 the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 16. The entry (Ext.PW-8/A) mentions that the informant was standing in his field on 27.10.2008, at about 08:30 a.m. FIR (Ext.PW-7/A) mentions the time of the incident as 27.10.2008, at 05:30 a.m. These two documents clearly show that the prosecution has altered the time of the incident from 05:30 am to 08:30 a.m. 17. The learned appellate Court held that the entry was proved by producing the original record and the witness producing the record was not cross-examined regarding the time of the incident; therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court was not sustainable. The learned appellate court also held that the time in the FIR might be the result of an error committed by the person recording the FIR. This explanation would have been material, had there not been any interpolation in the time in the entry in the daily diary. The interpolation in the daily diary and the time mentioned in the FIR support the conclusion of the learned trial court that the time was initially mentioned as 05:30 a.m., but 15 2026:HHC:43833 was subsequently changed to 08:30 a.m. for the reasons best known to the prosecution. 18. The informant had mentioned the name of Sucha Singh, son of Karatara, in the entry (Ext.PW-8/A). He had not mentioned the name of Kuldeep Rai (PW-2), as the person who was present on the spot. The learned appellate Court held that the FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the incident and there is no requirement to mention the names of all the witnesses. This finding could have been sustained, had the name of Sucha Singh not been mentioned. When the name of Sucha Singh was mentioned, but the name of Kuldeep Rai was omitted, it was sufficient to excite suspicion in the mind of the learned trial Court, especially when Kuldeep Rai is the informant’s son. 19. The informant Prem Chand (PW-1) stated that the accused started digging the edge of the field. He objected, and the accused inflicted a blow by means of a spade on the informant's nose. Rajinder, Kuldeep, Sucha Singh and Onkar came to the spot. 20. Kuldeep Rai (PW-2) stated that his father Prem Chand was going to the Court on a cycle, Ram Paul was standing inside the gate, they started talking to each other, and Ram Paul shouted that 16 2026:HHC:43833 he would cut the edge. The informant went after the accused, and the accused inflicted a blow on the informant's nose. 21. The narration of the events by this witness is contrary to the informant’s statement. The informant stated that he was present in his field, whereas this witness stated that the informant was going to the Court on his cycle. The informant stated that the accused started digging the edge of the field and he objected, whereas this witness stated that the accused shouted that he would cut the edge and the informant went after him. The discrepancies in the statement of this witness and the absence of his name in the FIR make it difficult to rely upon his testimony, and the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding his testimony. 22. Sucha Singh (PW-3) stated that the accused was standing in his field and the accused was working in his field. The informant came to the spot and enquired as to why the accused was interfering with the edge. Rajinder and Kuldeep came to the spot. The accused picked up a spade and inflicted a blow on the informant's face. His clothes were blood-stained. 23. The narration of the events by this witness is also contrary to the informant's statement. He stated that the accused was working in his field with the edges, and the accused objected, 17 2026:HHC:43833 which is contrary to the informant's version that Ram Paul came to the spot and started digging the edge of the field. 24. The prosecution produced blood-stained Parna (Ext.P- 2) and under vest (Ext.P-3). ASI Parmod Singh (PW-9) claimed that he had taken the photograph of the informant (Ext.D-1 to D-4). The informant is shown to be wearing a blood-stained shirt and not any blood-stained under vest or Parna. Thus, the learned Court had rightly concluded that these clothes were not connected to the informant. 25. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that the accused was posted as a bailiff in Dasuya Court. Amit Goel (DW- 3) proved the attendance register (Ext.DW-3/A), in which the informant’s attendance was marked on 27.10.2008. 26. The learned appellate Court held that a person can cover the distance between the place of incident and Dasuya in less than 2 hours by taxi or car. There was no such evidence on record, and this finding is not sustained by the record. In any case, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the plea of alibi was reasonable cannot be said to be perverse, requiring any interference by the learned appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC 18 2026:HHC:43833 OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt 19 2026:HHC:43833 also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to 20 2026:HHC:43833 reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 27. The judgment of the learned appellate Court is silent regarding the perversity of the judgment of the learned trial Court. The learned appellate Court has dealt with the matter as if it was deciding the matter on the original side, which is not permissible. It has been found out above that the view taken by the learned trial 21 2026:HHC:43833 Court was a reasonable view that could have been taken and no interference was required with it, even if another view was possible. 28. Learned Appellate Court had failed to adhere to the principle for setting aside the acquittal, which affected the jurisdiction vested in it. Hence, the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court is not sustainable. 29. In view of the above, the present revisions are allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court in Criminal Appeal 23-X/2013, dated 28.10.2014 is ordered to be set aside, and the judgment of the learned trial Court is ordered to be restored. Fine amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of appeal, if no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special 22 2026:HHC:43833 Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court 31. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. 32. The revision petitions stand disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 07th October, 2026. ( Ravinder )