2026:HHC:43110 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 112 of 2014 Reserved on: 24.9.2026 Date of Decision: 05.10.2026. Joginder Singh ...Appellant Versus Sandeep Hetta ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Hitender Verma, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.11.2013, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'NI Act'). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:43110 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant has raised an apple orchard on his land at Village Sairu. The accused approached the complainant in the year 2011 to sell the apple crop to him. The complainant agreed. The accused paid some money in cash and issued a cheque for a sum of ₹9,25,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank to repay the balance. The complainant presented the cheque to the bank of the accused, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement of "insufficient funds". The complainant issued a legal notice to the accused asking him to repay the money within 15 days after the receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the money. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 3 2026:HHC:43110 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Virender Sharma (CW-1) and himself (CW-2) to prove his complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the complainant's case in its entirety. He stated that he was working as a Munshi with an apple contractor. He had taken the apple crop of Joginder for sale to Chandigarh. He had kept his signed chequebook with Jitender, who had handed over the cheque in his (complainant’s) absence. The accused examined Jitender (DW-1), himself (DW-2), and Vinod Kumar (DW-3) in his defence 6. The learned Trial Court held that the plea taken by the accused that he had kept a signed cheque book at home and his brother Jitender had handed over the cheque to the complainant was plausible. The accused was at Chandigarh at 4 2026:HHC:43110 the time of the issuance of the cheque and could not have issued the cheque. The accused has to establish his defence on the balance of probabilities, and the evidence of the accused was sufficient to discharge the burden placed upon him. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint. The plea set up by the accused that he had handed over the chequebook to his brother Jitender, who had issued a cheque in the complainant’s favour, was unbelievable. The accused admitted his signatures on the cheque, which carried a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge a debt/liability. Chandigarh is not a far-off place from Theog, and a person can easily reach Chandigarh within three hours from Theog. Therefore, the plea taken by the accused that he was at Chandigarh does not disprove the complainant's case that the accused had issued a cheque in his favour. The learned Trial Court ignored the presumption attached to the cheque, and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable. 5 2026:HHC:43110 Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, and Mr Hitender Verma, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the accused admitted his signatures on the cheque, and a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The explanation given by him that he had kept a chequebook at home and his brother had issued the cheque was not probable. The accused admitted that he had taken the complainant’s apple crop to Chandigarh, which corroborates the complainant’s case. The learned Trial Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6 2026:HHC:43110 10. Mr Hitender Verma, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the accused had kept the chequebook with his brother who had delivered the cheque to the complainant. This was duly proved by the statement of Jitender (DW1) and the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted this version. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence placed before the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 7 2026:HHC:43110 Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein 8 2026:HHC:43110 one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the 9 2026:HHC:43110 accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. While dealing with the appeal against the acquittal in a complaint filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 18 SCC 106 that the normal rules with the same rigour cannot be applied to the 10 2026:HHC:43110 cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act because there is a presumption that the holder had received the cheque for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The Appellate Court is entitled to look into the evidence to determine whether the accused has discharged the burden or not. It was observed: - “12…. The principles aforesaid are not of much debate. In other words, ordinarily, the appellate court will not be upsetting the judgment of acquittal, if the view taken by the trial court is one of the possible views of the matter and unless the appellate court arrives at a clear finding that the judgment of the trial court is perverse, i.e. not supported by evidence on record or contrary to what is regarded as normal or reasonable; or is wholly unsustainable in law. Such general restrictions are essential to remind the appellate court that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judgment of acquittal further strengthens such presumption in favour of the accused. However, such restrictions need to be visualised in the context of the particular matter before the appellate court and the nature of the inquiry therein. The same rule with the same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, the accused is entitled to bring on record the relevant material to rebut such presumption and to show that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his defence, but while examining if the accused has brought about a probable defence so as to rebut the presumption, the appellate court is certainly entitled to examine the evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused. 11 2026:HHC:43110 13. For determination of the point as to whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment and orders of the trial court and convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the basic questions to be addressed are twofold: as to whether the complainant Respondent 2 had established the ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, so as to justify drawing of the presumption envisaged therein; and if so, as to whether the appellant-accused had been able to displace such presumption and to establish a probable defence whereby, the onus would again shift to the complainant?” 14. The ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 as under: 5.3. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100 COMP CAS 755. “10. On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under the provision are: (i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; 12 2026:HHC:43110 (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. 11. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied, then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In the explanation to the section, clarification is made that the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 5.4. The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are as follows: i. The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account. ii. The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. iii. Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the period of six months or within the period of its validity. iv. The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money 13 2026:HHC:43110 standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or because it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account. v. A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque. vi. Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. vii. Filing of the complaint within a month from the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate not below first class. 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. The accused Sandeep Hetta admitted in his cross- examination that the cheque (Ext. C-1) bears his signatures inside the red circle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain vs. Ajay Singh (2023) 10 SCC 148 that the contention of the accused that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant is sufficient to trigger the presumption contained under Section 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act. It was observed: 36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where 14 2026:HHC:43110 the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40]]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents of the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption. 37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shift the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further. 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE 15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arise against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, 15 2026:HHC:43110 (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra). 16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions. 17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197]. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda (supra) that a statutory presumption arises on the admission or proof of the execution of the negotiable instrument, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption. It was observed: 5.7. A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions clearly indicates towards the statutory presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of the negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument was executed by the drawer, the rules of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act help him and shift the burden of rebutting the said presumptions upon the said drawer. Since these presumptions are rebuttable, the accused has the burden of disproving the same by leading evidence, either direct or indirect, to the effect that there did not exist any consideration or debt or that the non-existence of the said debt or consideration is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration or debt 16 2026:HHC:43110 existed. However, a bare denial of the passing of any consideration or existence of any debt does not support the defence of the accused and, therefore, to disprove the presumptions, something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted back to the complainant. The accused has to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration and the debt did not exist or their non- existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist. 19. The complainant stated in his cross-examination that the apple crop was sold for ₹45,00,000/-. The accused had paid ₹35,75,000/- in cash, and the remaining amount of ₹9,25,000/- was paid by cheque. Naresh is his son, and he had sold the entire apple crop to the accused. He denied that he had sold 669 apple boxes at Chandigarh through his son, he volunteered to say that Naresh had brought ₹8,25,000/- from Chandigarh. He denied that he had a dispute with the accused regarding the payment. He volunteered to say that the payment of ₹8,25,000/- was included in the payment of ₹35,75,000/-. 20. The complainant’s cross-examination makes his version highly doubtful. As per his statement, he had sold the entire crop to the accused for ₹45,00,000/-, out of which the accused had paid ₹35,75,000/-. Therefore, Naresh had no 17 2026:HHC:43110 reason to sell the apples for ₹8,25,000/-. The explanation provided by the complainant that ₹8,25,000/- was part of ₹35,75,000/- is not acceptable because the amount of ₹35,75,000/- was paid in cash by the accused. Hence, the cross- examination of the complainant shows that he had obtained an amount of ₹8,25,000/- out of the balance amount payable by the accused through his son by selling the apple boxes at Chandigarh. This makes his version doubtful that the cheque was issued for consideration. 21. The accused claimed that he had kept a signed chequebook with Jitender (DW-1), who had issued a cheque in the complainant’s favour. This statement was corroborated by Jitender (DW-1), who stated that he had issued a blank cheque in favour of the complainant's father because the chequebook was with him and the accused had gone to Chandigarh with the apple crop. The accused was at Chandigarh on the date of the issuance of the cheque. 22. The learned Trial Court accepted the statement of this witness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 18 2026:HHC:43110 716: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. It was observed on page 829: “219. It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall be given to the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses. In Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 351: 2002 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court held as under: (SCC p. 356, para 3) “3. … Before drawing the curtain on this score, however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution — a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently from that of the prosecution's witnesses.”(emphasis supplied) 220. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh (2002) 2 SCC 426: 2002 SCC (Cri) 350 as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. … Incidentally, be it noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one — the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case based on the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. A suggestion was there to the prosecution witnesses, in 19 2026:HHC:43110 particular PW 10 Dholu Ram, that his father Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days before the day of the occurrence itself—what more is expected of the defence case: a doubt or a certainty— jurisprudentially, a doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been made, the prosecution has to bring on record the availability of the deceased during those 2/3 days with some independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement for the defence to meet — it is the prosecutor's duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence — this itself is a circumstance, which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature.” 221. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram (2000) 4 SCC 515: 2000 SCC (Cri) 845, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21- 23) “21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted written submissions over and above the oral arguments addressed by him. One of the contentions adverted to by the learned counsel pertains to the evidence of the defence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali). The counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam Ali can be believed, it is sufficient to shake the basic structure of the prosecution’s evidence. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the following observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 166: 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score. It is this: 20 2026:HHC:43110 ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case, and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 23. The learned Trial Court held that the plea taken by the accused that he had kept a signed chequebook at home and his brother Jitender had handed over the cheque to the complainant appeared to be plausible. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken on the basis of evidence produced before the Court, and it is not permissible to interfere with it even if another view is possible. 24. The complainant’s cross-examination and the statements of the accused and his witnesses make the complainant's version highly doubtful that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. 25. It was submitted that there is a presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. However, this presumption is not absolute but is 21 2026:HHC:43110 rebuttable, and the moment evidence is led, the presumption stands rebutted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275, that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 26. In the present case, the cross-examination of the complainant and the statements of defence witnesses rebut the presumption. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 27. No other point was urged. 22 2026:HHC:43110 28. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th October, 2026 (Chander)