1 CGHC010369332024 2026:CGHC:28849-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1981 of 2024 Vijay Kumar Hadde @ Pallu S/o Shri Munna Ram Aged About 25 Years Resident Of Village Jhalriya, Police Station Pasta, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Policr Station Balrampur, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sushobhit Singh, Advocate through video conferencing. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice . 10.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sushobhit Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, through video conferencing. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.07.15 18:05:28 +0530 2 2. Though the matter is listed today for hearing on I.A. No. 1 of 2024 (an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail), considering that the appellant has been in custody since 13.06.2022, and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up for final hearing. 3. Learned State counsel submits that the notice issued to the father of the victim (PW-8) has been duly served; however, no one has appeared on behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal. 4. The present criminal appeal, preferred under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNSS"), is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.08.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (First Fast Track Special Court) (POCSO), Ramanujganj, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as "the learned trial Court") in Special Session (POCSO) Case No. 53 of 2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows: Conviction Sentence Section 342 of the the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 01 year and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 363 of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Section 6 of the Protection of R.I. for 20 years and fine of 3 Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) Rs.15000/-, in default of payment of fine, 02 months R.I. more. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 15.06.2022, the father of the victim (PW-8) lodged a written report (Ex.P/10) at Police Station Balrampur alleging that his daughter, aged about 16 years, had gone to the house of her grandfather situated at Village X within the jurisdiction of Police Station Rajpur on 09.06.2022. On 14.06.2022, the victim informed her family that she would be returning home. Accordingly, her grandmother escorted her to Rajpur Bus Stand at about 10:30 a.m. and made her board a bus for her native village, whereafter the complainant was informed telephonically about her departure. The complainant thereafter deputed his sons to receive the victim at Dumarkhi at about 12:00 noon. However, despite waiting till about 2:00 p.m., the victim did not arrive by any of the buses. After making enquiries and waiting for a considerable period, the complainant's sons returned home. Thereafter, efforts were made to trace the victim in the nearby localities as well as amongst her relatives and acquaintances, but her whereabouts could not be ascertained. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, Crime No.126/2022 was registered at Police Station Balrampur against an unknown person for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and the First Information Report (FIR) was recorded as Ex.P/11. 4 7. During the course of investigation, on 17.06.2022, Woman Head Constable Preeti Sahu (PW-4), in the presence of the victim's father, recovered the victim from the bank of the Daldhowa River, whereupon a recovery memo (Ex.P/12) was prepared. Thereafter, the statement of the victim was recorded. As the victim made allegations disclosing the commission of offences of a sexual nature, she was referred for medical examination at the District Hospital, Balrampur. Dr. Alak Anuragi Minj (PW-1), who medically examined the victim, submitted her report (Ex.P/1), wherein it was opined that the hymen of the victim was found to be old torn. 8. During investigation, Sub-Inspector Manoj Singh (PW-6), for the purpose of ascertaining the age of the victim, obtained the certified extract of the Admission–Withdrawal Register relating to the victim's admission to Class-I from St. Joseph Primary School, Darridih, and seized the same vide seizure memo (Ex.P/5). The certified extract of the register was exhibited as Ex.P/6C. 9. Inspector Surendra Uke (PW-7), during further investigation, inspected the place of occurrence on the basis of the information furnished by the victim's father and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/7). A Samsung Galaxy mobile phone and a Pulsar motorcycle bearing Registration No. CG-30-D-5626 were seized from the appellant, Vijay Kumar Hadde, in the presence of witnesses vide seizure memo (Ex.P/8). His underwear was also seized under seizure memo (Ex.P/9). 10. During investigation, it also surfaced that the co-accused, Pramod 5 Ram, had allegedly concealed the victim at his residence and had facilitated the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant. Consequently, both the appellant and the co-accused were arrested in accordance with law in the presence of witnesses. 11. Inspector Surendra Uke (PW-7) recorded the statements of the parents of the victim during investigation and also got the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balrampur, which has been exhibited as Ex.P/2. Thereafter, the appellant was subjected to medical examination for assessment of his potency and his underwear was also forwarded for examination. Dr. Navnit Toppo (PW-3), vide reports Ex.P/3 and Ex.P/4, opined that the appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse. The articles seized during investigation, namely, the underwear of the appellant, the vaginal slide of the victim and her pubic hair samples, were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur, for chemical examination. 12. Upon completion of the investigation and after compliance with all statutory formalities, the investigating agency filed the charge-sheet against the appellant and the co-accused, Pramod Ram, for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366-A, 368, 376(2)(n), 342 and 506 of the IPC, as also under Sections 3/4 and 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act. 13. Upon consideration of the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet so filed, the learned trial Court found a prima facie 6 case against the appellant, Vijay Kumar Hadde @ Pallu, for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 342, 506 Part II and 376(2)(n) of the IPC, along with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Likewise, a prima facie case was found against the co-accused, Pramod Ram, for the offences punishable under Section 368 of the IPC and Section 17 of the POCSO Act. 14. Accordingly, charges were framed against the appellant and the co-accused. The substance of the accusations having been read over and explained to them, they denied the charges, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 15. Upon conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the appellant and the co-accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them, pleaded false implication and claimed innocence. In defence, the accused examined Govardhan Manikpuri (DW-1). 16. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined eight witnesses and exhibited thirteen documents. However, the learned trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges levelled against the co-accused, Pramod Ram, beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted him of all the charges. 17. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences referred to in paragraph 4 of this judgment and sentenced 7 him accordingly. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the prosecution case is riddled with material contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies, which strike at the very root of the matter and render the entire prosecution version wholly unreliable. It is further contended that the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error in convicting the appellant under the provisions of the POCSO Act, despite the prosecution having failed to establish that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. According to learned counsel, the reliance placed upon the Admission–Discharge register (Ex.P/6C), wherein the victim's date of birth is recorded as 01.01.2006, is wholly misconceived. Inviting the attention of this Court to the testimony of the Head Teacher (PW-5), learned counsel submits that she has categorically admitted in her cross-examination that no birth certificate of the victim was produced at the time of her admission in the school and that the date of birth entered in the Admission–Discharge register was merely recorded on the basis of the Aadhaar Card produced by the father of the victim. It is, therefore, urged that the said school record cannot be regarded as a reliable or conclusive piece of evidence for determining the age of the victim. 8 19. Learned counsel further submits that the testimony of the victim's father (PW-8) also fails to conclusively establish the age of the victim. Though, in his examination-in-chief, he stated that the victim's date of birth is 01.01.2006 and that she was about seventeen years of age at the relevant time, he fairly admitted during his cross-examination that no birth certificate of the victim had ever been prepared. It is submitted that, in the absence of any authentic documentary evidence establishing the age of the victim, the Investigating Officer ought to have subjected the victim to a radiological or ossification test for scientific determination of her age. The omission to undertake such an exercise creates a serious lacuna in the prosecution case and renders the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act highly doubtful. He further contended that the conduct of the victim, as emerging from her own testimony, is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution story. Referring to her deposition, it is submitted that the victim herself admitted that while she was returning from her grandmother's house, the appellant met her near Semarsot village, whereafter she accompanied him on his motorcycle to his house and remained there till the evening. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly took her to the room of the co-accused, Pramod Ram, situated at Ambikapur. Despite having sufficient opportunity to raise an alarm or seek assistance from persons available on the way or from the neighbourhood, the victim admittedly did not make any such attempt. According to learned counsel, such conduct appears to be wholly unnatural and creates a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution version. 9 20. Learned counsel would further submit that the medical evidence does not substantially corroborate the prosecution version. As per the medical examination report (Ex.P/1), no external injury or injury over the private parts of the victim was noticed by the examining Doctor, nor has any definite opinion been expressed suggestive of the use of force. It is further submitted that, although the prosecution claims that the articles seized during the course of investigation were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur, for forensic examination, the FSL report has not been proved in accordance with law by exhibiting the same during the course of trial. In the absence of the FSL report being duly proved and brought on record, no evidentiary value can be attached to the alleged forensic opinion. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to produce any scientific evidence capable of lending assurance to its case. It is, therefore, urged that the absence of reliable medical and scientific corroboration, coupled with the material inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, entitles the appellant to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 21. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the findings recorded by the learned 10 trial Court are based upon a proper appreciation of the evidence and do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. 22. Learned State counsel further submitted that the testimony of the victim is cogent, trustworthy and inspires confidence. It is argued that it is a well-settled principle of law that where the testimony of the victim is found to be credible and of sterling quality, conviction can safely be founded upon her sole testimony even in the absence of independent corroboration. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has meticulously considered every contention advanced on behalf of the appellant and has recorded well-reasoned findings based upon the evidence available on record. It is, therefore, urged that no ground for interference is made out and the present appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 23. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the entire record of the learned trial Court. 24. The principal question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident so as to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act. 25. For determining the aforesaid issue, this Court has carefully examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution principally relies upon the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/6C) maintained by 11 St. Joseph Primary School, Darridih, and the oral testimonies of the victim (PW-2), her father (PW-8) and the Head Teacher (PW-5). As per the entries contained in the said register, the victim's date of birth has been recorded as 01.01.2006. 26. The victim (PW-2), in her examination-in-chief, stated that her date of birth is 01.01.2006. Likewise, her father (PW-8) deposed that the victim's date of birth is 01.01.2006 and that she was about 17 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. However, during his cross- examination, he admitted that no birth certificate of the victim had ever been prepared. Thus, except for the aforesaid oral assertions, no primary documentary evidence has been produced by the prosecution to establish the date of birth of the victim. 27. The Head Teacher (PW-5) of St. Joseph Primary School, Darridih, deposed that the particulars relating to the victim were entered at Serial No.3393 of the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/6C) and that the victim was admitted to Class-I on 21.06.2013. According to the said register, the victim's date of birth is recorded as 01.01.2006. However, in her cross-examination, she admitted that no birth certificate of the victim was produced at the time of her admission and that the date of birth recorded in the school register was entered solely on the basis of the Aadhaar Card produced by the father. This admission, in the considered opinion of this Court, considerably diminishes the evidentiary value of the said school record. 28. Upon an overall appreciation of the evidence available on record, 12 this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to produce cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. Mere production of the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/6C), without establishing the source or authenticity of the date of birth recorded therein, cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof of the age of the victim. 29. Apart from the aforesaid school record, no birth certificate issued by the competent authority, municipal record or any other contemporaneous document evidencing the date of birth of the victim has been brought on record. Furthermore, despite the absence of any authentic documentary evidence, no radiological or ossification test was conducted during the course of investigation for scientific determination of the victim's age. The oral evidence led by the prosecution on this aspect is also neither definite nor free from doubt. In such circumstances, this Court is unable to safely accept the prosecution's assertion that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. 30. In the above factual background, it would be appropriate to refer to the settled principles of law governing the determination of age and the evidentiary value of entries made in school records. 31. In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 584, while placing reliance upon the earlier decision in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, reported in 1988 Supp SCC 604, 13 the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the evidentiary value of school records for determining the age of a person and held as under:- “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 14 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra 15 Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of 16 determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 33. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents 17 mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 18 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 34. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras 14 to 17 as under : 19 “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be 20 decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or 21 equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 35. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the prosecution has principally relied upon the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/6C) and the oral testimonies of the victim (PW-2), her father (PW-8) and the Head Teacher (PW-5) to establish the age of the victim. Although the date of birth of the victim has been recorded as 01.01.2006 in the said register and both the victim and her father have deposed to the same effect, the Head Teacher (PW-5), in her cross-examination, has categorically admitted that no birth certificate was produced at the time of the victim's admission in the school and that the date of birth recorded in the Admission–Discharge Register was entered solely on the basis of the Aadhaar Card produced by the father. She has further admitted that she has no personal knowledge regarding the correctness of the said date of birth. 36. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid evidence 22 falls short of the standard required to conclusively establish the age of the victim. The school record, in the absence of any foundational document on the basis of which the date of birth came to be recorded therein, cannot by itself be treated as conclusive proof of age. Likewise, the oral assertions of the victim and her father, unsupported by any primary documentary evidence, are insufficient to establish that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. 37. It is also pertinent to note that the prosecution has not produced any birth certificate issued by the competent authority, municipal record, hospital record or any other contemporaneous public document evidencing the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, despite the absence of any reliable documentary evidence regarding the victim's age, no effort was made by the investigating agency to have the victim subjected to a radiological or ossification test for scientific determination of her age. These omissions assume considerable significance while appreciating the prosecution case. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish, by cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence, that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. Consequently, this Court is unable to affirm the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the victim was a minor at the relevant point of time. The legal consequences flowing therefrom shall be considered at the appropriate 23 stage while examining the correctness of the impugned judgment. 39. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 40. The victim (PW-2) deposed that she was acquainted with the appellant, Vijay Kumar Hadde, as he belonged to Village Jhalariya and used to visit her village. She further stated that she came to know the co-accused, Pramod Kumar, when the appellant had once taken her to his room at Ambikapur. According to her, her date of birth is 01.01.2006. She stated that while returning from her grandmother's house in June, 2022, the appellant met her near Semarsot, whereafter she accompanied him on his motorcycle to his house and remained there till the evening. Thereafter, the appellant took her to the room of co- accused Pramod Kumar at Ambikapur, where they stayed for the night, and on the following morning, the appellant dropped her near her village. She further deposed that she was thereafter taken by her father to Police Station Balrampur, where her statement was recorded, following which she was medically examined. She also stated that the appellant had established physical relations with her on six to seven occasions. 41. During her cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that she had stated her date of birth on the basis of the date mentioned in her Aadhaar Card and that she was unaware whether any birth certificate had been prepared. She further admitted that she used to communicate with the 24 appellant through Facebook and over the phone and had accompanied him on earlier occasions to Pawai Fall and Parewadah. She also admitted that she had voluntarily alighted from the bus at Semarsot and had accompanied the appellant to Village Jhalariya. She further admitted that she did not raise any alarm or seek assistance from any person while travelling with the appellant to Ambikapur. 42. The father of the victim (PW-8) corroborated the statements made by the victim, affirming the accuracy and consistency of her account. 43. Dr. Alak Anuragi Minj (PW-1), who examined the victim on 17.06.2022, deposed that the victim was produced before her for medico-legal examination by Woman Constable Rajanti Lakra of Police Station Balrampur. Upon examination, a black mole was noticed on the left cheek of the victim. The victim had fully developed secondary sexual characteristics and no external injury was found on any part of her body. On genital examination, no fresh injury was found over the genital region; pubic hair was present and the hymen was found to be old torn. The victim stated that the last alleged incident had occurred on 14.06.2022. Two vaginal slides were prepared and the pubic hair samples were collected, sealed separately and handed over to the accompanying police constable for forensic examination. The Doctor opined that, in the absence of any injury over the genital region, no definite opinion could be given as to whether there had been any recent sexual intercourse. She further advised that the vaginal samples be sent to Medical College, Ambikapur for chemical examination. The 25 medical examination report was proved as Ex.P/1. 44. Dr. Navnit Toppo (PW-3) deposed that on 18.06.2022, the appellant, Vijay Kumar Hadde, was produced before him by Constable Rajesh (No. 778) for medical examination to assess his potency. Upon examination, the appellant was found to be of normal physique with fully developed secondary sexual characteristics. The external and genital examination revealed no abnormality, and the testes were found to be normal and in their proper position. In his opinion, no abnormality was detected which could indicate that the appellant was incapable of performing sexual intercourse. The potency examination report was proved as Ex.P/3. 45. PW-3 further deposed that, on the same day, a sealed packet containing the appellant's grey-coloured underwear was produced before him. Upon opening the packet, he noticed a whitish stain on the inner portion of the underwear. The stained portion was marked, the underwear was resealed and handed over to the accompanying police constable for chemical examination. The examination report relating to the underwear was proved as Ex.P/4. 46. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution is required to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent, reliable and convincing evidence. It is equally well settled that a conviction in a case involving allegations of sexual assault can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided such testimony is found to be wholly reliable and inspires confidence. 26 However, where the evidence suffers from material infirmities or creates a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit thereof. 47. Further, in Alamelu (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of the present case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This 27 witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 48. In the light of the aforesaid settled principles, the evidence on 28 record has been carefully evaluated. The victim (PW-2), in her examination-in-chief, alleged that the appellant had established physical relations with her on six to seven occasions. However, during her cross- examination, she admitted that she was acquainted with the appellant prior to the alleged incident; that they used to communicate through Facebook and over the phone; that they had visited Pawai Fall and Parewadah together on earlier occasions; and that she had voluntarily alighted from the bus at Semarsot and accompanied the appellant to Village Jhalariya. She further admitted that, while travelling with the appellant to Ambikapur, she did not raise any alarm or seek assistance from any person despite having sufficient opportunity to do so. 49. The conduct of the victim, as emerging from her own testimony, assumes considerable significance. According to her, she remained with the appellant at his house till the evening and thereafter accompanied him to the room of the co-accused at Ambikapur, where they stayed overnight. She has not stated that she made any attempt to escape or complain to any person during this period. Likewise, while travelling to Ambikapur and thereafter, she admittedly did not seek assistance from anyone. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, such conduct assumes relevance while appreciating the overall credibility of the prosecution version. 50. The medical evidence also does not materially advance the prosecution case. Dr. Alak Anuragi Minj (PW-1), who medically examined the victim, found no external injury on her body and no fresh 29 injury over her genital region. Though the hymen was found to be old torn, the doctor categorically opined that, in the absence of any injury, no definite opinion could be expressed as to whether there had been any recent sexual intercourse. Thus, the medical evidence neither corroborates nor conclusively supports the prosecution version. 51. Another circumstance which assumes significance is that, although the vaginal slides, pubic hair samples of the victim and the underwear of the appellant were admittedly forwarded for forensic examination, the prosecution did not exhibit the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory during the course of trial. Consequently, no corroborative forensic evidence is available on record to support the prosecution case. 52. Thus, upon an overall appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. The testimony of the victim, viewed in its entirety, also does not inspire such confidence as would justify sustaining the conviction solely on its basis. Her admissions during cross-examination, coupled with the inconclusive medical evidence and the absence of any exhibited forensic evidence, create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. 53. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence available on record, the 30 one favourable to the accused must ordinarily be adopted. In the present case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the standard required for recording a conviction in a criminal trial. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 54. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside. 55. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.08.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO) are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges for the offences punishable under Sections 342 and 363 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant is reported to be in custody and shall be released forthwith, if his custody is not required in connection with any other case. 56. In view of the final disposal of the appeal, I.A. No. 1 of 2024 (application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail) does not survive for consideration and is accordingly disposed of. 57. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition 31 against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 58. The learned trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan