1 2026:CGHC:27036-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 540 of 2026 Dr Ruchi Jain D/o Ramesh Kumar Jain, Aged About 42 Years, R/o D- 313, Sector 5, Near Bank of Baroda, Tagore Nagar, Tehsil and District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Technical Education, Manpower and Planning Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Dist- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Director, Directorate of Technical Education, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Dist- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Public Service Commission, Through The Secretary, Public Service Commission, Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Harsh Dave, Advocate For Respondents No.1 and 2/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, Advocate on behalf of Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 02-07-2026 Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.07.14 11:16:20 +0530 2 1. Heard Mr. Harsh Dave, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for respondents-State and Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate for the respondent No.3 on I.A. No. 01 of 2026, an application under Section 2(2) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 3374 in preferring the present writ appeal. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 02.01.2017, passed by learned Single Judge, in WPS No. 3321 of 2016 (Dr. Ruchi Jain v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. 3. On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the impugned order dated 02.01.2017, after an inordinate delay of 3374 days, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant filed WPS No.3321/2016 which was decided along with bunch of other writ petitions, by learned Single Judge vide a common order dated 02.01.2017, whereby all the writ petitions were dismissed and the other writ petitioners whose writ petitions were dismissed along with the writ petition of the present appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 02.01.2017 filed 3 Writ Appeal No.14/2017 and other writ appeals. The Writ Appeal No.14/2017 and other writ appeals arising out of the order dated 02.01.2017 were decided by common judgment dated 07.12.2018 and the said order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 02.01.2017 was quashed allowing those writ appeals. Against the judgment dated 07.12.2018 passed in WA No.14/2017 and other connected writ appeals the State preferred appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order 22.08.2024 in Civil Appeal No. (s) 8097-8122/2024 affirming the judgment dated 07.12.2018 passed in the writ appeals. 4. He further submits that vide order dated 22.08.2024 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that impugned judgments would be applicable only to the parties who have approached the learned Single Judge of the High Court. The petitioner thereafter, filed fresh WPS No.11759/2025 which was dismissed as withdrawn by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 23.01.2026. Thereafter, against the order dated 02.01.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.3321/2016 filed by the petitioner/present writ appellant the present writ appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, 4 the appeal is not liable to be entertained. 6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant writ appeal. 7. The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the delay of about 3374 days in preferring the present writ appeal deserves to be condoned or not. 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:- “5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been 5 presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter 6 of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be 7 non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for 8 condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we 9 must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” 9. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a clear and satisfactory 10 demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice. 10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that there is a delay of 3374 days in preferring the present writ appeal. The appellant has sought to condone the delay by contending that after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 22.08.2024, she bona fide believed that, being one of the original writ petitioners, the benefit of regularisation would be extended to her without the necessity of filing an independent appeal. It is further urged that she immediately submitted a representation before the competent authorities and, upon their inaction, diligently pursued the remedy by filing WPS No. 11759/2025, which ultimately came to be withdrawn on 23.01.2026 with liberty to avail the appropriate remedy. The record thus indicates that the appellant was not completely inactive during the relevant period and has attempted to attribute the delay to the bona fide pursuit of alternate proceedings arising out of subsequent judicial developments. Whether such explanation constitutes "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must, however, be examined in the light of the settled principles governing condonation of delay, keeping in view the length of the 11 delay, the chronology of events, the conduct of the appellant, and the requirement that every substantial period of delay should receive a satisfactory and convincing explanation. 11. The law of limitation is founded on considerations of public policy, intended to secure certainty and finality in judicial proceedings and to prevent revival of stale claims. A party seeking condonation of an inordinate delay is required to furnish a satisfactory, cogent and convincing explanation covering the entire period of delay and to establish that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be instituted within the prescribed period. In the present case, although the appellant has sought to attribute the delay to the subsequent judgment/order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 22.08.2024, the submission of a representation, and the filing of a subsequent writ petition, these events occurred long after the period of limitation had already expired. The application is conspicuously silent as to the circumstances which prevented the appellant from challenging the order dated 02.01.2017 within the prescribed period or within a reasonable time thereafter. The subsequent pursuit of representations or alternate proceedings cannot, by itself, explain or efface the prolonged period of inaction preceding such steps. Further, the petitioner/appellant has not satisfactorily explained that why the petitioner/appellant waited in the period between the order passed in the writ appeals, dated 07.12.2018 till the order 22.08.2024 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation 12 accounting for the entire delay of 3374 days, the appellant has failed to establish 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and such an extraordinary delay cannot be condoned merely on equitable considerations or on the ground that similarly situated persons have subsequently obtained relief. 12. Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. 13. As a consequence, the instant writ appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil