2026:HHC:3341 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2755 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.1.2026 Date of Decision: 23.1.2026. Tushar Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary & Panku Chaudhary, Advocates For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, assisted by ASI Bhamdev, IO, PS Manali, District Kullu, HP. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 16 of 2025, dated 23.01.2025, registered at Police Station, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 103(1) read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:3341 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant, Mayank Thakur, made a complaint to the police, which led to the registration of the FIR. There is no eyewitness in the case. The prosecution has cited 33 witnesses, out of whom only one witness has been examined. The police have failed to collect sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family and he would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant, Mayank Thakur, was discharging his duties at Manu Rangshala, where a cultural programme was being organised on 22.1.2025 at about 8.00 PM. The people were dancing, when the informant heard some commotion. He went to the spot and found that some people were quarrelling. One person was bleeding. The informant caught hold of the injured person, which the other persons went away. The injured person 3 2026:HHC:3341 was taken to the hospital, and he identified himself as Daksh Thakur. He subsequently succumbed to his injuries. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The postmortem examination of Daksh Thakur was conducted, and it was found that the cause of death was hemorrhagic hypodermic shock as a result of an ante-mortem incised wound leading to cardiopulmonary shock. The police checked the CCTV footage and found five people leaving Manu Rangshala between 8.04 and 8.05 PM. One person was identified as Tushar Sharma (the present petitioner). The police arrested him. He had sustained an injury on his right hand. His clothes were blood-stained, and he was wearing the same clothes as seen in the CCTV Footage. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the clothes. The involvement of other persons was not found. The investigation revealed that the petitioner had an altercation with the deceased, he inflicted injuries to the victim, Daksh Thakur, by means of a broken bottle. The DNA profile of the deceased was found on the petitioner’s shoes. The petitioner’s photograph was found to be similar to the person shown in the CCTV footage, but no definite opinion could be given. The clothes in the photograph were similar to the clothes in the CCTV Footage. 4 2026:HHC:3341 As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, injuries sustained by Daksh Thakur could have been caused by means of a broken bottle. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 20.4.2025 and a supplementary charge on 5.12.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary and Panku Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a heinous offence which is punishable with the extreme penalty of death. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:3341 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find 6 2026:HHC:3341 whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same 7 2026:HHC:3341 judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court 8 2026:HHC:3341 granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is  Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu 9 2026:HHC:3341 Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report mentions that the petitioner had sustained injuries. The DNA of the deceased was found on the petitioner’s shoes. His clothes were also blood-stained. The petitioner’s photograph was found to be similar to the person seen leaving Manu Rangshala between 8.04 and 8.05 PM. All these circumstances, prima facie, show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of a crime. 10 2026:HHC:3341 11. It was submitted that the informant, Mayank Thakur, admitted in his cross-examination that no Test Identification Parade was conducted in the present case, and the petitioner’s identity has not been established. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Matru alias Girish Chandra Versus State of UP (1971) 2 SCC 75 that the test identification parade does not constitute a substantive piece of evidence. It is meant for the investigating agency to lend an assurance that the investigation is proceeding along the right lines. It was held in Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625: 1998 SCC (Cri) 859 that the identification of the accused in the court is a substantive piece of evidence, and there is no requirement of its corroboration from a previous identification parade. It was held in Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 110, that the test identification parade is not necessary in every case. Similarly, it was held in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that the dock identification is a substantive piece of evidence and the absence of a test identification parade is not fatal in every case. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the petitioner from the absence of the test identification parade in the present case. 11 2026:HHC:3341 12. The petitioner is accused of committing an offence under Section 103 (1) of the BNS, which is punishable with death. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are 12 2026:HHC:3341 sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 13. Considering the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 14. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail. It was observed at page 141: 13 2026:HHC:3341 “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 15. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail on the ground of delay in the progress of the trial. 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 18. The observations made here-in-above are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Vacation Judge 23rd January, 2026 (Chander)