Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
32 jdt. 01.07.2026 jb.
WPA 13799 of 2026 (Wasim Akram vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.)
Mr. Piush Chaturvedi Md. Hafiz Ali …. For the Petitioner Mr. Madhu Jana Ms. Puja Sonkar …. For the State Mr. Joy Chakraborty Ms. Ipsita Ghosh … For the Respondent no. 9
The petitioner is the member of Burwan Panchayat Samiti and submitted a no confidence motion against the Sabhapati before the Prescribed Authority on 4th June, 2026 which was received by the latter on the same date. The Prescribed Authority issued a notice on 8th June, 2026 fixing the date of meeting on 18th June, 2026. However, by a subsequent notice issued on 17th June, 2026 the meeting was postponed due to non availability of police assistance. The petitioner seeks a direction upon the Prescribed Authority to convene the meeting and conclude the same in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for the private respondent/Sabhapati draws the attention of this Court to an order of the Hon’ble Division Bench passed on 17th March, 2026 wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench held that since the time frame laid down under Section 12 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 had expired,
2 the requisition notice/motion had lost its validity. The requisitionists were granted liberty to bring another motion in accordance with law and the Prescribed Authority was directed to comply with the provision of law without unnecessarily delaying the issue, for whatever reason. With utmost deference to the said order, this Court is inclined to place reliance on the authority in C. Bright vs. District Collector and Others reported in (2021) 2 SCC 392 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the rule of interpretation of statutes and has observed that the use of word ‘shall’ in the statute does not necessarily mean that in every case it is mandatory that unless the words of the statute are literally followed, the proceedings or the outcome of the proceedings would be invalid. When the statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. The principle of liberal construction of the statute alone in all circumstances may not serve the purpose of the statute. Referring to a judgment in Remington Rand of India Limited vs. Workmen reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court, 224 dealing with Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Hon’ble Court has stated that though Section 17 is mandatory, the time limit to publish the award within 30 days is directory
3 inter alia, for the reason that non publication of the award within the period of 30 days does not entail any penalty. The ratio decidendi of the said judgment is applicable in the fact situation of the present case since non compliance of the mandate laid down under Section 12 of the Act of 1973 does not entail any penalty upon the Prescribed Authority.
In view of the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Courts directs the Prescribed Authority, being the 5th respondent herein, to convene the meeting within 10 days from the date of communication of this order and take the proceeding to its logical conclusion in terms of Section 12 of the Act. The requisition notice shall be treated to have been submitted on the date of communication of this
order. The Officer in Charge, Burwan Police Station being the 8th respondent herein, is directed to render necessary assistance to the 5th respondent so that the meeting is held peacefully and without any disturbance from any corner whatsoever. The writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Since no affidavit has been invited, allegations contained in the writ petition shall be deemed not to have been admitted.
4 Urgent certified website copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of requisite formalities.
(Suvra Ghosh, J.)