1 CGHC010063232026 2026:CGHC:29273-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 531 of 2026 State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Mainpur, District- Gariyaband (C.G.) ... Appellant versus Muiba @ Gaganna @ Dokra @ Dharmendra Netam S/o Lachhen Netam Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Basawapur, Police Station Jimlagatta District- Gadchirouli (Maharastra) ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Government Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate (Amicus Curiae) Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 13.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the appellant/State and Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.07.13 17:17:23 +0530 2 2. This criminal appeal under Section 21(1) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short, "the NIA Act") is directed against the judgment dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh in Special Case (NIA) No.09/2019, whereby the respondent/accused, namely Muiba @ Gaganna @ Dokra @ Dharmendra Netam, has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 8 of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005, and Sections 16, 23, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, by extending to him the benefit of doubt. The acquittal has principally been recorded on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the memorandum and consequential recoveries beyond reasonable doubt and that the evidence led by the prosecution suffered from material contradictions and infirmities. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 19.10.2018, a joint team of security forces, while conducting an anti-Naxalite search operation in the forest area near village Bade Gobra, Supadongri Pahadi, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Mainpur, District Gariaband, came under indiscriminate firing allegedly opened by armed members of the banned CPI (Maoist) organization. It is alleged that the extremists had also planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) with the intention of causing death and grievous 3 injuries to the police personnel. The security forces retaliated in self-defence, whereupon the extremists fled into the dense forest taking advantage of the terrain. On the basis of the report lodged by the police party, the concerned crime was registered and investigation was set into motion. 4. During the course of investigation, the respondent/accused Muiba @ Gaganna @ Dokra @ Dharmendra Netam, who was already in the custody of the police in connection with another case, was taken into custody in the present case on 30.06.2019. It is the prosecution case that the respondent made a memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, pursuant to which various articles allegedly used by the banned organization, including country-made firearms, gelatin sticks, Naxalite literature, an AK-47 rifle, live cartridges, cash amounting to 2,47,000/-, magazines, radio sets, backpacks and other ₹ incriminating materials, were recovered from different places at his instance. 5. Upon completion of investigation, the investigating agency filed a charge-sheet against the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 8 of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 and Sections 16, 23, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 4 Act, 1967. The learned Special Judge framed charges accordingly, to which the respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. During the trial, the prosecution examined several witnesses and exhibited documentary evidence in support of its case. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Special Judge, by judgment dated 19.09.2025 passed in Special Case (NIA) No.09/2019, held that the prosecution had failed to establish the memorandum and consequential recoveries beyond reasonable doubt, noticed material contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and consequently extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent, acquitting him of all the charges. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), Bilaspur in Special Case (NIA) No.09/2019, the appellant/State has preferred the present criminal appeal under Section 21(1) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, assailing the findings recorded by the trial Court as being contrary to the evidence available on record and the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials. 8. Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the appellant/State would submit that the learned Special Judge has committed a manifest error in acquitting the 5 respondent by adopting a hyper-technical approach in appreciating the evidence on record. It is contended that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the respondent had made a voluntary disclosure statement, pursuant to which several incriminating articles, including an AK-47 rifle, live cartridges, explosives, Naxalite literature and other materials connected with the banned CPI (Maoist) organization, were recovered from places exclusively within his knowledge. Such recoveries constitute a highly incriminating circumstance admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which has not been appreciated in its proper perspective. It is further submitted that the trial Court has attached undue importance to minor discrepancies and omissions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the police witnesses associated with the memorandum and seizure proceedings, while ignoring that such inconsistencies are natural and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. Merely because independent witnesses were not associated with the seizure proceedings or because there were certain variations regarding the manner of recovery, the entire prosecution case could not have been discarded, especially when the official witnesses consistently supported the recoveries and there was no material to establish any motive for falsely implicating the respondent. 9. Learned Deputy Government Advocate would further contend that the trial Court has misapplied the principles governing the 6 admissibility and evidentiary value of discoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The finding that the prosecution failed to establish the recoveries beyond reasonable doubt is contrary to the evidence available on record. The Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent's disclosure led to the discovery of concealed arms, explosives and other articles which were not otherwise within the knowledge of the investigating agency, thereby furnishing a strong incriminating circumstance connecting the respondent with the offences alleged. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from serious errors of law and appreciation of evidence, rendering it perverse and unsustainable. The findings recorded by the learned Special Judge are contrary to the material available on record and have resulted in miscarriage of justice. It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment dated 19.09.2025 be set aside, and the respondent be convicted in accordance with law. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the respondent, vehemently opposes the submissions advanced by the learned Government Advocate and would submit that the impugned judgment of acquittal is based on a meticulous appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence and does not suffer from any perversity, illegality or misapplication of law warranting interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal. It is submitted that the learned trial Court 7 has assigned cogent and convincing reasons for extending the benefit of doubt to the respondent and the view so taken is a plausible one based on the evidence available on record. 11. Learned Amicus Curiae would further submit that the entire prosecution case rests solely upon the alleged memorandum statement of the respondent and the consequential recoveries purportedly made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the prosecution has failed to prove the memorandum and recoveries in accordance with law. The seizure witnesses, namely PW-5 Dilip Thakur and PW-14 Vijay Kumar Mishra, have not consistently supported the prosecution case and their testimonies are replete with material contradictions. PW-5 admitted that he had signed the memorandum and seizure documents at the police station and not at the place of recovery and did not support the preparation of the recovery panchnamas (Exhibits P-18 and P-19). Likewise, PW-14 admitted that no independent witness was associated with the recovery proceedings, that he could not state the time at which the memorandum was recorded, and that he had no knowledge of the articles allegedly recovered. In these circumstances, the learned trial Court rightly held that the alleged recoveries were shrouded in serious doubt. It is further submitted that none of the members of the police party present at the time of the alleged incident identified the respondent as one of the assailants. The prosecution has not conducted any test identification parade nor 8 has it adduced any reliable evidence to establish the presence or participation of the respondent in the incident dated 19.10.2018. The respondent came to be arrested nearly eight months after the occurrence in connection with another case, and except the disputed memorandum and alleged recoveries, there is no substantive evidence connecting him with the offences alleged. The Investigating Officer (PW-12), in his cross-examination, has also admitted several material omissions, including that he was not part of the search party which participated in the anti-Naxalite operation, had not visited the original place of occurrence in connection with Crime No.113/2018, and that no independent witness was associated during the memorandum and seizure proceedings. These admissions materially weaken the prosecution case. 12. Learned Amicus Curiae would also contend that the learned trial Court has correctly applied the settled principles governing the evidentiary value of discoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and has rightly relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 17 SCC 273, and Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1983) 1 SCC 143, to hold that a disclosure statement by itself cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless supported by reliable and independent evidence establishing the nexus between the accused and the crime. The findings recorded by the trial Court are thus fully supported by law as well as by the 9 evidence on record. Lastly, it is submitted that while considering an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is required to bear in mind the well-settled principle that an acquitted accused enjoys a reinforced presumption of innocence. Unless the findings of the trial Court are shown to be manifestly illegal, perverse or wholly unreasonable, interference is not warranted merely because another view is possible. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka (2026 INSC 67) and Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat (2024 INSC 295), wherein it has been reiterated that if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible and reasonable view based on the evidence, the appellate Court should refrain from reversing an order of acquittal. It is, therefore, prayed that the present appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have minutely examined the entire record of the case, including the impugned judgment of acquittal, the oral and documentary evidence adduced before the learned Special Judge and the findings recorded therein. 14. The principal question which falls for consideration is whether the judgment dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), Bilaspur acquitting the respondent of the offences 10 punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 8 of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 and Sections 16, 23, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 suffers from perversity, manifest illegality or misappreciation of evidence so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. 15. A careful scrutiny of the prosecution evidence reveals that the entire case against the respondent substantially rests upon the memorandum statement allegedly recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the consequential recoveries said to have been effected at his instance. The learned trial Court has subjected the evidence relating to the memorandum and seizure proceedings to close scrutiny and has found that the prosecution has failed to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of PW-5 Dilip Thakur, PW-14 Vijay Kumar Mishra and PW-12, the Investigating Officer, has been analysed threadbare by the learned Special Judge, who has recorded cogent reasons for holding that the prosecution witnesses have made materially inconsistent statements regarding the manner, place and time of recovery, preparation of seizure documents and participation in the recovery proceedings. PW-5 has admittedly not supported the preparation of the recovery panchnamas (Exhibits P-18 and P-19) 11 and has admitted that his signatures were obtained at the police station. PW-14 has admitted that no independent witness was associated with the recovery proceedings and that he had no knowledge regarding several articles allegedly recovered. These material discrepancies go to the root of the prosecution case and cannot be brushed aside as minor inconsistencies. 16. It is equally significant that none of the members of the police party, who were allegedly attacked during the anti-Naxalite operation on 19.10.2018, identified the respondent as one of the assailants. The prosecution has neither conducted any test identification proceedings nor led any reliable evidence to establish the presence of the respondent at the place of occurrence. The respondent came to be implicated nearly eight months after the incident when he was already in custody in another case. Except for the disputed memorandum and the alleged recoveries, no independent evidence has been brought on record connecting the respondent with the occurrence in question. The Investigating Officer has himself admitted in his cross- examination that he was not a member of the search party which had participated in the operation on the date of the incident and had not even visited the place of occurrence in connection with Crime No.113/2018. These admissions substantially weaken the prosecution case and lend support to the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court. 12 17. The learned Special Judge has also rightly observed that even if the alleged discoveries are assumed to have been proved, the same by themselves would not conclusively establish the participation of the respondent in the offences alleged unless the prosecution succeeds in proving the necessary nexus between the recovered articles and the commission of the crime. Discovery of an article pursuant to a disclosure statement is only one incriminating circumstance and cannot, in the absence of other reliable evidence, constitute the sole basis for recording a conviction. The prosecution was under a legal obligation to establish, by cogent and convincing evidence, that the respondent was one of the persons who had participated in the alleged attack on the police party and had consciously possessed the prohibited arms, ammunition and explosive substances. The learned Special Judge has rightly found that such foundational facts have remained unproved. 18. The learned trial Court has relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mani (supra) and Mohd. Abdul Hafeez (supra), while holding that a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is a weak piece of evidence and cannot, by itself, sustain a conviction in the absence of independent corroboration. We find ourselves in agreement with the said view. The appreciation of evidence undertaken by the learned Special Judge is neither arbitrary nor contrary to the settled principles governing criminal jurisprudence. 13 19. It is a settled principle of law that an appellate Court dealing with an appeal against acquittal possesses full power to re-appreciate the evidence; however, such power is required to be exercised with circumspection. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are demonstrated to be perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable, interference is unwarranted merely because another view is possible on the evidence. The respondent, having secured an acquittal after full-fledged trial, enjoys a reinforced presumption of innocence. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge are founded upon a comprehensive appreciation of the evidence on record and cannot be said to be either perverse or impossible. On the contrary, the view taken by the learned trial Court is a reasonable and plausible view emerging from the evidence available on record. 20. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant/State has failed to demonstrate any perversity, patent illegality or miscarriage of justice in the impugned judgment of acquittal so as to warrant interference by this Court. The principles governing interference in an appeal against acquittal have been succinctly reiterated by the Supreme Court in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa (supra) and Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda (supra), wherein it has been held that if the view adopted by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view based on the evidence on record, the appellate Court ought not to substitute its own opinion merely because another view is also 14 possible. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, we find no compelling reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment rendered by the learned Special Judge. 21. Consequently, the present appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The judgment dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA Act), Bilaspur in Special Case (NIA) No.09/2019 acquitting the respondent of the charges levelled against him, is affirmed. 22. Office is directed to send a certified copy of this order to the concerned trial Court forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu