- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA REVIEW PETITION NO. 423 OF 2025 BETWEEN: MUNIYAPPA, S/O LATE MADDURIGA @ MADDURAPPA, AGED 60 YEARS, R/AT S THOLOHALLI VILLAGE YELURU POST, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, DEVANHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 110. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. YASHWANTH NETHAJI N.T, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT. INDRAMMA, D/O LATE T.D. NARAYANASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, R/O KURUBARAPETE, SUIEBELE, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BANGALORE RURAL DIST - 562 129. DODDA AKKAYAMMA, SINCE DEAD BY LRS 2. SRI VENKATESH, S/O LATE GANGAPPA AND MUNIYAMMA, GRANDSON OF LATE DODDAKKAYAMMA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 3. SRI. RAVI, S/O LATE GANGAPPA AND MUNIYAMMA, GRANDSON OF LATE DODDKKAYAMMA, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, 4. SMT. NARAYAMMA, W/O LATE VENKATESH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESPONDENT NO.2 TO 4 ARE R/AT S. THOLOHALLI VILLAGE YELURU POST, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, DEVANHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 110. 5. SMT. RATHNAMMA W/O O.S. VEERAJAPPA, D/O DODDAKKAYAMMA, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, NAKKANAHALLI VILLAGE, NANDAGUDI HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 129. 6. SRI. MUNIKRISHNA, S/O MUNIYAPPA AND LAKSHAMAMMA, GRANDSON OF LATE DODDAKKAYAMMA, YANGUNTE VILLAGE, SULIBELE HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 129. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. H. SHANTHI BHUSHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R1) THIS REVIEW PETITION FILED UNDER ORDER 47 RULE 1 R/W SEC. 114 OF CPC, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS REVIEW THE - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 03.09.2025 PASSED IN W.P NO. 16046/2024 (GM-CPC) AND DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court seeking review of the order dated 03.09.2025 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.16046/2024. 2. Heard the learned counsel Sri. Yashwanth Nethaji N.T. appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel Sri. H. Shanthi Bhushan appearing for respondent No.1. 3. The order of this Court in Writ Petition No.16046/2024 reads as follows: "…. …. …. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows: What brings the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition revolves around a narrow compass. A suit is instituted in O.S.No.1036 of 2007 by the 1st respondent/plaintiff and other respondents who were - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 defendants. The suit was for declaration. The prayer and the schedule in the suit reads follows: “WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass Judgment and decree:- (a) to declare that the Plaintiffs have jointly acquired absolute title to the suit schedule property by inheritance to the property of Late Madduriga @ Maddurappa. (b) to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants or their agents, servants or any body claiming under or through them from interefering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule property. (c) to grant such order or relief as this Hon'ble Court may deens fit in the circumstances of the case including the costs of the proceedings, in the interest of justice and equity. S C H E D U L E Thatthe part and parcel of the agricultural land bearing Sy.No.8 situated at Shotrhiya Thellohalli Village, Channarayapatna Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, an extent of 2.27 guntas bounded on: East by : Road West by : Kantharaj's Property North by : Girish's property South by : T.R. Munegowda's property." The petitioner is not made a party to the proceedings. After 13 days of filing the suit a compromise is entered into between the parties and the suit comes to be decreed. The petitioner then comes to know that the very property that he had got by way of a partition is made the subject matter of the suit and is closed by entering into a compromise. This comes to the petitioner as a bolt from the blue. The petitioner therefore immediately prefers another suit in O.S.No.1185 of 2017 against the respondents herein, seeking a declaration that the compromise decree so entered into on 12-11-2007 in O.S.No.1036 of 2007 is - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 vitiated by fraud, collusion or misrepresentation. The suit in O.S.No.1036 of 2007 was closed on 12-11-2007, immediately thereafter, within 36 days of the closure of the suit, the petitioner prefers another suit seeking the afore-noted prayer. The suit is kept pending for 16 years. It comes to be disposed on 20-12-2023 holding that a compromise decree recorded by any Court, if has to be challenged, it should be only before the same Court. 4. While there can be no qualm about the order impugned, as it is in tune with law, the Apex Court in the case of BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS AND ANOTHER V. KOTHAKAPU MUTHYAM REDDY AND OTHERS1, has held as follows: "…. …. …. 31. Similarly, issue was again examined by the High Court of Jharkhand (Single Judge) in Mira Sinha v. State of Jharkhand [Mira Sinha v. State of Jharkhand, 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar 4377 : AIR 2016 Jhar 92] . The learned Judge, in para 7 held as under : (SCC OnLine Jhar) “7. In the background of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC application is maintainable only when the suit is barred by any law. The expression “law” included in Rule 11(d) includes the law of limitation and, it would also include the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.” 32. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad, Gujarat, Bombay and Jharkhand High Courts in the aforementioned four decisions which, in our opinion, is the proper interpretation of the expression “law” occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. This answers the first submission of the learned counsel for the respondents against the respondents. 1 (2018) 13 SCC 480 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 33. So far as the second submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, it also has no merit. In our view, the decision rendered in State of Punjab [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] is by the larger Bench (three Judge) and is, therefore, binding on us. No efforts were made and rightly to contend that the said decision needs reconsideration on the issue in question. That apart, when this Court has laid down a particular remedy to follow for challenging the award of Lok Adalat then in our view, the same is required to be followed by the litigant in letter and spirit as provided therein for adjudication of his grievance in the first instance. The reason being that it is a law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India (see M. Nagaraj v. Union of India [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 1013] ). It is then for the writ court to decide as to what orders need to be passed on the facts arising in the case. 34. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. 35. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order [Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy v. Bhargavi Constructions, 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 217 : (2015) 6 ALD 1] is set aside and the order passed by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the application filed by the appellant-defendants under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code is allowed resulting in rejection of the plaint. 36. We, however, make it clear that the respondent-plaintiffs would be at liberty to challenge the legality and correctness of the award dated 22-8-2007 passed by the Lok Adalat by filing the writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article 227 of the Constitution in the High Court in accordance with law." In the light of the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS supra, admittedly a separate suit was not maintainable - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 challenging a compromise decree. If the compromise decree on any ground or manifold circumstances, had to be challenged, it ought to have been preferred before the same Court, which had recorded the compromise and closed the proceedings. 5. In the light of the law, a separate suit being filed, was not maintainable, but the suit is pending before the concerned Court for 16 years, for no fault of the petitioner. The delay that has accrued is due to the pendency of the suit, which was not maintainable. Therefore, the act of the Court should prejudice no litigant. The petitioner cannot be left high and dry. He is entitled to agitate his rights by filing an application to recall the compromise so entered into. If the petitioner had delayed the recalling or institution of the suit that he has, it would have been an altogether different circumstance. The petitioner has diligently agitated his rights, but contrary to law i.e., before a wrong forum. Therefore, if the application is now preferred before the concerned Court, the concerned Court reject the application on the ground of delay. 6. Therefore, while affirming the order passed by the concerned Court, I reserve liberty to the petitioner to prefer an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC before the same Court, which recorded the compromise. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 would at this juncture submits that challenging the impugned order, Regular First Appeal is preferred and the same is pending.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not preferred the said Regular First Appeal. The submission is placed on record. 8. Reserving the aforesaid liberty, the petition stands disposed. Ordered accordingly." - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 It is not the case of the review petitioner that he was not heard in the matter; the review petitioner was heard, the matter was contested and then the order was passed. 4. The subsequent development to the afore-quoted order of this Court is, an application is filed by the 1st respondent, who was the petitioner in Writ Petition No.16046/2024, seeking setting aside of the compromise. Without hearing the present review petitioner, it transpires that the concerned Court has set aside the compromise decree that was drawn. This comes to be challenged by the present review petitioner before the co-ordinate Bench in Writ Petition No.7539/2026, disposed on 12.03.2026, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 3. The plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.1036/2007 before the Trial Court seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction. Thereafter, the parties to the suit have settled the matter by way of compromise and the compromise decree was passed on 12.11.2007. Subsequently, the respondent No.1 herein, who claims to be interested in the property filed a petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 & 3A of CPC for recalling the compromise decree dated 12.11.2007 on the ground that it has been obtained by fraud. On the said petition, notice has been issued to the parties in the original suit including the petitioner herein. The matter was initially directed to be posted on 22.04.2026. In the meantime, respondent No. 1 filed a memo for preponing the case. - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 As a result, the matter was posted on 02.01.2026 and notice was issued to the petitioner herein returnable by 12.02.2026. Thereafter, by impugned order dated 17.02.2026, the compromise decree dated 12.11.2007 has been recalled. The notice was received by the petitioner's son. Since the earlier notice received by the petitioner fixed the date as 22.04.2026, the petitioner was unaware of the preponing and therefore, he was not present when the impugned order was passed. Therefore, aggrieved by the impugned order, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the compromise decree dated 12.11.2007 was passed by mutual consent and without any fraud. He further contends that the notice regarding the preponement of the hearing was received by the petitioner’s son, and the petitioner was unaware of the change in scheduled date. Consequently, the petitioner could not appear when the impugned order was passed. It is urged that, in the interest of justice, the impugned order recalling the compromise decree be set aside and the petitioner be afforded an opportunity to be heard. He further submits that if this Court were to allow the writ petition by affording an opportunity of being heard, the petitioner is ready to appear before the Trial Court on the next date of hearing fixed by the Court without any prior notice. 5. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, in order to give opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.” Before the co-ordinate Bench, the contention was that, while setting aside the compromise decree pursuant to the order passed by this Court, the review petitioner was not heard. On that score, the co-ordinate Bench sets aside the - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 order of setting aside the compromise decree dated 17.02.2026 and directs the parties to appear before the concerned Court and the matter is now at large before the concerned Court being contested. 5. After all these proceedings, the petitioner now comes up with a review petition contending that the compromise was not entered into before the concerned Court, but the concerned Court had referred the matter to the Lok Adalat and the compromise was entered into before the Lok Adalat and recorded before the concerned Court. The said proceeding itself stands covered by the judgment of the co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of SMT. AKKUBAI v. SHRI VENKATRAO2, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 11. I really wonder, whether the Learned Judge who has entertained this matter was aware of the elementary aspects of judicial functioning and the Lok Adalath. A common order-sheet cannot be maintained by the Court as well as the Lok Adalath. A Court cannot be converted into a Lok Adalath. In the order-sheet maintained by the Court, a portion of the proceedings is referable to the Court proceedings and another portion refers to the proceedings of the Lok Adalath. The Conciliator has no place inside the Court. The very object of accepting this Lok Adalath as an alternative mode of 2 ILR 2014 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 resolution of dispute is that, all matters do not need adjudication. The matter which could be resolved by persuasion, negotiation and understanding should be taken out of adjudication process and should be resolved by means of Lok Adalath satisfactorily, so that the cases are disposed of expeditiously and the Courts will be saving the time of adjudicatory process, and they can utilize that time which is saved, in adjudicating the cases. If on the day the plaint is presented, the parties are also present before the Court, they are ready with the compromise petition and when they are filing an application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, when they are admitting the terms of the compromise and execution of the terms and condition, then the Court before which it is presented, is the competent Court to record the compromise and dispose of the suit in terms of the compromise. The question of referring the said dispute to the Lok Adalath would not arise. If it is referred, it is a farce. If this is accepted and encouraged, both the judicial system and this alternative dispute resolution mechanism gets a bad name and would be subjected to redicule in the eyes of public. All persons who are indulging in this process would be doing great injustice and dis-service to the judicial system. They are not conscious of their action and its repercussions and the image of the Judiciary, which would create in the mind of the public. That is not the object with which neither Legal Services Authority Act of 1987 is passed by the Parliament providing for the institution of Lok Adalath nor Section 89 was introduced by the Parliament amending CPC. The essence of these provisions is neither understood by the Learned Judge nor by the Learned Counsels who are appearing for the parties.” 5.1. Following the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench in SMT. AKKUBAI supra, another co-ordinate Bench of this Court - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 in the case of SMT. RENUKA v. SRI. RAMANAND3, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 20. This Court has also been coming across several matters relating to such compromise before the LokAdalat which are challenged by way of writ petitions. Hence, I also deem it fit to issue general directions in respect of such matters which are referred to LokAdalat and compromise recorded as under: (i) When a compromise is filed before the Court in terms of the decision in Smt.Akkubai vs. Shri Venkatrao and Others [ILR 2014 KAR 2051] (supra) it is for the Court to record the compromise and not refer the matter to the LokAdalat (ii) It is only if there is no settlement arrived at before the Court and the parties request for the matter to be referred to Lok-Adalat to enable a settlement then in such event the parties are to be referred to the Lok-Adalat and in the event of a compromise being arrived at before the Lok Adalat, the same could be recorded by the lokAdalat. (iii) When the matter is referred to Lok-Adalat, separate order sheets would have to be opened and maintained by the said Lok-Adalat and the order sheet of the Court in the suit cannot be used by the Lok-Adalat. (iv) The trial Court and or the Lok-Adalat while recording compromise is required to ascertain if the parties are present personally as also to ascertain and verify their identities by production of suitable documentary proof. 3 Writ Petition No.103766 of 2018 (GM-RES), disposed on 31-03- 2022. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 (v) In the event of a power of attorney appearing, it would be the bounden duty of the Court or the Lok-Adalat to ascertain if the concerned party has been served with notice. (vi) The Court as also the Lok-Adalat would always have to be suspicious if the party were to enter appearance even before service of notice which is a red flag that there is something that is fishy in the matter. (vii) When recording a compromise being entered into by a power of attorney, the original of the power of attorney is required to be examined by the Court and the Lok-Adalat and necessary endorsement made in the order to that effect and the original power of attorney returned to the parties. (viii) As far as possible the trial Court and or the LokAdalat to secure the presence of the party and obtain signature of such party rather than the power of attorney. (ix) The Trial Courts shall ensure that proper and acceptable proof of identity of the parties to proceedings as mandated by the Government for various purposes (such as Aadhar Card, Driving Licence, Passport Copy, Election Identity card, etc.,) are obtained as a matter of rule.” In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the co-ordinate Benches of this Court and the subsequent development of the parties agitating their rights before the concerned Court, there is no warrant to entertain the subject review petition. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 6. Entertaining the review petition in the teeth of the aforesaid submissions would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KAMLESH VERMA v. MAYAWATI4, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, 4 (2013) 8 SCC 320 - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29735 RP No. 423 of 2025 undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) 7. For the aforesaid reasons and finding no merit to interfere in the present review petition, the petition stands dismissed. Pending applications in I.A.No.1/2026 and I.A.No.2/2026 stand disposed as a consequence. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 2 Sl No.: 18