1 CGHC010144972019 2026:CGHC:28384 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 118 of 2019 1 - The Sub Area Manager South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Kurasia Group, P.O. Kurasia Colliery, Chirmiri Area, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Shri Babulal S/o Shri Nagina Ex-Roof Bolter, Kurasia Colliery, Qtr. No.4, Subhash Colony, Domanhill Ward No. 35, P.O. Sonawani, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 2 - The Controlling Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act And Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Main Road, Torwa, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Appellate Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act And The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), D-6, Avanti Vihar, Sector-I, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 09.07.2026 1. Heard. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking following relief (s) : “10/1) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records of the case mentioned in para 3 of the petition. -2- 10.2) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ or direction and order dated 23.01.2019 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Appellate Authority and order dated 20.03.2018 (Annexure P/2) passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 may kindly be set-aside/quash. 10.3) Any other relief or relief(s) which this Hon'ble Court may think proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted.” 3. The facts, in brief, are that Respondent No. 1, namely Babulal, was working on the post of “Roof Bolter” under the SECL authorities. Initially, he was appointed on 29.10.1983 to the post of General Mazdoor, Category-I, and subsequently, he was promoted. In the service record, he entered his name as “Babulal S/o Nagina” and also disclosed his postal address. A complaint was made by Nagendra Yadav S/o Babulal Yadav, alleging that Respondent No. 1 had impersonated himself as Babulal S/o Nagina Yadav to secure employment, whereas his actual name is Uma Shankar Yadav S/o Jeevnandan Yadav. The complaint was referred to the office of the Superintendent of Police on 13.02.2015. In response, a letter dated 25.01.2016 was addressed to the SECL authorities, wherein it was revealed that the correct name of Respondent No. 1 is Umashankar Yadav S/o Jeevnandan Yadav, R/o Rasulpur, District Saran (Bihar). Based on such communication, article of charge was issued to the petitioner and a departmental inquiry was conducted. After inquiry, the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service vide order dated 18.10.2016. In the meantime, Form-M under the provisions 3 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act of 1972’) was issued to respondent No.1 with intent to forfeit amount of gratuity. Thereafter, respondent No.1 approached the Controlling Authority under the Act of 1972 claiming therein amount of gratuity. The Controlling Authority vide order dated 16.03.2018 allowed the application and directed the SECL authorities to make payment of gratuity to respondent No.1 to the tune of Rs.10 lacs within a period of 30 days. The employer preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Act of 1972 and said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 23.01.2019, affirming findings recorded by the Controlling Authority. The petitioner/employer has filed this writ petition challenging the said orders. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that respondent No.1 impersonated himself to secure employment under the petitioner/employer and after full-fledged departmental enquiry, an order of dismissal from service was passed by the disciplinary authority. He would submit that an inquiry was conducted by the police authorities too, wherein, it was found that the actual name of respondent No.1 is Uma Shankar Yadav S/o Jeevnandan Yadav, whereas, in the service record, he had reflected his name Babulal S/o Nagina. It is further argued by Mr. Bajpai that Form-M was issued to respondent No.1 immediately after the order of dismissal from service on 18.10.2016 and thus, sufficient opportunity of hearing was afforded to respondent No.1 prior to taking decision with regard to forfeiture of amount of gratuity. He would further contend that there was impersonation -4- and services of respondent No.1 have already been terminated; therefore, he is not entitled to the amount of gratuity in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(6) of the Act of 1972. He would further contend that the Appellate Authority passed an order placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union Bank of India and Ors. Vs. C.G. Ajay Babu, 2018 (9) SCC 529, whereas, the proposition of law laid down in that case has been overruled in the matter of Western Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. Manohar Govinda Fulzele & Anr. reported in 2025 (3) SCR 183. It is further argued that for forfeiture of gratuity, conviction in a criminal proceeding is not necessary, if the misconduct alleged and proved constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. He would submit that this matter may be remitted back to the Appellate Authority to decide whether the forfeiture should be of whole or a part of the gratuity payable to respondent No.1. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/workman would oppose the submissions. He would submit that there is no finding recorded by the disciplinary authority with regard to moral turpitude. He would further submit that the disciplinary authority was under an obligation to record a finding to the effect that the misconduct of respondent No.1 amounts moral turpitude and therefore, the forfeiture of any part of the gratuity would be illegal and bad in law. It is further contended that the disciplinary authority/ appointing authority should have issued a notice to respondent No.1 with regard to the question of 5 the nature of the misconduct as to whether it constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and the extent to which amount of gratuity can be forfeited. He would contend that as no opportunity of hearing was afforded in this regard, the Controlling authority and the Appellate authority under the Act of 1972 rightly passed orders in favour of the workman. He would also refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Govinda Fulzele (supra). 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7. Section 4(6) of the Act of 1972 which is relevant for adjudication of this case reads as under :- “4.Payment of gratuity- (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),- (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee [may be wholly or partially forfeited] [ Substituted by Act 25 of 1984, Section 3, for " shall be wholly forfeited" (w.e.f. 1.7.1984).]- (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.” 8. Bare reading of above quoted provisions would make it clear that gratuity of an employee can be forfeited, if his services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to property belonging to the employer. The gratuity can -6- wholly or partially be forfeited if services have been terminated for riotous or disorderly conduct or services of employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. 9. In the present case, services of respondent No.1 have been terminated on the ground that he secured employment by impersonation. It was further alleged that his actual name was Uma Shankar, whereas, he secured employment depicting his name ‘Babulal’ and a report in this regard was submitted by the Superintendent of Police before the SECL authorities. 10.Perusal of the order passed by the disciplinary authority would reveal that there is no finding to infer that the misconduct of respondent No.1, in normal circumstances, constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. 11. It is true that failure of the employer to initiate criminal proceedings on the fraud is not necessary and such phrase cannot be inserted in Section 4(6)(b) of the Act of 1972 as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Govinda Fulzele (supra). 12.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Govinda Fulzele (supra) in para 10 held that only requirement is for the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing Authority to decide as to whether the misconduct could, in normal circumstances, constitute an offence involving moral turpitude, with a further discretion conferred on the authority forfeiting gratuity, to decide whether the forfeiture should be of the whole or only a part of the gratuity 7 payable. It is also held that there should be a notice issued to the terminated employee, who should be allowed to represent both on the question of the nature of the misconduct; whether it constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, and the extent to which such forfeiture can be made. 13.In the matter of Manohar Govinda Fulzele (supra), notices were issued to the workmen and representations were made by the said workman and those representations were considered by the employer and therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court taking sympathetic approach remitted back the matter for fresh consideration to the appointing authority to limit the forfeiture to 25% of the gratuity payable and release the balance amounts to respondent employees. Relevant para 10 is reproduced herein below : “10. As has been argued by the learned Solicitor General and the learned Counsel appearing for MSRTC, subclause (ii) of Section 4(6)(b) enables forfeiture of gratuity, wholly or partially, if the delinquent employee is terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, if the offence is committed in the course of his employment. An ‘Offence’ as defined in the General Clauses Act, means ‘any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being’ and does not call for a conviction; which definitely can only be on the basis of evidence led in a criminal proceeding. The standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding is quite different from that required in a disciplinary proceeding; the former being regulated by a higher standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ while the latter governed by ‘preponderance of probabilities’. The provision of forfeiture of gratuity under the Act does not speak of a conviction in a criminal proceeding, for an offence involving moral turpitude. On the contrary, the Act provides for such forfeiture; in cases where the delinquent employee is terminated for a misconduct, CA No.2608 OF 2025 (@SLP (C) NO.10088 of 2020) which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. Hence, the only requirement is for the Disciplinary Authority or the Appointing Authority to decide as to whether the misconduct could, in normal circumstances, constitute an offence involving moral turpitude, with a further discretion conferred on the authority forfeiting gratuity, to decide whether the forfeiture should be of the whole or only a part -8- of the gratuity payable, which would depend on the gravity of the misconduct. Necessarily, there should be a notice issued to the terminated employee, who should be allowed to represent both on the question of the nature of the misconduct; whether it constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, and the extent to which such forfeiture can be made. There is a notice issued and consideration made in the instant appeals; the efficacy of which, has to be considered by us separately.” 14.As in the present case there is no finding with regard to moral turpitude; no notice was issued with regard to forfeiture of gratuity showing the extent of forfeiture; and therefore, in my opinion, the Controlling Authority and Appellate Authority rightly directed the employer to make payment of gratuity to the tune of Rs.10 lacs to the workman/respondent No.1. Therefore, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned orders. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha