APHC010605592024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3396] WEDNESDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 129/2025 Between: TELU GNANESWAR, S/O T.KANAKA DURGA RAO, AGED 44 YRS, D.NO.60/14-2, SIDDARDA COLLEGE BACKSIDE SBI COLONY, VIJAYAWADA. ...PETITIONER AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP., BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT AT AMARAVATHI. 2. TELU PADMAVATHI, D/OJ. REDDYAIAH, AGED 42 YRS, D.NO.23- 25/1-10, KAVURI VARI STREET SATYANARAYANA PURAM,VIJAYAWADA. ...RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. R SIVA SAI SWARUP Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 2. K V ADITYA CHOWDARY The Court made the following: ORDER: The instant Criminal Petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 8BNSS9) has been filed, by the Petitioner / Respondent, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in D.V.C.No.133 of 2023 on the file of the Court of I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada. 2 2. Heard Sri R.Siva Sai Swarup, learned counsel for the Petitioner, Sri K.V.Aditya Chowdary, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 and Ms. K. Priyanka Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State/Respondent No.1. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Respondent would submit that the complaint filed by Respondent No.2 herein under Domestic Violence Act is time-barred as well as baseless. Learned counsel would further submit that the parties married in February 2009, but Respondent No.2 lived with the Petitioner for only four months. Since then, they have been living separately, and thus the Domestic Violence Act, which requires ongoing cohabitation, is not applicable. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further submit that the Petitioner was acquitted from the criminal case in C.C. No. 1613/2015 on the file of the Court of IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada registered under Section 498-A IPC, on the ground that no evidence was placed to support the claims of harassment or cruelty. Respondent No.2 herein filed an appeal in CrlA.No.2801 of 2018 before this Court against the said acquittal and the same is pending. Further, Respondent No.2 also filed a maintenance petition in F.C.(M.C.)O.P.No.334 of 2016 on the file of the Court of XIV Additional District Judge-cum-Additional Family Judge, Vijayawada and the said petition, after full-fledged trial, was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent No.2 herein carried the matter to this Court in Crl.R.C.No.721 of 2022 which is pending adjudication. 3 It is further submitted that, on the petition filed by the Petitioner herein in F.C.O.P.No.149 of 2020 before the Family Court, Vijayawada, the marriage between the Petitioner and Respondent No.2 was dissolved, against which, Respondent No.2 filed F.C.A.No.90 of 2023 before this Court and the same is pending adjudication. The learned counsel argues that the present complaint under the Domestic Violence Act is barred by the one-year limitation period as prescribed by Section 12 of the Act. In view of the long separation between the parties, the lack of evidence, and the dismissal of previous claims, the complaint is an abuse of process and is liable to be quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 would submit that, acquittal of the Petitioner from C.C.No.1613 of 2015 cannot be a valid ground to quash the proceedings in D.V.No.133 of 2023. Respondent No.2 approached this Court by way of Crl.A.No.2801 of 2018 against the said acquittal. Similarly, dismissal of the maintenance case filed by Respondent No.2 is also not a proper ground for quashment of the present case. It is further argued that, though Respondent No.2 had lived with the Petitioner for a limited period to time, it does not invalidate the abuse against Respondent No.2 nor does it exclude the Petitioner from liability under the Act. It is settled law that the term domestic relationship under the D.V.Act clearly means any relationship between two individuals who are living together or have lived together in the past in a shred household. Hence, the ground that 4 the Petitioner does not have a marital life with Respondent No.2 would be irrelevant as they have admittedly led a marital life in the past. It is further submitted that the Hon9ble Supreme Court in Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan1 had categorically held that, by the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would only arise after there is a breach of an order passed under the said section. Learned counsel would finally submit that there are no valid and tenable grounds to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner at this stage. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 5. Considering the submissions made and a bare perusal of the record would show that, it is evident from the submissions and documents on record that the parties were married in February 2009 and lived together for only a brief period. As was held by the Hon9ble Supreme Court in Kamatchi case referred to supra, though there is no starting point for limitation under Section 12 of the D.V.Act, in view of the separation of the couple herein, several years prior to the present complaint, this Court is of the view that the proceedings against the Petitioner can be quashed. 6. The Hon9ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others2, has laid down the following guidelines to be considered while dealing with the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C(528 BNSS). 1 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 370 2 AIR 1992 SC 604 5 “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court 6 will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.= (emphasis supplied) 7. In view of the fifth guideline referred to above, initiation of the present proceedings, after acquittal of the Petitioner from the offence under Section 498-A IPC and dismissal of the maintenance petition, that too after several years of separation, appears improbable to proceed against the Petitioner. Even if the issue of limitation is ignored, this Court finds that the complaint under the Domestic Violence Act is not supported by sufficient material to substantiate the allegations. Though proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act are distinct in nature and are not to be automatically rejected merely because earlier proceedings were unsuccessful, in the present case, the complaint lacks prima facie evidence and appears to be an abuse of process of law. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that it is a fit case to exercise the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS. 8. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings in D.V.C.No.133 of 2023 on the file of the Court of I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada, against the Petitioner are hereby quashed. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. ________________________________________ Dr.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA Date: 04.02.2026 Dinesh 7 THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA Crl.P.No.129 of 2025 Date: 04.02.2026 Dinesh