1 CGHC010164522026 2026:CGHC:29219-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 579 of 2026 1. Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank Through Its Managing Director Cum Chairman, Head Office, Mahadev Ghat Road, Sunder Nagar, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, C.G., (Appellants Banks Name Altered From Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank To Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank Vide Gazette Notification Dated 24.10.2025 Published By The Gol) 2. Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank Through Its Regional Manager, Regional Office First Floor, Vivek Complex, Sangam Gali, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 3. Branch Manager Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank, Branch Office, Sedam, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus Ashwini Kumar Kurre S/o Late Preetam Kurre Aged About 61 Years R/o Nawapara, Ambikapur, P.S. Gandhinagar, Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. Through His Wife, Namely Urmila Kurre, W/o Ashwini Kumar Kurre, R/o Nawapara, Ambikapur, P.S. Gandhinagar, Tehsil Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rishabh Gupta, Advocate. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.07.13 17:26:19 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 13 .07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sabyasachi Bhauri, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, and Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rishabh Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, an application seeking condonation of delay. 2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon considering the reasons assigned in the application, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 is allowed, and the delay of 1283 days in filing the present appeal is condoned. 3. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellants assailing the orders dated 01.09.2022 and 27.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 3864 of 2018 (Ashwini Kumar Kurre vs. Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank & Others) and MCC No. 643 of 2024 (Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank & Others vs. Ashwini Kumar Kurre), whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent herein and the MCC preferred by the appellants herein were disposed of. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the appellant is a Regional Rural Bank constituted under the provisions of 3 the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (for short, ‘Act of 1976’). The respondent was serving under the Bank and, during the course of his service, allegations of serious misconduct involving financial irregularities were levelled against him. On the basis of the said allegations, criminal proceedings came to be initiated against the respondent and, simultaneously, the Bank, in discharge of its statutory and administrative obligations as an employer, also initiated departmental proceedings in accordance with the applicable service regulations. He further submits that the respondent challenged the continuation of the departmental proceedings by filing WPS No. 3864 of 2018 primarily on the ground that the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings arose out of the same set of facts and, therefore, continuance of the departmental enquiry during the pendency of the criminal trial would prejudice his defence. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 01.09.2022, allowed the respondent's prayer and directed that the departmental proceedings be kept in abeyance till the conclusion of the criminal trial, while granting liberty to the Bank to resume the enquiry thereafter from the stage at which it then stood. He submits that a plain reading of the order dated 01.09.2022 demonstrates that the same was not rendered upon an independent examination of the settled principles governing simultaneous continuation of departmental and criminal proceedings, but was passed solely on the premise that the controversy stood concluded by the earlier order passed in WPS No. 2377 of 2018 4 (Sandip Kumar Singh v. Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank & Others). He further submits that the very foundation on which the impugned order dated 01.09.2022 rests has subsequently disappeared inasmuch as the order dated 27.03.2018 passed in WPS No. 2377 of 2018 has been set aside by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 394 of 2025 (Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank & Other vs. Sandip Kumar Singh) vide judgment dated 24.07.2025, whereby the Bank was permitted to proceed with and conclude the departmental enquiry. 6. It is further submitted by the learned counsel, appearing for the appellants that another similarly situated employee of the Bank, namely Alok Kumar, who was also a co-accused in the same criminal case, had obtained an identical order from the learned Single Judge in WPS No.3470 of 2018 (Alok Kumar Vs. State Rajya Gramin Bank through its Managing Director and others) vide order dated 09.05.2018 by placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra). The said order has likewise been set aside by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 701 of 2025 (Chhattigarh Rajya Gramin Bank & Others vs. Alok Kumar) vide judgment dated 13.10.2025 by following the law laid down in Writ Appeal No. 394 of 2025. He also contended that, therefore, in respect of identically situated employees arising out of the very same transaction, the Division Bench has already held that the departmental enquiry ought not to remain stayed indefinitely. 5 7. Learned counsel for the appellants further stated that in view of the subsequent reversal of the judgment in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra), the Bank preferred MCC No. 643 of 2024 seeking modification of the order dated 01.09.2022. While deciding the said Miscellaneous Case on 27.03.2026, the learned Single Judge expressly recorded that the judgment in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra), which constituted the sole basis of the order dated 01.09.2022, had already been set aside by the Division Bench and that the very foundation of the earlier order no longer survived. However, the learned Single Judge held that the Miscellaneous Case was not maintainable for modification of the earlier order and granted liberty to the Bank to avail such other remedies as may be available in law, including the remedy of filing a writ appeal. It is in pursuance of the said liberty that the present appeal has been preferred. He further submitted that once the judgment which constituted the sole foundation of the order dated 01.09.2022 has itself been reversed by a superior Bench, the consequential order passed in the respondent's case cannot be permitted to continue, as the very basis upon which the relief was granted has ceased to exist. It is contended that an order which rests entirely upon a precedent that has subsequently been set aside cannot survive independently and deserves to be interfered with. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the law governing simultaneous continuation of criminal proceedings and departmental enquiries is now well settled. Departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution operate in distinct fields, serve different 6 purposes and are governed by different standards of proof. While disciplinary proceedings are decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, a criminal prosecution requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, pendency of a criminal trial does not, by itself, furnish a legal ground to indefinitely stay disciplinary proceedings. He submitted that there exists no absolute proposition of law requiring every departmental enquiry to be stayed merely because a criminal case is pending. Whether such deferment is warranted depends upon the facts of each case, particularly whether continuation of the enquiry would cause real and demonstrable prejudice to the defence of the employee in the criminal trial. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstance exists warranting an indefinite suspension of the disciplinary proceedings. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that there can be no straightjacket formula requiring disciplinary proceedings to remain in abeyance till the conclusion of criminal proceedings. Rather, the Courts are required to balance the interests of the employee with the larger public interest and the need for maintaining discipline in public institutions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that where criminal trials are likely to take considerable time, departmental proceedings ought not to be stalled indefinitely, particularly in cases involving financial irregularities, breach of trust or embezzlement by employees of public sector institutions. He further submitted that despite the lapse of several years from the date of the alleged incident and despite filing of the 7 charge-sheet long ago, the criminal trial has made little meaningful progress and is still at the stage of recording prosecution evidence. There is no reasonable likelihood of the criminal proceedings concluding within the foreseeable future. Continuation of the stay granted by the learned Single Judge would therefore result in an indefinite postponement of the disciplinary proceedings, seriously prejudicing the Appellant Bank and defeating the very object of maintaining administrative discipline and accountability in a public financial institution. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants also contended that the Bank is entrusted with public funds and is under a statutory obligation to ensure probity, financial discipline and institutional integrity. Permitting disciplinary proceedings to remain suspended for an indefinite period solely because of the pendency of a criminal trial would not only adversely affect the administration of the Bank but would also be contrary to the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417; Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699; M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679; Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636; and D. Ganesan v. Union of India [SLP (C) No. 15023 of 2022, decided on 23.01.2024], wherein it has consistently been held that departmental proceedings should not be stayed for an indefinite period merely because criminal proceedings are pending and that such enquiries may continue unless continuation thereof causes serious prejudice to the 8 defence of the delinquent employee. 11. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned order dated 01.09.2022 deserves to be set aside, as the precedent forming its sole basis has already been reversed by the Hon'ble Division Bench and continuation of the stay on departmental proceedings would be contrary to the settled principles of law governing simultaneous criminal prosecution and disciplinary proceedings. It is accordingly prayed that the Bank be permitted to proceed with and conclude the departmental enquiry against the respondent in accordance with law. 12. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent supported the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge. He submitted that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings arise out of the same set of allegations and are founded upon substantially the same evidence. It was contended that continuation of the departmental enquiry during the pendency of the criminal trial would seriously prejudice the defence of the respondent in the criminal proceedings. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge had rightly exercised jurisdiction in staying the departmental proceedings so as to protect the respondent from such prejudice and that no interference is called for in the present intra-Court appeal. It was also contended that merely because the judgment rendered in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra) has subsequently been set aside would not, by itself, render the impugned order illegal, particularly when the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge was otherwise justified on the 9 facts of the case. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the material available on record. 14. The principal question which arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the order dated 01.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge directing that the departmental proceedings against the respondent shall remain stayed till conclusion of the criminal trial can be permitted to continue when the very judgment on the basis whereof such order was passed has subsequently been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court. 15. From a plain reading of the order dated 01.09.2022, it is evident that the learned Single Judge did not independently examine the issue as to whether the facts of the present case justified staying the departmental proceedings. The order was passed solely on the ground that an identical issue had already been decided by this Court in WPS No. 2377 of 2018 (Sandip Kumar Singh [supra]). Thus, the order impugned is entirely founded upon the view taken in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra). 16. It is not in dispute before us that the judgment rendered in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra) has subsequently been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 394 of 2025 by judgment dated 24.07.2025. It is equally undisputed that another order passed by the learned Single Judge in favour of a similarly situated employee, namely Alok Kumar, which had also been founded upon Sandip Kumar Singh 10 (supra), has likewise been set aside by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 701 of 2025 vide judgment dated 13.10.2025. Therefore, the very foundation on which the impugned order dated 01.09.2022 rests no longer survives. 17. Significantly, while deciding MCC No. 643 of 2024, the learned Single Judge himself recorded that the judgment in Sandip Kumar Singh (supra) had already been reversed by the Division Bench and that the basis of the order dated 01.09.2022 had ceased to exist. The learned Single Judge, however, declined to modify the earlier order only on the ground that such modification was beyond the scope of the Miscellaneous Case and expressly granted liberty to the appellants to avail the appropriate remedy, including filing a writ appeal. The present appeal is, therefore, a consequence of the liberty so granted. 18. Apart from the aforesaid aspect, the legal position governing simultaneous continuation of departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution is no longer res integra. It is well settled that the object, scope and standard of proof in departmental proceedings are entirely different from those in criminal proceedings. While a criminal Court records a finding on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt, a disciplinary authority proceeds on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, pendency of a criminal prosecution does not ipso facto require the disciplinary proceedings to be stayed. 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.K. Meena (supra); Mohd. Yousuf Miya (supra), M. Paul Anthony (supra); Girish V. (supra), and 11 recently in D. Ganesan (supra), has consistently held that there is no inflexible rule requiring disciplinary proceedings to remain stayed during pendency of criminal proceedings. Stay of departmental proceedings is an exception and not the rule. Such stay may be justified only where continuation of the enquiry would seriously prejudice the defence of the delinquent employee and where the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. 20. In the present case, the criminal case has remained pending for several years and, as submitted before us, the prosecution evidence is still under recording. There is nothing on record to indicate that the trial is likely to conclude within a reasonable period. Acceptance of the respondent's contention would result in the departmental proceedings remaining suspended indefinitely. Such a course would not only frustrate the object of disciplinary control in public service but would also seriously prejudice the administration of a public sector banking institution entrusted with public funds. 21. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that the departmental proceedings deserve to remain stayed till conclusion of the criminal trial. More particularly, when the sole precedent on which the impugned order was founded has itself been reversed by a coordinate Division Bench, the impugned order cannot be permitted to survive. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing that 12 the departmental proceedings against the respondent shall remain stayed till conclusion of the criminal case. The impugned order dated 01.09.2022, having been rendered solely on the basis of a judgment which has subsequently been set aside by the Division Bench, is liable to be interfered with. 23. Accordingly, the present writ appeal deserves to and is hereby allowed. The order dated 01.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 3864 of 2018 and the consequential order dated 27.03.2026 passed in MCC No. 643 of 2024 are hereby set aside. The appellant Bank is permitted to proceed with and conclude the departmental proceedings against the respondent in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned orders. It is, however, made clear that the disciplinary authority shall independently consider the material available before it and shall conclude the enquiry strictly in accordance with the applicable service regulations and principles of natural justice. 24. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan