JUDGMENT : HARISH KUMAR, J. 1. We have meticulously heard the learned Senior Advocates and Advocates appearing in this batch of the appeals on behalf of the respective parties. 2. Considering the fact that in all the intra court appeals, challenge has been led to the judgment dated 07.03.2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in cluster of writ petitions, being C.W.J.C. No. 16170 of 2022 and other analogous cases, with the consent of the parties, the same have been taken up together and being disposed of by this common judgment/order. 3. For better appreciation of the issues involved in this batch of the appeals, this Court deems it apt and proper to give the short facts of the cases, which in sum and substance, are similar and duly narrated in the impugned judgment/order; which led to filing of the present Letters Patent Appeals before this Court. 4. The writ petitioners-appellants herein were the candidates for the post of Panchayat Teacher/Prakhand Teacher under the Bihar Panchayat Primary Teacher (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 and its amended Rules, 2008. Having found eligible, the appellants had applied for the post of Panchayat Teacher/Prakhand Teacher in the year 2006 and some of them in the year 2008, during the 1 st and 2 nd phase of the appointment process. The name of the appellants were duly included in the merit list and called upon for counselling. However, after the final selection process, these appellants were not appointed to the said post. 5. Subsequently, certain selected candidates either resigned or voluntarily vacated the post after serving for a few years in the year 2012 or latter. Upon acquiring knowledge of these vacancies, the writ petitioners-appellants approached the District Appellate Authorities, in the year 2016 and 2017, seeking their appointment against the said posts. Considering the grievances of the writ petitioners-appellants and the submissions made by the Panchayat Secretaries, the District Appellate Authorities allowed the appeals in their favour. In pursuance of the orders of the District Appellate Authorities, finally their cases were duly considered by the respondent Employment Units and accordingly their appointments were facilitated on the post of Panchayat Teachers/Prakhand Teachers within their respective districts. 6. In the aforesaid premise, all the writ petitioners-appellants submitted their consent letters and assumed charge at the designated schools. In pursuance of the orders of the District Appellate Authorities, finally their cases were duly considered by the respondent Employment Units and accordingly their appointments were facilitated on the post of Panchayat Teachers/Prakhand Teachers within their respective districts. 6. In the aforesaid premise, all the writ petitioners-appellants submitted their consent letters and assumed charge at the designated schools. However, despite submissions of their joining on the said post, they were not allowed salaries. Consequently, the number of the petitioners approached this Court by filing various writ petitions in the year ranging from 2022 to 2024. Upon adjudication of these matters, the Court allowed the writ petitions, directing the competent authorities to verify the claims of the petitioners and ensure the disbursement of their salaries accordingly. 7. The respondent State authorities having came to know about the appointment of the writ petitioners and faced with the orders of the different Benches of this Court approached the State Appellate Authority, challenging the orders passed by the District Appellate Authorities. The writ petitioners were noticed and upon adjudication, the State Appellate Authority finally allowed the appeals filed by respondent State authorities, thereby setting aside the appointment of the writ petitioners with retrospective effect from their respective dates of appointment and the District Education Officers of the concerned districts were directed to recover all payments disbursed to the writ petitioners. 8. Aggrieved with the orders of the State Appellate Authority passed in identical manner and fashion, the writ petitioners have challenged those orders in different writ petitions before this Court. 9. The learned Single Judge considering the common question of facts and law involved in all the writ petitions heard the matters analogously and disposed of the same by a common judgment/order dated 07.03.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 16170 of 2022 and other analogous cases, which is questioned before this Court by filing the present intra Court appeals. 10. 9. The learned Single Judge considering the common question of facts and law involved in all the writ petitions heard the matters analogously and disposed of the same by a common judgment/order dated 07.03.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 16170 of 2022 and other analogous cases, which is questioned before this Court by filing the present intra Court appeals. 10. The learned Single Judge after having tendered due consideration to the submissions of the respective parties and taking note of the materials available on record culled out the points for consideration, inter alia, as follows: “(i) Whether the District Appellate Authorities have the power to pass an order regarding appointments against the vacancies from the first phase held in 2006, which were later carried forward to the second phase in 2008 and concluded in December 2010, and if so, whether an appointment made by the authorities after the closure of the first and second phase appointments remains valid? (ii) Whether the delay in filing of case by the petitioners before the District Appellate Authorities, as well as the delay by the District Programme Officers in appealing against the order of the District Appellate Authorities without providing a satisfactory reason before the District Appellate Authorities and the State Appellate Authority, respectively, can be condoned? (iii) Whether the District Appellate Authorities, while passing its order, failed to appreciate and consider Letter No. 465 dated 09.07.2012 issued by the Principal Secretary of the Education Department?” 11. To answer the 1 st point framed hereinabove, the learned Single Judge highlighting the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S tate of Orissa Vs. Rajkishore Nanda , (2010) 6 SCC 777 , State of Punjab Vs. To answer the 1 st point framed hereinabove, the learned Single Judge highlighting the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S tate of Orissa Vs. Rajkishore Nanda , (2010) 6 SCC 777 , State of Punjab Vs. Raghbir Chand Sharma , (2002) 1 SCC 113 , as also the order passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 1398 of 2013 and the order of a learned coordinate Bench of this Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 7481 of 2014 opined that the recruitment process for the first phase and second phase of 2006 and 2008 appointment was conclusively completed by the year 2010 and the writ petitioners in the batch of the cases were applicants in the first and second phase of recruitment for the said post, hence any vacancies that arose in the 2012 or later on would be categorized as future vacancies and could not be considered under the concluded phases of recruitment process. Allowing the petitioners’ claims by the District Appellate Authorities, held to be in direct contravention of the settled legal principles laid down in the above referred cases; accordingly, the order of the District Appellate Authorities have been found to be in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, rendering them legally unsustainable.” 12. The learned Single Judge further went to hold that the authorities would have arbitrarily excluded other eligible candidates based on a mere presumption that either they were disinterested in employment or they had forfeited their rights by not approaching the District Appellate Authorities. Such an approach would be manifestly unjust and in violation of the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 13. Furthermore, in case the District Appellate Authorities had found merit in the claim of the petitioners’, the matter ought to have been referred to the Employment Committee, which is vested with the power to make such appointments. Failure to adhere to this legal procedural requirement renders the decision of the District Appellate Authorities legally unsustainable. 14. The jurisdiction of the District Appellate Authorities have been questioned in view of the prescription of the Rules, 2006 and Rules, 2008, which duly prescribed the Block Development Officer, as the competent authority to adjudicate the complaints. 15. Failure to adhere to this legal procedural requirement renders the decision of the District Appellate Authorities legally unsustainable. 14. The jurisdiction of the District Appellate Authorities have been questioned in view of the prescription of the Rules, 2006 and Rules, 2008, which duly prescribed the Block Development Officer, as the competent authority to adjudicate the complaints. 15. Answering the point no.(ii), the learned Single Judge has held that the writ petitioners inexplicably delayed the filing of their appeals before the District Appellate Authorities for a period exceeding six to eight years, notwithstanding the facts of the case of the writ petitioners was not one where they were overlooked in favor of another candidate; rather, it pertains to appointments on posts that became vacant in 2012 and later on. The learned Single Judge also observed that in the appeal before the District Appellate Authorities, the petitioners deliberately omitted to implead the District Programme Officer, District Education Officer, and other relevant officials of the Education Department, as necessary parties. This calculated omission resulted into failure to present a comprehensive and accurate account of the matter before the adjudicating authority and thereby directly affected respondent State authorities. 16. In the considered opinion of the Court, the appeals preferred by the petitioners before the District Appellate Authorities is held to be barred by limitation, as they have failed to provide any cogent justification or plausible explanation for the inordinate delay in approaching the District Appellate Authorities. However, with respect to the issue of condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the State Appellate Authority by the respondent State authorities, the learned Single Judge referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector (Land Acquisition) Vs. Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107 and the guidelines enunciated in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani , (1996) 3 SCC 132 as well as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal no. 2474 of 2012, has observed that substantial justice must prevail over technical considerations, and that a pragmatic and just approach should be adopted while dealing with delay in filing the appeals. Chandra Mani , (1996) 3 SCC 132 as well as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal no. 2474 of 2012, has observed that substantial justice must prevail over technical considerations, and that a pragmatic and just approach should be adopted while dealing with delay in filing the appeals. The learned Single Judge further underscored the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation and held that appeals filed by the State if stands dismissed on the ground of delay attributable to the default of an officer or employee, the ultimate casualty in such instances is public interest. In public interest, hence some reasonable latitude be extended to the State in the matters where the delay is neither mala fide nor indicative of gross negligence. The Court finds that the State Appellate Authority has rightly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the Respondent Authorities. 17. Answering the point no.(iii), the learned Single Judge has been pleased to hold that the District Appellate Authorities failed to consider and apply the directives contained in Letter No. 465 dated 09.07.2012 while rendering its decision. The said letter issued by the Principal Secretary of the Education Department clearly prescribes that the remaining vacancies upon completion of 1 st and 2 nd phase of appointment shall be merged with 3 rd phase of 2012. 18. After having elaborately responded to the points formulated in the batch of the writ petitions, finally the learned Single Judge upheld the order of the State Appellate Authority and consequently dismissed all the writ petitions and disposed off all the interlocutory applications accordingly. 19. Mr. Y. V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate representing the appellants in L.P.A. No. 315 of 2025 and other analogous cases has submitted with all his vehemence that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that it is not a case wherein the appellants had secured appointment on the basis of any forged certificate or concealment. In absence of any finding that the writ petitioners-appellants any how concealed the materials facts or committed fraud upon the District Appellate Authority or the Employment unit, any finding of the learned Single Judge in this regard is wholly erroneous and baseless. In absence of any finding that the writ petitioners-appellants any how concealed the materials facts or committed fraud upon the District Appellate Authority or the Employment unit, any finding of the learned Single Judge in this regard is wholly erroneous and baseless. The respondent State authorities had not advanced any sufficient cause in filing the appeals before the State Appellate Authority after inordinate delay of more than six years and in the meanwhile, the decision of the District Appellate Authority had been duly complied by the Employment unit in the year 2017 itself, hence in any view of the matter, the appeal preferred by the State authorities ought to be dismissed on account of inordinate delay. Reliance has also been placed on a decision rendered in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs. , (2025) SCC OnLine SC 54, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. 20. Mr. Giri, learned Senior Advocate further argued that the vacancies against which the appellants were appointed had not been carried forward/merged with future vacancies, if that being so, the appellants could not have been appointed by the Employment unit. Moreover, the appointments of the writ petitioners-appellants were made on the basis of the orders of the District Appellate Authorities, who are the competent authority to decide the issues under the statutory rules framed, in exercise of power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that no rival claims were raised against the appointments of the appellants either before the State Appellate Authority or this Court, hence the writ petitioners-appellants, who were possessing proper qualification in terms of the prevailing rules and had been discharging their duties for several years, their appointments should not have been disturbed. 21. 21. Referring to the order passed by the State Appellate Authority, it is further contended that the appellants before the State Appellate Authority were the District Programme Officer (Establishment) and the Block Education Officer, who do not have any locus standi to challenge the order of the District Appellate Authority as they were neither the parties to the appeal before the District Appellate Authority nor the relevant Rules recognize them. 22. This Court has also been reminded that the Hon’ble Court not only acts as a Court of law, but also as a Court of equity, and in the present case, the equity lies in favour of the appellants. Mr. Giri, learned Senior Advocate further contended that the order of the State Appellate Authority cannot be allowed to sustain in law, as it exceeded its jurisdiction in directing for retrospective termination of the writ petitioners-appellants and for recovery of salary already paid to the writ petitioners-appellants against the services rendered by them. 23. Mr. Mrigank Mauli, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. S. S. Sundram, learned Advocate for the appellants in L.P.A. No. 293 of 2025 and other analogous appeals have taken this Court through the order passed by the concerned District Appellate Authority, also the order of the State Appellate Authority and submitted at the Bar that the facts of the case of appellants, on whose behalf they are appearing are different to other. In their cases, in the light of the order of the District Appellate Authority, the employment unit has considered cases of the respective writ petitioners-appellants herein and on being found having requisite qualification in terms with the prevalent rules, they were duly appointed. While reiterating the submissions tendered by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Y.V. Giri, it is further contended that the explanation for condonation of delay of 4-6 years was not sufficient explanation, rather the District Programme Officer (Establishment)/District Education Officer have submitted that the delay has occurred because they recently joined their respective offices. Since the decision of the employment unit was an independent decision, providing fresh cause of action; without there being any challenge by the employment unit, the cancellation of the appointment of the writ petitioners-appellants at the instance of the District Education Officer/District Programme Officer (Establishment), by the State Appellate Authority amounts to traveling beyond the relief sought for in the appeal preferred by the State authorities. Moreover, the District Programme Officer (Establishment) was neither authorized by the State Government to challenge the order of the District Appellate Authority nor he had the locus to challenge the same on account of the fact that he was not a party before the District Appellate Authority. 24. Mr. Mauli, learned Senior Advocate strenuously argued that the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in absence of a judicial Chairperson is without jurisdiction, as has been held by a Single Bench of this Court in Pradip Kumar Yadav & Pradeep Kumar Yadav & Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others (C.W.J.C. No. 17508 of 2021 and other analogous cases). Relying upon the said judgment, a Bench of this Court in the case of Shobha Kumari Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 12632 of 2025), 2025 (4) PLJR 1 and Sonam Kumari Vs. State of Bihar and Ors . (C.W.J.C. No. 9257 of 2024) has reiterated the said proposition. It is need to be noted that the aforesaid order passed in Shobha Kumari and Sonam Kumari (supra) has been authored by one of us (Harish Kumar, J). 25. It is lastly contended that the State Appellate Authority, wrongly recorded that the State authorities were not made party before the District Appellate Authority, rather the Block Selection Committee was a party in which the Block Education Extension Officer and Block Education Officer were the members. 26. Adding further to the submissions recorded hereinabove, Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate in L.P.A. No. 287 of 2025 and L.P.A. No. 288 of 2025 and other analogous case submitted that the appellants applied for their appointment as Panchayat Teachers in pursuant to the 2 nd Phase of selection process initiated in the year 2008, irrespective of their good position in the merit list, they were not declared successful. However, subsequently, when the vacancies have arisen on account of resignation of some of the Panchayat Teachers, they approached before the District Appellate Authority and, accordingly, on being found eligible, in pursuant to the order passed by the District Appellate Authority, Employment Unit issued appointment letters in their favour, hence in any circumstances, the selection of the appellants was to be governed by the Rules, as were in existence in the year 2008. It is vehemently contended that the admission of the appeal by the State Appellate Authority comprising only of Chairman (Administration), who was a retired officer and in absence of Chairman (Judicial), who happens to be the retired Judge of the High Court, the entire proceeding at the behest of the State authorities, who were not even the party before the District Appellate Authority is wholly unsustainable and without jurisdiction. The entire action and the order of the State Appellate Authority is said to be in contravention of the provisions contained in Rule 4(3) of the Bihar State School Teachers and Employees Disputes Redressal Rules, 2020, hence the impugned orders passed by the State Appellate Authority are liable to be quashed on account of coram non-judice. 27. To support the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions rendered in Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors. Vs. Ravinder Nath & Ors. , 2008 (2) SCC 350 and Managing Director, Bhoruka Textiles Ltd. Vs. Kashmiri Rice Industries , (2009) 7 SCC 521 where the Court in no uncertain term held that judgment and decree passed by a court or tribunal lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. 28. Representing the appellants in L.P.A. No. 314 of 2025 and other analogous appeals, Mr. Umesh Kumar Mishra, learned Advocate reiterating the above referred submissions further argued that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition has failed to consider the fact that the appellants had been regularly pursuing their cases for their appointment and finally they approached the District Appellate Authority, when their repeated request has not been acceded. The Education Department, Government of Bihar vide its letter has clarified that the post, which falls vacant after cancellation of appointment of illegally appointed teacher, the District Appellate Authority can direct for filling up of the said vacant post, hence the order of the District Appellate Authority cannot be termed as illegal. The Education Department, Government of Bihar vide its letter has clarified that the post, which falls vacant after cancellation of appointment of illegally appointed teacher, the District Appellate Authority can direct for filling up of the said vacant post, hence the order of the District Appellate Authority cannot be termed as illegal. The consolidated order passed by the learned Single Judge is not proper, as the facts of each cases are different, which ought to have been considered. The learned Single Judge also failed to appreciate that the cases relied upon by the appellants in C.W.J.C. No. 277 of 2012 dated 06.01.2012, the Court had directed for appointment of the concerned petitioners therein even in the year 2012. Moreover in C.W.J.C. No. 19754 of 2021 dated 19.09.2022, the order of the learned State Appellate Authority was set aside and the order of the District Appellate Authority has been upheld, which is exactly similar to the employment of the teachers with the case of these petitioners-appellants. He also reiterated the submissions that the Chairman (Administration) has/had no jurisdiction to consider and dispose of the appeal in absence of the Chairman, (Judicial). 29. To buttress the aforesaid submissions, reliance has also been placed on the decision rendered in C.W.J.C. No. 17508 of 2021 ( Pradip Kumar Yadav @ Pradeep Kumar Yadav Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. ) and other analogous cases. 30. While adopting above referred arguments, learned Advocate representing the appellant in L.P.A. No. 372 of 2025 has submitted that apart from the order of the State Appellate Authority and the order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge are wholly unsustainable in law, the action of the respondent authorities is per se illegal, as they have availed two remedies at a time, as on one hand the State had filed an application before the District Appellate Authority for review and on the other hand, without withdrawing the same, the order has been challenged before the State Appellate Authority. The application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority also suffers from suppression and wrong facts and moreover the entire process has taken place without giving any proper information to the higher authorities. 31. The application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority also suffers from suppression and wrong facts and moreover the entire process has taken place without giving any proper information to the higher authorities. 31. Learned Advocate for the appellant in L.P.A. No. 429 of 2025 and L.P.A. No. 377 of 2025 further submitted that finding of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the District Appellate Authority lacks jurisdiction and the Block Development Officer was the competent authority to adjudicate the issue is wholly erroneous and unsustainable in law. Letter no. 287 dated 09.04.2010, issued by the Principal Secretary, Education Department clearly provided that all complaints and appeals related to the Teachers Recruitment and Service Condition shall be filed only before the District Appellate Authority, who has been vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide such matter. It is further submitted that letter no. 7 dated 05.07.2010 further clarified that where the appointing authorities were unable to complete the appointment of selected candidates within time, in such circumstances, the Employment Unit shall complete the process after taking consent of Education Department. 32. Battery of Advocates, appearing in other L.P.As have also adopted the submissions of the learned Senior Advocates/Advocates 33. Mr. Sarvesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Advocate General-13, Mr. Prateek Kumar, as well as other learned Advocates representing the State respondents in their respective cases have vehemently refuted the contention of the appellants. Dispelling the primary contention of the appellants that the vacancies have arisen consequent upon death and resignation of Panchayat/Block Teachers appointed in 1 st and 2 nd Phase appointment giving cause of action for getting appointment on the basis of merit list prepared in the year 2007- 08 is said to be wholly fallacious and lacks support of law. Consequent upon coming of a new Teachers Appointment Rules, 2012, the Education Department vide its letter no. 465 dated 09.07.2012 clearly stipulated that remaining vacancies upon completion of 2 nd phase appointment shall be merged with the 3 rd phase of 2012 and, as such, no appointment can be made unless there is a specific dispute pending consideration before any forum. 465 dated 09.07.2012 clearly stipulated that remaining vacancies upon completion of 2 nd phase appointment shall be merged with the 3 rd phase of 2012 and, as such, no appointment can be made unless there is a specific dispute pending consideration before any forum. It is beyond any cavil of doubt that a merit list with regard to appointment and selection for the public post is only for one year and, as such, they do not have cause of action for putting their grievance. [vide Ali Hossain Mandal & Ors. Vs. West Bengal Board of Primary Education & Ors. , (2024) 15 SCC 90] . Further reliance has also been placed in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Raghbir Chand Sharma & Anr ., AIR 2001 SC 2900 that no candidate can claim that he would have been offered appointment on account of vacancy arose due to resignation or otherwise. 34. Reference has also been made to the decision rendered in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. Vs Rajkishore Nanda & Ors. , AIR 2010 SC 2100 where the Court held that If the selection process is over and merit list has expired and appointments had been made, then no relief can be granted. The writ petitioners have approached the District Appellate Authority after a period of 5 to 7 years and that too without any cause of action. Further the appointment was prohibited from the said merit list and no vacant post has to be merged with the 3 rd phase appointment of 2012, as per new Rules, 2012. 35. The application or any case filed before the District Appellate Authority was wholly without jurisdiction, as in respect to the selection and appointment to the post of Panchayat Teachers/Block Teachers for 2 nd phase, the competent authority was the Block Development Officer as well as the Deputy Development Commissioner respectively. Moreover, it is not the case of the writ petitioners that they have filed complaint initially before the Block Development Officer/Deputy Development Commissioner, which remained pending till constitution of the District Appellate Authority [Vide: Manohar Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. L.P.A. No. 984 of 2014 ]. 36. Moreover, it is not the case of the writ petitioners that they have filed complaint initially before the Block Development Officer/Deputy Development Commissioner, which remained pending till constitution of the District Appellate Authority [Vide: Manohar Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. L.P.A. No. 984 of 2014 ]. 36. The writ petitioners deliberately did not make the District Education Officer, District Programme Officer and other officers of the Education Department as party respondents before the District Appellate Authority, so that in their absence positive orders be passed in favour of the writ petitioners. It is also alleged that the Block Development Officer-cum-Secretary of Block Employment Unit as well as employment units were hand in glove with the petitioners. The conduct of the writ petitioners was amounting to an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking advantage of unfair and other. 37. Learned Advocate for the State further contended that if for any reason, the District Appellate Authority was of the view that the vacancies arisen on account of resignation or otherwise, it should be filled up from the same appointment process, then it should have given opportunity to all the candidates figuring in the merit list, particularly to those, who were higher to the writ petitioners and, as such, there is clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Since the very appointment of the writ petitioners was illegal, void, ab initio and was a project of fraud and, as such, salary earned consequently is recoverable in view of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rita Mishra Vs. Director, Primary Education, Bihar , AIR 1988 Pat 26 . 38. The reliance placed by the State Appellate Authority in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. , AIR 2004 SC 1469 is apparently applicable in the facts of the case. The contention of the appellants that the appointment should be sustained on the basis of principle of equity is, per se, untenable in view of the settled proposition of law that equity can only supplement the law and not supplant or override it, particularly where exists a conflict between equity and the law, it is the law that prevails. The contention of the appellants that the appointment should be sustained on the basis of principle of equity is, per se, untenable in view of the settled proposition of law that equity can only supplement the law and not supplant or override it, particularly where exists a conflict between equity and the law, it is the law that prevails. The reference may be taken to a decision rendered in the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, 2007 (2) SCC 230. 39. While concluding the submissions, learned Senior Advocates/Advocates for the State have submitted that the findings arrived at by the State Appellate Authority has rightly not been interfered by the learned Single Judge, as it is neither suffering from any perversity nor contrary to any material evidences, rather it is based on sound principle of law. The writ court while exercising the prerogative writ jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate the evidence, which is available before the statutory Tribunal, and the view taken by such Tribunal cannot be substituted by the writ court solely considering that based on such evidence an another view is possible. 40. After having extensively and carefully heard the learned Senior Advocates/Advocates for the respective parties and going through the materials available on record as well as the order/judgment of the learned Single Judge, the following issues culled out for consideration before the Court in the batch of this intra Court appeals: ISSUES (I) As to whether the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in absence of Chairman (Judicial) in terms with Rules, 2020 suffers from the vice of Coram non-judice and thus unsustainable in law? (II) Whether the delay condoned by the State Appellate Authority in filing of appeals after a period of six years from the order of District Appellate Authority is legal and sustainable in law, in view of the submissions led by the appellants that no sufficient and reasonable cause for delay has been explained? (III) Whether the District Education Officer/District Programme Officer and the Block Education Officer had the locus standi to file the appeal before the State Appellate Authority despite not being a party in any lis before the District Appellate Authority and whether they are not estopped from filing appeal after appointing the writ petitioners against the respective posts of Panchayat/Prakhand Teachers? (III) Whether the District Education Officer/District Programme Officer and the Block Education Officer had the locus standi to file the appeal before the State Appellate Authority despite not being a party in any lis before the District Appellate Authority and whether they are not estopped from filing appeal after appointing the writ petitioners against the respective posts of Panchayat/Prakhand Teachers? (IV) Whether the life of the merit list of Panchayat/Prakhand Teachers pertaining to selection process of 2006-2008 can revive on account of resignation and other reasons subsequently in the year 2012 and onwards? (V) Whether the writ petitioners, who were the participants of the 2 nd phase of the selection process held in the year 2006 and 2008 could have been appointed after coming into force of Rules, 2012 by committing procedural bypass, despite and having not possessing the qualification of Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)? (VI) Whether the order of retrospective termination of the writ petitioners from the date of appointment and directions for recovery of salary disbursed to them is sustainable in law in the facts of this case? 41. Issue no. I: As to whether the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in absence of Chairman (Judicial) in terms with Rules, 2020 suffers from the vice of Coram non-judice and thus unsustainable in law? 41.1. Before answering the issue, it would be apt and proper to take note of the prescriptions under which the structure of Appellate Authority has been incorporated and established. The Government of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred under Articles 162 and 243, Section 47 read with Section 146 of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006, Sections 46, 47 read with Section 419 of Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, Section 38 of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Section 14 of the Bihar Private Schools (Fee Regulation) Act, 2019, has framed the Bihar State Teaching Institutions Teachers and Employees (Disputes Redressal and Appeal) Rules, 2020. Rule 2(iii) of Part-I defines the Appellate Authority means the District Appellate Authority constituted at the district level and the Appellate Authority constituted at the State level, under the provisions of these Rules. 2(v) defines the ‘Chairman’, means the Chairman of the State Appellate Authority. Rule 3 of Part-2 of Rules, 2020 deals with constitution of the Appellate Authority which reads as follows: “3. Constitution of Appellate Authority: (i) The State Govt. 2(v) defines the ‘Chairman’, means the Chairman of the State Appellate Authority. Rule 3 of Part-2 of Rules, 2020 deals with constitution of the Appellate Authority which reads as follows: “3. Constitution of Appellate Authority: (i) The State Govt. shall constitute District Appellate Authority at the District level who shall perform the powers and functions, conferred under these Rules. There will be two members who shall act as Presiding Officer. (ii) The State Govt. shall constitute State Appellate Authority at the State level, having two chairman to hear appeal against the decisions/orders passed by the District Appellate Authority and Divisional Level Fee Regulation Committee. (iii) The scope and distribution of work between the Presiding Officers/Chairman of the Appellate Authority shall be determined by the department, from time to time.” 41.2. Rule 4(iii) of Part-2 of Rules, 2020 provides that there shall be two separate Chairman in the State Appellate Authority. One of the Chairman shall be the retired Justice of the Hon’ble High Court and the other Chairman shall be the retired officer of the Indian Administrative Service in the rank, not below than the Principal Secretary. The State Government, may authorise any Chairman to discharge the duty of another Chairman. Part-3 of Rules 2020 deals with powers and function of the District Appellate Authority as well as the State Appellate Authority which, inter alia, provides that the authority shall hear the appeal against the decision of the District Appellate Authority, provided any application/complaint has been filed within 30 days from the date of passing of the final order but the authority will have the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal, if there exits reasonable grounds. The State Appellate Authority shall have the same powers for enquiry of any matter or hearing which has been vested with the Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. While adjudicating any dispute, Rule 17 of Rules 2020 clearly says that all the functions of the authority shall be deemed to be the judicial function under the provisions of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. 41.3. For proper appreciation of the Rules noted hereinabove, it would be imperative to get insightful assistance from the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which highlighted and crystallized the object and the issue through various decisions. In the case of Amulya Chandra Kalita Vs. Union of India & Ors. 41.3. For proper appreciation of the Rules noted hereinabove, it would be imperative to get insightful assistance from the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which highlighted and crystallized the object and the issue through various decisions. In the case of Amulya Chandra Kalita Vs. Union of India & Ors. , (1991) 1 SCC 181 (overruled) while examining the validity of the constitution of Administrative Tribunal referring to the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 established under Section 4 of the said Act read with Section 5(1) which sets out the constitution of the Tribunal and adds that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal may be exercised by Benches thereof, held that the prescription statutorily recognised that every Bench of the Tribunal must consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. It is, therefore, obvious that the Administrative Member alone could not have heard and decided the matter. The aforesaid decision rendered in Amulya Chandra Kalita (supra) has been overruled in Dr. Mahabal Ram Vs. Indian Council of Agriculture Research , (1994) 2 SCC 401 , by holding as follows: “6. Sub-sections (2) and (6) appearing as limbs of the same section have to be harmoniously construed. There is no doubt that what has been said in Sampath Kumar case [ (1987) 1 SCC 124 : (1987) 2 ATC 82 : AIR 1987 SC 386 : (1987) 1 SCR 435 ] would require safeguarding the interest of litigants in the matter of disposal of their disputes in a judicious way. Where complex questions of law would be involved the dispute would require serious consideration and thorough examination. There would, however, be many cases before the Tribunal where very often no constitutional issues or even legal points would be involved. Mr Ramamurthi, Senior Counsel, suggested to us in course of the hearing that keeping the principles indicated in the Constitutional Bench judgment in view, the Single Member contemplated under sub-section (6) should be meant to cover a judicial member only. That view may perhaps not be appropriate to adopt. Mr Ramamurthi, Senior Counsel, suggested to us in course of the hearing that keeping the principles indicated in the Constitutional Bench judgment in view, the Single Member contemplated under sub-section (6) should be meant to cover a judicial member only. That view may perhaps not be appropriate to adopt. On the other hand, we are prepared to safeguard the interests of claimants who go before the Tribunal by holding that while allocating work to the Single Member — whether judicial or administrative — in terms of sub-section (6), the Chairman should keep in view the nature of the litigation and where questions of law and for interpretation of constitutional provisions are involved they should not be assigned to a Single Member. In fact, the proviso itself indicates Parliament's concern to safeguard the interest of claimants by casting an obligation on the Chairman and Members who hear the cases to refer to a regular bench of two members such cases which in their opinion require to be heard by a bench of two Members. We would like to add that it would be open to either party appearing before a Single Member to suggest to the Member hearing the matter that it should go to a bench of two Members. The Member should ordinarily allow the matter to go to a bench of two Members when so requested. This would sufficiently protect the interests of the claimants and even of the administrative system whose litigations may be before the Single Member for disposal. To make a distinction between Judicial Member and Administrative Member functioning under sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act may not be appropriate and, therefore, we have not been able to accept the approach suggested by Mr Ramamurthi. The observation made in the two- Judge Bench case that no provision was cited to them that a Single Member could hear cases laid before the Tribunal led to the conclusion that the judicial business of the Administrative Tribunal was intended to be carried by a bench of two Members. The vires of sub-section (6) has not been under challenge and, therefore, both the provisions in Section 5 have to be construed keeping the legislative intention in view. The vires of sub-section (6) has not been under challenge and, therefore, both the provisions in Section 5 have to be construed keeping the legislative intention in view. We are of the view that what we have indicated above brings out the true legislative intention and the prescription in sub- section (2) and the exemption in sub-section (6) are rationalised.” 41.4. In Dr. Mahabal Ram , the Hon’ble Court while reiterating the law laid down in S.P. Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors. , (1987) 1 SCC 124 has observed that the interest of litigants would require to be safeguarded in the matter of disposal of their disputes in judicious way. It would be pertinent to note that the approach adopted in the case of Dr. Mahabal Ram (supra) is held to be correct by a 7-Judge Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs Union of India & Ors. , (1997) 3 SCC 261 , since it harmoniously resolved the manner in which Section 5(2) and 5(6) can operate together. The Constitution Bench however further clarified that where a question involving the interpretation of a statutory provision or rule in relation to the Constitution arises for the consideration of a single Member Bench of the Administrative Tribunal, the proviso to Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 will automatically apply and the Chairman or the Member concerned shall refer the matter to a Bench consisting of at least two Members, one of whom must be a Judicial Member. This will ensure that questions involving the vires of a statutory provision or rule will never arise for adjudication before a single Member Bench or a Bench which does not consist of a Judicial Member. It is only by this way that the Court held Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 will no longer be susceptible to charges of unconstitutionality. 41.5. The Constitution Bench in its penultimate paragraph considering all the aspects has also ruled that: “It must be remembered that the setting-up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of their specialised knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass- roots experience would best serve this purpose. It was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass- roots experience would best serve this purpose. To hold that the Tribunal should consist only of judicial members would attack the primary basis of the theory pursuant to which they have been constituted. Since the Selection Committee is now headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, nominated by the Chief Justice of India, we have reason to believe that the Committee would take care to ensure that administrative members are chosen from amongst those who have some background to deal with such cases.” 41.6. In State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Utility Users’ Welfare Association & Ors. , (2018) 6 SCC 21 referring to the mandate led by the Constitution Bench to the decision in Madras Bar Association vs Union of India & Anr. , (2010) 11 SCC 1 (MJ-I) and further in Madras Bar Association vs Union of India & Anr. , (2014) 10 SCC 1 (MJ-II) observed that the Members of the Tribunal discharging judicial functions could only be appointed from sources possessing expertise in law and competence to discharge judicial functions. 41.7. Summing up the legal positions as narrated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, this Court feels it worth benefiting to refer the observations made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Madras Bar Association (MJ-II) (supra) where the Court said that “the legislature is presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law and therefore know that where disputes are to be adjudicated by a Judicial Body other than Courts, its standards should approximately be the same as to what is expected of main stream Judiciary. Rule of law can be meaningful only if there is an independent and impartial judiciary to render justice. An independent judiciary can exist only when persons with competence, ability and independence with impeccable character man the judicial institutions. Rule of law can be meaningful only if there is an independent and impartial judiciary to render justice. An independent judiciary can exist only when persons with competence, ability and independence with impeccable character man the judicial institutions. When the legislature proposes to substitute a Tribunal in place of the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction which the High Court is exercising, it goes without saying that the standards expected from the Judicial Members of the Tribunal and standards applied for appointing such members, should be as nearly as possible as applicable to High Court Judges, which are apart from a basic degree in law, rich experience in the practice of law, independent outlook, integrity, character and good reputation. It is also implied that only men of standing who have special expertise in the field to which the Tribunal relates, will be eligible for appointment as Technical members. Therefore, only persons with a judicial background, that is, those who have been or are Judges of the High Court and lawyers with the prescribed experience, who are eligible for appointment as High Court Judges, can be considered for appointment of Judicial Members” 41.8. In the afore-noted legal background, now coming to the prescriptions noted hereinabove, especially Rules 3 and 4 of Rules, 2020 which deals with Constitution of the Appellate Authority and its structure. It is evident that the legislature has provided two separate Chairman in the State Appellate Authority; one of which shall be a retired Justice of the Hon’ble High Court, whereas another Chairman shall be the retired officer of the Indian Administrative Service, not below than the Principal Secretary. The said prescription further mandates that the State Government, may authorise any Chairman to discharge the duty of another Chairman. This provision further gets clarified from reading of rule 3(iii) which says that the scope and distribution of work between the Presiding Officer/Chairman of the Appellate Authority shall be determined by the Department from time to time. 41.9. Carefully reviewing the prescription, this Court through his office requested Mr. Abhinay Raj, panel lawyer of the State as to whether the State Government has come out with any notification authorising the Chairman to discharge the duty of another Chairman or there is any letter/notification which further clarify the scope and distribution of the work between the Chairmans of the State Appellate Authority. Abhinay Raj, panel lawyer of the State as to whether the State Government has come out with any notification authorising the Chairman to discharge the duty of another Chairman or there is any letter/notification which further clarify the scope and distribution of the work between the Chairmans of the State Appellate Authority. The aforesaid query was enquired through Smt. Rekha, Secretary, State Appellate Authority, who conveyed this Court through Mr. Abhinay that till date there is no such letter/notification by the State Government and/or by the Department of Education. Irrespective of the fact, there is no such notification/letter by the State Government or the Department prescribing distribution of work between the Chairman of the Appellate Authority, since the Rules specifically provides constitution of the State Appellate Authority having two separate Chairman and the power for distribution of work and authorization by the State Government to discharge the duty of another Chairman clearly suggests that both the Chairmen may hear the cases separately allotted to them; hence even in absence of such notification/letter once the function of the authority shall be deemed to be judicial function, any order of the authority cannot be questioned on this score alone. However, where questions of law and interpretation of constitutional/statutory provisions are involved, it should be heard by a Bench consisting of both the Chairman (Judicial) and the Chairman (Administrative). In such eventuality, it would also be open to either party appearing before the Chairman (Administrative) to make a prayer to refer the matter to a Bench consisting of Member (Judicial), if complicated question of law is involved. This would sufficiently, in all circumstances, protect the interest of the claimants and even all the administrative system, when litigation may be placed before the Chairman (Administrative). 41.10. Since the vires of any of the provisions of Rules, 2020 are neither under challenge nor even alleged to be ultra vires of the Constitution, in the opinion of this Court, it would be appropriate to give a harmonious construction to the statutory provisions to ensure that the State Appellate Authority carries out its function more effectively in resolving the disputes in terms with the relevant provisions of the Rules, 2020. 41.11. 41.11. Before parting with the conclusion, it would be unjust and improper on our part, if we fail to take note of the submission led by the learned Advocate for the appellants that one of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pradip Kumar Yadav @ Pradeep Kumar Yadav & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. and other analogous cases [C.W.C.J. No. 17508 of 2021] dated 17.04.2025 has held that the order passed by the Chairperson of the State Appellate Authority, who was an officer of Indian Administrative Service, can only be held to be without jurisdiction and placing reliance upon the said judgment as well as the order rendered in C.W.J.C. No. 12632 of 2025 [ Shobha Kumari vs. State of Bihar & Ors .], 2025 (4) PLJR 1 , besides the other grounds, one of us (Harish Kumar, J.) in C.W.C.J. No. 9257 of 2024 [ Sonam Kumari vs. State of Bihar & Ors .] has concurred the view and set aside the order passed by the State Appellate Authority by holding it suffers from illegality. 41.12. Bare reading of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 17508 of 2021, besides the fact that the order/judgment has been put to challenge before the learned Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 500 of 2025 and the operation of the order is stayed, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, there is no discussion pertaining to the prescription of Rules, 2020 in the light of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court discussed in the aforegoing paragraphs, rather the order in C.W.J.C. No. 17508 of 2021 is in relation to the prescriptions provided under the Bihar State School Teachers and Employees Disputes Redressal Rules, 2015, which stood repealed with effect from the date of issuance of the notification contained in Memo No. 07/Pradhi-4/2016-715 dated 25.08.2020, whereby Rules, 2020 has been brought into force. However, we made it clear that the view taken by this Court shall have its application prospectively till such prescription of Rule, 2020 holds the field. Moreover, this Court may not find any legal impediment in dealing with the issue on merit in reference to the statutory scheme and also the judicial precedents, which aspects have not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 9257 of 2024 and other above referred cases. 41.13. Moreover, this Court may not find any legal impediment in dealing with the issue on merit in reference to the statutory scheme and also the judicial precedents, which aspects have not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 9257 of 2024 and other above referred cases. 41.13. After making elaborate discussions and highlighting the relevant prescriptions of the Rules, 2020 as well as legal position referred hereinabove, this Court unanimously comes to the conclusion that the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in absence of Chairman (Judicial) in terms with Rule 4(iii) does not suffer from vice of Coram non judice. We answered accordingly. 42. Issue no. II: Whether the delay condoned by the State Appellate Authority in filing of appeals after a period of six years from the order of District Appellate Authority is legal and sustainable in law, in view of the submissions led by the appellants that no sufficient and reasonable cause for delay has been explained? 42.1. Before responding to the afore-noted issue, it would be pertinent to take note of the law of limitation which is enshrined in the legal maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the party, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislative fixed period of time. The vested right of a party should not be disrupted at the instance of the person, who is guilty of culpable negligence. [vide : Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 317 and K.R. Mudgal & Ors. vs. R.P. Singh & Ors. , (1986) 4 SCC 531 ]. 42.2. It is well settled that in order to determine as to whether there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance, it is required to be examined whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a device to cover an anterior purpose, however, the Court has cautioned that while making such consideration regarding a sufficient cause, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned. And that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from imparting such substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned [Vide: State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr. , (2000) 9 SCC 94 ] . It would be worth benefiting to take note of the decision rendered in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , where the Hon’ble Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observed as under: “The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.” 42.3. In O.P. Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 66 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in gross miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for private citizen as for Government-authorities. State like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest suffers owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents, where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest suffers owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents, where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have ‘a little play at the joints’. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limit- is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. [vide: G. Ramegowda, Major vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bengalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 ]. 42.4. We must keep it in our mind as to whether circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred; for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. [vide : Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. , AIR 1987 SC 1353 and Tukaram Kana Joshi and Thr. Poa Holder Vs. M.I.D.C. & Ors. , (2013) 1 SCC 353] . It would also be relevant to take note of the decision rendered in H. D. Vora Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 337 , where the Hon’ble Supreme Court condoned 30 years delay in approaching the Court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicants. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed. 42.5. Coming to the facts of the case at hand, the appellants have approached the Court after a long delay of completion of the recruitment process held under Rules, 2006 and subsequently in the year 2008 by impleadings the members of the Employment Unit as opposite parties before the District Appellate Authority in the year 2016-17; the same was entertained and orders have been passed. Accordingly, the writ petitioners-appellants herein were appointed. Accordingly, the writ petitioners-appellants herein were appointed. However, in none of the application filed before the District Appellate Authority, the higher authority of the Education Department and the State Government were made as opposite parties, since their appointments were not to the knowledge and in approval of the State Government and its authorities, they were not being allowed salary/honorarium. In such circumstances, they approached this Court where different Benches of this Court directed to ensure salary/honorarium for the period they have discharged their duties to the respective posts. It is only then the State Government and its higher authority of the Department of Education came to know and challenge the order of the District Appellate Authority by filing different appeals before the State Appellate Authority. It is only in such circumstances, the authorities competent in this behalf moved an appeal against the order affecting the right and public interest even at the belated stage with a prayer to condone the delay. At this juncture, it would be worth benefitting to refer a decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , 2025 Live Law (SC) 339, where the Hon’ble Court referring to a decision rendered in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) as well as various other decisions have concluded that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. Since in the present case also the facts clearly reveal that the authorities of the Education Department and the State of Bihar had not been made party before the District Appellate Authority and the State Appellate Authority is empowered under Rules, 2020 having jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal, we do not find that there was no sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal before the State Appellate Authority and accordingly no fault is found in the order of the State Appellate Authority condoning the delay. This Court further observed that the reliance led by the appellants on the decision rendered in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. This Court further observed that the reliance led by the appellants on the decision rendered in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, where the Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation and further while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. Since this Court finds that the sufficient cause has been assigned by the appellants in approaching the State Appellate Authority as referred hereinabove, the reliance placed by the appellants on the decision in H. Guruswamy (supra) with all respect is not applicable in the facts of this case. We answered this issue accordingly. 43. Issue no. III: Whether the District Education Officer/District Programme Officer and the Block Education Officer had the locus standi to file the appeal before the State Appellate Authority despite not being a party in any lis before the District Appellate Authority and whether they are not estopped from filing appeal after appointing the writ petitioners against the respective posts of Panchayat/Prakhand Teachers? 43.1. It is trite that the party/authority, whose order is sought to be quashed and the authority under whose control they function are necessary party if a case is instituted against the Members of the Employment Unit, who are the statutory functionaries regulated by the authorities of the Education Department as well as the State. In absence of the State or its instrumentalities and its higher authorities, who are ultimately concerned with the subject matter or would have been affected by the outcome of the case, must be made party to the lis in all fairness of the things. Non-impleadment of the authorities, who is/are responsible for ultimate regulation of the Department/Institution would certainly cast a shadow of doubt of collusion and/or move to obtain a favourable order in connivance with the officials of the Departments/Institutions, who are standing in his/their favour. 43.2. Non-impleadment of the authorities, who is/are responsible for ultimate regulation of the Department/Institution would certainly cast a shadow of doubt of collusion and/or move to obtain a favourable order in connivance with the officials of the Departments/Institutions, who are standing in his/their favour. 43.2. Conferring rights or benefits on the writ petitioners-appellants, who had consciously participated in a well thought out, and meticulously orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining employment would amount to espousing the cause of "the unfair". 43.3. It is no longer res integra that any order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party who has not been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the ground of breach of natural justice or the order in no manner would be applicable to them. However, it must be kept in mind that suppression of even single material fact may be fatal before the Writ Court. It would be useful to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. , AIR 2004 SC 2421 , where the law has succinctly been stated as follows: “13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken.” 43.4. The State and its authorities, in fact, are under bounden duty to challenge an order, which will affect sanctity of recruitment process and cause injustice at large, even through they have not been made party to a lis, either knowingly or unknowingly. Any illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated or ignored as the same will not only violate Articles 14 of the Constitution, but cause distrust upon the system, which is governed by rule of law 44. Issue no. Any illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated or ignored as the same will not only violate Articles 14 of the Constitution, but cause distrust upon the system, which is governed by rule of law 44. Issue no. IV: Whether or not the life of the merit list of Panchayat/Prakhand Teachers pertaining to selection process of 2006-2008 can revive on account of resignation and other reasons subsequently in the year 2012 and onwards? 44.1. To answer the question formulated hereinabove, it would be pertinent to take note of the relevant prescriptions of the Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 and its Amended Rules, 2008. Bare reading of Bihar Panchayat Primary Teacher (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rule, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rule, 2006’) and its amended Rule, 2008, it appears that the same has been duly framed in exercise of powers provided under Article 243 G of Constitution of India and Sections 47 and 48 to be read with section 146 of Bihar Panchayti Raj Act, 2007 In the light of the amended provision of Article 21-A of the constitution of India, which mandate free and compulsory education to the children from the age of 6 to 14 years. Rule 8 of Rule, 2006 provided the eligibility criteria for appointment to the post of Prakhand/Panchayat Teacher, which categorically provides that the candidate must have the qualification of Intermediate or equivalent degree along with two years Teachers Training Diploma/Certificate from any institution having recognition from the NCTE or other equivalent degree, as has been provided therein is not necessary for this list to be explained exhaustively. The procedure of the recruitment has been duly prescribed in Rule 9, which contains the constitution of the Committee for preparation of panel and recruitment of Prakhand/Panchayat Teacher. It is made clear that the members selected for panel shall have the tenure of one year. After preparation of the panel objection shall be invited and after resolving the objection the panel shall be finalized. In case of any dispute in relation to Employment and Service Condition of the Prakhand/Panchayat Teacher in terms with the Rule, 2006, the Block Development Officer/Deputy Development Commissioner shall have all the power to decide such dispute, however, subsequently in view of the amendment vide notification no. In case of any dispute in relation to Employment and Service Condition of the Prakhand/Panchayat Teacher in terms with the Rule, 2006, the Block Development Officer/Deputy Development Commissioner shall have all the power to decide such dispute, however, subsequently in view of the amendment vide notification no. 1056 dated 03.07.2009 in the amended Rules, 2008, the Appellate Authority was directed to be constituted in each district by the State Government, for which the Human Resources Development Department shall prescribe the condition. 44.2. Bare reading of the aforesaid prescription what has surfaced is that the life of the merit list has not been prescribed but the tenure of the Members of the Employment Unit shall be only for one year. Hence, even if the period of merit list has not been prescribed, the law in this regard is very clear that the life of a panel ordinarily is one year and the same can be extended only by the State and that too if the statutory rule permits it to do so. Admittedly, there is no such rule extending any power to any of the Employment Unit or the State to extend the life of a merit list/panel. In the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. B. Valluvan & Ors. , (2006) 8 SCC 686 , the Court held that once a panel stands exhausted upon filling up of all the posts, the question of enforcing a future panel would not arise. 44.3. In the case of State of Orissa & Anr. Vs. Rajkishore Nanda & Ors. , (2010) 6 SCC 777 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in no uncertain term has held that the select list cannot be treated as a reservoir for the purpose of appointments, that vacancy can be filled up taking the names from that list as and when it is so required. It is settled legal proposition that no relief can be granted to the candidate if he approaches the Court after expiry of the select list. If the selection process is over, select list has expired and appointments had been made, no relief can be granted by the Court at a belated stage. 44.4. The reliance placed by the learned Advocate for the State on the decision of Ali Hossain Mandal and Ors. Vs. West Bengal Board of Primary Education and Ors. If the selection process is over, select list has expired and appointments had been made, no relief can be granted by the Court at a belated stage. 44.4. The reliance placed by the learned Advocate for the State on the decision of Ali Hossain Mandal and Ors. Vs. West Bengal Board of Primary Education and Ors. , (2024) 15 SCC 90 also covers the issue formulated hereinabove where the Court reiterating the decisions rendered in B. Valluvan, Rajkishore Nanda (supra) as well as the decision in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Md. Kalimuddin & Ors. , (1996) 2 SCC 7 and in the case of Girdhar Kumar Dadhich & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , (2009) 2 SCC 706 , has ruled that “the opinion expressed in the above judgments makes it clear that a panel or a merit list cannot be treated as if it exists in perpetuity, which will facilitate making appointments as and when required. When the panel expires or after the selection process is over with most posts being filled, the benefit of appointments cannot be given unless the panel's validity is legally extended. However, no such extension of the panel's validity was granted. 44.5. This Court also takes note of the decision rendered by the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Tara Kant Sinha Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [LPA No. 1398 of 2013], while the Court refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, that there is vacancy subsists because of resignation of one of the selected candidates on the well established principle of the Hon’ble Apex Court held that vacancy caused after joining and resignation cannot be used for the same to be filled up by any candidate from the panel as the panel life comes to an end after the appointment process is over. 44.6. After going through the decisions afore-noted as also the relevant prescriptions of Rules, 2006 and its Amended Rules, 2008, it is manifest that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the merit list, it would not give the candidate an indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. 44.6. After going through the decisions afore-noted as also the relevant prescriptions of Rules, 2006 and its Amended Rules, 2008, it is manifest that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the merit list, it would not give the candidate an indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. With the appointment of the candidates against the post in respect of which the consideration came to be made and a merit list was prepared the date on which the recruitment process gets completed. The panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility and no one else in the panel can claim that he should have been offered appointment either in the vacancy arising on account of the subsequent resignation of the persons or on his death, who were initially appointed from the panel, or any other vacancies arising subsequently. 44.7. This Court, in the aforesaid premise, has no hesitation to hold that the life of the panel, which was prepared in terms with Rules, 2006 and its Amended Rules, 2008, cannot be revived on account of resignation of persons appointed subsequently in the year 2012 and onwards. 45. Issue no. V: Whether the writ petitioners, who were the participants of the 2 nd phase of the selection process held in the year 2006 and 2008 could have been appointed after coming into force of Rules, 2012 by committing procedural bypass, despite having not possessing the qualification of Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)? 45.1. Once by the notification bearing No. 7/V.1-37/2010-241 dated 3 rd April, 2012, the Government of Bihar, exercising powers under Section 47 read with section 146 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, has come out with the Rules, 2012, all the earlier prescriptions of 2006 Rules as well as its Amended Rules, 2008 stood repealed. However, notwithstanding the repealing of previous Act, the action taken under the previous Rules and notification shall be deemed to be valid and will not cause any effect to the service conditions of the Teachers, who were appointed in terms with the previous Rules. The provisions prescribed the procedure of employment under Rule 11 of Rules 2012 clearly suggests that the Government of Bihar through its Employment Units shall inform the number of vacancies of the Panchayat Teachers/Prakhand Teachers, whereupon applications were invited. The provisions prescribed the procedure of employment under Rule 11 of Rules 2012 clearly suggests that the Government of Bihar through its Employment Units shall inform the number of vacancies of the Panchayat Teachers/Prakhand Teachers, whereupon applications were invited. The eligibility for employment for the post of Panchayat/Prakhand Teacher, besides other qualification of the candidate, he/she must have passed the Teachers Eligibility Test. Under the Rules of 2012, any vacancy arising in the year 2012 or thereafter on account of resignation, removal, or a finding that the appointment was obtained through fraudulent means shall be treated as a vacancy occurring in that year itself. Accordingly, such vacancy shall be governed by the Rules of 2012 or the rules in force on the date on which the post falls vacant. The claim of the person who had applied at the time of initial recruitment would not survive. Reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on a letter issued by the Principal Secretary, Education Department bearing No. 465 dated 09.07.2012 further clarifies that the vacancies fallen after coming into force the 2012 Rules would be filled up in terms with 2012 Rules, except those with respect to which litigation is pending. Admittedly, in these cases, there had never been any challenge to the merit list prepared pursuant to Rules, 2006 and its Amended Rules, 2008 and for the first time the writ petitioners have approached before the District Appellate Authority in the year 2016-17 without there being any valid cause of action. 45.2. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court comes to the conclusion that extending appointment to the petitioners, who were the candidates of 2006 Rules and the Amended Rules 2008 in the year 2017, after coming into force of 2012 Rules, would amount to committing a procedural bypass and a fraud by knowing well that the petitioners had not passed the Teachers Eligibility Test and thereby not possessing eligibility for appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher/Prakhand Teacher as required under Rules, 2012. 46. Issue no. VI: Whether the order of retrospective termination of the writ petitioners from the date of appointment and directions for recovery of salary disbursed to them is sustainable in law in the facts of this case? 46.1. True it is that there is no obligation on the Court to protect an illegal appointment. 46. Issue no. VI: Whether the order of retrospective termination of the writ petitioners from the date of appointment and directions for recovery of salary disbursed to them is sustainable in law in the facts of this case? 46.1. True it is that there is no obligation on the Court to protect an illegal appointment. The extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible. Adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, even the Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. 46.2. The constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi and Others , (2006) 4 SCC 1 while reiterating the aforesaid proposition has reminded us that consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Employment under the State constitutes a national wealth. Every person eligible has a right to apply and be considered under Article 14 of the Constitution. The selection therefore has to be by open advertisement, equal opportunity for participation to the eligible and competitive merit selection. To dilute the requirement in any manner, shall not only be subverting the entire Constitutional scheme but shall also open the flood gates of favouritism, nepotism and corruption reducing public employment to pocket boroughs. The opening of a Service Book and enhancement of salary cannot confer the camouflage of legality on such an illegal appointment. Considering such illegal appointments it was observed in the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union Vs. Delhi Administration, (1992) 4 SCC 99 “the courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations. Once a person appointed in rank, illegally, cannot complain that the termination procedure was arbitrary. Considering such illegal appointments it was observed in the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union Vs. Delhi Administration, (1992) 4 SCC 99 “the courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations. Once a person appointed in rank, illegally, cannot complain that the termination procedure was arbitrary. Those who came in through the back door must go out through the same door as observed in the case of State of U.P. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers’ Association , (1994) 2 SCC 204 . 46.3. Conferring the rights and benefits on the writ petitioners, who had no cause of action, left after completion of the recruitment process under Rule, 2006 and amended Rule, 2008; yet they moved the District Appellate Authority in the year 2016 and 2017 that too when the earlier rules were already replaced by a new Rule, 2012, which prescribes the eligibility of a candidate must have passed the Teachers’ Eligibility Test; it is nothing but, a well-thought-out, meticulous, and “orchestrated” plan to circumvent well laid down norms for gaining employment. 46.4. From the record, it is evident that there is no material to show that vacancy occurring owing to resignation or other reason have not been carried forward to the next recruitment process; and even for the sake of argument, if it is accepted for the time being that certain posts remained vacant, in such circumstances, those vacancies, which had arisen on account of the resignation or otherwise should be filled up from a fresh selection process strictly in consonance with the constitutional scheme after giving opportunity to all the candidates figuring in the merit list, particularly, to those who were higher to the writ petitioners, along with those prospective candidates, who acquired eligibility on the date of fresh selection. But the fact of this case depicts a sorry state of affairs, the manner in which the petitioners have approached the District Appellate Authority almost a delay of 7-8 years without impleading the necessary parties, including State authorities of the Education Department and secured the appointment after getting the order from the District Appellate Authority. 46.5. But the fact of this case depicts a sorry state of affairs, the manner in which the petitioners have approached the District Appellate Authority almost a delay of 7-8 years without impleading the necessary parties, including State authorities of the Education Department and secured the appointment after getting the order from the District Appellate Authority. 46.5. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the appointment of all the writ petitioners is illegal and obtained in a clandestine manner, no defect is found in the order/judgment of the learned Single Judge in upholding and affirming the order of the State Appellate Authority, but now the only question left to be answered by this Court is as to whether the State Appellate Authority was competent to pass the order of termination with retrospective effect and direct for recovery of salary. 46.6. This issue can very well be answered by referring to a decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rita Mishra (supra) where the learned Court has underscored that the rights to salary, pension and other service benefits are entirely statutory in nature in public service. Therefore, these rights, including the right to salary, spring from a valid and legal appointment to the post. Once it is found that the very appointment is illegal and is non-est in the eye of law, no statutory entitlement for salary or consequential rights of pension and other monetary benefits can arise. In particular, if the very appointment is rested on forgery, no statutory right can flow from it. Accepting the aforenoted settled legal position, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra), upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the State Appellate Authority, has held as follows: “...The rights to salary, pension and other service benefits are entirely statutory in nature in public service. The appellant obtained the appointment against a post meant for a reserved candidate by producing a false caste certificate and by playing a fraud. His appointment to the post was void and non est in the eye of the law. The right to salary or pension after retirement flows from a valid and legal appointment. The consequential right of pension and monetary benefits can be given only if the appointment was valid and legal. His appointment to the post was void and non est in the eye of the law. The right to salary or pension after retirement flows from a valid and legal appointment. The consequential right of pension and monetary benefits can be given only if the appointment was valid and legal. Such benefits cannot be given in a case where the appointment was found to have been obtained fraudulently and rested on a false caste certificate. A person who entered the service by producing a false caste certificate and obtained appointment for the post meant for a Scheduled Caste, thus depriving a genuine Scheduled Caste candidate of appointment to that post, does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. A person who seeks equity must come with clean hands. He, who comes to the court with false claims, cannot plead equity nor would the court be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate by playing a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue.” From the above referred discussions, it is culled out that in case of Rita Mishra (supra), her appointment was rested on forgery and similarly in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra) he had procured the appointment by producing a false caste certificate of Scheduled Caste and thus deprived a genuine Scheduled Caste candidates for appointment, hence the Court held their appointment void ab initio and they do no deserve any sympathy or indulgence of the Court. Now, we take up the facts of this case; undoubtedly the cases of the petitioners are not identical to the cases of Rita Mishra and R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra), where they had secured their appointment by playing fraud upon the authorities. Now, we take up the facts of this case; undoubtedly the cases of the petitioners are not identical to the cases of Rita Mishra and R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra), where they had secured their appointment by playing fraud upon the authorities. In the case at hand, the writ petitioners have approached before the District Appellate Authority by bringing on record the facts, though without impleading necessary parties and secured the appointment in pursuant to the order of the District Appellate Authority, hence in the opinion of this Court, the case of the writ petitioners- appellants herein are not akin to the case of Rita Mishra and R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra) and their appointments are not, per se, rested on forgery. Thus, in such circumstances, the retrospective termination and direction for recovery of salary, directed by the State Appellate Authority and upheld by the learned Single Judge is not legally sustainable in law as well as on facts. Accordingly, this issue is also answered. Conclusion: 47. Keeping in mind the determination of all the jurisdictional issues referred to hereinabove, we may consciously conclude that the State Appellate Authority, in the absence of the Chairman (Judicial), in terms of Rule 4(iii), does not suffer from the vice of coram non judice in view of the specific provisions of the Rules, 2020, which prescribe the mode and manner of carrying out its functions in resolving disputes, even separately by the bench of Chairman (Administrative), unless the complex legal issue is not involved; which would give harmonious effect to the legislative enactment. Furthermore, the State Appellate Authority has not committed any error in accepting the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the respective appeals by the authorities of the Education Department of the State, in the public interest, and thereby prevented miscarriage of justice; especially when the necessary parties were not arrayed as respondents before the District Appellate Authority. 48. Furthermore, the State Appellate Authority has not committed any error in accepting the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the respective appeals by the authorities of the Education Department of the State, in the public interest, and thereby prevented miscarriage of justice; especially when the necessary parties were not arrayed as respondents before the District Appellate Authority. 48. This Court also finds and holds that the State and its authorities are under a constitutional obligation to uphold the sanctity of the recruitment process, and whenever a severe wrong is surfaced, at large, by an unfair manner through an orchestrated plan, they are under a bounden duty to challenge such an order, irrespective of the fact that they were not made a party to the lis, either knowingly or unknowingly; as an illegality cannot be sanctified by mere passage of time, unless it is specifically protected in law, in any manner. 49. This Court has also concluded that the life of the panel/merit list, duly prepared in terms of the Rules, 2006 and the amended Rules, 2008, cannot be revived on account of the resignation or death of persons appointed subsequently in the year 2012 and onwards, in absence of any specific provision under the Statute. Hence, any appointment from the panel/merit list, after having completed the earlier recruitment process long back in the year 2008, cannot be saved and deemed it legal under any circumstances after coming into force of the new rules, which prescribe altogether an exclusive eligibility criteria, which the writ petitioners do not possess. Extending appointments to the petitioners, irrespective of the aforesaid fact, would amount to a procedural bypass and a fraud on the system, knowing well that the petitioners do not have the requisite eligibility for appointment to the posts of Panchayat Teachers/Prakhand Teachers, as required under the Rules, 2012. 50. In view of the reasons afore-noted, this Court has held the appointments of all the writ petitioners to be illegal, having no sanctity in the eyes of law and being dehors the statutory prescriptions. Nonetheless, being conscious of the fact that the appointments of the petitioners were not based on forgery but rather on an illegal order of the District Appellate Authority, the Court has found the retrospective termination and the direction for recovery of salary to be not legally sustainable. 51. Nonetheless, being conscious of the fact that the appointments of the petitioners were not based on forgery but rather on an illegal order of the District Appellate Authority, the Court has found the retrospective termination and the direction for recovery of salary to be not legally sustainable. 51. Before parting with this case, now we also propose to deal with the submissions led by the learned Senior Advocates/Advocates for the appellants that this Court is also a Court of equity and in the present case the equity lies in favour of the appellants. 52. We do not find any reason to approve aforenoted contention in view of the well settled legal position that whenever there is conflict between the law and equity, it is law, which has to prevail. 53. Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law, as has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Council for Indian School Certificate Examination Vs. Isha Mittal & Anr., (2000) 7 SCC 521 . 54. We must keep in mind that equitable consideration have no place where the statute contains express provisions. What is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law [vide Madamanchi Ramappa Vs. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 and E. Palanisamy Vs. Palanisamy , (2003) 1 SCC 123 ]. 55. It would be also worth noticing here that while exercising Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction, the Letters Patent Bench only exercises the power of court of correction and corrects its own orders in exercise of its power, as was vested in the single judge. The Division Bench ought not to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge of the Court unless it is shown to be based on no evidence, perverse, palpably unreasonable and unsustainable with any particular position in law. The scope of interference is within a narrow compass. 56. The Division Bench ought not to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge of the Court unless it is shown to be based on no evidence, perverse, palpably unreasonable and unsustainable with any particular position in law. The scope of interference is within a narrow compass. 56. In view of the discussions referred hereinbefore, we do not find any perversity and palpable unreasonableness or any infirmity in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, which warrants any interference with the same, except the affirmance made by the learned Single Judge to the order of the State Appellate Authority whereby the termination of the writ petitioners have been made with retrospective effect with a direction of recovery of salary. Such direction is hereby set aside. The termination of the writ petitioners shall take effect from the order passed by the State Appellate Authority in their respective cases, on which date the order of the District Appellate Authority stood cancelled. 57. It is further made clear that if the writ petitioners have been allowed salary for certain period, the same shall not be recovered and would be only entitled to the salary for the period they have rendered their services in their respective schools after proper verification of the record, in this regard. 58. Accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeals stand dismissed, with only modification, as stated hereinabove, and the direction in this regard. 59. No order as to costs. I agree - Sangam Kumar Sahoo, CJ.