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2026 DAILYLAW 26084 (AP)

The Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd v. Sri T. Srinu

WA/1223/2025 · 2026-03-05

Battu Devanand, Subhendu Samanta

body2026

Judgment text

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APHC010606072025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3565] FRIDAY,THE SIXTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA WRIT APPEAL NO: 1223/2025 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent be pleased to allow the instant Writ Appeal by setting aside the order dated 18.06.2024 passed in W.P.No. 35323 of 2014 and pass such Between: 1. THE ANDHRA PRADESH POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD, REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, VIDYUTH SOUDHA, VIJAYAWADA. 2. THE JOINT SECRETARY (PERSONNEL), ANDHRA PRADESH POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LTD. VIDYUT SOUDHA, VIJAYAWADA. 3. THE CHIEF ENGINEER (O AND M), LOWER SILERU, H.E. SCHEME, APGENCO, MOTHUGUDEM POST, KHAMMAM DISTRICT. 4. THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (O AND M), MACHKUND HYDRO ELECTRIC (JOINT SCHEME PROJECT), AP. GENCO, ONUKUDELLI POST, KORAPUT DISTRICT, ODISHA STATE 5. THE PROJECT DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, GENERATION DIVISION, APGENCO, ONUKUDELLI POST, KORAPUT DISTRICT, ODISHA STATE. ...APPELLANT(S) AND 1. SRI T SRINU, S/o (Late) T. Syamalamma, Aged about 38 years, Occ 2 Unemployed, R/o Onukudelli, Koraput District, Odisha State. ...RESPONDENT IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to dispense with filing with the certified copy of the order dated: 11.12.2024 in W.P. No. 35323 OF 2014, passed by His Lordship The Honourable Sri Justice N.HARINATH GARU and pass such IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to condone the delay of 335 days in preferring the writ appeal against the orders passed in W.P.No.35323 of 2014, dated 11.12.2024, and pass such IA NO: 3 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to permit to file the additional materials from Ex.P1 to Ex.P14 i.e., from 30 to 69 pages and pass such IA NO: 4 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to suspend the operation of the order dated 11.12.2024 in W.P.No. 35323 of 2014 pending disposal of the Writ Appeal and pass such Counsel for the Appellant(S): 1. K.KRISHNABUSHAN CHOWDARY SC For APGENCO Counsel for the Respondent: 1. V HIMABINDU The Court made the following: 3 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA I.A.No.02/2025 IN W.A.No.1223 /2025 JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand) This writ appeal filed against the order, dated 11.12.2024 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.35323 of 2014, wherein the learned single Judge partly allowed the writ petition holding that the respondents therein are directed to consider the petitioner‟s case and pass necessary orders in accordance with law by setting aside the memo issued by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, Vidyut Soudha, Hyderabad, dated 25.10.1994, as the same has a fundamental flaw. 2. The appellant filed I.A.No.2 of 2025 seeking to condone the delay of 335 days in filing the present writ appeal. 3. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that the delay caused is thus not willful, wanton, or due to negligence, but for the reasons stated in the affidavit and accordingly sought to condone the delay in filing the writ appeal. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection and sought to hear the delay condonation petition at first and requested to decide the same. Accordingly, the delay condonation petition in I.A.No.2 of 2025 is taken for consideration. 4 5. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed to condone the delay in the absence of sufficient cause to condone the delay. He further contends that the appellant failed to show any sufficient cause to condone the delay and the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit filed along with the delay petition are very vague and no proper reasons are stated. Accordingly, he requested to dismiss the delay condonation petition. 6. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel on either side and upon perusing material available on record, we have to consider whether the reasons stated in the affidavit filed by the petitioners for the delay caused in filing the writ appeals would establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of such a delay or not. 7. In view of the above submissions made on either side, it is relevant to look into the averments made in the affidavit filed by the petitioner/ appellant along with the delay condonation petition as extracted herein under: “3. The order in W.P.No.35323 of 2014 was passed on 11.12.2024 and received by the appellants on 26.12.2024. It is to submit that after pronouncement of the judgment, the petitioner was under the bonafide impression that there was no scope for further remedy. 4. That the petitioner came to know about certain apparent errors on the face of the record and legal grounds justifying an Appeal for the order only upon consulting a new legal counsel and upon such advice and examination of the order, it was found that there exists a valid case for Appeal. 5. That immediately thereafter, steps were initiated to compile relevant documents, and prepare the Writ Appeal and during the said process when the file was under active circulation for approval of the concerned authorities, the 5 same got mixed up with other files and subsequently during verification, it was found that the same is not processed and hence delay occurred. 6. The coordination between multiple departments, including the legal, human resources, and operational wings of APGENCO, required extensive consultation to ensure a comprehensive appeal, which contributed to the delay.” 8. In State of Odisha and others vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School1, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed with a delay of 123 days. The relevant portions are extracted herein under: 20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up. 22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred. 9. Besides this, the appellants should state valid legal grounds seeking to condone the abnormal delay in filing the writ appeals. 1 2026 INSC 148 6 10. In the case of Office of Chief Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another2 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with a petition filed for condonation of delay of 427 days after considering various decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, observed as extracted hereunder: 12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an 2 2012 LawSuit (SC) 124 7 anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 11. In another judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 663 days came down heavily, while dismissing the said application in The State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Bherulal3 as extracted hereunder: 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government 3 2020 SCC OnLine SC 849 8 or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible. 8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. 12. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another4 wherein it is held as hereunder: “28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. 4 1992 (3) SCC 563 9 Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd5 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a „sufficient cause‟ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 14. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. 6, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 15. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.,7 that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 5 AIR 1962 SC 361 6 AIR 1935 PC 85 7 AIR 2009 SC 1927 10 16. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,8 this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression „sufficient cause‟ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigor as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 17. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 8 (2013) 14 SCC 81 11 18. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 916 days caused in preferring an appeal in case of University of Delhi vs. Union of India (UOI) and others9 held as hereunder: “20. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent. 21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law.” 9 2020(1) ALT 230 12 19. In Union of India and Another Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through His Lrs..10 Hon‟ble Apex Court has while referring to the cases of locus classicus like Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited.11, vide para 30 and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [cited 4 supra], vide para 33, finally held that delay should not be excused as a matter /of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party and the parties seeking delay condonation have to prove that they are reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and it is the vital test for condoning the delay. 20. 20. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court as herein above and for the reasons stated above, in our considered view, the petitioners failed to establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of such delay. Thus, this Court is inclined to dismiss the Interlocutory Application filed along with W.A.No.1223 of 2025. 21. Accordingly, I.A.No.02 of 2025 in W.A.No.1223 of 2025 is hereby dismissed. 22. In view of the dismissal of condonation delay application, the W.A.No.1223 of 2025 shall stand dismissed. 23. There shall be no order as to costs. 10 2024 SCC Online SC 489 11 (2012) 3 SCC 563 13 As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND ____________________________ JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA Dated:06.03.2026 PGR 14 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND & THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA I.A.No.02/2025 IN/AND W.A.No.1223 of 2025 Dt. 06.03.2026 PGR