ORDER : SUDHIR SINGH, J. Heard the parties. 2. Following is the relief sought for in the present writ application:- “I. For quashing the letter dated 15.09.2025 issued by the Tender Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Respondent No.-3, communicated vide E-letter dated 16.09.2025 by the Respondent No.-5, as contained in Annexure- P:7 by which the Petitioner who was duly selected in financial bid being L-1 against NIT No- RRSMP/10/25-25, Package No- RRSMP/25-26 (Tender ID 143239) has been cancelled and order for re-tender has been made. II. For commanding the Respondents to continue the contract and issue work order in favour of the Petitioner as he has been duly selected being L-1 for the execution of the said contract work. III. For issuance of such other appropriate order or direction which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 3. The brief facts of the present case are that an e-tender bearing No. RRSMP-10/2025-26 was invited under the signature of the Engineer-in-Chief-cum-Additional Commissioner-cum-Special Secretary on 03.07.2025 for execution of works under the Rural Road Strengthening and Management Program (RRSMP), which was uploaded on the departmental portal on 05.07.2025. The last date for submission of bids was initially fixed as 01.08.2025 and was subsequently extended to 08.08.2025. The petitioner, being eligible, participated in the tender process for Package No. RRSMP/25- 26 (Tender ID 143239), Arwal-2. During the technical evaluation, one of the bidders, namely Praveen Kumar (ID No. 624777), was declared disqualified on account of non-submission of payment certificate and Form 26AS as required for verification of Annual Turnover under the bid conditions. Opportunity was granted to the bidders to raise objections; however the said bidder did not avail the same. Thereafter, the financial bid was opened and the petitioner was declared L-1 (lowest bidder). The case of the petitioner was also recommended for issuance of work order by the Executive Engineer. Subsequently, the Tender Committee, vide decision dated 15.09.2025 (communicated on 16.09.2025), cancelled the tender process and directed re- tendering on the ground that the disqualified bidder was not afforded adequate opportunity.4. The order under challenge is the Letter dated 15.09.2025 (Annexure- P/7) issued by the Tender Committee, which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned action is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The order under challenge is the Letter dated 15.09.2025 (Annexure- P/7) issued by the Tender Committee, which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned action is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that a concluded stage of tender evaluation cannot be nullified on untenable and extraneous considerations. 6. Learned counsel further submits that even the basis of the impugned action is factually unsustainable. It is pointed out that the petitioner has brought on record, by way of supplementary affidavit, a letter dated 12.09.2025 (Annexure- P/8 to the supplementary affidavit) issued by the concerned bidder, namely Praveen Kumar, addressed to the competent authority, wherein he has categorically stated that he had mistakenly not submitted the requisite certificates and that he has neither filed any objection nor intends to do so in future. The said matter is reproduced as under:- 7. It is further submitted that the said letter was forwarded by the Executive Engineer vide Memo No. 1490 dated 13.09.2025 (Annexure- P/9 to the supplementary affidavit) to the higher authority, thereby leaving no ambiguity regarding the position of the said bidder. The said document is reproduced as under:- 8. In view thereof, learned counsel submits that the very foundation of the impugned decision stands vitiated as the concerned bidder himself has accepted that he had mistakenly not submitted the requisite documents and waived any right to object. It is, thus, submitted that the impugned order is unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the impugned decision has been taken after due scrutiny by the Departmental Tender Committee in order to ensure fairness and transparency in the tender process. It is submitted that as per Clause 4.4A(a) of the CMBD, submission of documents for verification of Annual Turnover (ATO), including payment certificate/26AS, is mandatory. Although, Clause 24.2 of the CMBD pertains to substantial responsiveness, the requirement under Clause 4.4A(a) being essential could not be dispensed with. It is further submitted that since the financial bids had already been opened, the confidentiality of rates stood compromised, and therefore, it was not feasible to seek any further clarification from bidders. In such circumstances, the decision to cancel the tender was justified. 10. It is further submitted that since the financial bids had already been opened, the confidentiality of rates stood compromised, and therefore, it was not feasible to seek any further clarification from bidders. In such circumstances, the decision to cancel the tender was justified. 10. Learned counsel further submits that as per Clause 33 of the NIT, the competent authority reserves the right to cancel the bidding process at any stage prior to award of contract without assigning any reason. It is further submitted that the impugned decision is strictly in accordance with the aforesaid clauses and does not warrant interference. 11. The limited issue for consideration before this Court is whether the respondent authorities were justified in cancelling the tender process on the ground of alleged denial of opportunity to a bidder, when such bidder had, prior to the impugned decision itself, waived his right to submit the requisite documents or raise any objection. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon consideration of the materials available on record, it transpires that the sole foundation of the impugned decision dated 15.09.2025 is that one bidder, namely Praveen Kumar, was disqualified for non-compliance of Clause 24.2 of the CMBD and non-submission of 26AS/Payment Certificate as required under Clause 4.4A, and that he was allegedly not afforded adequate opportunity to respond to such disqualification. 13. However, the materials on record unequivocally demonstrate that prior to the impugned decision itself, the said bidder had waived his right to submit the requisite documents or to raise any objection. The letters dated 12.09.2025 and 13.09.2025 (Annexure- P/8 & P/9), clearly establish that the said bidder consciously accepted his disqualification and categorically stated that he neither intends to file any objection nor to pursue the matter further. 14. In such circumstances, the very foundation of the impugned decision becomes unsustainable and collapses. The doctrine of waiver, which is a well-recognized principle in law, postulates that where a person, with full knowledge of his rights, voluntarily abandons or relinquishes the same, he cannot subsequently be heard to complain. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre , reported in (2004) 8 SCC 229 has held that a right can be waived by the party for whose benefit it exists, even by conduct. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as follows: “10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre , reported in (2004) 8 SCC 229 has held that a right can be waived by the party for whose benefit it exists, even by conduct. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as follows: “10. A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. Whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct.” 15. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, once the concerned bidder had, before the decision dated 15.09.2025, consciously and waived his right to object or to furnish documents, there remained no subsisting right or grievance which required protection or consideration by the respondent authorities. In such a situation, for the authorities to subsequently rely upon an alleged denial of opportunity to that very bidder as a ground for cancelling the entire tender process is not only contradictory but also manifestly arbitrary. 16. This Court is unable to comprehend as to how a ground, which had already ceased to exist by virtue of Annexure-P/8 could have been resurrected to justify cancellation of the tender. Such an approach clearly reflects non-application of mind and consideration of an irrelevant factor, while ignoring material facts available on record. 17. Further, it is well settled that while the State and its instrumentalities possess discretion in contractual matters, such discretion is not absolute and must conform to the mandate of fairness, transparency, and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that judicial review is concerned with the decision- making process, and interference is warranted where the decision is arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as follows:- “ 94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as follows:- “ 94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 18. Likewise, in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517 , it has been held that if a decision is so arbitrary that no reasonable authority could have arrived at it, the Court would be justified in interfering. “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 19. In the present case, the cancellation of the tender is based on a ground which is demonstrably factually incorrect and legally untenable, inasmuch as the bidder concerned had already waived his right. The decision, therefore, suffers from arbitrariness, non-consideration of relevant material, and reliance on a non-existent ground. 20. In the present case, the cancellation of the tender is based on a ground which is demonstrably factually incorrect and legally untenable, inasmuch as the bidder concerned had already waived his right. The decision, therefore, suffers from arbitrariness, non-consideration of relevant material, and reliance on a non-existent ground. 20. This Court also finds that once the tender process had progressed to the stage where the petitioner was declared L- 1, the respondents were expected to act in a fair and reasonable manner, and any decision to annul such process ought to be supported by cogent and valid reasons. The reason assigned in the present case falls short of such standard. 21. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned decision dated 15.09.2025 cancelling the tender process suffers from serious infirmity and cannot be sustained in law. 22. Consequently, the order dated 15.09.2025 is set aside and the writ application is, accordingly, allowed. 23. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.