JUDGMENT : S. B. PD. SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for both the parties. 2. The present Civil Miscellaneous application has been filed for setting aside the order dated 04.11.2025 passed by learned Civil Judge(Jr. Division)/Munsif, Lakhisarai in Execution Case No. 1 of 2023 whereby and whereunder the learned Trial Court has dismissed the petition filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent/plaintiff had filed Eviction Suit No. 3 of 2017 for eviction of the petitioner/defendant from the suit properties in which the he appeared and filed written statement. Ultimately, the suit was decreed by the Trial Court. Against the said judgment and decree, the petitioner/defendant has filed First Appeal No. 3 of 2022 to the Court of learned District Judge which is still pending. The respondent/plaintiff/decree-holder has filed Execution Case No. 1 of 2023 in which the petitioner/defendant has filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 04.11.2025 against which the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further argued that learned Executing Court has not registered his petition being Miscellaneous Case as per Rule 45(a) of the Civil Court Rules and has also not determined the question raised by the petitioner regarding executability of the decree. He further submits that the petitioner/defendant though has filed an objection petition under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the decree is not executable on several grounds as identification of the suit properties is not clear and specific and in absence of proper identification of the suit premises, it makes the decree non-executable. He further submits that respondent/plaintiff has no right to get the premises vacated without proper identification. 5. In response to the above petition of the petitioner/defendant filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the respondent/decree-holder has filed his rejoinder and contested the petition and ultimately the learned Trial Court has dismissed the petition by the impugned order. The relevant paragraphs of the impugned order is extracted hereunder:- “A rejoinder to the aforesaid objection petition has been filed by the D.H repundiating the objection raised by the Judgment-debtor and has sought for dismissal of the objection petition of Judgment debtor. The relevant paragraphs of the impugned order is extracted hereunder:- “A rejoinder to the aforesaid objection petition has been filed by the D.H repundiating the objection raised by the Judgment-debtor and has sought for dismissal of the objection petition of Judgment debtor. It has also been mentioned in the rejoinder that the defects pointed out are trifling and will not stand in the way of execution of the decree and that ought to be rejected straight way summerily. The D.H has further mentioned that even if there is no written prayer, under law the execution of a decree may be allowed on oral submissions. To bring home these points a case law of H.H.C, Patna observation filed that me Ram Babu Rai Vs Nachari Mishra. Civil Miscellaneous Jurisdiction no. 936 of 2013 dated 15.11.2017 wherein observation made by Hon'ble Court that decree passed erroneously or by not following regular procedure is not null and void can be executed. Heard on the objection petition. Perused the case record. In the past too, the Judgment debtor is filing petition after petition objecting and resisting the execution on one pretext or the other. The objections raised by the Judgment debtor are not tenable and the property mentioned in the decree are clearly identifiable. The Judgment debtor should not raise frivolous and unnecessary objections. The objection petition of the Judgment debtor is meritless and hence stands rejected.” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment reported in AIR 2004 CALCUTTA 267 (Ms. Saraswat Trading Agency versus Union of India and Others). The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under :- “(A) Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), S. 47-Powers of executing Court- Raising of question as to executability of null decree-Is permissible under S. 47-Further on finding decree is nullity, it is duty of Court to hold that decree is not executable. In an application under S. 47 the question that a decree is not executable being a nullity can be raised, and the executing Court can decide the question. In such cases the question of acquiescence will not be relevant. A decree which is a nullity in the eye of law is no decree, and hence even by consent of the parties such a decree cannot be executed by the Court. In such cases the question of acquiescence will not be relevant. A decree which is a nullity in the eye of law is no decree, and hence even by consent of the parties such a decree cannot be executed by the Court. In the instant case the judgment-debtor did not raise the question before, but for this reason it cannot be denied the remedy available to it under S. 47 of the C.P.C. If the Court finds that the decree is a nullity, as contended by the judgment-debtor, the Court cannot proceed to execute it, and it is the duty of the court to hold that the decree is not executable.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 (Radhey Shyam And Another versus Chhabi Nath And Others). 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff has submitted that the petitioner/defendant is the tenant of the suit premises and learned Trial Court while delivering judgment in Title Eviction No. 03 of 2017 has also mentioned this fact. The relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:- “Here in this case, in the written statement, it has been admitted frequently by the defendant that the plaintiff is collecting the rent from him. In para 9 of the written statement it is mentioned "the father of the defendant had started to pay the nominal sum by way of rentals to the father of the plaintiff"; (b) In Para 13 of the written statement it is stated "Plaintiff is only the rent collector of the suit premises" and in para 14 of the written statement it is stated "after death of the father of the plaintiff and after death of the father of the defendant, the plaintiff is collecting money from the defendant on same principle."; (c) it is reiterated that there is no dues of any sum from the month of December 2015 to March 2017 (vide para 21 of W.S.) and in para 23 of W.S. the defendant admitted that he had deposited the alleged rentals for May and June 2017 through the money order to the plaintiff." There are few rent receipts also being exhibited by the PW1: Shyam Sundar Tibrewal, which clearly shows the rent of the building to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. These exhibits are: Ext. These exhibits are: Ext. 1: Counter foil of rent receipt no.07 dated: 28/05/2014. Ext. 1/1: Counter foil of rent receipt no.08 dated: 13/06/2015. Ext. 1/2: Counter foil of rent receipt no.18 dated: 08/09/2015. Ext. 1/3: Counter foil of rent receipt no.25 dated: 25/12/2015. On the receipts there is signature of the defendant. The receipts also shows ward no. 23 as mentioned by the PWI in his plaint. Thus, there is no doubt after considering the pleading of both parties that the defendant was indeed paying rent to the plaintiff. So far as denial of the title of the suit property is concerned, Ld. counsel on behalf of the plaintiff submitted that the defendant having been inducted, by the plaintiffs, as the tenant, cannot deny the title of the plaintiffs and they are estopped from denying the same under the statutory provision of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The defendant had accepted the plaintiff as the landlord, and cannot now turn round and challenge the title of the plaintiff. According to him, the defendant has been continuously paying rent to the plaintiffs according to the said mutual arrangement made between both parties and that the said plea of denial of the plaintiffs' title is wholly malicious and has been taken in order to make out a ground for defence in the suit. The learned counsel also submitted that once the tenant was inducted by the landlord and the tenant proceeded to occupy and enjoy the grant of that tenancy, he can not be allowed to challenge the title of the landlord later on. The defendant is debarred from making such a claim under the well-established doctrine of estoppel as well as under the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act which contains the said principles.” 9. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff further argued that after admitting the tenancy, the petitioner/defendant cannot challenge the title and ownership of the respondent/plaintiff as per provision of Order 116 of the Evidence Act. He further submits that petitioner/defendant has also filed Civil Miscellaneous Jurisdiction No. 713 of 2022 in which Hon’ble High Court has held as follows:- “I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the materials available on record. From perusal of the plaint and impugned order, it appears that the tenant/landlord relationship has been admitted by the petitioner in his written statement. From perusal of the plaint and impugned order, it appears that the tenant/landlord relationship has been admitted by the petitioner in his written statement. He has stated in the written statement that the rent of suit premises has been paid to the plaintiff/respondent and has filed the rent receipt also. The petitioner has also admitted that a sum of Rs.89,600/- is due towards the arrears of rent which the petitioner would pay in installment and, accordingly, the learned Trial Court had granted him 45 days time to pay the arrears of rent as well as current rent by its order dated 24.6.2019. Instead of depositing the arrears of rent and current rent in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, the petitioner came out with a new plea that the plaintiff/respondent is not the owner of the suit premises. Under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the tenant cannot dispute the Title of the landlord. However, in the present case the tenant has admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant in his written statement.” 10. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has also placed reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2017 SC 1577 (M/s. Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Pvt. Ltd. versus P.R. Selvam Alagappan). The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:- “Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), S.-47-Execution of decree-Objection-Decree neither suffering from jurisdictional error nor a nullity- Objections as to executability of decree-Cannot be entertained.” 11. When the above principle is applied to test the applicability of Section 47 of the CPC in this case, it clearly transpires that Judgment and decree passed in favour of decree-holder is neither suffering from any jurisdictional error nor it can be said as nullity. Moreover, the objections raised by the judgment-debtor has been properly examined and discussed in the Impugned order. It appears that although the said petition under Section 47 of the CPC filed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor has not been registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but the entire factual and legal aspects of the petitioner and this case has been well appreciated by the Executing Court in its impugned order. It appears that although the said petition under Section 47 of the CPC filed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor has not been registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but the entire factual and legal aspects of the petitioner and this case has been well appreciated by the Executing Court in its impugned order. It is well settled law that procedural law is subservient to the substantial law and it is meant for facilitating the substantial justice and in this case, not mentioning the number of Miscellaneous Judicial Case regarding the petition filed under Section 47 of the CPC, does not vitiate the proceedings and make the order illegal. 12. After hearing both the parties, it appears that despite order to vacate the suit premises was passed by the Competent Court, the petitioner/defendant has not vacated the suit premises till date. 13. Hence, after going through the above arguments, this Court finds that learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the application filed by the petitioner/defendant under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality and impropriety in the impugned order dated 04.11.2025 passed by learned Civil Judge(Jr. Division)/ Munsif, Lakhisarai in Execution Case No. 1 of 2023. 15. Civil Miscellaneous No. 251 of 2025 accordingly stands dismissed and accordingly, the earlier order of stay of the proceedings of Title Execution Case No. 01 of 2023 passed by this Court on 27.02.2026 stands vacated.