JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has filed the instant application for the following relief(s): “For quashing the order dated-10.1.08 passed in ATA Nos- 507(3)/2006 by The Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi as contained in Annexure-4 whereby and whereunder the respondent no-1 has set aside the order dated-28.7.06 (Annexure-3) passed by the A.P.F.C, Patna under section 7A of the Act. II. Any other writ/writs, direction/ directions, order/orders, in respect of any other relief or reliefs to which the petitioner may be deemed entitled, may also be issued.” 2. The case of the petitioner as culled out from Writ petition is that M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd. was an establishment covered under the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1952”) with effect from 01.04.1997. The said establishment discontinued payment of statutory dues and submission of statutory returns from April 2001 on the plea that it had ceased its activities with effect from 31.03.2001. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that immediately thereafter, another establishment, namely M/s Electronic Net, commenced business from 01.04.2001 from the same premises and was carrying on identical activities which were earlier undertaken by M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd. M/s Electronic Net, however, claimed that it was an entirely separate legal entity and, therefore, the provisions of the Act, 1952 were not applicable to it. Thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the Enforcement Officer, who submitted his report dated 07.03.2002 stating inter alia that upon cessation of the earlier establishment, M/s Electronic Net started functioning from 01.04.2001 and the Attendance Registers for April, May and June 2001 reflected employment strength of 19, 19 and 20 employees respectively. The records bear the signature of the Director, Mr. Sanjeev Kumar. On the basis of the inquiry and materials on record, proceedings under Section 7A of the Act culminated in an order dated 30.07.2004 determining statutory dues amounting to Rs. 2,08,875/- for the period June 2001 to June 2003 against M/s Electronic Net. 4. An application under under Section 7B Sub Section (1) of the Act was filed by respondent no.2 for a review of the order passed under Section 7A(1) which was disposed of on 28.07.2006 without disturbing the order dated 30.07.2004. 2,08,875/- for the period June 2001 to June 2003 against M/s Electronic Net. 4. An application under under Section 7B Sub Section (1) of the Act was filed by respondent no.2 for a review of the order passed under Section 7A(1) which was disposed of on 28.07.2006 without disturbing the order dated 30.07.2004. Aggrieved by it, respondent no.2 preferred an appeal bearing ATA No. 507(3)/2006 before the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The Tribunal,vide ex parte order dated 10.01.2008, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the authority dated 28.07.2006. The petitioner challenged the said order primarily on the grounds that the Tribunal acted beyond jurisdiction, failed to consider material evidence, passed a cryptic and non- reasoned order, and misread the attendance register. 5. The Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the materials on record clearly demonstrate that M/s Electronic Net was merely a continuation of M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd., functioning from the same premises and engaged in identical business activities. A mere change in nomenclature cannot defeat statutory liability. 6. It is further submitted that the attendance register for June 2001 shows 20 employees. The Tribunal erred in accepting the plea that one employee remained absent throughout the month. A bare perusal of the attendance register indicates that the said employee was present. Even otherwise, casual absence does not reduce the statutory employee strength. 7. It is further contended that the impugned order is cryptic and bereft of reasoning. The Tribunal failed to analyse documentary evidence and passed the order mechanically. 8. The Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal exceeded its statutory jurisdiction. Under the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, the period for filing an appeal is 60 days, extendable by another 60 days only. Beyond 120 days, there is no power to condone delay. 9. The Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case relied on the judgments passed by different coordinate Bench of this Court reported in (1) 2014 SCC Online Pat 5024 (The Employee Provident Fund Organization Vs. M/s Janta Cold Storage Mahnar & Anr.) (2) 2017 SCC Online Pat 967 (M/s Janta Cold Storage Mahnar Vs. The Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr, (3) 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 7557 (Central Board of Trustees, Employees Provident Fund Organization V. M/S S.K.Nasiruddin Biri Merchhant Pvt. Ltd. Shaluganj) 10. M/s Janta Cold Storage Mahnar & Anr.) (2) 2017 SCC Online Pat 967 (M/s Janta Cold Storage Mahnar Vs. The Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr, (3) 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 7557 (Central Board of Trustees, Employees Provident Fund Organization V. M/S S.K.Nasiruddin Biri Merchhant Pvt. Ltd. Shaluganj) 10. The Learned counsel for the petitioner refers paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment reported in 2014 SCC Online Pat 5024 (supra) which reads as follows: “18. Now, question arises as to whether Tribunal has got jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation as prescribed in rule 15 of the Rules. A similar question arose before Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Custom and Central Excise (supra). The aforesaid case was of Central Excise Act and there was provision in section 35H of the Central Excise Act that appeal and reference to High court should be made within 180 days from the date of communication of the decision of the order. The Apex Court took note of the aforesaid provision and held that time limit prescribed for making reference to the High court is absolute an unextendable by the court under section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be judged from the terms of the special law and in the very terms of Limitation Act. It has further been held that the court is bound to respect legislative intention and not to extend limitation period by giving liberal interpretation. 19. Admittedly, the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 has been brought into existence to protect the interest of the employees of the factories and other Establishments and the aforesaid Act is self contained Act. The aforesaid Act prescribes 30 days limitation for filing restoration petition, if any appeal is dismissed in default. There is no provision in the above stated Act or Rules which gives power to court to extend the period of limitation beyond 30 days. If Legislature had intention to give such power to Tribunal, the Legislature certainly would have framed the aforesaid provision either in the Act or in the Rules. Therefore, in my view, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation beyond the period of 30 days to entertain restoration petition against the order of dismissal of appeal in default. Therefore, in my view, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation beyond the period of 30 days to entertain restoration petition against the order of dismissal of appeal in default. It is well known maxim that, however, a law is hard but after all, it is the law and, therefore, in the aforesaid circumstance, Tribunal was bound to entertain restoration petition against the order of dismissal of appeal in default within the prescribed period of 30 days and in no case, Tribunal has got power to extend the aforesaid period of 30 days in entertaining restoration petition against the order of dismissal of appeal in default making the provision of Limitation Act applicable to the case.” 11. The Learned counsel for the petitioner refers paragraph 4 of the judgment reported in 2017 SCC Online Pat 967 (supra) which reads as follows: “4. The learned single Judge went through the entirety of the facts, the relevant provisions relating to such restoration application, especially Rule 15 of the Employees Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1997, and a catena of different decisions not only of this Court, but even the Hon'ble Apex Court and then came to the considered opinion that the Tribunal had no business or power to entertain a second restoration application after much delay and then decide the matter on merits.” 12. The Learned counsel for the petitioner refers paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 7557 (supra) which reads as follows: “ 9. Without going into the merit of the case, the Court is persuaded to decide the present writ petition only on the ground of preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. It is true that period of limitation is liberally required to be examined and for substantial justice a petition may not be rejected only on the ground of limitation. However, if for condoning delay there is special Act prescribing period for filing an application/or Appeal, certainly in that event beyond legislation the Court may not exercise its jurisdiction. It is a settled law that if Statute states to do a thing in a particular manner then every thing is to be done in the same manner not in any other way. Before proceeding it would be appropriate to quote the provisions which deals with limitation in such situation. It is a settled law that if Statute states to do a thing in a particular manner then every thing is to be done in the same manner not in any other way. Before proceeding it would be appropriate to quote the provisions which deals with limitation in such situation. In respect of cases arising out of the Employees' Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1952”) a Rule has been framed exercising power under sub Section 1 of Section 21 of the Act 1952. The Central Government has framed a Rule in respect of procedure to be adopted by the Appellate Tribunal which is called as Employees' Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997. Rule 7 of the Rules 1997 deals with the time of filing of Appeal, deposit of amount etc. For just decision in the matter it would be appropriate to quote Rule 7 as follows : - “7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.- (1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of rupees five hundred to be remitted in the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situate. (2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days: (3) Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75 per cent of the amount due from him as determined under section 7-A: Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7-O.” 10. On perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is evident that an aggrieved person can file an Appeal within a period of 60 days from the date of issuance of order/notification. However, the Appellate Tribunal has been authorized to condone further delay of 60 days. Meaning thereby, that in any event after expiry of 120 days from the date of issuance of the order no Appeal can be entertained nor delay can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal. In view of observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 32 of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE CASE (Supra) and paragraph no. 16 of (2013) 10 SCC 765 (POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER) it is sufficient for coming to the conclusion that in absence of any special power to condone delay beyond 120 days as prescribed under Rule 7 of Rule 1997, the Appellate Tribunal has grossly erred in condoning the delay in filing Appeal and allowing the same. It is true that such restriction may cause hardship or inconvenience to the party but as held this Court has no option but to inference. The Maxim dura lex sed lex which means “law is hard but it is the law” stands attracted in such a situation. Accordingly, without going into the merit of the case the court is satisfied that the learned Appellate Tribunal was not justified in entertaining the Appeal after expiry of statutory period of limitation.Accordingly, the Order Dated 24 September 2014 passed in ATA No. 346(3) of 2014 passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi is hereby set aside. 11. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the respondent regarding maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the petitioner was not authorized to file the writ petition is concerned, the Court is of the opinion that the Act 1952 has primarily been enacted for the welfare of the employees and to protect the right and interest of the employees, certainly the petitioner is entitled to assail illegal/incorrect order passed by Appellate Tribunal.” 13. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that when a special statute prescribes a specific period of limitation and extent of condonable delay, the same is mandatory. The Tribunal cannot extend limitation beyond the statutory framework. The Act, 1952 is a welfare legislation intended to protect employees. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that when a special statute prescribes a specific period of limitation and extent of condonable delay, the same is mandatory. The Tribunal cannot extend limitation beyond the statutory framework. The Act, 1952 is a welfare legislation intended to protect employees. Any interpretation defeating its object must be avoided. 14. From perusal of the earlier orders of the Court dated 31.10.2025, 10.11.2025 and 09.01.2026 passed in the present proceedings, it would reveal that no one had appeared on behalf of the respondent on the aforesaid dates. It is further evident from the record that, despite adequate opportunity, no counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent till date. However, on 27.01.2026, the Learned counsel appearing for the respondent entered appearance and submitted that the order passed in ATA No. 507(3)/2006 by the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition, is legal, valid and calls for no interference by this Court. 15. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the Learned counsel for the respondent. 16. The main issues which arise for consideration are: Whether M/s Electronic Net was a separate entity or a continuation of the earlier establishment; Whether the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction; Whether the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind. 17. From the materials available on record, particularly the inquiry report and attendance registers, it is evident that immediately upon the cessation of M/s Impex Kompt Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd., M/s Electronic Net commenced operations from the same premises and engaged in identical activities. The employment strength during the relevant period met the statutory requirement. The inference drawn by the authority under Section 7A was based on cogent evidence. 18. The Tribunal, however, accepted the plea regarding absence of one employee without proper scrutiny of the attendance register. The finding is contrary to the documentary evidence and amounts to misreading of record. 19. A quasi-judicial authority is duty-bound to assign reasons in support of its conclusions. The order of the Tribunal lacks reasons and cannot be sustained in law. Though, the Act, 1952 is a beneficial social welfare legislation, any attempt to defeat its object must be discouraged. 20. 19. A quasi-judicial authority is duty-bound to assign reasons in support of its conclusions. The order of the Tribunal lacks reasons and cannot be sustained in law. Though, the Act, 1952 is a beneficial social welfare legislation, any attempt to defeat its object must be discouraged. 20. On the question of limitation, the law is well settled that when a statute prescribes a specific period for condonation of delay the same cannot be extended by judicial interpretation. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and must function within the four corners of the Act and Rules. The Tribunal cannot extend the period of limitation beyond the statutory framework. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the impugned order dated 10.01.2008 passed by the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA No. 507(3)/2006 suffers from illegality, jurisdictional error and non-application of mind, and is liable to be set aside. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 10.01.2008 passed by the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA No. 507(3)/2006 is hereby quashed and set aside. 23. Interlocutory Application(s) , if any, shall stands disposed of.