2026:HHC:43564 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 204 of 2015 Reserved on: 22.09.2026 Date of Decision: 07.10.2026. Ramesh Chand ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the petitioner : Mr Peeyush Verma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Anuj Bali, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 05.12.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 15.05.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, H. P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:43564 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that informant Harbans Singh (PW3) was driving a truck bearing registration No. HP-63-1913 on 18.12.2007. He reached the car seat cover factory at Shoghi at about 05:30 p.m. A bus bearing registration No. HP-03B-6031 came from the opposite side at high speed. The bus overtook a tipper and came to the wrong side of the road. The informant tried to avoid the accident. However, the driver of the bus did not slow down and hit the truck. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the bus driver. An intimation was given to the police. Inspector Amar Singh (PW8) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW3/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. He took the photographs (Ext.A1 to Ext.A12) and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/B). He seized the bus and the truck along with the documents vide memos (Ext.PW1/A and Ext.PW1/B). Subhash 3 2026:HHC:43564 Chander (PW9) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there were no defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW9/A and Ext.PW9/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Shyam Lal (PW1), Pyare Lal (PW2), Mohinder Singh (PW4), Amit (PW5) and Hem Chand (PW6) witnessed the recoveries. Harbans Singh (PW3) is the informant. Nitin Verma (PW7) did not support the prosecution case. Inspector Amar Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. Subhash Chander (PW9) mechanically examined the vehicles. HC Sahib Singh (PW10) proved the entry in the daily diary. Sunil Kumar (PW11) is an eyewitness. 4 2026:HHC:43564 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent and had not caused any accident. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the witnesses that the accused was driving the bus on the wrong side of the road were corroborated by the site plan and the photographs. The skid marks were visible behind the bus, suggesting that the accused was unable to control the bus. There was nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that they had made false statements. Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. The prosecution case could not be doubted because some of the witnesses had not supported it. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 10 days. 5 2026:HHC:43564 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. The prosecution version that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed was corroborated by the skid marks seen on the spot. The skid marks showed that the bus had moved from the central line to the right side. The learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material on record. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was also lenient, which did not require any interference in the appeal. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Many people had gathered on the spot, but no person was examined. The prosecution version was highly improbable. The truck was released to the informant on the same day. Hence, no reliance could have been placed upon the photographs or the site plan. The statements of 6 2026:HHC:43564 the witnesses were read piecemeal and were not read holistically. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Anuj Bali, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The informant admitted that the truck was released to him on the same day. The mechanical examination of the truck was conducted on the next day, which is not possible. This aspect was ignored by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the accident had occurred in the year 2007 and the witnesses had deposed in 7 2026:HHC:43564 the year 2009 after the lapse of nearly 2 years. The contradictions were bound to come with time. This Court should not re- appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior 8 2026:HHC:43564 Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 9 2026:HHC:43564 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the 10 2026:HHC:43564 evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 11 2026:HHC:43564 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Informant Harbans Singh (PW3) stated that he was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-63-1913. When the truck reached near Sherpa Auto, an HRTC bus bearing registration No. HP-03B-6031 came at a high speed from the opposite side. It overtook a tipper and hit the truck on the wrong 12 2026:HHC:43564 side of the road. His truck suffered damage in the accident. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that the bus was pressed from the left side. There was a traffic jam for about 1½ hours, which was cleared by the police. The police reached the spot 1½ hours after the accident. The bus was carrying passengers. About 100- 150 people had gathered at the spot. The police had recorded the statements of the passengers. He volunteered to say that he could not tell the number of persons whose statements were recorded. The investigation was conducted at Sherpa Auto, which is a mechanic shop. The vehicle was handed over to him at 08:00-8:30, and he left the spot immediately thereafter. There was a curve at the place of the accident. He denied that there was no negligence on the part of the accused. 16. It was submitted that the truck was handed over to him at about 08:00-8:30 and no reliance can be placed upon the photographs and the site plan. The mechanical examination of the truck was also conducted on 19.12.2007 at about 12:00 p.m., which is not possible. Hence, the prosecution case becomes 13 2026:HHC:43564 doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. The sapurdari memo (Ext.PW1/C) shows that the truck was handed over to the informant on 19.12.2007. The informant has nowhere stated that the truck was handed over to him on the date of the accident. Therefore, his testimony regarding the delivery of the truck at about 08:00-8:30 has to be read along with the sapurdari memo, and it cannot be inferred from his testimony that the truck was handed over to him on the date of the accident. 17. It was submitted that there is a blank space in the memo (Ext.PW1/C) which shows that it was prepared subsequently and not on the date mentioned in the memo. This submission cannot be accepted. Shyam Lal (PW1) proved the memo. He was not cross-examined regarding the date of preparing the memo. No suggestion was put to him that the sapurdari memo was not prepared on the date mentioned in the memo; even though a suggestion was put to him that the Memo was prepared in the Police Station. Harbans Singh (PW3) had also signed the memo, and it was also not suggested to him that it was not prepared on the date mentioned in the memo. Therefore, the submission that the sapurdari memo was not prepared on the date mentioned in it cannot be accepted. 14 2026:HHC:43564 18. Informant admitted that 100-150 people were present on the spot and the bus was filled with passengers. It was submitted that the statements of the passengers and independent witnesses were not recorded. Hence, the prosecution case is doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. In Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696, the incident had taken place at the bus stand. It was contended that independent witnesses were not examined and the prosecution case was doubtful. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent persons. It was observed: “11. In light of these principles, we may now consider the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. The contention relates to the failure of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses. The High Court has examined this contention but did not find any infirmity in the investigation. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has not been able to produce any independent witness to the incident that took place at the bus stand. There must have been several such witnesses. But the prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. The experience reminds us that civilised people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves 15 2026:HHC:43564 away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that a crime, like a civil dispute, is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere, whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness, must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused." 19. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be doubted because of the non-examination of the persons present on the spot. 20. The informant’s statement that the bus was driven at a high speed and towards the wrong side of the road is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW8/B), wherein 2½ feet of skid marks have been shown from the central line towards the right side of the road from where the skid marks had started. A distance of 14 feet is available towards the left side of the bus, while 13 feet of space is available towards its right side. The photographs (Ext.A3 and Ext.A4) also show the skid marks behind the tyre of the bus. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J. 2024 that the spot map 16 2026:HHC:43564 showing the skid marks to the extent of 74 feet proved the negligence of the accused. It was observed: “10. Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A, the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid marks of 74 feet on the road are clear to show that the jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the right side and crushed the girl at point 'A'…” 21. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the bus was being driven at a high speed towards the right side of the road. 22. Sunil Kumar (PW11) stated that he was taking tea at Sherpa Tea Stall, Shoghi, on 18.12.2007. An HRTC bus came from Solan and hit a truck coming from Shimla at about 05:20 p.m. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the bus, as he had driven the bus towards the right side at a high speed. The accused was driving the bus. He stated in his cross- examination that 4-5 persons were present in the Sherpa Tea stall. It was dark at the time of the accident. There was a traffic jam, and many vehicles had stopped on the road. The police 17 2026:HHC:43564 reached the spot after about 10-15 minutes. The police remained on the spot for about 30-45 minutes. The passengers were also present on the spot. 23. The informant stated that the police had reached the spot after 1½ hours, whereas this witness stated that the police had reached the spot after 10-15 minutes. The informant stated that the police remained on the spot for 2½ -3 hours, whereas this witness stated that the police remained on the spot for 30- 45 minutes. It was submitted that the discrepancies in the time mentioned by these witnesses will make the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission will not help the accused. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accident had occurred in the year 2007, whereas the witnesses had made the statements in the years 2009 and 2010. Therefore, the contradictions were bound to come, as memories fail with time. Further, no person remembers the time by looking at the watch, and when he is asked about the time, he generally gives an estimate of the time. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the moment, and one cannot expect people to make 18 2026:HHC:43564 very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed: - “(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.” 24. Therefore, the discrepancy regarding the time is not sufficient to make the prosecution case doubtful. 25. Subhash Chander (PW9) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles and prepared the reports (Ext.PW9/A and Ext.PW9/B). It has been mentioned in the report (Ext.PW9/A) that it was prepared at Boileauganj ground on 19.12.2007, whereas the report (Ext.PW9/B) was prepared at Shoghi. It was submitted that it is highly unlikely that one vehicle was examined on the spot and the other was examined at Boileauganj ground. Subhash Chander (PW9) stated in his cross-examination that the traffic was moving on the road at the time of his visit to the spot, which shows that the police had moved the vehicle before the examination, and this was also necessary to clear the traffic jam. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be doubted because the vehicle was moved from the spot. 19 2026:HHC:43564 26. The statements of the witnesses that the HRTC bus was driven towards the right side of the road while overtaking the tipper are duly corroborated by the site plan and the photographs, and the learned Courts below had rightly accepted it. 27. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 20 2026:HHC:43564 28. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 29. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW- 6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the 21 2026:HHC:43564 motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 30. In the present case, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulation, which led to the accident, and both the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the Bus. 31. The evidence on record shows that the accused had driven the bus towards the right side and had put the lives of the passengers travelling in the bus and the informant driving the truck in danger. Thus, he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. 32. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor 22 2026:HHC:43564 suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so that the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in motion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result 23 2026:HHC:43564 in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 33. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 34. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, 24 2026:HHC:43564 where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 35. In the present case, the learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of imprisonment till rising of the Court, and the payment of a fine of ₹1,000/-, which was extremely lenient and no further leniency is required in the present case. 36. No other point was urged. 37. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 38. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 39. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th October, 2026 (Nikita)