1 2026:CGHC:4445 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Writ Petition (C) No. 4138 of 2025 Order Reserved on 26.09.2025 Order Delivered on 27 .01.2026 Harikrishna Ogare S/o Late Shri Ganesh Ram Ogare Aged About 33 Years R/o Village- Devri, Tahsil- Mungeli, District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - Regional Transport Authority Sector 27 3rd Floor, Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - M/s Rainbow Travels Through Prop. Anurag Shukla, Bus Operator, R/o Ravi Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - State Transport Appellate Tribunal Ghadi Chowk, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondents ___________________________________________________________ For petitioner : Mr. Anshul Ranjan Shrivastava & Mr. Shivesh Singh, Advocates For State-Respondent : Mr. Satish Gupta, Govt. Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Subodh Pandey, Advocate ___________________________________________________________ Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma CAV Order 1. By way of this petition, petitioner sought following relief(s) : 2 “10.1 That, petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the record of the petitioner and kind enough to quash the impugned order dt. 18/07.2025 passed by Respondent no. 3 in Revision no. 31/2025 i.e. ANNEXURE P/1, in the interest of justice. 10.2 Any other relief or reliefs that may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may be also kindly be granted.” 2. Brief facts of this case are that the Petitioner is a stage carriage permit holder and plying his buses on various routs to provide better transport facilities to the commuters and hence applied for a permanent permit for the general public living in the remote tribal areas and working on and off between Raipur to Kodwagudan covering almost 155 kms. The hearing was taken place before the RTA for vehicle on 02/09/2024 after affording opportunity to the route operators wherein the respondent no.2 has also objected during the hearing on the point of time table only. The order dated 20/01/2025 was issued and the permit was granted to the petitioner for vehicle bearing no. CG2025 -SC-0073A. Vide order dated 13.02.2025 for a period of 5 years. The aforesaid order and permit was challenge in the Revision Petition No. 31/2025 before the respondent no. 3 on various new grounds not mentioned in the objections raised during the hearing. The respondent no.3 has allowed the revision over ruling the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 1926, wherein it was laid down that there is no provision under Motor Vehicle Act to reject 3 the incomplete application for grant of permit since the respondent no.1 and the respondent no.3 are quasi-judicial authority, therefore, their jurisdiction is to decide the application within four corners of the Motor Vehicle Act and therefore the impugned order is illegal. Hence, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order has been passed by the respondent no.3 in utter violation of factual and legal aspect as well as settled principle of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts and therefore illegal by inception thus liable to be set aside. The impugned order is per-se illegal in as much as the respondent no.3 did not consider this very fact that the only motive of the Motor Vehicle Act is to provide better transport facilities to the commuters and since the respondent no.2 is not the route operator of the petitioner because the respondent no.2 is operating his vehicle between Bhatapara to Mungeli which is a part of common route. however the petitioner is coming from Raipur to Kodwagudan, therefore, the clashing of time table is inevitable because more than 100 vehicles operating between the Raipur to Bilaspur via Mungeli, Bhatapara, etc, therefore the Tribunal ought to have quash the revision in the light of settled principle of Full Bench of Kerala High Court AIR 2007 Kerala 177, but the revision was allowed therefore the impugned order is illegal thus liable to be set aside. He would further submit that the impugned order is per-se illegal in as much as the Rule 72(3)(c)(b) 4 (e) had been fulfilled by the petitioner since the application submitted in compliance of Sub-Clause (c) with total number of vehicles with permits and spare vehicles along with payment of taxes duly submitted by the petitioner with his application having No Dues of taxes on these vehicles simultaneously in compliance of Sub Clause(b) the detail of registration of vehicle issued by the RTO had already been submitted and the sub clause (e) is not applicable since Chhattisgarh Road Transport Corporation is not existed in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore declaration sought in this sub clause is obsolete clause hence the impugned order is illegal. The impugned order is illegal in as much as the Tribunal in para 15 of the impugned order has not only over ruled the Full Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court (AIR 2006 Kerala 177) but also wrongly interpreted the option to exercise its mind to the facts and circumstances of each cases since the only grounds taken in the objection was the time table, therefore the respondents cannot file a revision on any other new ground which neither raised at the time of hearing nor considered, hence the impugned order is illegal thus liable to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the impugned order dated 18.07.2025 is lawful and based on binding precedents, holding the field on the issue. The petitioner’s reliance on judgments under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is 5 misconceived, as the present case is governed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The answering respondent has valid locus standi due to route overlap and clash of timings. The requirement of disclosure of maintenance and repair facilities in Column No.12 is mandatory, and non-compliance renders the application invalid. Since the petitioner failed to meet this statutory requirement, Respondent No.3 rightly set aside the permit, warranting no interference under writ jurisdiction. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 6. Considering the facts of the case and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and examined the impugned order with utmost circumspection. 7. Section 70 of the Act, 1988 provides that an application for a permit in respect of a stage carriage or as a reserve stage carriage shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars namely; (a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates; (b) the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle; (c) the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided and the time-table of the normal trips. Explanation.—For purposes of this section, Section 72, Section 80 and Section 102, “trip” means a single 6 journey from one point to another, and every return journey shall be deemed to be a separate trip; (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions; (e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing, maintenance and repair of the vehicles, for the comfort and convenience of passengers and for the storage and safe custody of luggage; (f) such other matters as may be prescribed. 8. On perusal of the records, it reveals that the impugned order has been passed on the basis that the application Form MPMVR- 42 Column Nos. 11 to 15 has not been filled up by the petitioner. First of all, petitioner has been filed Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) (Annexure P-2) not filed application Form MPMVR- 42. Now, this Court has gone through the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) (Annexure P-2) and as per column No.5, 6 & 7, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has applied for ‘stage carriage permit’ for vehicle bearing registration No.CG-10-G-5400. 9. In Column 11, it is mentioned that “Applicable in this case of application for reserve stage carriage permit”. It is pertinent to mention here that ‘Stage Carriage Permit’ defined under Section 2(40) and granted under Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a "stage carriage" is a motor vehicle designed to carry more than six passengers for hire or reward at separate fares for individual passengers, covering the whole or parts of the journey. 7 These vehicles operate like public buses on a fixed route or area with designated stops and a timetable while ‘Reserved Carriage’ defined under Section 2(7) and granted under Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a "Contract Carriage" is a vehicle hired as a whole under a contract to carry passengers for hire or reward. Unlike stage carriages, they do not pick up passengers not included in the contract during the journey. Examples include taxis, tourist buses, and school buses. 10. Column 11(a) of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Details of reserve stage carriage for which reserve stage carriage permit is desired”, column 11(b) of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Details of reserve stage carriage permits already held by the applicant”, column 11(c) of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Details of stage carriage permit on which vehicle mentioned in column 4 is authorized to use as reserved stage carriage.” 11. In order to adjudicate the issue involved in the present petition, namely, whether the application of the petitioner could have been rejected on account of non-filling of Columns 11 to 15 of Form C.G.M.V.R.-42 (S.C.P.A.), it becomes necessary to examine the nature, scope and applicability of each of the said columns individually. 12. Column 11 requires the applicant to disclose the stage carriage 8 permit number under which the vehicle mentioned in the form is already authorised to operate. This column is evidently applicable only in cases where the applicant is already holding a stage carriage permit. In the present case, the petitioner had applied for grant of a fresh permit and admittedly was not holding any stage carriage permit on the date of application. In the absence of any existing permit, there was no occasion for the petitioner to furnish any permit number. Thus, Column No. 11 was not applicable to the petitioner’s application. 13. Column 12 of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “The arrangements intended to be made.” 14. Column 12 pertains to the validity of the route covered under an existing permit. Since the petitioner was not operating any stage carriage service prior to the filing of the application, no route validity existed which could have been disclosed. This column presupposes an already sanctioned route and therefore cannot be insisted upon in an application seeking initial grant. Accordingly, Column No. 12 was also irrelevant for the petitioner. 15. Column 13 of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Any other information as desired by the RTA.” 16. Column 13 requires disclosure of the number of daily trips authorised under an existing permit. In the absence of any prior 9 permit, the question of authorised daily trips did not arise. It is also borne out from the record that the petitioner had separately submitted the proposed time-table, which was duly considered by the competent authority at the time of grant. Hence, non-filling of Column No. 13 cannot be treated as a defect. 17. Column 14 of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Particulars to be furnished in case of application of renewal.” 18. Column 14 seeks details of the vehicle already authorised under a stage carriage permit. The petitioner had duly disclosed the particulars of the vehicle proposed to be operated, including vehicle number, make, model and seating capacity, in the relevant columns meant for fresh grant. Column 14, however, relates to a vehicle already covered by an existing permit, which situation was admittedly absent in the present case. Therefore, Column 14 had no applicability to the petitioner. 19. Column 15 of the Form CGMVR-42 (SCPA) denotes that “Particulars of all stage carriage permits held in the applicant or held by him the name of any person and permit held by any company of which the applicant is a director.” 20. Column 15 requires disclosure of the classification of service under an existing permit, such as ordinary, express or deluxe. Since the petitioner was not operating any stage carriage service 10 prior to the grant, no such classification could have been furnished. The classification of the proposed service was a matter to be determined by the authority while granting the permit, and not a pre-condition to filing the application. Thus, Column 15 was also not required to be filled. Result of the Examination 21. From the above analysis, it is evident that Columns No. 11 to 15 are conditional in nature and are applicable only in cases where the petitioner is already a permit holder or where renewal/reserve stage carriage permit is involved. They do not apply to an application seeking grant of a fresh stage carriage permit. 22. The rejection of the petitioner’s application solely on the ground of non-filling of these columns reflects a hyper-technical approach, ignoring the substance of the application and the purpose of the prescribed form. 23. It is evident from the record that the impugned order has been passed by respondent No.3 without due appreciation of the factual matrix and the settled principles governing the field under the Motor Vehicles Act. The primary object of the Act is to ensure efficient, convenient, and uninterrupted transport facilities for the commuting public. The Tribunal, while allowing the revision, has failed to keep this object in mind and has proceeded on a hyper- 11 technical interpretation of the provisions, thereby defeating the very purpose of the statute. 24. The objection raised by respondent No.2 was confined solely to the alleged clash of time-tables. It is an admitted position that respondent No.2 is not operating on the same route as that of the petitioner, but only on a part of a common route, whereas the petitioner operates on a distinct and longer route. In view of the large number of vehicles operating on the Raipur–Bilaspur sector via Mungeli and Bhatapara, some overlapping of time schedules is inevitable and cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for interference. 25. The Tribunal has further committed a manifest error in overlooking the binding ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in AIR 2007 Kerala 177, which categorically holds that a mere time-table clash on a common route is not sufficient to set aside a permit or to interfere with the grant thereof. The reasoning adopted in Paragraph-15 of the impugned order not only runs contrary to the said binding precedent but virtually overrules it, which the Tribunal was not competent to do. 26. This Court further finds that the petitioner had duly complied with the requirements of Rule 72(3)(b) and (c) by furnishing all necessary details relating to vehicle registration, permits, spare 12 vehicles, and payment of taxes along with No Dues Certificates. As regards Rule 72(3)(e), the same is clearly inapplicable in the State of Chhattisgarh in the absence of the Chhattisgarh Road Transport Corporation, rendering the requirement under the said clause obsolete. The Tribunal, therefore, erred in law in treating non-compliance of the said provision as a valid ground for allowing the revision. 27. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Babu Goverdhan Regular Motor Service & Others, (1970) AIR (SC) 1926: Para 17 & 18 of said order are as under : “17. The further question that arises for consideration, is as to whether the view of the High Court that the application of the appellant is defective and suitable to be dismissed inasmuch as columns 10, 14 and 15 in the application form have not been properly filled up, is correct. Here again, we are not inclined to agree with the reasoning of the High Court that under such circumstances the application filed by the appellant cannot., be treated to be an application under the Act. It is needless to state that an application must. furnish full and complete information that is within his knowledge or possession, in his application for the grant of a permit. The scheme of the Act is quite clear, viz. that an applicant must have a proper permit for operating transport services. To obtain that permit, certain formalities and procedure have to be gone through. Apart from the other applicants having an opportunity to make representations or objections to 13 the claim made by a particular applicant, certain other persons and authorities, as will be seen under s. 57(3), have been given a right to make representations. Such filing of objections or making of representations can be effective only if an applicant gives all the information which is in it.s power or control. The expression, 'as far as may be', occurring in s. 46 of the Act, must only mean that an applicant must give information on the various particulars and matters referred to in s. 46, in so far as those requirements apply to him and in respect of which it is possible to give information. In the absence of the expression 'as far as may be' in the old s. 46 of the Act, the Mysore High Court, in two of its decisions C.K.M. Services v. Mys. Revenue Board(1) and Sethuramachar v. Hiranayya(2) has taken the view that the provisions in s. 46 must be considered to be mandatory and non-compliance with those provisions will mean that there is no proper and valid application under the Act and that an authority would be justified in rejecting the same. In Sethuramachar's case('2) the High Court has indicated that in the section, as it now stands, the position may be different. 18. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in an unreported decision in S.H. Motor Transport Company v. The State Transport Appellate Authority(3) (a certified copy of which has been given to us) has held that when an applicant does not give some information on certain particulars required under s. 46, it must be understood that he does not intend to do the necessary things as mentioned therein. In our opinion, the matter has to be approached from a slightly different angle, viz., whether the authorities have got the power to reject an 14 application summarily if it does not contain information on any matters or particulars referred to in the form. We are unable to find any provision in the statute giving a power to the transport. authorities to reject an application summarily on that ground; but, we have already emphasized that the application must give the necessary information on the various particulars and matters enumerated in the form prescribed for such purpose. It is to the interest of the applicant himself to give full and clear information because he stands the risk of the permit not being granted to him for lack of information on certain matters. But this is quite a different thing from the power of the authority to reject an application forthwith on the ground that the application is defective. The only provision where such a power to reject summarily is given is under the proviso to s. 57(3). Under this proviso, the Regional Transport Authority, without following the procedure of publishing an application and inviting objections can summarily refuse the application in the circumstances mentioned therein. No doubt it may be asked that if an application lacks information on very vital matters, the whole object of publishing the same and inviting objections could not be achieved because the parties entitled to make objections and representations cannot effectively make the same. But, as we have already pointed out it is really in the interest of the applicant himself to give the information as far as it lies within his power, on all matters. What the High Court has done in this case, was really to reject the application of the appellant summarily, a power which even the Transport Authority does not, in our opinion, have 15 under the Act. Probably the statute did not give power to an authority to reject an application summarily in cases not coming within the proviso to s. 57(3) because when considering an application for grant of permit on merits, it may be open to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving reasons, under s. 57(7), to refuse the application for permit. In such a case, as the Regional Transport Authority is bound to give reasons, the sufficiency and validity of the reasons given may also be canvassed before the appellate authority in an appeal under s. 64 of the Act. But all this can be done only at the time of considering the grant of permit on merits, and not at an earlier stage, and the refusal to grant the permit will be not on the ground that the application is defective, but on the ground that the particulars or information and other matters given in the permit do not enable the Regional Transport Authority to take the view that a particular applicants claims are superior to those of others.” 28. In light of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the permit cannot be cancelled only on the ground of defective application. It is pertinent to mention here that when considering an application for grant of permit on merits, it may be open to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving reasons to refuse the application for permit but all this can be done only at the time of considering the grant of permit on merits, and not at an earlier stage, and the refusal to grant the permit will be not on the ground that the application is defective. But on the ground that the particulars or 16 information and other matters given in the permit do not enable the Regional Transport Authority to take the view that a particular applicant’s claim is defective. Conclusion 29. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that non- filling of Columns 11 to 15 did not render the application of the petitioner defective. Therefore, this Court holds that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality and arbitrariness and is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. 30. Accordingly, the order dated 18.07.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by Respondent No.3 in Revision No.31/2025 is hereby set-aside and the present petition is allowed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Vasant