2026:HHC:43554 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1065 of 2026 Reserved on: 25.9.2026 Date of Decision: 07.10.2026. Sukhwinder Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of HP & Anr. …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Sneh Bhimta and Sameer Thakur, Advocates. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition has been filed for quashing of the Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) dated 04.02.2023 prepared by Police Station Dharamshala for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:43554 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Nishant Kumar Sharma, made a complaint to the police that his ingress to the property was obstructed by debris and building material by Sukhwinder Singh @ Mithu (the present petitioner) and other contractors. They entered into the informant's property by breaking the lock put on the main gate and threw the debris inside it. The debris, including boulders, etc., had been thrown all over the road. Dumpers, tractors, and excavators were parked on the road, which were causing a serious threat to the traffic moving on the road. Hence, it was prayed that action be taken against the accused persons. 3. The police investigated the matter and found that the informant, Nishant Sharma, had taken the property bearing Khasra Nos. 825, 826, 833, and 834 from Sarita Shreedhar. Sukhwinder @ Mithu (the present petitioner) was carrying out the construction on the land of Sunita Kumari. He threw the 35 tippers of debris on the informant’s land. The petitioner disclosed on inquiry that the informant had asked him to dump the debris on his land and had handed over the key to him. The informant had not cooperated with the investigation. The police found after the investigation that an offence punishable under Section 427 of the 3 2026:HHC:43554 IPC was made out, but no offence punishable under Section 447 of the IPC was made out. Hence, a Non-Cognizable Report was filed before the Court. 4. The learned Trial Court held that the police had filed the complaint, whereas the matter was to be treated as a police report. Hence, the Court ordered the issuance of summons to the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC. 5. Being aggrieved by the filing of the NCR and the issuing of the notice, the petitioner/accused has approached this Court, asserting that no offence is made out against him. The allegations in the FIR and the police report, even if taken to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. The ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC are not made out. The informant failed to establish his ownership or possessory rights over the land in question where the debris was thrown. The throwing of the debris on the property does not cause any destruction or change in the property. The report of the demarcation shows that the debris was thrown on Khasra Nos. 824, 825, 832, 833, 834, and 827. Khasra Nos. 824, 832, and 833 4 2026:HHC:43554 are owned by the villagers. Khasra No. 827 is owned by the State of H.P. The police did not examine any owner to corroborate its version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the NCR pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 6. I have heard M/s Sneh Bhimta and Sameer Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 7. Ms Sneh Bhimta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are false. The allegations in the FIR and NCR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 8. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the report of the demarcation prima facie establishes that the petitioner had thrown the debris upon the informant's land and the land of other persons. The principle of locus standi does not apply to the criminal case, and ownership of the property is immaterial. The police have 5 2026:HHC:43554 filed the report before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it and should relegate the petitioner to the remedies available under law. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly 6 2026:HHC:43554 defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code 7 2026:HHC:43554 or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of 8 2026:HHC:43554 this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 12. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of the process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 9 2026:HHC:43554 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The status report mentions that 35 tippers of debris were thrown on the land. The report of the demarcation conducted by Tehsildar, Dharamshala, mentions that huge piles of mud and debris were found on the spot. The demarcation was conducted, and this debris was found on Khasra Nos. 824, 825, 832, 833, 834, and 827. Khasra No. 832 was in the possession of Jagdish Chand, Dev Raj, and Smt. Sarita Shreedhar. Khasra No. 834 is in the possession of Smt. Sarita Shreedhar. The informant specifically stated that he is the power of attorney for Smt. Sarita Shridhar. Therefore, prima facie, the debris was thrown on the land in the informant’s possession. 15. It was submitted that no power of attorney was taken on record, and the informant’s allegation that he is the power of attorney of Smt. Sarita Shreedhar has not been established. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - 10 2026:HHC:43554 “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 16. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that 11 2026:HHC:43554 once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23, this Court, while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge- sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not 12 2026:HHC:43554 supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 18. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited, as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 13 2026:HHC:43554 19. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 20. It was submitted that throwing of the debris on the property does not cause any damage to it, and the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 425 of IPC are not satisfied. This submission is not acceptable. Section 425 of the IPC provides that if property is destroyed, changed, or its value or utility is diminished, a mischief is committed. Section 23 of the IPC defines wrongful loss as loss of property caused by unlawful means, to which the person losing it is legally entitled. It was held in Dilip Kumar v. State of U.P., 2011 SCC OnLine All 600 that raising construction on the public road would diminish its value and would constitute mischief. It was observed: The definition of “mischief” is to have the same meaning as given under section 425 of the Penal Code, 1860. Section 425 of the Penal Code, 1860 defines mischief thus: “Whoever with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits mischief”. Thus, this section clearly speaks of causing any change in property or to destroy or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously; this constitutes “mischief”. Thus, on this broad definition, certainly by making 14 2026:HHC:43554 construction on public land, which is not permissible, its utility will be diminished, and the property will be injuriously affected. 21. The throwing of the debris over the property would diminish its value and force the owner to remove it by employing labour or other suitable means. Therefore, the owner would suffer a loss which he would not have done but for the throwing of the debris over the property. Hence, prima facie, the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC are satisfied. 22. It is undisputed that the police have filed the NCR before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be 15 2026:HHC:43554 filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 23. The allegations in the complaint Qmade to the police and the contents of the NCR show the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC. Therefore, the proceedings cannot be quashed, and the judgment of Kim Wansoo Bansu v. State of U.P., 2023 (11) SCC 673, that when no offence is found to have been committed, does not apply to the present case. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 26. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th October, 2026 (Chander)