JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Gyanand Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner duly assisted by Ms. Akanksha Malviya and Mr. Brajendra Nath Pandey, learned counsel representing the sole respondent. 2. The present petition has been preferred for the grant of following relief(s): “(i) for quashing the order dated 15.12.2009 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Khagaria in Execution Case No. 01 of 2003 (Meenakshi Gupta @ Rinku vs.Deepak Kumar) by which it has been held that the execution case filed by the respondent under Order XXI, Rule 11 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to execute the award dated 31.05.2003 made by the Special Lok Adalat, Khagaria is maintainable in the eye of law and as such the parties may further proceed in the matter in accordance with procedural law. (ii) for holding that the award dated 31.05.2003 made by the Special Lok Adalat, Khagaria is not executable in the facts and circumstances of the case and as such the execution case filed by the respondent for execution of the said award is not maintainable. (iii) for grant of any such other relief or reliefs for which the petitioner is legally found entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The petitioner, Deepak Kumar and the respondent, Meenakshi Gupta @ Rinku tied nuptial knots on 10.12.1993 . The petitioner at that time was serving as the Scientist in the Department of Information and Technology, Government of India, Chennai. Though they continued their marital journey together for more than five years, it is his case that once the petitioner’s mother reached Chennai, the problem arose and thereafter, the lady left for her parents’ home at Khagaria, (Bihar). This followed Complaint Case No. 568(C) of 1999 under section 498 (A) of the Indian Penal Code and ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act 4. Two other cases which came into existence thereafter are/were the Divorce Suit No. 8 of 2002 and the Maintenance Case No. 12 of 2000 . Later, good sense prevailed upon the parties and their joint petition/agreement was stamped by the Lok Adalat, Khagaria which followed the award dated 31.05.2003. 5. Two other cases which came into existence thereafter are/were the Divorce Suit No. 8 of 2002 and the Maintenance Case No. 12 of 2000 . Later, good sense prevailed upon the parties and their joint petition/agreement was stamped by the Lok Adalat, Khagaria which followed the award dated 31.05.2003. 5. As per the award, the parties agreed to close/withdraw all the three aforesaid cases in the following terms and conditions: “(i) they will be taking care of the sentiments of each other as husband and wife and shall not do anything which is not moral; (ii) the petitioner shall be paying one- third of his salary to the lady in her Bank Account; (iii) the ornaments of the lady shall be returned by the petitioner; (iv) in case, any of the party violates the terms and conditions, one of them shall be entitled to move before a competent Civil Court for getting it executed.” (Annexure-3 to the petition). 6. Close on the signing of the aforesaid agreement, which followed the award, the lady feeling cheated by the husband preferred Execution Case No. 1 of 2003 (Meenakshi Gupta @ Rinku vs. Deepak Kumar) before the Family Court, Khagaria alleging that the petitioner who is drawing salary of Rs.20,000/- and was thus liable to pay one-third of the salary following the agreement has sent only the Bank Draft of only Rs.716/- for the month of June, 2003. It is to be noted that the award is dated 31.05.2003 and the first draft that was received by the lady was of Rs.716/-. (Annexure-4 to the petition). 7. Notice was issued to the petitioner who filed his response on 06.02.2004 and in between, he ensured that from the month of July, 2003, the lady receives an amount ranging between Rs.2,500/- to Rs.4,000/-. (Annexure-5 to the petition). 8. The record thus shows that at the first instance, the petitioner chose to violate the terms and conditions of the agreement signed between the parties on 31.05.2003. 9. As the story unfolds, in the year 2006, the respondent, Meenakshi Gupta preferred another Matrimonial ( Divorce) Suit No. 4 of 2006 (Meenakshi Gupta @ Rinku vs. Deepak Kumar) . The parties appeared and vide an order dated 15.12.2009 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Khagaria , the said petition was allowed and the marriage was dissolved. 9. As the story unfolds, in the year 2006, the respondent, Meenakshi Gupta preferred another Matrimonial ( Divorce) Suit No. 4 of 2006 (Meenakshi Gupta @ Rinku vs. Deepak Kumar) . The parties appeared and vide an order dated 15.12.2009 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Khagaria , the said petition was allowed and the marriage was dissolved. No financial liabilities/payment to the lady has been discussed in the said order. (Annexure-7 to the petition). 10. On the same day ( 15.12.2009 ), the concerned learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Khagaria took up the Execution Case No.1 of 2003 and after observing that the conditions/agreement signed between the parties have been violated and in case of failure of the either of the party to fulfill the terms and conditions of the award, they had liberty to approach the competent Civil Court for the execution of the award, the Court held the petition to be maintainable. 11. The concluding paragraph of the order dated 15.12.2009 read as under: “In the result, It find no irregularity if the decree-holder has filed the instant execution case against the Judgment-debtor for realisation of money in regard to the Award or the Decree. To sum up, this execution case is maintainable in the eyes of law and the parties may further proceed in accordance with procedural law.” 12. Aggrieved, the present writ petition. Pursuant to the notice issued to the sole respondent, she put in her appearance here. 13. Mr. Gyanand Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it was the lady who breached the condition inasmuch as she never went to Chennai to reside as a wife. He submits that the subsequent development is that Divorce Suit filed by her has been allowed, they no longer continue as the husband and wife and as such, the award is not executable. In that background, the Family Court, Khagaria erred in deciding that the petition is maintainable. 14. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court to the judgment and order of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Chen Shen Ling vs. Nand Kishore Jhajharia reported in 1972 SC 726 with reference to paragraph no. 7 which read as follows: “ 7 . 14. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court to the judgment and order of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Chen Shen Ling vs. Nand Kishore Jhajharia reported in 1972 SC 726 with reference to paragraph no. 7 which read as follows: “ 7 . In our view the terms of the decree required that the judgment-debtor himself shall pay immediately after the signing of the decree a sum of Rs. 41,254.12 and that after every six months thereafter he was to go on making payments of identical amounts until the entire decretal amount was paid up, and although the word 'instalment' has been used in sub-clause (b) of Clause (2), it does not mean that the initial payment of Rs.41.254.12 n.p was not to be taken as an instalment for the purposes of sub-clause (f) of the said clause. Any other construction would, as pointed out by the High Court, lead to the absurd conclusion that if the judgment-debtor made a default in making the initial payment, the decree could not be executed for that amount even within three months subject to the decree-holder's getting the permission of the Reserve Bank as stated in the compromise terms or that he could not take out execution for the decretal amount in case there was a default for making the payment for six months. There is nothing to distinguish the initial payment of Rs. 41,254 12 n.p from the other like amounts to be paid subsequently. It is clear from what we have stated that the decree imposes mutual obligations on both the appellant and respondent in such a way that the performance by one is conditional on the performance by the other and accordingly no execution can be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his part but when objection was taken, satisfy the executing court that he was in a position to do so. This Court had in Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan 1956 SCR 62 = (AIR 1956 SC 359) , observed at pages 68-69:- “There may of course be decrees where the obligations imposed on each side are distinct and severable and in such a case each party might well be left to its own execution. This Court had in Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan 1956 SCR 62 = (AIR 1956 SC 359) , observed at pages 68-69:- “There may of course be decrees where the obligations imposed on each side are distinct and severable and in such a case each party might well be left to its own execution. But when the obligations are reciprocal and are interlinked so that they cannot be separated, any attempt to enforce performance unilaterally would be to defeat the directions in the decree and to go behind them which of course, an executing Court cannot do..........The reason is, as we have explained, that to hold otherwise would be to permit an executing Court to go behind the decree and vary its terms by splitting up what was fashioned as an indivisible whole into distinct and divisible parts having separate and severable existence without any interrelation be-tween them just as if they had been separate decrees in separate and distinct suits......... If the decree says that on payment being made some definite and specific thing is to be given to the other side, the executing Court cannot alter that and allow something else to be substituted for the thing ordered to be given.” 15. He has further drawn the attention of this Court to another case of Jai Narain Ram Lundia vs. Kedar Nath Khetan & Ors. reported in 1956 SC 359 with reference to paragraph no. 18 which read as follows: “18. Much of the argument about this revolved round the question whether the equitable rules that obtain before decree in a suit for specific performance continue at the stage of execution. It is not necessary for us to go into that here because the position in the present case is much simpler. When a decree imposes obligations on both sides which are so conditioned that performance by one is conditional on performance by the other execution will not be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his side but, when objection is raised, satisfies the executing Court that he is in a position to do so. Any other rule would have the effect of varying the conditions of the decree: a thing that an executing Court cannot do. Any other rule would have the effect of varying the conditions of the decree: a thing that an executing Court cannot do. There may of course be decrees where the obligations imposed on each side are distinct and severable and in such a case each party might well be left to its own execution. But when the obligations are reciprocal and are interlinked so that they cannot be separated, any attempt to enforce performance unilaterally would be to defeat the directions in the decree and to go behind them which, of course, an executing Court cannot do. The only question therefore is whether the decree in the present case is of this nature. We are clear that it is.” 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner conclude by submitting that the order dated 15.12.2009 needs interference and the petition be allowed. 17. Learned counsel representing the sole respondent on the other hand submits that the entire facts clearly shows that the parties came to an agreement on 31.05.2003 and payment of one-third salary was one of the important term and conditions. The petitioner breached the same in the following month itself by sending a meager amount of Rs.716/-. Thus contrary to the submissions put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the lady violated the terms and conditions, it was the petitioner himself who chose not to abide by it in the very next month. He submits that the aforesaid amount of Rs.716/- sent to the respondent was not only an insult to the lady but also to the award stamped by the Lok Adalat. 18. The submission is that even the ornament was not returned and thus the lady was forced to file the Execution Case No. 1 of 2003. As the petitioner attitude completely changed thereafter, she was left with no option but to prefer the Matrimonial (Divorce) Suit No. 4 of 2006 in which an order was passed on 15.12.2009 granting them Divorce. 19. Learned counsel submits that the Family Court, Khagaria having gone through the Award rightly held in its order dated 15.12.2009 that the petition is maintainable. The submission is that the petitioner will have the opportunity to satisfy the Court that in the facts and circumstances/the developments that took place thereafter, the award has become non-enforceable. However, he cannot challenge the maintainability of the petition. The submission is that the petitioner will have the opportunity to satisfy the Court that in the facts and circumstances/the developments that took place thereafter, the award has become non-enforceable. However, he cannot challenge the maintainability of the petition. He concludes by submitting that the petition is fit to be dismissed. 20. Having heard the parties and perusing the records, this Court firstly would take note of the award that was signed between the parties/couple. However, he cannot challenge the maintainability of the petition. He concludes by submitting that the petition is fit to be dismissed. 20. Having heard the parties and perusing the records, this Court firstly would take note of the award that was signed between the parties/couple. This Court reproduces the agreement dated 31.03.2003 which is the part of the award and read as follows: ¼1½ vLi’V ¼2½ vLi’V ¼3½ lquhy dqekj g0&vLi’V U;k;ky;] ,l- Mh- ts- ,e- [kxfM+;k dEiysu ds”k u0a 569lh@99 feuk{kh xqIrk cuke fnid dqekj oxSjg lh-Mh- ua- 4213 fo”ks’k yksd vnkyr u-a&2z 31-05-2003 eSa nhid dqekj iq= Lo0 jk/kks lko- osyu cktkj] iks0$Fkkuk$ftyk& eqaxsj orZeku foKku vf/kdkjh ,l- bZ- lehj lsaVj Qksu bysDVªkseSxuksfVDl- ¶ySV uEcj&Hkh- Jh vikVZeUs V uEcj&27 dkejkt ,eUs ;w dLV bLVªhV] vkfM;k j ih- vks- pUs ukbZ& 600020 rFkk Jhefr& ehUkk{kh xqIrk iRuh& fnid dqekj iq=h Lo0 eksgu yky xqIrk eksgkiV~Vh f”kokyk jksM] [kxfM;+ k Jh egs”k dqekj flag] vf/koDrk] Jh jktsUnz >k] vf/koDrk Jh dkSlsUnz dqekj flag] Jh pUnznos izlkn ;kno] yksd vfHk;kstu rFkk Jh vt; dqekj JhokLro] ftyk ,oa l= U;k;k/kh”k [kxfM+;k dh e/;oL;rk eas ftyk tuin U;k;k/kh”k [kxfM;+ k ds U;k;ky; eas yfEcr fookg foPNsn ckn la0@8@2002 ,oa Hkj.k&iks’k.k ckn la[;k 12@2000 vUrxZr fgUn Hkj.k&iks’k.k vf/kfu;e rFkk ifjokn okn la[;k 569lh@99 /kkjk 498, fooknksa dk vkilh le>kSras ds vk/kkj ij [kwc lksap le>dkj fcuk fdlh ncko ds LosPNkiwoZd fuEukafdr “krksZa ds vk/kkj ij lekIr djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k%& ¼1½ bl le>kSrs ds i{kdkj Jh nhid dqekj rFkk Jherh ehuk{kh xqIrk dk fookg 10 fnlEcj 1993 dks fgUnw jhfr&fjokt ds vuqlkj lEiUu gqvk ;kfu rRi”pkr nksuksa gh i{kdkj ifr&iRuh ds :i esa yxHkx lksa ikWp o’kksZa rd lq[kn oSokfgd thou O;rhr djrs jgsaA ijUrq] HkkX; dh fu;fr ds dkj.k nksuksa i{kksa esa erHksn ,sls mHkjsa tks eqdnesa ckth ds :i esa lkeus vk;s ijUrq vc nksuks gh i{k ;kuh nhid dqekj ,oa Jhefr ehUkk{kh xqIrk bl le>kSrs ds ek/;e ls cspSuc) gksrs gSa fd ge vkt ls ds ckn ls ,d nwljs ds lkFk lHkh ekuoh; laosnukvksa ds lkFk O;ogkj djrs gq, ,d nwljsa dks lEekuiwoZd lg;ksx ifr&iRuh ds :i esa jgrs jgsaxs vkSj ge nksuksa ifr iRuh dHkh Hkh ,d&nwljs ds izfr vLokHkkfotd] ve;kZfnr ,oa vekuoh; O;ogkj ugha djsaxsA ¼2½ eSa nhid dqekj rFkk Jhefr ehUkk{kh xqIrk bl ckr ij lger gSa fd oSokfgd thou esa mRiUu erHksnksa ls vkilh lnHkko ,oa fo”okl esa tks àkl vk;k gS mls vkilh fo”okl ,oa lnHkko dks iqu% Lfkkfir djus ds fy, eSa nhid dqekj vius dks cpuc) djrk gwWa ,oa lger gksrk gwWa fd eSa viuh iRuh Jhefr ehUkk{kh xqIrk dk Hkj.k&iks’k.k ns[k&Hkky ,oa lqj{kk ,d ftEesnkj ifr ds :i esa fuHkkrk jgwaxk vkSj vius lHkh dVkSfr;ksa ds ckn erHksnksa ls vkilh lnHkko ,oa fo”okl esa tks àkl vk;k gS mls vkilh fo”okl ,oa lnHkko dks iqu% Lfkkfir djus ds fy, eSa nhid dqekj vius dks cpuc) djrk gwWa ,oa lger gksrk gwWa fd eSa viuh iRuh Jhefr ehUkk{kh xqIrk dk Hkj.k&iks’k.k ns[k&Hkky ,oa lqj{kk ,d ftEesnkj ifr ds :i esa fuHkkrk jgwaxk vkSj vius lHkh dVkSfr;ksa ds ckn dqy izkIr osru dk 1@3 Hkkx Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk ds uke ij [kksys x;s cSad [kkrsa esa rc rd tek djrk jgwaxk tc rd fd nksuksa i{k e/; vkilh fo”okl ,oa lnHkko iqu% Lfkkfir u gks tk;s vkSj bldh iqf’V Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk Lo;a u dj nsaA ¼3½ eSa nhid dqekj rFkk Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk vkil esa bl ckr ij lger gksrs gSa rFkk cpuc) gksrs gSa fd Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk ds yxHkx 18 ¼vBkjg½ Hkj ds vkHkw’k.k ftldk ewY; yxHkx vLlh gtkj :i;k gSA dks nhid dqekj Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk ds vf/kiR; esa ns nsaxs vkSj og vkHkw’k.k Jhefr ehuk{kh xqIrk dks ck/;dkjh gksaxs vkSj ;fn bu “krksZa esa ls fdlh Hkh ,d “krZ ds mYya?ku fdlh Hkh i{kdkj }kjk fd;k tk;sxk rks bl le>kSrs dks ykxw djkus dk iw.kZ vf/kdkj O;ogkj U;k;ky;] [kxfM+;k ds {ks=k/khu fLFkr l{ke U;k;ky; dks gksxk vkSj i{kdkj dks ;g vf/kdkj gksxk fd og iwoZ ds ckn dkj.k ,oa u;s mRiUu okn dkj.kksa ds vk/kkj ij iqu% ckn lafLFkr dj ldsaxsA i{kdkj ¼1½ g0& vLi’V Jh nhid dqekj ¼2½ g0&vLi’V Jhefr ehUkk{kh dqekjh e/;LFk ¼1½ Jh vt; dqekj JhokLro] g0&vLi’V ftyk ,oa l= U;k;k/kh”k] [kxfM+;kA ¼2½ Jh fodk”k dqekj flag] g0&vLi’V vf/koDrk ¼3½ Jh ekuos sUnz dqekj] ¼vf/koDrk½ g0&vLi’V ¼4½ Jh jkts”k dqekj ¼HkkbZ½ g0&vLi’V ¼5½ Jh egs”k dqekj flag] g0&vLi’V vf/koDrk ¼6½ Jh jktsUnz >k] g0&vLi’V vf/koDrk ¼7½ Jh thrUs nz dqekj flag] g0&vLi’V vf/koDrk ¼8½ Jh pUnznos izlkn ;kno] g0&vLi’V yksd vfHk;kstd g0&vLi’V g0&vLi’V g0&vLi’V (emphasis added) 21. The content of the award clearly show that: (i) they were to take care of the sentiments of each other; (ii) the petitioner was to pay one-third of his salary amount to the lady; (iii) the petitioner further agreed to return the ornament to the lady. 22. The fourth condition further records that failure to abide by the terms and conditions, either of the party shall be knocking the doors of the competent Civil Court for the enforcement of the award. 22. The fourth condition further records that failure to abide by the terms and conditions, either of the party shall be knocking the doors of the competent Civil Court for the enforcement of the award. This Court has further taken note of the fact that the petitioner in the very next month breached the agreement signed between the parties by sending a Bank Draft of only Rs.716/- which followed the Execution Case No. 1 of 2003 . Thus, the stand of the petitioner that the lady violated the terms and condition has to be rejected outrightly. 23. In any case, this Court is not here to either ensure execution of the award or to see to it that whether the same is executable or not. The question before the Court is: “whether in the aforesaid facts and circumstances where one of the party chose not to abide by the terms and condition violating the same immediately after the award was stamped by the Lok Adalat on 31.05.2003, the other party was justified in filing the case before the competent court and in that background, whether the order dated 15.12.2009 by which the competent Civil Court held that the case is maintainable is justified or not.” 24. The Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (henceforth for short ‘the Act’) deals with award of the Lok Adalat and read as follows: “Award of Lok Adalat: (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of the section 20, the Court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870). (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award.” 25. The wordings of ‘the Act’ is very clear, every award by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall be filed to any court against the award. 26. The wordings of ‘the Act’ is very clear, every award by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall be filed to any court against the award. 26. In that background, when the petitioner violated the terms and conditions on the very next month, the lady rightly preferred petition before the competent Civil Court for getting it enforced. 27. It is to be noted that the petitioner has nowhere recorded as to whether he returned the ornaments of the respondent to her which was also part of the award. 28. So far as the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned in the case of Chen Shen Ling (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that decree imposes mutual obligations and no execution can be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only performs his obligation but when objection taken, satisfy the executing court that he was in a point to do so. 29. The aforesaid case of the Hon’ble Apex Court is not applicable in the present case where the Court is dealing on the point as to whether the petition preferred by the sole respondent before the Civil Court is maintainable or not. This Court can only observe that the petitioner will have the opportunity to satisfy the court concerned the circumstances which led him not to abide by the terms and conditions of the Award but cannot challenge its maintainability. 30. Again, so far as the case of Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra) is concerned, it also relates to the execution of the award and thus is distinct from the present case where this Court is dealing with the maintainability of the Execution Case preferred by the sole respondent. 31. The aforesaid two orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly show that the execution orders were challenged before the court concerned and in that background, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unless the parties perform their respective roles, the agreement is not executable. 32. The present case relates to maintainability of the petition preferred by the lady before the competent Civil Court in the year 2003 as the respondent alleged that the terms and conditions of the award was not adhered to by the petitioner. 32. The present case relates to maintainability of the petition preferred by the lady before the competent Civil Court in the year 2003 as the respondent alleged that the terms and conditions of the award was not adhered to by the petitioner. This Court is of the opinion that the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Khagaria was perfectly justified in holding that the Execution Case No. 1 of 2003 preferred by the lady against the petitioner is maintainable. The petitioner will have ample opportunity before the Family Court, Khagaria to satisfy as to what led to the failure of the award dated 31.05.2003. 33. The petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. The interim order dated 30.03.2010 stands vacated. The Interlocutory Application, if any, also stands consigned.