JUDGMENT : This appeal has been preferred by the appellants for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.12.2010 and 07.01.2011 respectively passed by learned Addl. District & Session Judge, F.T.C. 3 rd , Banka in S.T. No. 1302 of 2004 Tr. No. 483 of 2010 arising out of Amarpur P.S. Case No. 16 of 2004, G.R. Case No. 164 of 2004, whereby the concerned Trial Court has convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 304B/34 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Further the appellants were convicted under Section 201/34 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and in default of payment of fine further sentence of six months. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The brief case of the prosecution is that the daughter of the informant Sadhana Kumari was married to the Appellant No. 1 (Chandan Kumar alias Mantu) on 11.05.2003 and at the time of marriage his daughter went to her sasural with articles including ornaments and furniture etc. After one week her daughter came to her Mayaka Narayanpur. The accused Chandan Kumar used to come the house of the informant and demand Rs. 1,00,000/- as dowry from the informant’s daughter. On 28.12.2003 after the Bidai of his daughter the Appellant No. 1(Chandan Kumar) took his daughter to his home i.e. Katahara. On telephone the informant’s daughter told him that the accused Ram Kishun Singh (Father in law), Smt. Kaushalya Devi (Mother in law), Chandan Kumar (Husband) and Bhaisur Shankar Singh & Manoj Kumar Singh had demanded Rs.1,00,000/- as dowry, and if the same is not fulfilled they will kill & throw her into Kojhi Dam. On 19.02.2004, when the informant made a call on telephone to his daughter at her sasural, one lady received the phone, but after hearing the name of the informant she disconnected the phone. Then on doubt the informant along with some persons went to Kathara on 20.02.2004. There he found that the house of the accused Ram Kishun Singh was locked. On inquiry from the villagers it came to his knowledge that his daughter was killed. Then the informant lodged this case before the local police by way of a written application. Then on doubt the informant along with some persons went to Kathara on 20.02.2004. There he found that the house of the accused Ram Kishun Singh was locked. On inquiry from the villagers it came to his knowledge that his daughter was killed. Then the informant lodged this case before the local police by way of a written application. Based on the written application of the informant, Amarpur P.S. Case No. 16 of 2004 was registered against the appellants and others under Section 304B/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code 3. After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-Sheet No. 34 of 2004 dated 30.05.2004 against the appellants under Sections 304B/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The C.J.M., Banka took cognizance and committed the case to the court of Sessions. 4. The learned trial court after perusal of material collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant took cognizance, thereafter, the charges were framed on 26.07.2006 under Sections 304B/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants, which was explained to the appellants, to which, they pleased not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. To substantiate its case, the prosecution has examined altogether thirteen witnesses. They are:- (I) PW-1 Arun Mahto; (ii) PW-2 Bal Krishna Thakur ; (iii) PW-3 Arjun Mandal ; (iv) P.W.-4 Pradumn Mandal ; (v) P.W.-5 Mahesh Mahto ; (vi) P.W.- 6 Ram Mandal ; (vii) P.W.-7 Muni Lal Mandal ; (viii) P.W.-8 Rekha Devi ; (ix) P.W.-9 Ganesh Prasad Singh (informant) ; (x) P.W.-10 Manoj Kumar Singh ; (xi) P.W.-11 Sandeep Kumar (xii) P.W.-12 Yogesh Lal Mandal ; (xiii) P.W.-13 Arun Prasad Singh 6. Apart from the oral evidence, the prosecution has relied upon one exhibit i.e. Exhibit No. 1-Written petition. 7. On behalf of the defence three witnesses were examined. They are:- (i) D.W.-1 Naval Kishore Tanti; (ii) D.W.-2 Sanjay Mandal; (iii) D.W.-3 Saudagar Singh 8. Apart from the oral evidence, the defence has also relied upon following exhibits/documentary evidences, which are:- 9. On the basis of evidences/circumstances as surfaced during the trial, the learned trial court has examined the appellants under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., where they completely denied the evidences surfaced during the trial and claimed their complete innocence. 10. Apart from the oral evidence, the defence has also relied upon following exhibits/documentary evidences, which are:- 9. On the basis of evidences/circumstances as surfaced during the trial, the learned trial court has examined the appellants under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., where they completely denied the evidences surfaced during the trial and claimed their complete innocence. 10. Taking note of the evidence as surfaced during the trial and after considering the arguments as advanced by both the parties, the learned trial court has convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 304B/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them in the manner as indicated above. 11. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. Hence, the present appeal. 12. I have considered the rival submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the deposition of the witnesses examined during trial before learned trial court. 13. That the prosecution in order to prove its case has examined thirteen witnesses. Strangely enough P.W. 1, cousin, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 have been declared hostile. Before being declared hostile, in their chief, they have stated that the deceased was ill and was suffering from diarrhea. 14. P.W. 7 also clearly stated that Sadhna Kumari died due to diarrhea and she was having good relation with her husband and sasurali people. He has not been declared hostile. 15. P.W. 8, Rekha Devi, is the mother of the deceased. She has levelled the allegation of demand of dowry. The same is general and omnibus to the core without any specific instance, date, time or any supporting material at any level. The disturbed relation as portrayed by mother and also subsequently by father never ever resulted in any Panchayati or any claim before any authority. This complete absence of supporting material puts the prosecution case in doubt. 16. P.W. 9 is the father of the deceased and he has also levelled similar allegation and so have P.W. 10, P.W. 11 , P.W. 12 and P.W. 13. 17. The allegations have not traveled beyond three things:- (I) That there was demand of dowry by all the laws sans any specific details, date or time of the occurrence and also sans any objective material to support the allegation. 17. The allegations have not traveled beyond three things:- (I) That there was demand of dowry by all the laws sans any specific details, date or time of the occurrence and also sans any objective material to support the allegation. (II) That the girl was killed and her dead-body was cremated without information to the prosecution. (III) That Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:- “304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 18. The law though provides for a presumption in case of dowry death if death is in other than natural circumstance, within seven years of marriage and there is a demand of dowry within close proximity of the death or killing. 19. In this backdrop, it is necessary to examine the materials which have been produced by the either side relating to death of the deceased. The prosecution has just levelled bald allegation of killing without any material as to how and where and when the dead-body was disposed off. The defence on the other hand has exhibited the prescription of referral hospital, the death certificate and the document relating the Sradh where allegedly the informant also participated. The trial court has doubted the factum of participation of the informant in the Shradh ceremony after the lodging of the F.I.R. The same not withstanding, the defence is supposed to show a preponderance of probability to discharge the burden of prove that the death was natural. The trial court has doubted the factum of participation of the informant in the Shradh ceremony after the lodging of the F.I.R. The same not withstanding, the defence is supposed to show a preponderance of probability to discharge the burden of prove that the death was natural. The naturalness or unnaturalness of death is not to be presumed, it is to be decided by cogent evidence and only once the prosecution establishes the homicidal death coupled with death within seven years of marriage as well as demand of dowry, the presumption can be raised. In the instant case, death is admitted but its unnaturalness has not been proved by the prosecution case at all and thus, one of the basic requirements of raising the presumption with regard dowry death is missing. In the facts and circumstances of the case, thus, this Court finds that the defence has been able to bring out a case that the deceased may have died a natural death. 20. It is settled law that defence witnesses are also entitled to equal weight and they cannot be brushed aside merely because they are defence witnesses. 21. So far as the requirement of 304-B and raising of presumption is concerned, in the case of Baijnath & Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in ABC 2016 (II) 273 SC , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “33. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus, predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 34. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 34. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty. 35. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304B as in Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another Vs. State of Punjab – (2011) 11 SCC 517 and echoed in Rajeev Kumar Vs. State of Haryana – (2013) 16 SCC 640 . In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao – (2003) 1 SCC 217 to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.” In the case of Manu Sharma @ Munnu Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar passed in Cr. Appeal(DB) No. 554 of 2017 the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as follows:- “25. In Kans Raj Vs. The State of Bihar passed in Cr. Appeal(DB) No. 554 of 2017 the Hon’ble Patna High Court has held as follows:- “25. In Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately before”. However, it also doesn’t mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough. The relevant para of the Kans Raj Case (Supra) may be referred to which is as follows: “15.……..“Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.” (Emphasis supplied) 29. As such, for raising presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act against the accused, the Prosecution is required to prove the following two conditions:- (i) Dowry Death of a woman in terms of Section 304(B), IPC has been committed. (ii) The Accused has subjected the woman to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. 30. The aforesaid two conditions being foundational facts are required to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts for raising presumptions under section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. The presumption of innocence is human right, subject to the statutory exceptions. The said principle forms the basis of our criminal jurisprudence. Hence, the foundational facts required for raising presumption, must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. Otherwise, the prosecution would only file a charge-sheet against the accused claiming that the case of the prosecution should be accepted as gospel truth, putting entire burden on the accused to prove his innocence. Such proposition of law would be certainly violative of the fundamental right of the Accused, as enshrined in our constitution. Hence, presumption can be raised only when the foundational facts are established by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubts. Reliance is placed on Babu Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows, in the context of the POCSO Act: "27. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. However, subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of the presumption, the same may not lead to any injustice or mistaken conviction. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of the presumption, the same may not lead to any injustice or mistaken conviction. Statutes like Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those Statutes are found to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused. However, such a presumption can also be raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. There may be difficulty in proving a negative fact. 28. However, in cases where the statute does not provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always lies on the prosecution. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as those of statutes as referred to hereinabove, that the burden on proof is on the accused. The statutory provision even for a presumption of guilt of the accused under a particular statute must meet the tests of reasonableness and liberty enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. (Vide: Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 ; Narendra Singh Vs. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , AIR 2004 SC 3249 ; Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70 : AIR 2007 SC 451 ; Noor Aga Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 ; and Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 : AIR 2008 SC 1325 )." (Emphasis supplied) 22. The accused persons have clearly stated in their response in the questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the deceased died due to diarrhea and thereafter, D.W. 1, D.W. 2 and D.W. 3 has proved the original receipt of Referral Hospital, Amarpur as Exhibit-A, purchase of wood at Barari Crematorium dated 19.02.2004 as Exhibit-B and the details of the money given by the people at the time of Shradh which is locally known as “Chauk”. These documents along with the assertion under Section 313 Cr.P.C. clearly go on to show that the deceased may have died a natural death, and even if the burden of proof is shifted to the accused they have reasonably succeeded in discharging the same. 23. These documents along with the assertion under Section 313 Cr.P.C. clearly go on to show that the deceased may have died a natural death, and even if the burden of proof is shifted to the accused they have reasonably succeeded in discharging the same. 23. Another aspect of the case is general and omnibus allegation of nature. 24. Again the expression soon before her death may not be immediately proximate to the death but it must have a reasonable and live nexus with the death. The prosecution has failed to show any live nexus between demand and death and thus, on this score also the case of the prosecution fails. 25. In result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.12.2010 and 07.01.2011 respectively passed by learned Addl. District & Session Judge, F.T.C. 3 rd , Banka in S.T. No. 1302 of 2004, Tr. No. 483 of 2010 arising out of Amarpur P.S. Case No. 16 of 2004, G.R. Case No. 164 of 2004 and the appellants are hereby acquitted from 304B/34 & 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 26. In result, the appeal is allowed. 27. The appellants are hereby discharged from the liabilities of the bail bond.