Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:JHHC:9938-DB ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Civil Review No. 104 of 2017 Reenu Kumari, W/o Lakhindra Das, R/o Qr. No. 85-B, Type-A, South Railway Colony, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S.- Chutia, District- Ranchi ... … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Principal Secretary, Human Resource Development Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi 3. The Director, Primary Education Directorate, Human Resource Development Department, Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi. 4. The District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi ... … Opposite Parties ……….. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ……….. For the Petitioner : Mr. Shashikant Ojha, Adv. For the State : None ……….. Order No. 09/Dated, the 1st April, 2026 Per Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. Heard Mr. Shashikant Ojha, learned counsel for the appellant. None appears on behalf of the State. 2. This application has been preferred by the petitioner for review of the order dated 18.04.2017 passed in L.P.A. No. 589 of 2009. 3. The fact in brief is that an advertisement was published on 29.08.2002 in the daily newspaper ‘Hindustan’ by J.P.S.C., Ranchi for filling up of 9223 posts of Primary Trained Teachers against the vacancies of Nationalized Primary Schools in different district of the State of Jharkhand. The petitioner had submitted her form and Admit Card was also issued to her. The petitioner had appeared in the written examination and in the result published on 13.11.2003 she was declared successful. The petitioner as per the requirement had submitted the necessary certificates on 06.01.2004. However, since the Caste Certificate produced by the petitioner was not issued by the State of Jharkhand the appointment of the petitioner was withheld. The Caste Certificate was subsequently produced which was issued by the State of Jharkhand and the petitioner was appointed and she was posted in a primary school where she gave her joining as Assistant Teacher. In the meantime, some of the candidates had approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 578 of 2004 which was disposed of on 01.05.2006, pursuant to which the petitioner was issued show cause notice and thereafter the services of the petitioner was terminated. Being aggrieved, several persons similarly situated to that of the petitioner had preferred a writ application being W.P.(S) No. 115 of 2007, in which, vide order dated 14.12.2009 the orders of termination were upheld. Challenge was made to the said order in L.P.A. No. 589 of 2009 and the same was dismissed on 18.04.2017. The aggrieved persons had moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Diary No. 25511/2017 but the same was withdrawn on 08.09.2017 with a liberty to file a review application and this is how the present review application has come before us. 4. Mr. Shashikant Ojha, learned counsel for the review-petitioner has submitted that the advertisement did not specify the period during which the candidates were required to submit the Caste Certificates. The petitioner had deposited the Caste Certificate of the State of Bihar initially and later on the Caste Certificate from the State of Jharkhand was deposited and as such there was no impediment for the authorities in continuing with the services of the petitioner. The learned Division Bench has not considered this aspect of the matter and since there is an error apparent on the face of record the review application deserves to be allowed. 5. None appears on behalf of the State. Page 3 of 10 6. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been considered in the order dated 18.04.2017 passed in L.P.A. No.589 of 2009 in the following manner: “12. In the facts of the present case, these appellants (original petitioners) have never produced Scheduled Caste certificates issued by the State of Jharkhand authorities on or before the cutoff date prescribed in the public advertisement. They presented the certificate of the Scheduled Castes issued by the State of Jharkhand authorities after several years. This is also not permissible in the eye of law. Cutoff date cannot be extended by this Court. (i) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another v. M/s Parameswaran Match Works & others, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305, especially in paragraph no.10 as under: “10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes.” (Emphasis Supplied) (ii) It has held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others v. Ramjee Prasad and Others, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368 especially in paragraph no. 8, as under: “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court's attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cutoff date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.” (Emphasis supplied) (iii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary & ors., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 especially in paragraph no.21, as under: “21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31121993, as fixed by notification dated 2161995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M. Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31-12-1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cutoff date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. .............................................................................. .............................................................................” (Emphasis supplied) (iv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan & ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 especially in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17, as under: “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cutoff date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cutoff date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cutoff date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cutoff date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cutoff date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cutoff date. That cannot make the cutoff date, per se, arbitrary unless the cutoff date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cutoff date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cutoff date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cutoff date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cutoff date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cutoff date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The timegap between the advertisement and the cutoff date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cutoff date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cutoff date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cutoff date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cutoff date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cutoff date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cutoff date may well contend that the cutoff date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cutoff date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cutoff date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cutoff date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cutoff date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cutoff date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cutoff date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cutoff date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid judgments even if these appellants (original petitioners) have produced the certificates of their Scheduled Caste from the authorities within the State of Jharkhand, but, they have missed the bus or boat. The time for such submission of documents has gone. After the cutoff date, no document can be presented. Much less, they can be appreciated by the State. Nothing will be looked into by the State now. Hence, no error has been committed by the State of Jharkhand in terminating the services of these appellants. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge.” 7. Admittedly the Caste Certificate issued from the State of Jharkhand of the petitioner was produced at a much later date as the earlier Caste Certificate produced was related to the State of Bihar which was contrary to the directions given in W.P.(S) No. 578 of 2004. The deposit of Caste Certificate beyond the date fixed would not be in consonance with the rules, notifications and regulations fixing such cut of date. The petitioner also seems to have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order dated 18.04.2017 passed in L.P.A. No. 589 of 2009 which however was dismissed as withdrawn. No error apparent on the face of the record has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and consequent thereto the present review application stands dismissed. 8. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands closed. (Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Dated, the 1st day of April, 2026 A. Sanga /- Uploaded on 10 /04/2026