1 CGHC010241102026 2026:CGHC:28340 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 799 of 2026 1 - Ramkaran Sahu S/o Shri Ramadhin Sahu Aged About 37 Years By Caste Teli, R/o Village Jur, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Tejilal Lal Sahu S/o Mohan Aged About 55 Years By Caste Teli, R/o Village Jur, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Surajpur, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Santosh Bharat, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Ghanshyam Kashyap, Dy.GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Order on Board 08/07/2026 The present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 15.05.2026 passed by SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.07.10 11:30:44 +0530 2 the learned Third District Judge, Surajpur in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 04/2026, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No.1 was partly allowed and an order of temporary injunction was granted in his favour, except in respect of the residential house which is in possession of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is defendant No.1 in the civil suit filed by respondent No.1 seeking declaration of title, permanent injunction and recovery of possession in respect of land bearing Khasra No.1270, admeasuring 0.22 hectare, situated at Village Jur, Tahsil Bhaiyathan, District Surajpur. It is contended that the petitioner has been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit property since the year 2000 pursuant to a family settlement arrived at between the parties. Respondent No.1 is the petitioner's nephew and, in terms of the said settlement, the petitioner has remained in possession of the entire suit property. 3. It is further submitted that after the year 2000, the petitioner developed the property by constructing a residential house and has been residing therein ever since. According to the petitioner, although respondent No.1, in collusion with the revenue authorities, succeeded in getting his name mutated in the revenue records, such mutation does not confer title or dislodge the petitioner's settled and actual physical possession over the suit property. It is further submitted that the land was subsequently demarcated at the instance of the petitioner and the demarcation proceedings also recorded his possession over the 3 property for more than two decades. Therefore, respondent No.1 has neither title nor lawful possession over the suit property. 4. He further submits that the learned trial Court, upon due consideration of the pleadings and material available on record, dismissed the application preferred by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC vide order dated 24.01.2026. However, in appeal, the learned appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and, while protecting the petitioner's possession over the residential house, granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the petitioner from interfering with the remaining portion of the suit land during the pendency of the suit. It is contended that the learned appellate Court failed to appreciate the demarcation report and the long-standing possession of the petitioner arising out of the family settlement and, instead, proceeded solely on the basis of mutation entries standing in the name of the plaintiff. The appellate Court, therefore, ignored the settled principle that mutation entries neither create nor extinguish title and are relevant only for fiscal purposes. It is further submitted that the petitioner's settled physical possession has not been duly considered while passing the impugned order and, consequently, the impugned order suffers from material irregularity and jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and may be set aside. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 4 6. From a perusal of the plaint filed by respondent No.1 (Annexure P/1), it transpires that the plaintiff has specifically averred that the Tahsildar, Bhaiyathan, vide order dated 10.06.2022, directed restoration of possession of the subject land in his favour and, in pursuance thereof, he was delivered possession on 20.07.2022. It is further pleaded that, thereafter, the plaintiff cultivated the suit land. According to the plaintiff, by the time possession was restored, defendant No.1 had hastily raised a residential structure over a portion of the land and subsequently threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences, compelling him to lodge a report with the police authorities. The aforesaid averments have been categorically denied by defendant No.1 in his written statement (Annexure P/2). It is the specific stand of defendant No.1 that he has been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for the last 23 years, during which period he has developed the property and raised construction thereon. It is further contended that the subject land has stood mutated in his name since the year 2000, thereby asserting his lawful possession and disputing the claim advanced by the plaintiff. 7. The appellate Court, upon consideration of the material placed before it, partly allowed the appeal and, while protecting the petitioner's possession over the residential house, restrained him from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the remaining portion of the suit land till final adjudication of the civil suit. The scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in matters relating to grant or refusal of temporary injunction is well settled. Supervisory 5 jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, committed patent perversity or ignored settled principles of law. Unless the order impugned suffers from manifest illegality or results in grave miscarriage of justice, re-appreciation of the material on record is impermissible. 8. The jurisdiction to interfere in the matter relating to temporary injuction has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 in para 40 to 45 and 49 which reads as under: “42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonard Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222, (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan, (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand (1972) 1 SCC 898. 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the 6 scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: “38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case (supra), SCC pp. 695-96. 38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought 7 to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in 8 exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere 9 errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice 10 does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 9. Similarly, in the matter of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, it has been held in para 15 and 16 as under: 15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the 11 nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd, (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the 12 face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 10. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, and having considered the impugned order in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matters of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any patent perversity, jurisdictional error or manifest illegality warranting exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge