1 2026:CGHC:13736 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5698 of 2021  Rajshree Damu (Koshley) W/o Shri B.B. Ramu Damu Aged About 46 Years R/o Indrasen Nagar, Near Rajrani Campus, 27 Kholi, Bilaspur, Police Station-Civil Line, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Home/police, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralay, Police Station And Post- Rakhi, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Director General Of Police (D.G.P.) Police Headquarters (Phq), Police Station And Post- Rakhi, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3. Inspector General Of Police (Igp) Office Of Inspector General Of Police, Bilaspur Range, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 4. Superintendent Of Police (S.P.) Office Of Superitntendent Of Police (Sp), Janjgir-Champa, District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Abhishek Pandey, Advocate along with Mr. Rishabhdev Sahu, Advocate For State : Mr. Abhishek Singh, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 23.03 .2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to produce all the relevant records relating to case of SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2026.03.25 18:49:51 +0530 2 the petitioner before this Hon’ble Court for its kind perusal. 10.2 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside/quash the impugned punishment order dated 15.11.2014 (Annexure P/5) passed by respondent No. 3/IGP,Bilaspur (C.G.). 10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/quash the impugned appellate order dated 19.1.2016 (Annexure P/6) passed by respondent No. 2/DGP,PHQ, Raipur (C.G.). 10.4 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/quash the impugned first revisional order dated 5.5.2017 (Annexure P/7) passed by respondent No. 2/DGP,PHQ, Raipur (C.G.). 10.5 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/quash the impugned second revisional order dated 11.09.2018 (Annexure P/9) passed by respondent No. 2/DGP, PHQ, Raipur (CG). 10.6 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/quash the impugned second appellate order dated 4.2.2021 (Annexure P/11) passed by Assistant IGP, PHQ, Raipur on behalf of respondent No. 1. 10.7 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to refund the entire amount to the petitioner which has been deducted from her account pursuant to the impugned punishment order dated 15.11.2014. 10.8 That this Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to direct respondents to give suitable compensation to the petitioner for the mental trauma and agony, harassment and hardships suffered by him as also cost of the litigation.” 2. Facts in brief are that at the relevant time petitioner was posted on the post of Sub-Inspector at Police Chowki - Hasoud, Police Station – Jaijaipur, District 3 Janjgir-Champa. A complaint was received against the petitioner to the effect that though the petitioner was directed to submit final report pursuant to order passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jaijaipur in a criminal case, but she did not comply with the said order. An article of charge was issued to the petitioner on 11.08.2021. The petitioner filed reply, and thereafter, disciplinary authority appointed enquiry officer and presenting officer. During course of enquiry, an application was moved by the petitioner on 13.12.2012 for supply of certain documents. Similar application was moved on 22.04.2013, thereafter, applications were moved on 24.09.2013 and 01.01.2014 for appointment of Defence Assistant to present the case on her behalf, but orders were not passed on those applications. 3. The enquiry officer found the allegation proved, and subsequently, the petitioner as well as one more delinquent employee were inflicted with penalty of deduction of pay scale to the minimum on their post for period of one year. 4. The petitioner preferred departmental appeal before the Director General of Police and vide order dated 19.01.2016, the penalty inflicted against the petitioner was modified and she was inflicted with penalty of stoppage of one increment for period of one year. The petitioner challenged said order by filing a revision petition and it was dismissed vide order dated 05.05.2017. The petitioner has challenged order dated 15.11.2014 (Annexure P/5), order dated 19.01.2016 (Annexure P/6), order dated 05.05.2017 (Annexure P/7), order dated 11.09.2018 (Annexure P/9), order dated 04.02.2021 (Annexure P/11) in the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though the petitioner 4 moved applications before the enquiry officer, but the relevant documents were not provided. He would further contend that the petitioner was not permitted to take assistance of a Government servant to present her case. It is also contended that the enquiry officer failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 14(19) of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred as “Rules, 1966”) as after completion of production of evidence the petitioner was not permitted to file written brief. It is also contended that the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority failed to comply with the Rule 18 of Rules, 1966, which provides common proceedings. He would contend that the enquiry was initiated against two delinquent employees, therefore, the competent authority was under obligation to pass order to initiate a common proceeding. He would pray to allow this petition. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose. He would submit that the petitioner has not challenged the procedural part of the enquiry. He would contend that there is no violation of principle of natural justice and further there is no allegation that the enquiry officer deviated to the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of Rules, 1966. Mr. Singh would submit that the permission was granted by Inspector General of Police to initiate a common proceeding against both the delinquent employees and the submission made in this regard is misconceived. Mr. Abhishek Singh would further submit that the petitioner moved applications to provide documents, but those documents were not in possession of enquiry officer and the petitioner should have moved application either before the revenue authorities to obtain revenue record or before the concerned police station to supply copy of FIR or complaint. 5 7. With regard to appointment of Defence Assistant according to the provisions of Rule 14 (8) of Rules, 1966, Mr. Abhishek Singh would submit that such plea was not raised before the appellate authority or the revisional authority and this issue has been raised first time before this Court. He would contend that the petitioner failed to demonstrate as to what prejudice is caused if Defence Assistant was not provided. Mr. Abhishek Singh would further submit that the contention made by Mr. Pandey with regard to submission of written brief is misconceived. He would submit that the inquiring authority may, after completion of enquiry, permit the presenting officer and the Government servant to file written brief of their respective case. He would submit that according to provisions of Rule 14 (19) of Rules, 1966 the Government servant may submit written brief but in the present case, petitioner failed to avail said opportunity. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 9. Article of charge was issued against the petitioner as she failed to comply with the direction/order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jaijaipur, whereby she was directed to submit a final report. The petitioner filed reply; a departmental enquiry was initiated; prosecution witnesses were examined and during course of enquiry applications were moved by the petitioner to provide certain documents. 10. Perusal of application dated 13.12.2012 would show that the petitioner had sought for copy of complaint filed by the complainant against the petitioner before the Criminal Court and a copy of FIR. The petitioner should have approached the concerned Court to obtain certified copies of those 6 documents as those documents were not in possession of enquiry officer; therefore, those documents were not provided by the enquiry officer. Vide letter dated 22.04.2013, the petitioner sought for a copy of complaint No. 691/2010, details of Crime No. 143/2010 and revenue records. The documents sought for in the application dated 22.04.2013 could have been obtained by the petitioner from the concerned revenue authorities or approaching the concerned police station. Those documents never remained in the possession of the enquiry officer, therefore, those documents were not provided. 11. The petitioner moved two applications dated 24.09.2013 and 01.01.2014 seeking permission to appoint a Defence Assistant. In both the applications, the petitioner wanted to engage one Ved Ram Bhaskar, Retired Superintendent of Police. 12. In the present case, enquiry report has not been placed on record. Mr. Pandey, Advocate has made an attempt to substantiate that Defence Assistant was not appointed as the enquiry officer did not grant permission to engage a Defence Assistant, and therefore, the petitioner failed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, which materially affected her case. 13. The stand with regard to appointed of Defence Assistant has been taken before this Court. The orders passed by the appellate authorities and the revisional authorities would reveal that said ground was not raised. The grounds which were not raised either before the appellate authority or revisional authority cannot be permitted to raise first time before this Court. Further, the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice caused to her; therefore, the contention made by Mr. Pandey cannot be accepted. 7 14. It is also argued that the petitioner was not provided written brief. Bare reading of Rule 14 (19) of Rules, 1966 would make it clear that after completion of an enquiry, the enquiry officer may permit the Government servant and the presenting officer to submit their written briefs. There is no provision to provide written brief either to Government servant or to presenting officer, thus, the contention made by Mr. Pandey appears to be misconceived. 15. With regard to compliance of Rule 18 of Rules 1966, it is stated by Mr. Abhishek Singh that an order was passed by the Inspector General of Police to initiate a common departmental enquiry against two Government servants vide order dated 13.07.2012, thus, this ground is also not available to the petitioner. 16. With regard to the power of this Court to interfere with the decision taken in the departmental inquiry, it is a well-settled principle of law that the scope of interference in a departmental inquiry is very limited. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank Versus M.L. Kalra (D) Thr. Lrs. & Anr., 2023 Live Law(SC) 733 under relevant para 9 held as follows:- “9. Before proceeding any further, we may benefit by adverting to the ratio in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) & Ors. v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(2) SCC 612 where a three-Judges Bench of this Court held that power of judicial review for the Courts in disciplinary action is circumscribed. The Court can only correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and the power exercised is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The following was pertinently observed by the Bench: “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial 8 review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion…” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. Versus Ajit Kumar Singh & Anr., 2023 LiveLaw(SC) 478 in paras 6 & 7 observed and held thus:- “6. The facts of the case leading to the issuance of charge- sheet, initiation of departmental inquiry, the report of the inquiry officer and the punishment inflicted upon respondent no.1 have already been narrated in the preceding paragraphs. It is not in dispute that during the course of inquiry, fair opportunity of hearing was afforded to the respondent no.1 at every stage. This was even found by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition challenging the punishment inflicted upon him. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court shows that matter was dealt with in a manner as if it was the first stage of the case, namely, the inquiry was being conducted and inquiry report was being prepared, which is not the scope in judicial review. The views expressed by this Court on the scope of judicial review in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava ,2021(2) SCC 612, are extracted below: “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or 9 reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25-27 xx xx xx 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained .” (emphasis supplied) Similar view was expressed in the later judgment of this Court in Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar vs. Union of India and Ors.2 7. If the facts of the case are examined in the light of the settled principles of law in scope of judicial review, we find that the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to reappreciate the entire evidence as if conviction in a criminal trial was being re-examined by the next higher court. The stand taken by the respondent no.1 was that he was on leave and there was no question of his tampering with any document. His contention was that merely because he had the duplicate key of the drawer where the documents were kept, he cannot be made responsible for any tampering. However, there was no answer to the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer in the Inquiry Report, namely, that the changed form of quotation of M/s. Laxmi Singh contained original signature of respondent no.1. The fact that this “Form of quotation” was changed is not in dispute. When the changed form of quotation also contained signature of respondent no.1, it clearly established his involvement in the tampering of document. This fact has not even been noticed by the Division Bench of the High Court.” 19. Taking into consideration the above-discussed fact and concurrent findings recorded by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of M.L. Kalra (supra) and Ajit Kumar Singh (supra) no case is made out for 10 interference, accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE $iddhant