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2026 DAILYLAW 25656 (CHH)

KMC CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED, v. MAA BANJARI CONSTRUCTION,

ARBA/46/2019 · 2026-07-07

Shri Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi

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Judgment text

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1 CGHC010329432019 2026:CGHC:28328 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ARBA No. 46 of 2019 KMC Constructions Limited, A Company Incorporated Under The Companies Act, 1956 Having Its Registered Office At Corporate House, Door No. 1 - 80/40/ S P 58- 65, Shipla Homes Layout, Gachibowli, Hyderabad - Through Its Vice President Shri Shashank Shekhar, Gachibowli, Hyderabad - 500032 ( Telangana ) ... Appellant versus Maa Banjari Construction, A Partnership Firm Having Its Office A Kalika Nagar, Kawardha ( C G ) Through Its Partner Shri Dinesh Mishra, S/o Shri Ramkripal Mishra, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Kawardha, District - Kabirdham Chhattisgarh., District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Anoop Majumdar, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Rupesh Shrivastava, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 08.07.2026 1. Heard. 2. This Arbitration Appeal has been preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act 1996’) challenging the order dated 19.6.2019 passed by 2nd Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Raipur in Arbitration Case No.35/2018, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act 1996, seeking to BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2026.07.10 18:14:42 +0530 2 set aside the award dated 18.7.2018 was dismissed on the ground that subject matter of the case was a commercial dispute involving the value of more than three lakhs, therefore, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. 3. Learned Sr. counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the dispute arising out of the award is admittedly a commercial dispute, and the value thereof exceeds Rs.1 crore. Therefore, once the learned 2nd Additional Judge came to the conclusion that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application, the proper course was to return the application filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, for filing the same before the competent Commercial Court at Naya Raipur. However, instead of returning the application, the learned Court below proceeded to dismiss it. Learned Sr. counsel further submits that as a consequence of the impugned order, if the appellant wishes to file application under Section 34 of the Act 1996 before the Commercial Court, the same may be rejected for want of copy of original award as it remains on the record of the Court of 2nd Additional Judge, Raipur. Learned counsel further submits that an issue of limitation may also arise. In such situation, the appellant may be deprived from getting justice, hence, learned Sr. counsel submits that this appeal may be disposed of by granting liberty to the appellant to file appropriate application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC and by directing the 2nd Additional Judge, Raipur to return the application under Section 34 of the Act 1996 along with the award and other documents to file the same before the Commercial Court, Naya Raipur. In this regard he placed reliance upon the decisions of Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani, (2024) 7 SCC 218 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Tejparas Associates & Exports Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2019 SC 4785. 3 4. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that he has raised objection with regard to maintainability of the case under Section 10(3) of the Commercial Court Act, 2015, which has been allowed by the learned Second Additional District Judge vide impugned order. Learned counsel further submits that if the appellant intended to seek return of the application filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, it ought to have moved an appropriate application before the learned Second Additional District Judge, which is now being prayed before this Court. It was further contended that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, contains no provision for return of an application filed under Section 34. He further contended that case law relied upon by the appellant is not favourable to him as both the case law pertains to the case involving territorial jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, whereas the issue in the present case pertains to the pecuniary jurisdiction, hence, prayer made by the appellant may be rejected. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. A bare perusal of the impugned order passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Raipur reveals that it rejected the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act 1996 on the ground that it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application. The relevant extract of the impugned order reads as under: “The aforesaid contract of the parties is regarding construction of road and bridges etc. as such same is fully covered under Section 2(1)(c) (vi) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. So the dispute between the parties is a commercial dispute. As per Section 2(1)(i) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 specified value for a commercial dispute should not be less than three lakh rupees. In the case in hand the value is more than 1 crore, therefore, the much more than the 4 specified value. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that in the present case subject matter is commercial dispute above value of three lakhs and arbitration is other than and international commercial arbitration. Therefore, this Court is of view that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present application and same is within jurisdiction of Commercial Court situated at Naya Raipur vide Notification No. F.No. 5853/1665/XXI-B/C.G./2016, Naya Raipur, dated 15.06.2016. As per order 7 rule 10 of CPC, plaint can be returned for presenting in the proper Court having jurisdiction and not any application or appeal. In the case in hand, the applicant has challenged the award by filing an application, so this Court of view that the present application can not be returned under the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, the application filed by the present respondent under Section 3 read with Section 10 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is hereby allowed and the application filed by the present applicant under Section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting-aside the award is hereby dismissed.” 7. Thus, the learned 2nd Additional District Judge rejected the application filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, holding that the dispute between the parties was a commercial dispute and the value of the award is more than one crore and, therefore, the jurisdiction to entertain the application vested exclusively in the Commercial Court. 8. Insofar as the prayer made by the appellant before this Court for return of the application filed by it under Section 34 of the Act 1996, before the Additional District Judge is concerned, it is true that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not contain any specific provision enabling return of such an application. However, the issue is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Slum Redevelopment 5 Corpn. (supra) has considered the issue with regard to remand of the case. Relevant para 28 & 29 of the afore-cited judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “28. The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the learned arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The legislature's intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC. That is why the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). We are not even suggesting that because the provisions of the CPC are not applicable, the appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is powerless to pass an order of remand. The remedy of an appeal will not be effective unless there is a power of remand vesting in the appellate authority. In the Arbitration Act, there is no statutory embargo on the power of the appellate court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand. However, looking at the scheme of the Arbitration Act, the appellate court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. 29. There may be exceptional cases where remand in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act may be warranted. Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration: (a) Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is made without consideration of merits; (b) Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference is made with the award; and (c) Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on record.” 6 9. Similar issue has also been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra) and relevant para 12 is reproduced as under:- 12. The learned counsel for the respondent would however, refer to the very same decision and contend that even if Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable, the exclusion of time can only be of the proceedings which is bonafide initiated in a Court without jurisdiction. It is contended that in the instant case the entire cause of action had occurred at Jodhpur and despite the same the appellant had deliberately initiated the proceedings at Jaipur which cannot be considered as a bonafide mistake. Though such contention is put forth, what cannot be lost sight in the instant facts is that the learned Judge of the Additional District Court, Jaipur while considering the maintainability of the proceedings before that Court, through the order dated 12.03.2008 has taken note of the very rival contentions with regard to the cause of action as contended and also the Court before which the proceedings was required to be initiated. Though at this point of time the position of law has been enunciated through several decisions, and there is clarity, at that juncture the consideration with regard to the definition of Court as contained in the Act was required to be interpreted and on taking note of various decision of the Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusion that keeping in view the fact situation the petition is to be returned for presentation in the appropriate Court. The very nature of consideration made by the Court at Jaipur would indicate that the matter required a detail consideration before exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the Civil Procedure Code and the Court during the said proceedings has not arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings had been initiated malafide before that Court. However, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstance of the present case the Court had ordered return of the petition for appropriate presentation and the date had been fixed. The correctness of the said order had not been assailed by the respondent herein seeking absolute rejection of the petition by 7 raising grounds on the nature of findings rendered therein since that Court had not held the petition to be malafide. 10. Although the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not contain any specific provision for the return of an application filed under Section 34, the learned Additional District Judge, Raipur, dismissed the appellant's application on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the same, which is found to be a valid ground. However, merely because the Court lacked jurisdiction, the appellant cannot be deprived of an opportunity to raise his grievance before the competent Court to hear the case, i.e. Commercial Court. Denial of such opportunity would leave the appellant remedy less. .11. Moreover, in view of the impugned order passed by the learned 2nd Additional Judge, Raipur, if the appellant is required to file a fresh application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, before the Commercial Court, the question of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996, may also arise. Therefore, having considered the observation made by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the aforesited cases, this Court is of the considered view that ends of justice would be served if the prayer made by the appellant is allowed. 12. Consequently, impugned order dated 19.6.2019 passed by 2nd Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Raipur in Arbitration Case No.35/2018 is set aside and present appeal is disposed of granting liberty to the appellant to file application under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC before the learned 2nd Additional District Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Raipur, seeking return of the application filed under Section 34 of the Act 1996 along with copy of award filed by it and other documents, if any, to present it before the Commercial Court, Raipur, within a period specified by the 2nd Additional Judge, Raipur. It is further directed that 8 in the event of filing of such application by the appellant within 15 days from the date of this order, the learned 2nd Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Raipur, shall restore the Arbitration Case No.35/2018 to its original file and consider and pass order on the said application in accordance with law, expeditiously. 13. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. No order as to costs. 14. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Bini